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ABSTRACT
A scrutiny of the theoretical literature on share 
tenancy reveals that there are two broad approaches to the 
study of the causes of tenancy, its efficiency implications 
and its dynamics: i.e. the neoclassical and the Marxist. 
Neoclassicals consider share tenancy as essentially a 
contractual arrangement, a rational response to 
imperfections in rural markets with the aim of improving 
allocative efficiency in a static setup. The imperfections 
may arise due to the inherent characteristics of rural 
markets such as risk, uncertainty, indivisibility, 
information asymmetry and moral hazard problems. By 
contrast, Marxists view share tenancy as essentially a 
production or class relation and a method of surplus 
appropriation, and a cause of agrarian stagnation in a 
dynamic context. The applicability of these two approaches 
to share tenancy is examined with primary data collected 
from three villages in Orissa in Eastern India. It is 
concluded that the Marxist approach is more powerful in 
studying share tenancy, in its addressing the problem in 
the context of a differentiated class society. Our study 
lends support to certain aspects of the Marxist approach, 
while some others are rejected.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
In less developed agrarian economies agriculture plays 
a key role in accelerating the tempo of development by 
providing employment, generating income and creating 
demand, supplying raw materials and wage goods to the 
industrial sector and promoting exports. In India 
agriculture is the mainstay of livelihood1 for about 
seventy percent of the working force. Due to the slow pace 
of industrialisation, agriculture continues to be over 
crowded without any significant transfer of unemployed 
surplus labour from the rural sector to the industrial 
sector. Agriculture is confronted with the peculiar feature 
of its primary factor of production, i.e. land, being fixed 
in amount. On the other hand, the population growth rate is 
high2 worsening the adverse land-man ratio further. 
Moreover, land is concentrated in few hands of large 
farmers and medium farmers.2 As a result, a significant 
proportion of village households belong to the category of
1 According to 1971 Census the proportion of work force in 
agriculture was 72 per cent (Laxminarayan and Tyagi, 1982: 7) .
2 According to Census of India 1991, Series 1, Paper 1, the 
annual exponential growth rate of population in 1981-91 is 2.11 
per cent and shows a marginal decline from that of 2.22 per cent 
in 1971-81.
3 According to the Agricultural Census, 1971, the marginal 
holdings (from 0.002 to 1.00 ha) constituting 51 per cent of 
total holdings operate only 9 per cent of land, whereas the top 
group (10.13 ha and above) consisting of 4 per cent of holdings 
operate 31 per cent of land (Laxminarayan and Tyagi, 1982: 46) .
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poor peasants and landless labourers. Under these 
circumstances tenancy or leasing in of land might be seen 
to play an important role by providing livelihood to the 
land poor section of the peasantry.
The history of peasant movements all over India 
confirm the fact that tenants are usually exploited by the 
landlord class because of their precarious existence at the 
margin of subsistence. Also, tenancy is considered to be 
allocatively inefficient leading to sub-optimal resource 
use and a feature of backward agriculture4 which acts as 
a barrier to the development of capitalist productive 
forces. Thus, quite apart from problems of 'equity' and 
'exploitation' involved in share tenancy, there is also a 
problem of inefficient allocation (Sen,1966: 446). That is 
partly why in the pre and post independence periods and 
more specifically in the early fifties a spate of tenancy 
reforms5 were undertaken and continue to be amended and 
extended in scope. But the implementation of these measures 
has been poor. Tenancy as prohibited by law is under­
estimated in all official records. There is a significant 
proportion of concealed tenancy6 and tenancy undoubtedly
4 It is not tenancy per se, that is inefficient. As tenancy 
was clearly compatible with agrarian transition to capitalism by 
imbibing particular forms of capitalist tenancy, for example in 
18th and 19th century England and in Japan in late 19th century.
5 In India the enunciation of land reform programme and its 
implementation reflect clear class bias (Griffin, 1974). There 
was a radical land reform ideology without a radical land reform 
programme (Joshi, 1974).
6 As per Sawant' s (1991, p.20, Table 3) estimate, at the all 
India level the percentage of non-reported tenancy to total 
tenancy among rural households was 37.17 % in 1981.
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continues to play a major role in the rural arena. 
Therefore, a study of tenancy will help in exploring the 
causes, consequences and persistence of tenancy.
According to the mode of rent payment, tenancy can 
mainly be divided into three types viz. share tenancy, 
fixed kind and fixed cash tenancy.7 In the case of share 
tenancy the cultivator pays the landlord a fixed proportion 
of gross output whereas in fixed tenancy the direct 
producer pays a fixed quantity of crop or cash as the case 
may be. Among the three types of tenancy, share tenancy is 
more prevalent8 and it manifests itself in complex forms, 
and that is why it is of more academic interest. More than 
seventy years ago Alfred Marshall wrote: "There is much to 
be gained from a study of the many various plans on which 
the share contract is based {1961, p.643, Footnote 2)." 
This same statement can be reiterated today.
Share tenancy is a type of land tenancy or land lease, 
and more specifically it can be defined as a contractual 
arrangement between a landowner and a tenant for a 
specified period of time, in which the tenant leases in
7 There is a fourth type of rent payment in terms of labour 
which was prevalent in the manorial economy of Western Europe 
until the end of 14th century in the form of serf's unpaid labour 
on manor's land and also as Corvee labour in Russia. In the 
present era, in backward agriculture, it is also observed that 
in tenancy contracts, the landlords usually stipulate some labour 
services to be rendered by the tenant for the landlord in 
addition to the customary rent payment. And in most cases the 
tenants are unpaid or underpaid for these labour services to the 
landlord.
8 According to NSS Report No.331, 37th Round, in 1982 in 
India the percentage of leased-in operated area for share product 
was 42%, whereas for fixed produce and for fixed money it was 6% 
and 11% respectively (Parthasarathy, 1991: A35).
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land from the landowner with an agreement to pay rent for 
the use of land in terms of a contracted proportion of the 
physical output produced during the period. Historically, 
it is an age-old institution and a system of production 
organisation; and it has been extremely widespread 
geographically (Byres, 1983:32). It has shown dogged 
persistence in its reluctance to disappear because of its 
extreme adaptability and flexibility. It is observed in 
quite diversified circumstances like thickly populated and 
land scarce regions like South Asia and South East Asia and 
also in relatively labour scarce and land abundant Sub- 
Saharan Africa and Latin American countries. It is 
prevalent both in backward as well as advanced agriculture 
(Robertson, 1987: 2). Also, share tenancy manifests itself 
in varied forms to cater to the necessity of circumstances 
depending on differing socio-economic, cultural, 
demographic and ecological conditions. In its most 
complicated form, it is an interaction with multiple levels 
of contractual obligations between households involving 
land, labour, credit transactions, consumption loans, input 
sharing and output marketing and so on.
1.2 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY
The geographically pervasive and historically 
tenacious institution of sharecropping has drawn the 
attention of social scientists belonging to varied 
disciplines like history, social anthropology, sociology 
and economics and has been a source of heated controversy.
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As a result, there is a sizeable volume of literature on 
share tenancy which can broadly be divided into three 
schools of thought viz. classical, neoclassical and 
Marxist. In the classical and Marxist approach the dynamics 
of the share contract have been emphasized whereas in the 
neoclassical approach the efficiency implications of share 
tenancy have been analysed in a static allocative framework 
by constructing mainly theoretical models based on 
differing assumptions and under different market 
structures.9
It is useful to begin with Adam Smith who is 
considered to be the chief architect of the classical 
paradigm on share tenancy,10 According to Smith share 
tenancy provides some incentive to work as the tenant knows 
that a proportion of the proceeds due to his increased 
effort will accrue to him. And therefore, share tenancy is 
deemed progressive in comparison to the system of serfdom 
which it replaced in the post-feudal estates of Western 
Europe. Smith in his Wealth of Nations argued that European 
metayers {share tenants) succeeded landed slaves (serfs) as 
the primary tenants in Europe: “Such tenants, being free
men, are capable of acquiring property, and having a 
certain proportion of the produce of land, they have a 
plain interest that the whole produce should be as great as
9 See Quibria and Rashid (1984), Koo (1973) and.Otsuka and 
Hayami (1988) for different models of tenancy constructed under 
different market structures.
10 Adam Smith's treatment of sharecropping was brief but 
quite influential. In the Wealth of Nations (1969: 489-91), Adam 
Smith devoted only three paragraphs to discussing Metayers.
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possible  A slave, on the contrary, who can acquire
nothing but his maintenance, consults his own ease (1969: 
4 9 0 ) But the ultimate disadvantage of share tenancy lay 
in its lack of stimulus towards investment on the part of 
cultivators, since a proportion of the returns accrue to 
the landowner who invests nothing. Thus Smith viewed 
metayage as inefficient but pointed out that the source of 
inefficiency differs from that of slavery or labour rents. 
The slave shirks his labour supply, while the share tenant 
has an incentive to work hard but not to invest his own 
stock.
Smith points out that: "To this species of tenancy
succeeded,...... farmers properly so called, who cultivated
the land with their own stock, paying a rent certain to the 
landlord (1969: 491)." And under long term leases of fixed 
tenancy, the tenants are motivated to invest in further 
improvement of the farm as there is the possibility of 
recovering it. Thus to the classical economists share 
tenancy was of considerable interest due to its location 
in the evolution of land tenure systems. The classical 
position is that the appearance and adoption of various 
land tenure systems is an historical-evolutionary process 
that has been conditioned by the development of monetized 
market capitalism and affected by efficiency improving 
changes in the organisation of agricultural production 
(Jaynes, 1984: 44). This viewpoint has been expounded more 
or less explicitly by a number of economists, including
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A.Turgot, Richard Jones, and J.S.Mill.11
The first formal statement concerning the allocative 
implication of sharecropping is presented by Marshall12 
which is known as the traditional neoclassical view. 
According to Marshall the tenant will not invest resources 
beyond the level where the marginal cost of output is equal 
to half of the value of the marginal product. Similarly the 
landlord will not invest unless the marginal product of 
such investment is equal to a minimum of twice the marginal 
cost (Johnson, 1950:259). Thus if the landowner and the 
tenant view their interests independently of each other, 
production will be sub-optimal as the marginal conditions 
of efficiency are not satisfied. Marshall like Smith, 
Jones, and Mill attempted to rank various land tenure 
arrangements according to economic efficiency. But whereas 
Smith and Jones viewed a share lease, though wasteful, as 
transitional, Mill and Marshall laid the blame on 'custom7 . 
According to Mill and Marshall the metayage system in 
Europe was regulated by custom and not by competition and 
was a repository of inefficiency.
In contrast to this line of thinking Marxists
11 Of course Mill was more sympathetic to sharecropping than 
Adam Smith. Mill claimed "that the unmeasured vituperation 
lavished upon the system by English writers, is grounded on an 
extremely narrow view of the subject (Quoted from Cheung, 
1969:39)." Mill, however, argued that insecurity of tenure was 
the major defect of Metayage in France. Under security of tenure, 
as was prevalent in Italy, share tenancy was perfectly compatible 
with agricultural improvement (Johnson, 1950: 262).
12 Marshall's treatment of sharecropping or Metayage is 
relatively brief covering only three pages in his Principles of 
Economics (1961:643-45). Yet it was deeply influential.
29
consider share tenancy as an intermediate method of surplus 
appropriation which is conditioned by the prevailing power 
relations and the nature of production process. Marx 
devotes only one paragraph on Metayage in his Capital
{Vol.3, 1974: 803) and views share tenancy as a transitory
form of rent from pre-capitalist ground rent to capitalist 
rent. Thus, share tenancy is considered to be transitory in 
nature and it will tend to disappear with capitalist 
accumulation. Marxists argue that it is not the business of 
the landowner to introduce efficiency improving changes but 
his primary objective is to extract surplus to the point 
just consistent with the reproduction of the peasant 
households. This concept of reproduction in the Marxist
sense provides an essential causal link between past and 
present and is the social constraint on the objective 
function of surplus appropriation by the dominant class. 
Thus both classicals and Marxists consider share tenancy as 
the hall-mark of pre-capitalist and backward agriculture 
and it was presumed that with the development of commerce 
and penetration of market forces and with the spread of 
cash economy share tenancy would disappear being 
inconsistent with the changed scenario. But certain 
empirical evidence proved contrary.13 Byres in his
13 Recently the reemergence of land-leasing (informal) in 
Kuttand district of Kerala has drawn the attention of’economists 
(Eswaran, 1990; Kumar, 1991) . In Kerala, after the implementation 
of land reforms in 1970s, land leasing was virtually extinct. But 
due to increasing cost of cultivation, declining profitability 
of paddy, land management problem, unemployment and land hunger 
of the landless agricultural labourers tenancy is reappearing in 
a concealed form.
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'Historical Perspectives on Sharecropping7 has succinctly
summed this up:
Sharecropping has existed since remarkably early 
times; has been extremely widespread geographically; 
has shown an often astonishing historical continuity 
and tenacity; has, in some pre-capitalist/pre- 
socialist societies, such as China and Turkey, 
displayed a capacity to disappear and re-appear. It 
continues to exist pervasively in the so-called Third 
World.
(Byres, 1983: 32)
Thus the persistence of share tenancy continues to be a 
puzzle to economists and in their attempts to solve the 
puzzle there has been an explosion of literature on share 
tenancy in the last three decades. A scrutiny of the recent 
literature reveals that most of the theoretical and 
empirical work have been set in a static allocative 
framework with the aim (i) to explore the causes of share 
tenancy i.e. why does share tenancy exist?, (ii) to 
examine the efficiency implications of share tenancy as an 
institution in comparison to fixed tenancy and owner 
cultivation, (iii) to examine share tenancy as a feature of 
pre-capitalist or capitalist agriculture; in other words to 
associate sharecropping with a particular mode of 
production because of its tremendous versatility. The views 
of economists on these issues differ remarkably due in part 
to differing theoretical orientations of economists but 
also to the divergent conditions under which share tenancy 
is observed.
The dynamic implications of tenancy have been very 
sparingly dealt with or have been relegated to the 
background. It is surprising how the problem of share
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tenancy that attracted the attention of classical 
economists from Adam Smith to Mill as an institution in 
evolution i.e. an improvement upon the serf economy, was 
lost sight of and only the Marshallian geometrical display 
of allocational inefficiency (depicted in a foot-note, 
19 61, p.644) of sharecropping was highlighted and provided 
the foundation for further research work. Curiously, 
Marshall himself was abundantly aware of sharecropping's 
diverging historical past in different contexts.
Few studies have been undertaken to explore the 
dynamics of tenancy contracts. Studies by Pearce (1983) and 
Gupta (1980) are attempts to apply Marxist ideas to 
contemporary reality in limited directions. These studies 
are at a theoretical level trying to universalise Marx's 
notion of labour process and formal subsumption of labour. 
What is required is concrete case studies intensively 
undertaken to unfold the emerging production relations and 
concomitant system of production organisation due to 
changes in productive forces. Srivastava's (1989a) fairly 
intensive case study of three villages in Uttar Pradesh is 
revealing in this regard. But his study of tenancy 
relations is more or less an intra village study without 
taking into account the macro variables and the historical 
past which affect the tenancy relation to a significant 
extent. Moreover, while he points out the transition in 
tenancy contracts, he does not explain adequately why they 
change, and the reasons for leasing in and leasing out have 
not been explored. A holistic approach is necessary to
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study the factors that impinge upon a peasant urging him to 
enter into a specific type of production relation. The 
factors that affect an individual's decision can be 
represented as a spiral like structure where the family 
comes at the core, then comes the village, the state, the 
nation and the rest of the world consecutively. All these 
levels as well as the past historical developments, affect 
the peasants' behaviour in their present state.
There have been few studies of the dynamics of the 
tenancy relationship in the Chayanovian demographic family 
cycle framework where tenancy is considered as a rung in 
the ladder which a young family has to climb starting from 
doing unpaid labour on home farm at the bottom of the 
ladder at the early stage to owner-operate at the top when 
the family gains farming experience.14 Robertson's (1987) 
study of the dynamics of productive relationship in Africa 
is a pioneering work embracing a broader framework which he 
terms the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of 
contracts. Ontogenetic development takes place in response 
to the gradual growth and decline of the family. 
Phylogenetic change is necessarily slow, responding to 
major changes in structure of the economy, for example 
technical development, the expansion of markets, changes in
14 This idea is formulated by historians from their 
observations in American South. According to Spillman (1919: 
170) : 1 The first rung on the ladder is represented by the period 
during which the embryo farmer is learning the rudiments of his 
trade. In the majority of cases this period is spent as an unpaid 
labourer on the home farm. The hired hand stands on the second 
rung, the tenant on the third, while the farm owner has attained 
the forth or the final rung of the ladder." Quoted from Hallagan 
(1978: 335, Footnote No.3)
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land-labour ratios, or world recession (Robertson, 1987: 
18). He sees no justification in regarding tenancy either
as a casualty of evolution or as an obstacle to progress.
Likewise Lehman (1985: 34) in his study of tenancy
relationship in the Highlands of Ecuador (1985: 34)
applying Robertson's methodology holds the view that in 
contrast to much contemporary thinking, tenancy instead of 
imprisoning the tenants in their poverty, seems to offer at 
least an escape route from it. Winters (1978), a strong 
supporter of the agricultural ladder hypothesis on the 
basis of his study of agricultural tenancy in nineteenth 
century Iowa also concludes that "Tenancy did not undermine 
agricultural development and slow economic growth; in fact, 
by placing land in the hands of those who would put it to 
productive use, it probably enhanced both (p.107)."
But the findings of such studies are based on
specificity of the social settings of their study areas. 
The agricultural ladder hypothesis is based on the
observation that a family ( by a newly married couple) is 
set up by leasing in land from its parents; it then 
prospers and purchases land and starts self-cultivating its 
own land; and when it grows old fission of the family takes 
place and the old parents lease out land to their offspring 
and the process continues. In the case of India the family 
ideology is totally different from what is observed in 
Africa. In India the joint family structure is followed 
where the head of the household shoulders all 
responsibility and the resources of all the family members
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are pooled together for the development of the family. So 
after marriage the son with his wife does not move out to 
have a house of his own and arrange his own source of 
livelihood by leasing in land. Rather, all his liabilities 
are integrated to the parental family. Therefore tenancy 
plays different roles in different social settings.
To understand tenancy, intensive studies must be 
undertaken in different socio-economic, demographic and 
ecological contexts. The neoclassical and Marxist 
approaches attempt to develop a universally applicable 
theory of share tenancy, whereas the exponents of the 
agricultural ladder hypothesis put forward some 
anthropological explanations specific to certain economic 
environments.
Moreover, a close examination of the recent literature 
on share tenancy reveals that almost all of the studies 
have been framed in a narrow framework which can broadly be 
divided into three categories. The first category includes 
the studies by Bhaduri(1983a), Scott(1976) which consider 
share tenancy as an intra village phenomenon and explain it 
in terms of prevailing relations of production which are 
exploitative in Bhaduri's framework, and are based on 
'village subsistence ethic' in Scott's analysis. The second 
category consists of historical studies (Bagchi,1982; 
Djurfeldt and Lindberg,1975) where sharecropping is 
analysed in an historical perspective as a consequence of 
imperialist domination i.e. as an offshoot of colonial 
exploitative policy which deindustrialized the colonial
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economy and created a large unemployed reserve army which 
led to the creation of an absentee landlord class and a 
varied layered tenant class. The third category of studies, 
which are more numerous, explain share tenancy at the 
individual household level in terms of rational behaviour 
either in a competitive, monopolistic, game theoretic or 
principal agent framework15. They try to explore the causes 
of tenancy in a static functionalist framework. In order to 
probe the causes of tenancy, what they actually do is to 
study its functions or roles which may be considered as 
immediate causes whereas the crux of the problem remains 
untouched. Thus three categories of studies approach the 
problem from three levels i.e. the village in the first, 
historical developments in the second, the individual 
household in the third approach. These studies are partial 
in their analysis. What is required is an integrated and 
holistic approach to the question of share tenancy. So what 
is happening in a village can be explained in terms of 
internal conditions and external environment both past and 
present.
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The primary objective of this study is to situate 
share tenancy in the dynamics of institutional change. Is 
share tenancy a transitory phenomenon which will disappear 
with commercialisation of agriculture? Or is it versatile
15 For an excellent survey of models based on rational 
peasant behaviour under different market structures, see Quibria 
and Rashid (1984) .
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enough to persist by adapting itself to the changing socio­
economic conditions? Obviously the dynamics of tenancy 
relationship are inextricably linked with the causes of its 
existence and its efficiency implications. Why does tenancy 
exist and tend to persist? Is it efficient in comparison to 
fixed tenancy and owner cultivation? If it is inefficient, 
why doesn't society get rid of it ?
These are some of the questions to which there are no 
definitive answers as yet from economists. Disagreement 
over these issues seems to be genuine and cannot simply be 
discarded by adhering to a particular line of thinking. The 
diversity of views stems in part from the complicated 
nature of share tenancy, which as has been suggested 
differs remarkably in different socio-economic settings.
This study is primarily undertaken to study the 
dynamics of tenancy relationship with the aim of commenting 
upon the appropriateness of the two approaches i.e. the 
neoclassical and the Marxist to, understand the rationale 
and flexibility of the tenancy relationship. More 
particularly the objectives of the study are
(i) to explore the roles of share tenancy contracts
(ii) to examine the efficiency implications of
share tenancy
(iii) to study the dynamics of share tenancy 
contracts
(iv) to examine whether tenancy as observed 
resembles semi-feudalistic or capitalist 
relations of production
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(v) to comment on whether the neoclassical or the 
Marxist approach to share tenancy explains 
better the causes of its existence, its 
efficiency implications and its dynamics.
1.4 METHODOLOGY
In order to study the efficiency and the dynamics of 
share tenancy contracts or more precisely how the terms and 
conditions of tenancy contracts change with advancement in 
agriculture, we conducted a census survey of three villages 
in the state of Orissa in Eastern India, an area which is 
known for its poverty and backwardness.
The three villages selected as our study area belong 
to three categories based on a simple notion of the extent 
of development. The most advanced village is the village 
Charapara situated in Cuttack district which has perennial 
canal irrigation and in which the use of H.Y.V. seeds, 
chemical fertiliser and pesticides is prevalent. The 
moderately advanced village is Harinababi which is adjacent 
to Charapara and canal irrigated, but in which the use of 
yield stimulating inputs is less than in Charapara. The 
least advanced village or the backward village is the non­
irrigated village Sandhagaon, situated in the district of 
Dhenkanal. Moreover, historically the irrigated villages 
were located in Mughalbandi16 areas in Pre-British period
16 The three districts of Orissa (Cuttack, Puri and 
Balasore) which were under direct administration of Mughal 
emperors.
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and were under zamindari17 settlement during the British 
rule. On the other hand, the non-irrigated village 
Sandhagaon was a Garhjat18 in Pre-British period and a 
Tributary Mahal19 or a feudatory state under British rule.
In this study our aim is to highlight the intervillage 
and intravillage interclass differences with respect to the 
modality of tenancy transactions. In this context the 
following will be examined carefully: production relations
among the different strata of the peasantry, the changing 
class relations, the role of the state and different 
government policy measures, historical developments and 
the inter-relation between agriculture and industry. This 
may be termed an holistic political economy approach.
Our study involves a time dimension inasmuch as we 
explore the dynamics of tenancy contracts with the 
advancement in agriculture. We attempt to study it with 
cross-sectional data across regions. We study different 
villages at differing stages of agricultural development at 
a point of time rather than studying a particular village 
at distinct phases of development over time. To study the 
dynamics of intricate mechanism of tenancy contracts which 
often are interlocked with credit, labour and produce 
markets, one requires exhaustive detailed data encompassing
17 In the zamindari settlement, the zamindars or the 
landlords were the proprietors of land responsible to the 
Government for collection of land revenue from tenants.
18 Garhj ats were the lands belonging to Western Orissa 
consisting of mountain fortresses.
19 Tributary Mahals were ruled by semi-independent Rajas 
(kings) and British civil laws were not applicable there.
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all socio-cultural and economic aspects of the village 
economy for which no reliable secondary data are available. 
Moreover, to collect direct information from households 
over their past for which respondents are required to 
recall their past from memory is likely to be extremely 
difficult and will generate faulty data. But to a limited 
extent the recall method can intelligibly be used to draw 
overall inferences. While comparing the modality of tenancy 
arrangements as between advanced and backward agriculture 
we have also attempted to shed some light on the changes 
which have come about in individual villages.
Moreover, we deliberately avoided undertaking a large 
scale survey of tenancy relation by purposively selecting 
tenant households over a wider area. This is notoriously 
difficult to do. Rather we chose to focus attention on the 
dynamics of tenancy contracts in particular study villages 
as the nature of these contracts vary villagewise and the 
complexity of tenancy and its location specific features 
cannot be captured by large scale surveys. Bardhan and 
Rudra's (1980a) study of tenancy is a survey of 334 
villages in four states in Eastern India and because of its 
large scale nature the findings are problematic. As tenancy 
contracts after all involve decisions at the micro level 
which take place in a specific socio-economic context 
within a village boundary, the studies by Bardhan (1976) 
designed to explore the economic factors that explain the 
variations in tenancy at the state level are also of 
dubious usefulness. Thus we may use an analogy: in order to
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study the characteristics of fish, it is not necessary to 
catch the fish in the pond by spreading the net over 
different sections and bring them outside and classify, 
compare, analyse and interpret the results. This only 
touches the fringe of the problem, as what you will be able 
to identify are only the physical features in terms of 
size, shape and colour etc. But what an investigator is 
really interested is in the life process of the fish in its 
natural habitat. In order to do that one has to dive deep 
into the water and observe the play and the prey-predatory 
relationship under water. Therefore, participative 
observation in a natural setting is much more revealing in 
the study of complex tenancy relationship than the large 
scale surveys undertaken to draw some valid statistical 
generalisations.
As tenancy is very often interlinked with other 
markets like credit, labour and produce; to understand 
tenancy one must try to understand the intricate rural 
market mechanisms and the complicated multiplex exchange 
relationships that exist.20 For this sort of intensive 
study one requires detailed information which can broadly 
be divided into four categories:
(i) Village specific information: Ecological and 
infrastructural
20 Some studies for example, Singh's (1989) study in Punjab, 
in Gujarat by Vyas (1970), in Orissa by Bharadwaj and Das (1975) 
have been undertaken to explore the rationale of share tenancy 
and its dynamics. But these studies attempt to analyse tenancy 
as an isolated phenomenon without paying attention to its 
interlinkage with other markets like credit, labour and output.
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(ii) Household information which includes 
landholding pattern, demographic 
characteristics of households in terms of 
caste, family size, level of education and 
employment status
(iii) Characteristics of the farm economy i.e. 
cropping pattern, cropping intensity, crop 
yield, cost of cultivation, farm income, 
input use and labour use
(iv) Economic status of households which comprises 
sources of household income, consumption and 
investment expenditure, extent of indebtedness, 
sources of finance, purpose of borrowing and 
purchase and sale of asset and sale of crops
Again, detailed information has to be collected from 
specific type of respondents like tenants, attached 
labourers, casual labourers and farm servants to extract 
information regarding their terms and conditions of 
contract. For this purpose a village questionnaire and 
specific questionnaires for specific types of respondents 
were framed and information was collected by direct 
personal interview.21 All the households in all the three 
villages were included in the study.
Tenancy is legally prohibited in the state of Orissa 
except under certain unusual circumstances. Therefore, the 
study of the existence and persistence of an institution
21 See Appendix 1.1 for a copy of the questionnaire which we 
used (an Oriya version) to collect information from village 
respondents.
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which is forbidden by law is troublesome and beset with 
risk. As the types of information required for our analysis 
were sensitive ones, utmost care was taken in extracting 
information by cross examining and winning over their trust 
that the information would be kept confidential and the 
purpose of the survey was to understand their problems and 
to suggest some policy measures for their upliftment.
1.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Our study is restricted to three villages in Orissa. 
Therefore, the findings cannot be generalised for the state 
as a whole. As the number of tenant households was not 
large enough to allow us to apply parametric tests like t- 
test and anova, we have tried some of the non-parametric 
tests, which are of course less powerful but do not require 
the strict assumptions on sample distributions as the 
parametric tests demand.
The purpose of our study is not to supply conclusive 
evidence with respect to the questions that perplex 
economists. Rather our study is more poised to identify 
certain aspects of tenancy which have hitherto been left 
ignored.
1.6 PRESENTATION OF THE STUDY
To begin with, a brief survey of the theoretical 
literature on share tenancy is given in Chapter II. This 
includes the causes of tenancy in general and share tenancy 
in particular, the efficiency implications of share
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tenancy/ share tenancy as a theory of stagnation, and
dynamics of share tenancy contracts. All these issues are 
discussed by encapsulating the different views under two 
approaches i.e. the neoclassical and the Marxist. Different 
views on compatibility of share tenancy with differing mode 
of production are also discussed.
Chapter III contains a treatment of the salient
features of share tenancy in post-independent Orissa.
In chapter IV a profile of the study villages is given 
and the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of 
the households in relation to ownership, tenancy and 
'degree of tenancy' are analyzed.
Chapter V contains a statement of the characteristics 
of farm economy of study villages in terms of cropping
pattern, seed variety, crop yield, input use, farm income
and so on. These characteristics are studied with respect 
to ownership, tenancy and 'degree of tenancy'.
Chapter VI includes the main findings of the survey
with respect to basic features of share tenancy, for
example, the incidence of sharecropping, who leases in and 
why, who leases out and why, and the terms and conditions 
of share tenancy.
In chapter VII certain hypotheses are carefully
selected from the existing theory on the efficiency of 
share tenancy and those hypotheses are tested with the 
primary data collected from our three study villages. Also, 
changes in tenancy relations as observed in sample villages 
are discussed. An attempt is made to explain its
44
persistence and to examine whether it resembles semi- 
feudalistic or capitalist relations of production.
Chapter VIII deals with the findings of the survey 
with regard to tenancy being interlinked with other 
markets.
Chapter IX is the concluding chapter, incorporating a 
brief summary of the findings, a package of policy 
proposals and the possible directions in which the study 
might be extended.
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CHAPTER -I I
TENANCY AND THEORY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
There is a plethora of theoretical literature on share 
tenancy most of which attempts to explore the causes, 
delineate the consequences and examine the persistence of 
tenancy. Economists' views on these issues differ 
remarkably and the divergent views put forward by them can 
broadly be divided into two strands of thought i.e. 
neoclassical1 and Marxist. The views of neoclassicals and 
Marxists differ significantly: on the very definition of 
share tenancy, on its causes, its efficiency implications, 
and on the more complicated issue of tenancy in transition. 
In this chapter we will discuss different definitions of 
share tenancy, different perceptions of its roles and 
different views on the efficiency implications of share 
tenancy. We will try to examine share tenancy in terms of 
a theory of stagnation. The dynamics of tenancy contracts 
with technological change and tenancy and mode of 
production will be explored.
2.2 DEFINITION OF SHARE TENANCY
The difference in theoretical orientation of 
economists in explaining share tenancy can very easily be 
inferred from the way share tenancy is defined by different
1 We join together the classical and the neoclassical 
viewpoint as their analytical framework is common.
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economists.
Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations defines Metayers2
(share tenants) who, he suggests, succeeded the slave
cultivators of ancient times thus:
The proprietor furnished them with the seed, cattle, 
and instruments of husbandry, the whole stock, in 
short, necessary for cultivating the farm. The produce 
was divided equally between the proprietor and the 
farmer, after setting aside what was judged necessary 
for keeping up the stock, which was restored to the 
proprietor when the farmer either quitted, or was 
turned out of the farm.
(Smith, 1969: 490)
Marshall in his Principles of Economics distinguishes 
the English system of fixed rental and the system of 
Metayage which was prevalent in the great part of Latin 
Europe. Marshall tells us that in the case of Metayage or 
holding land on shares "the land is divided into holdings, 
which the tenant cultivates by the labour of himself and 
his family, and sometimes, though rarely, that of a few 
hired labourers, and for which the landlord supplies 
buildings, cattle, and, sometimes even, farm implements 
(Marshall, 1961: 643)." Thus share tenancy is according to 
Marshall an adjustment mechanism between the labour of the 
tenant and the land and other implements of the landlord.
It is to be noted that in the Smithian and Marshallian 
notions of share tenant, the tenant is a poor and 
impoverished tenant who lacks sufficient means of 
production to undertake cultivation and here the share of
2 The share tenants in France were known as Metayers. Smith 
writes that "they have been so long in disuse in England that at 
present I know no English name for them (1969: 489-90) ."
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the tenant resembles wages paid in kind.
But a more comprehensive definition has been given by 
Cheung, a noted proponent of the neoclassical approach 
belonging to the 'new school', those who embrace the so- 
called private rights doctrine. Cheung defines share 
tenancy thus:
Share tenancy is a land lease under which the rent 
paid by the tenant is a contracted percentage of the 
output yield per period of time. As a rule, the land 
owner provides land and the tenant provides labor; 
other inputs may be provided by either party. Share 
tenancy is thus share contracting, defined here as two 
or more individual parties combining privately owned 
resources for the production of certain mutually 
agreed outputs, the actual outputs to be shared 
according to certain mutually accepted percentages as 
returns to the contracting parties for their 
productive resources forsaken.
(Cheung, 19 69: 3) 
Thus, share tenancy is here viewed as a method of resource 
adjustment between two parties who have unequal resource 
endowments, and thereby makes production feasible. He.re the 
conflict between the interests of the landowner and the 
tenant is assumed away. The dominance of the landowner 
class over the tenants i.e. the economic power relations 
necessary for the enforcement of contracts is ignored.
There is another variant of the neoclassical approach 
where share tenancy is explained as a device to stabilise 
family income which is popularly known as the agricultural 
ladder hypothesis. This approach seems to have developed in 
the United States as a way of explaining share tenancy 
there (Winters, 1978) . A strong adherent of this
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hypothesis, Robertson, following the Chayanovian3 line of
thought argues that share tenancy is an arrangement to
mitigate against the instability of the family as a
productive unit and he defines:
Sharecropping is a means by which the process of 
production can be extended at a season's notice beyond 
the limits of the household, without violating its 
integrity as a unit of property holding and a 
consumption.
(Robertson, 1987: 1, emphasis added)
Thus, the neoclassicists define share tenancy as a rational
endeavour on the part of each of the parties involved to
improve upon their initial welfare conditions. Here the
socio-economic contexts in which the tenancy contracts are
agreed upon are not taken into account. Economic
rationality is isolated from the class dimension of a
differentiated peasantry.
In contrast to this, Marx proceeds as follows:
As a transitory form from the original form of rent to 
capitalist rent, we may consider the metayer system, 
or share-cropping, under which the manager (farmer) 
furnishes labour (his own or another's), and also a 
portion of working capital, and the landlord 
furnishes, aside from land, another portion of working 
capital (e.g., cattle), and the product is divided 
between tenant and landlord in definite proportions 
which vary from country to country. On the one hand, 
the farmer here lacks sufficient capital required for 
complete capitalist management. On the other hand, the 
share here appropriated by the landlord does not bear 
the pure form of rent. It may actually include 
interest on the capital advanced by him and an excess 
rent. It may also absorb practically the entire 
surplus labour of the farmer, or leave him a greater 
or smaller portion of this surplus labour. But, 
essentially, rent no longer appears here as* the normal 
form of surplus value in general. On the one hand, the
3 The theory of peasant economy put forward by Chayanov in 
the 1920s emphasises the influence of family size and structure 
on household economic behaviour.
sharecropper, whether he employs his own or another's 
labour, is to lay claim to a portion of the product 
not in his capacity as labourer, but as possessor of 
part of the instruments of labour, as his own 
capitalist. On the other hand, the landlord claims his 
share not exclusively on the basis of his 
landownership, but also as lender of capital.
(Marx, 1974: 803, emphasis added)
Here Marx considers sharecropping as a form of transitory
rent and a method of surplus appropriation. Thus share 
tenancy is viewed as an intermediate form of rent between 
pre-capitalist ground rent in its pure form and capitalist 
rent. In contrast to the neoclassical definition of tenancy 
as an arrangement to increase static allocative efficiency, 
Marx considers tenancy in a dynamic context. Moreover, the 
terms and conditions of the contract are not determined at 
the individual level and on mutual agreement. Rather 
sharecropping is a class relation between landlord as the 
dominant class and the farmer as the subservient class. And 
sharecropping is not a technical arrangement to increase 
land productivity but a means of appropriating surplus. 
Thus neoclassicals consider tenancy as essentially a 
contractual arrangement, whereas Marxists view it as 
essentially a production or class relation and a method of 
surplus appropriation.
Neoclassical analysis proceeds in terms of individual
rationality whereas Marxists take into account the socio­
economic matrix in which an individual is embedded. What 
neoclassicals explain is choice after a feasible set has 
been determined. But, what is important and what they 
abstract from is how the feasible set is determined and who
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determines it? In other words who sets the rules of the 
game? While making a choice an individual has to see where 
he is and his position in the class hierarchy and what 
options are open to him out of which he has to choose. And 
here the prevailing power relation comes into play which 
restricts the feasible choices of the weaker party in the 
transaction.
Bhaduri, an eminent Marxist theoretician, argues that 
class relations embody market relations and that exchange 
is a surface phenomenon of economic life, reflecting the 
underlying economic and social organization of production. 
His main contention is that in backward agriculture market 
forces are incipient and not adequately developed and that 
this inadequately developed market forms the basis for 
precapitalist and feudalistic exploitation. Thus, in this 
schema the involvement of peasants in market transactions 
is not triggered by the motive of gains from trade, but 
under compulsion of subsistence consumption needs which are 
to be met by entering into loan transactions with the 
dominant party. And this involuntary involvement in the 
market results in a cumulative process of forced commerce 
and unequal exchange by interlinking transactions in other 
markets like tenancy, produce, assets, labour and so on. 
Bhaduri emphasizes that in backward agriculture, surplus 
extraction is in the nature of commercial exploitation and 
lies in the sphere of exchange rather than in production.
Bhaduri explains share tenancy as a form of labour 
process and argues that the main intention of such a labour
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contract is to extract maximum amounts of man-hours of
labour per acre leased out at a minimum of supervision cost
under the threat of survival{1983: 88).
In the same vein Pearce (1983) argues:
Sharecropping is one mechanism through which owners of 
means of production acquire access to others' labour 
(p.53). Sharecropping as a form of labour organisation 
can be viewed as intermediate between forms of 
agrestic servitude and the full commoditisation of 
rural labour itself (p.45).
(Pearce, 1983, Emphasis added)
Thus the neoclassical definition of tenancy is contractual, 
while the Marxist interpretation of tenancy is one of 
surplus appropriation. One notes of the Marxist approach 
that it lacks a macro framework which clearly emphasizes 
the macro variables that create favourable conditions for 
the landowning class, which this class then takes advantage 
of. The contingencies upon which the Marxist superstructure 
is to be built need to be carefully pointed out. More 
accurately, the macro variables which limit the feasible 
choice set of the landowning class or influence their 
enforcement device need to be recognised.
2.3 ROLES OF TENANCY
Why does tenancy take place? What are the functions or 
roles of tenancy for which tenancy is so widespread in 
spite of various government legislation to curb it? From 
the point of view of the tenant, a tenancy transaction may 
at one extreme be a voluntary independent decision by a 
rational individual to enter into a contract with the aim 
of maximising profit. At the other end of the spectrum, it
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may be a compulsive involvement in the production 
relationship under the threat of survival, even though the 
returns from it are hardly commensurate to the effort that 
the tenant puts in. Neoclassicals seek the rationale for 
tenancy at the first level whereas Marxists explain it from 
the second perspective. Thus the neoclassical view is that 
the peasant acts independently in an impersonalised 
atmosphere under a market structure, whereas the Marxists 
emphasize that the farmer interacts in a social setting 
under compulsion, instead of acting atomistically.
2.3.1 Neoclassical Explanation of Existence of Tenancy
The exponents of the neoclassical approach view 
tenancy as a method of resource adjustment under imperfect 
market conditions (Bliss and Stern, 1982; Jodha, 1981; 
Sharma and Dreze, 1990). The imperfections in the markets 
may arise due to the existence of transaction costs caused 
by the inherent characteristics of rural markets such as 
risk, uncertainty, indivisibility, information asymmetry 
and moral hazard problems.
Transaction costs include information, negotiation, 
monitoring, coordination and enforcement of contract costs. 
Kenneth Arrow (1969, 48) has defined transaction costs as 
the 'costs of running the economic system'. Transaction 
costs are the equivalent of friction in physical systems. 
The role of transaction costs in production and contractual 
choice is increasingly recognised by neoclassical 
economists (Alston, Dutta and Nugent, 1984; Higgs, 1972).
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Therefore, the characteristics of rural markets are to 
be studied in order to identify the specific features which 
give rise to transaction costs and thereby necessitate the 
leasing of land and interlinked contracts as an adjustment 
mechanism.
2.3.1.1 The Land Market
In backward agriculture, the market for buying and 
selling of land is quite inactive {Bardhan and Rudra, 1978; 
Jodha, 1981) . Unless forced by extremely adverse 
circumstances, a cultivator hardly sells his land (Bailey, 
1971a). Farmers are reluctant to part with a secured real 
asset for cash as there exists no alternative profitable 
investment avenue for the sale proceeds. The markets for 
stocks and securities are not developed and the financial 
market is not integrated. Due to significant appreciation 
in land value, land continues to be both secured and to be 
a profitable investment. Besides, the ownership of land 
elevates the status of the owner in the village community. 
It is often observed that even emigrants from the village, 
who are settled in urban areas for a long period of time 
hesitate to sell land as they seek their primordial
identity in their native villages. Moreover, existence of 
high rent provides some assured income to land owner. For
all these reasons, land is hardly sold and the market for
land exists in tenancy (Bardhan and Rudra,1978; Jodha,
1981) .
It is often argued that the enterprising well-to-do
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farmers prefer to lease in land to enlarge their 
operational holding instead of purchasing land, as the 
capital equivalent to the purchase value of land gets 
blocked and thereby expanded production becomes difficult.
2.3 .1.2 The Labour Market
As tenancy is primarily a contractual arrangement 
between land and labour, the market for labour is also 
worth examining. The market for labour can be studied from 
the viewpoint of the landless or near landless labourer on 
the one side and the landlord on the other.
In labour surplus and land scarce backward 
agriculture, tenancy turns out to be an occupation and a 
source of livelihood for the land poor households: those 
who do not have any secured alternative job opportunity 
(Singh, 1988b). Due to seasonality in agricultural 
operations it is very difficult for the small holders and 
landless agricultural labourers to get employment 
throughout the year. Therefore, poor peasants and landless 
labourers may prefer to lease in land to depending on 
uncertain wage employment. Thus to insure against the risk 
of not getting employment and to avoid the search cost of 
getting it, landless households rent land.
Sharecropping has become important in a different 
context in, say, Sub Saharan Africa (Robertson, 1987), and 
in, say, nineteenth century Iowa (Winters, 1978) both of 
which have attracted attention. In such contexts, migrant 
labourers searching for a permanent foothold in the rural
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economy prefer to lease in land; or newly married young 
couples lease in land from their parents to earn their 
livelihood, as a means of getting on to the bottom rung in 
the farming ladder. In this context share tenancy is viewed 
as a cooperative endeavour on part of the landowner and 
tenant in co-joining their factors of production which
leads to an efficient outcome.
If we consider from the point of view of the
landowner, at the peak period of agricultural operations, 
it is very difficult for the landowner to get labour when 
the demand for labour is very high. Therefore, the 
landowner may prefer to lease out land. Moreover, even if 
labour is available, it is very difficult to supervise
labour as the outcome of labour input depends on the time 
that the labourer expends and the effort that he puts in 
(Akerlof, 197 6). Whereas the time element is observable,
effort cannot be observed. Thus, there is asymmetry in
information about the intensity of effort between the 
landowner and the labourer. It is very difficult on the 
part of the landowner to know whether the low yield is due 
to inadequate effort or due to bad weather. As a result, 
the labourer can shirk to the detriment of the landowner. 
This is the problem of moral hazard encountered in owner 
cultivation with hired labour.
Therefore, tenancy may be construed as a mechanism to 
reduce transaction costs, with the aim of increasing 
allocative efficiency due to information asymmetry and 
moral hazard problems (Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982) .
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In this context, neoclassicals emphasize imperfect 
information, risk and uncertainty factors in agricultural 
operations which give rise to tenancy, whereas classical 
writers stressed the incentive aspects of share tenancy. 
Smith viewed sharecropping as progressive, since relative 
to the serfdom that it replaced, it provided more incentive 
for greater or more careful application of labour, since a 
portion of the incremental proceeds due to increased effort 
accrued to labour. Thus Smith saw the emergence of share 
contracts on the post-feudal estates of Western Europe as 
a consequence of the desire to increase labour 
productivity. Likewise J.S.Mill argued that the tenant "... 
has a much stronger motive than the day labourer, who has 
no other interest in the result than not to be dismissed."4 
Thus it is to be noted that the classical economists 
instead of condemning share-tenancy for under supply of 
labour as implied in the Marshallian schema, recognised the 
positive labour supply effects of share tenancy. Among the 
neoclassicals Stiglitz (1974) argues that sharecropping is 
adopted because of its incentive effects (when direct 
supervision is costly or ineffective) and because of its 
risk-sharing features.
According to Cheung (1969), a noted neoclassical 
economist, the choice of contractual arrangement is made so 
as to maximise the gain from risk dispersion subject to the 
constraint of transaction costs. Cheung (1969: 67) asserts 
that 7 contracting on a share basis appears to involve
4 Quoted from Singh (1988b: 30).
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higher transaction costs as a whole than a fixed-rent
or wage contract.' Transaction costs include supervision 
and enforcement cost. The principal reasons for the higher 
costs of supervision are that the landowner must assess the 
yield and also monitor the tenant's input to prevent 
shirking. Production risk, on the other hand, is entirely 
borne by landowners in the case of wage contracts and by 
tenants under fixed rents, with sharecropping distributing 
risk to the same extent as product. Thus, Cheung's risk 
sharing argument provides a positive view of share 
contracts. Cheung citing some evidence from Taiwanese 
agriculture argues that sharecropping is associated with 
more risky crops to facilitate risk spreading in a world 
with no dependable insurance markets.
Reid (1974) in his study of the United States post- 
Bellum South distinguishes point and sequential 
uncertainty. He argues that the former, when 'the product 
of land and labour' is randomly and immutably affected 
cannot be reduced but can only be dispersed and that in 
contrast to Cheung, sharecropping is negatively associated 
with crops most subject to such uncertainty. Sequential 
uncertainty, on the other hand, implies the possibility of 
risk reduction. It implies an ability to take advantage of 
unforeseen circumstances. Thus, where contracts are 
flexible, adjustments can be made to ensure the best 
possible outcome for all concerned. Sharecropping, 
possessing such flexibility, is therefore preferred for its 
risk reducing rather than risk dispersing potential.
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Hallagan (1978) also does not agree with the risk- 
spreading argument for the selection of share tenancy as 
certain empirical evidence does not confirm to it. Rao 
(1971) found that in South India, it was rice which was 
sharecropped in assured irrigation areas, while the more 
risky tobacco crop tended to be rented. In tobacco growing 
regions the risk averse small holders preferred to lease 
out land to large operators who are more enterprising; as 
cultivation of tobacco requires complex decision making due 
to uncertainty in production and price. Thus if 
entrepreneurial and management skills are perfectly 
divisible and if market exists for these skills, those 
possessing them can obtain returns from them without 
entering into tenancy contracts. Rao suggested that the 
choice between sharecropping and renting in agriculture is 
more closely tied to the provision of entrepreneurial 
ability5 than to the allocation of risk between landlords 
and tenants. Hallagan goes further and argues that even 
if all individuals are risk neutral, a system of wage, 
share, and rent contracts can represent a response to the 
failure of markets for entrepreneurial inputs to supply the 
landowner with "just the kind of labor he wants all the 
while and have it just as he wants it." Due to the 
information costs in screening of workers of different 
quality, tenancy can be construed as a screening device by
5 Rao (1971: 580) defines entrepreneurial skill thus: "the 
existence of entrepreneurial function is indicated not by the 
existence of uncertainty as such but by the scope of decision­
making in the face of uncertainty."
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which the most efficient and entrepreneurial labourers will 
self-select themselves by entering into fixed rent 
contracts and the moderately efficient ones will prefer 
sharecropping and the least efficient will opt for hiring 
out labour (Hallagan,1978). Thus in the screening model 
differences in the allocation of output under the three 
contracts reflect differences in the provision of 
entrepreneurial ability rather than differences in 
preferences towards bearing risk. But, let us stress, in a 
cohesive, closely knit village economy, the landowner may 
have good knowledge of the entrepreneurial ability of the 
farmers and the role of share tenancy as a screening device 
would then be of far less relevance. This we will discuss 
in the context of village studies in Orissa.
Reid (1974) sees sharecropping as a preferred 
contractual arrangement when the labour force though having 
the productive skills necessary to cultivate, lacks 
managerial expertise, and the landowner can provide 
detailed supervision. As such it provides a step on the 
farming ladder between wage-labour and fixed-rent contracts 
and eventual owner occupation, whereby the sharecropper can 
gain valuable managerial experience plus access to capital 
inputs.
The contexts in which fixed rent contracts may be 
preferred for crops requiring entrepreneurial skills are 
nicely summarised by Newbery (1975b) i.e. where (i) tenants 
have special skills they do not wish to share with land 
owners,(ii) landowners are more risk averse than tenants,
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(iii) landowners face the problem of 'moral hazard' i.e. 
they cannot determine whether shortfalls in output are the 
tenant's fault, (iv) landowners may not be able to measure 
the entrepreneurial skill of a prospective tenant at the 
time of contract negotiation.
But a pertinent question arises. If the fixed rent 
contracts provide more incentives than share tenancy then 
why not move from pure labour contracts directly to fixed 
rents? Why is share tenancy preferred? One important 
explanation for this is that share tenancy acts as a credit 
system for the resource poor tenant.
2,3,1,3 The Credit Market
It is very often observed that formal credit markets 
are not developed in backward agriculture. This, it is 
postulated is because, the information costs necessary to 
establish the creditworthiness of small farms are too large 
for formal financial institutions to become involved. The 
risks of default are too high and farmers are unable to 
provide sufficient collateral to offset such risks. As a 
result, the small farmer enters into tenancy transactions 
with a large-holder who can advance production as well as 
consumption loans at the time of his need. The role of 
tenancy as a credit system has been emphasized by the 
classical writers including Smith and Turgot6. Smith (1969: 
490) writes that "a villein enfranchised,,., having no 
stock of his own, could cultivate only by means of what the
5 For a detailed discussion see Jaynes (1984).
61
landlord advanced to him, and must, therefore, have been
what the French call a metayer." Turgot considered poverty
a cause of metayage and not vice versa (Jaynes, 1984: 49).
Also Marx viewed share tenancy as a credit system and he
explicitly mentions this in his definition of sharecropping
"the landlord furnishes, aside from land, another portion
of working capital". But Marshall more explicitly and
emphatically argues that
This plan (share renting) enables a man who has next 
to no capital of his own to obtain the use of it at a 
lower charge than he could in any other way, and to 
have more freedom and responsibility than he would as 
a hired labourer; and thus the plan has many of the 
advantages of the three modern systems of co­
operation, profit sharing, and payment by piece-work.
(Marshall, 1961: 644)
Thus the tenant receives capital through the landlord at 
lower credit terms than he could elsewhere. This statement 
implies that credit markets are not perfect. Thus this 
interlinkage between rental and credit contracts can be 
construed as a mechanism for internalising the 
externalities generated by moral hazard considerations when 
production uncertainty and information asymmetries between 
agents prevail (Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982; Braverman and 
Srinivasan, 1981).7
Sometimes a tenant may advance loans to the landowner 
and cultivate the land until the landowner repays the loan. 
This is often termed as usufructuary right over land. The 
tenant takes the entire produce of land as interest due
7 See Taslim (1988) and section 2.5.1.1 for a detailed 
discussion on this issue.
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on loan advanced. This type of land pawning or mortgaging 
is usually observed in backward and non-irrigated 
agriculture (Jodha, 1981; Srivastava, 1989a) where returns 
to land are small.
The role of share tenancy in providing consumption 
loans or acting as an insurance against hunger has been 
clearly depicted by Scott (1976: 46) in his moral economy 
approach:
sharecroppers who can count on interest-free food 
loans prior to harvest, who are allowed more than 
their nominal share of the crop in a bad year, who get 
help in case of illness, who enjoy perpetual tenure, 
and who can count on petty favours from the landowner 
have a substantially stronger subsistence insurance 
than one would infer from the usual division of the 
crop.
(Scott, 1976: 46)
But most empirical studies reveal, to the contrary, that 
landlords are not so much moved by charitable impulse 
shaped by the village subsistence ethic. Rather, their 
pious gestures are poised to serve self-interest in a 
concealed manner.
The classical economists mainly emphasised share 
tenancy as an incentive and credit system whereas the 
neoclassicals stress share tenancy as a method of spreading 
and sharing risk to avoid transaction costs in the world of 
imperfect information and uncertainty.
2,3.1.4 The Capital Market
Interlinkage of land and labour may be a response to 
solve the problem of indivisibility or to gain economies of 
scale. Thus, sharecropping may serve the purpose of
63
enabling a fuller utilisation of the non-marketable 
resources (like family labour, female and child labour, 
draft animal labour) possessed by the tenant family. The 
absence of market in which the farmer can sell the services 
of his indivisible factors like his bullocks or his own 
managerial skills in his spare time prompts him to lease in 
land and reap the scale economies arising out of such 
indivisibilities.
In backward agriculture, for a peasant household next 
to land a pair of bullocks is a necessary requirement to 
undertake cultivation.8 As the bullock market and the 
rental market for bullocks are not developed, those who 
have an amount of land that is less than what is required 
for the optimum utilisation of a pair of bullocks lease in 
land. Therefore, some economists view tenancy as a bullock 
adjustment mechanism (Bliss and Stern, 1982; Jodha, 1981). 
Moreover, in comparatively advanced agriculture, for the 
utilisation of pumpsets to irrigate land in a compact block 
and to use a tractor in an extensive field i.e. to reap 
economies of scale due to indivisibility of factors, large 
capitalist farmers lease in land.
Likewise to reap economies of scale or to have the 
landholding in a compact block, the large farmers may lease 
in land and some times lease out to organise cultivation
8 In fact the bullock is a multipurpose good for the 
cultivator. It is the major source of draught power used for 
different operations like ploughing, threshing, irrigation and 
transport. It is a capital asset to the cultivator, determining 
his social status and creditworthiness. It is a source of supply 
of manure to the farm. See Bharadwaj (1974: 32) for a detailed 
account.
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without running into enormous supervision costs.
To sum up, the neoclassicals view tenancy in general
and sharecropping in particular as a method of resource
adjustment, an interlinked transaction between land and
labour and other factors of production to minimise
transaction costs which arise due to the existence of risk,
uncertainty and moral hazard problems in rural market
transactions. Bardhan(1984a: 95) writes "If there were a
complete set of perfect markets, tenancy would have been
theoretically uninteresting or insignificant. Its rationale
lies more in the imperfections and inadequacies of the
various input markets in agriculture." Thus the
neoclassicals study tenancy in the exchange sphere
emphasising the role of transaction costs due to market
imperfections whereas Marxists view it as a production
relation based on surplus appropriation.
I.Singh in a concise way summarises the neoclassical
position on tenancy by noting the conditions under which
share tenancy promotes efficiency:
Tenancy arrangements in general, and sharecropping
contracts in particular, can serve a variety of useful 
purposes in an environment in which markets for land, 
labor, credit, information, and entrepreneurial and 
managerial skills are underdeveloped and imperfect, 
and in which risk is endemic, transaction costs are 
high, and indivisibilities and fragmentation of 
holdings present major problems. Under these 
circumstances, sharecropping, which appears 
economically inefficient in a 'perfect' world, becomes 
a realistic second best solution.
(Singh, 1988b: 37)
There is another variant of neoclassical explanation
which emphasizes the equilibrating role of share tenancy in
stabilising family earnings in a world of uncertainty. Each
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family passes through a cycle of growth, fission and 
decline and as a result its needs and capacities change, 
necessitating adjustment behaviour. Robertson(1987: 14)
argues that
Domestic groups are inherently unstable, and in 
dealing with the pressures which this causes in the 
short and medium term, cooperative arrangements like 
sharecropping play a vital role: they allow households 
to barter surplus resources by establishing 
complementary relationships, which need not violate 
the long-term integrity of the family as a unit of 
reproduction, consumption and property-holding. The 
balance of exchanges can be sustained within the 
household only in the long run (children 'repay' their 
subsistence loan by supporting their parents later, or 
transferring the credit to a rising generation) 
(p.14). Sharecropping implies a greater degree of 
collusion, an active concern for the combination of 
resources throughout the crop season, than is ever 
likely to be the case with other agrarian arrangements 
like fixed rents and wage labour (p.15).
(Robertson, 1987: 14-15, emphasis added)
We note that this sort of explanation of share tenancy in 
terms of a stabilising mechanism in the domestic cycle of 
a family is location specific, usually observed in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, Ecuador and Malaysia. It may be relevant in 
these regions, but does not necessarily fit the South Asian 
context. As family ethic and values are different, then 
such explanation will not hold. A father advancing a loan 
to his offspring which is to be paid back may be unlikely 
in these contexts.
2.3.2 Marxist Explanation of Existence of Tenancy
The analytical framework of Marxists differs 
fundamentally from that of the neoclassicals. The 
neoclassicals consider share tenancy as a response to 
imperfections in markets, whereas Marxists view it as a
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transitory form of rent (Marx, 1974), a labour 
process(Bhaduri, 1983b), a mechanism of labour mobilisation 
and an intermediate method of surplus appropriation 
(Pearce, 1983) or a kind of formal subsumption of labour 
under capital characterised by absorption of absolute 
surplus value (Gupta. 1980) in the context of a dominant 
and dependent class structured society. All the Marxist 
writers explain share tenancy in a dynamic context in the 
evolution of society from feudalism, or a pre-capitalist 
mode of production to capitalism, whereas the neoclassicals 
consider it in a static ahistorical framework. Thus the 
neoclassical explanation of share tenancy is allocative at 
the micro level whereas the Marxist interpretation is an 
exploitative mechanism in a class society in a macro 
context.
Sharecropping involves interaction between households 
which differ in their command over land and other means of 
production. Thus, in the Marxist framework inequality in 
resource endowment is the prime reason for share tenancy to 
take place. Therefore, to explain share tenancy one has to 
probe into the causes of inequality in property ownership 
which is not a once and for all phenomenon in a society. It 
is given for individuals in the society into which they are 
born. It is the outcome of the behaviour of their ancestors 
which they inherit and in their own behaviour they modify 
it and leave it for their descendants. Therefore, what is 
observed today is nothing but an essential link between 
past and future. Past history as well as a coming future
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are important in explaining the relevant phenomena in the 
present world. Thus, sharecropping can be best understood 
in terms of the motion of the society and its dynamics.
2.3,2.1 Share Tenancy as Transitory Form of Rent
Marx considered sharecropping "As a transitory form of 
rent from the original form of rent to capitalist rent and 
rent no longer appears here as the normal form of surplus - 
value in general and the share here appropriated by the 
landlord does not bear the pure form of rent, may actually 
include interest on the capital advanced by him and an 
excess rent." Here by original form of rent Marx refers to 
precapitalist ground rent which can be labour rent, rent in 
kind, or money rent where unpaid surplus labour passes 
directly to the hands of the feudal lord/landlord/state in 
the form of corvee labour/tribute /tax. And in this case of 
ground rent in its pure form, the entire surplus labour is 
absorbed in rent. In contrast to this, in the case of 
sharecropping rent what we see is not the pure form of 
ground rent. It may include the entire surplus value or 
part of it and very important, interest on capital advanced 
by the landowner to the sharecropper. Thus Marx emphasises 
that in share tenancy land, labour and credit markets 
become interlinked.
Sharecropping is viewed as intermediate between pre­
capitalist ground rent and capitalist rent. So what is 
capitalist rent and how does it differ from pre-capitalist 
rent? According to Patnaik (1983: ) : "Pre-capitalist rent
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represents the surplus of output value over production 
costs including customary consumption of the petty 
producer, while capitalist rent represents the surplus of 
output value over the price of production (which includes 
average profit)". In the case of capitalist farming, profit 
instead of rent becomes the normal form of surplus value 
and rent still exists solely as a form, not of surplus- 
value in general, but one of its offshoots, surplus-profit. 
The average rate of profit is determined outside the 
country-side and in the urban trade and manufacturing 
sector. That is why size of the profit does not determine 
rent, but on the contrary it is determined by the rent as 
its limit.
2.3.2.2 Share Tenancy as Labour Mobilisation
However, Marx did not deal with sharecropping in 
greater detail. He gave only brief attention to it in his 
Chapter XLVII 'Genesis of Capitalist Ground-Rent' (1974:
7 82-813). An elaborate Marxist formulation of sharecropping 
is given by Pearce (1983) where he discusses sharecropping 
as a means of labour mobilisation to extract surplus.
According to Pearce the choice of contract depends on 
i) the level of class dominance and ii) the nature of the 
labour process. The labour process describes the manner in 
which direct labour is combined with means of production in 
productive activity i.e. it includes the technique of 
production, cropping pattern adopted and organisation of 
labour itself. When labour processes are characterised by
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uncertainty, the extent to which one class can extract 
surplus labour from another increases, because the resource 
poor are not able to take risk or cope with uncertainty. 
Consequently, the bargaining power of the rich is enhanced. 
The landowner's motive is to increase the produce from his 
land, and the smallholder or landless labourer will try to 
increase the outcome of his labour. The ultimate result
I
will depend on which party will be able to enforce its 
interest. The landowner faces the cost of supervision if he 
chooses to cultivate the land with hired labour. The class 
relations in conjunction with the labour process determine 
the method of surplus appropriation most consistent with 
dominant interests. Therefore, he opts for leasing out the 
land preferably on share contracts which will provide some 
incentives to the tenants to carry out the requisite tasks 
carefully. Labour rent will be acceptable to the landowner 
if the labour process is such that the supervision costs 
are not excessive. When the economic position of landowners 
and tenants is more equal the choice of contract will 
depend upon the labour process. If the uncertainty attached 
to production is considerable and both parties are risk 
averse, the likely outcome is share contract.
Likewise Bhaduri (1983b: 91) portrays the share
tenancy contract as a labour process which substitutes 
direct supervision. Under the threat of survival, the 
landowner can extract the required work effort from the 
tenant by different enforcement devices like leasing out 
land in small parcels and preferably to large families.
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2.3.2.3 Share Tenancy as Formal SubBumption of Labour
Gupta (1980) explains share tenancy as a transitory 
phenomenon between feudalism and capitalism. Capitalism is 
defined as generalised commodity production when products 
as well as factors of production including labour behave as 
commodities. To qualify further, capital as a commodity 
must dominate labour as a commodity. According to Marx 
capitalism is fully developed when there comes about real 
subsumption of labour under capital. Its foundation is laid 
by formal subsumption of labour under capital. In the case 
of formal subsumption of labour under capital, the 
technology remains the same and surplus value is extracted 
by lengthening the working day i.e. appropriating absolute 
surplus value. Appropriation of absolute surplus value 
always precedes the extraction of relative surplus value 
when real subsumption of capital takes place. Marx stressed 
the necessity for the minimum amount of capital for the 
real subsumption of capital to come about. Therefore, under 
the formal subsumption of labour accumulation takes place 
which revolutionises the technology and ultimately labour 
is really subsumed under capital.
Thus formal subsumption of labour is transitory and 
Gupta argues that sharecropping is nothing but a form of 
formal subsumption of labour under capital. As in the case 
of sharecropping, the tenant lacks the means of production 
and his labour becomes subsumed under the capital i.e. land 
and other means of production provided by the landowner to 
make his reproduction feasible. But empirically it is
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observed that part tenants i.e. who cultivate their own 
land as well as leased-in land are more numerous than 
landless tenants. The small farmers lease in land to 
utilise indivisible resources optimally. Therefore, Gupta's 
argument that tenants are alienated from the means of 
production is not tenable. Rather the possession of means 
of production enables the tenants to lease in land. Marx 
(1974: 803) stresses this in his definition of
sharecropping: "The sharecropper whether he employs his own 
or another's labour, is to lay claim to a portion of the 
product not in his capacity as labourer, but as possessor 
of part of the instruments of labour, as his own 
capitalist."
In this context Pearce's argument (1983) is more 
convincing. According to him sharecropping can be 
consistent with capitalist relations but only in a 
transitional sense in so far as it is associated with 
labour processes typical of non-capitalist modes of 
production, but subsumed under capitalist relations. 
Sharecropping is a method of surplus appropriation to the 
extent that it provides incentives for increased effort 
from direct producers where supervision costs are high. But 
with substantial intervention of capital into the labour 
process, supervision itself becomes part of the production 
process and becomes unnecessary. Therefore, sharecropping 
is an intermediate method of surplus appropriation and it 
will tend to disappear with capitalist accumulation.
The Marxist position on share tenancy can be
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summarised thus:
(i) Tenants are not voluntary participants in the 
tenancy contracts and are compulsively involved in 
the enforced transaction because of their 
vulnerability to adverse conditions due to a poor 
resource base.
(ii) The function of exchange is not to clear the market 
at an equilibrium price, but to give advantage to one 
party at the expense of the other party. It is, thus
unequal exchange
2.4 TENANCY AND EFFICIENCY
Share tenancy is often considered as a feature of 
feudalistic or pre-capitalist backward agriculture and is 
seen to be inefficient. Most of the early writers on share 
tenancy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries strongly 
condemned it. Thus to the Marquis of Mirabeau share tenancy 
was a "deplorable method of cultivation, the daughter of 
necessity and mother of misery."9 Arthur Young, in his 
Travels, described the metayer system in France and 
strongly condemned it: "There is not one word in favour of 
the practice, and a thousand arguments that might be used 
against it."10 Likewise McCulloch wrote "and wherever it 
has been adopted, it has put a stop to all improvements, 
and has reduced the cultivators to the most abject
9 Quoted from Basu (1984a: 125)
10 Quoted from Johnson (1950: 260).
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poverty. "11
But recently there has been a spurt of empirical work 
which claims that share tenancy can be efficient12 and that 
it is a response to an imperfect world. Reid (197 6: 57 6) 
claims that "sharecropping is chosen for its efficiency, 
not in spite of its inefficiency." With regard to the 
efficiency implication of tenancy the classicals, 
neoclassicals and Marxian writers hold different views. To 
avoid unnecessary sub-categories we join together the 
classical and neoclassical view under one head as their 
analytical framework is common.
2.4,1 Neoclassical View on Efficiency of Share Tenancy
Any discussion of the efficiency implication of 
sharecropping as an institution conveniently begins with 
Adam Smith. His interest lay in two central issues: the
impact of product sharing on intensity of labour effort, 
and its implication for capital accumulation and on-farm 
investment. Smith argued that share tenancy provides some 
incentives to effort and that as a result labour 
productivity will increase as the labourer knows that part 
of the proceeds from the increased effort will accrue to 
him. But the tenant would be extremely reluctant to employ 
his own capital on the farm as the landlord would receive 
a large part of the resultant product. In the words of Adam
11 Quoted from Johnson (1950: 261).
12 see Vyas (1970), Rao (1971), Parthasarathy and Prasad 
(1978), Bliss and Stern (1982) and Sharma and Dreze (1990) and 
others.
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Smith "It could never, however be in the interest of (the 
metayer) to lay out, in the further improvement of the 
land, any part of the little stock which they might save 
from their own share of the produce, because the lord, who 
laid out nothing, was to get one-half of whatever is 
produced (1969: 491)."
The attitude of the classical economists towards share 
tenancy was of disapproval and strong condemnation because 
of it acting as an effectual bar to agricultural progress 
by undermining investment. The exceptions were J.S. Mill 
and Sismondi who did not disapprove of share tenancy per se 
but attributed the widespread insecurity of tenure which 
existed, particularly in France, as the root cause of 
poverty and lack of investment. They were impressed by the 
example of Tuscany where sharecropping was deemed 
compatible with a prosperous agriculture as security of 
tenure existed. Sismondi himself was a resident landlord of 
that area.
The first formal statement concerning the allocative
implication of sharecropping is presented by Marshall which
is known as the traditional, neoclassical, or tax-
equivalent approach. It is curious to note that until the
time of Alfred Marshall it was not clearly recognised that
the argument which showed that the share-tenant would
under-invest capital also sufficed to show that he would
under supply work effort. In Marshall's words
For, when the cultivator has to give to his landlord 
half of the returns to each dose of capital and labour 
that he applies to the land, it will not be to his 
interest to apply any doses the total return to which
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is less than twice enough to reward him. If, then, he 
is free to cultivate as he chooses, he will cultivate 
far less intensively than on the English plan; he will 
apply only so much capital and labour as will give him 
returns more than twice enough to repay himself: so
that his landlord will get a smaller share even of 
those returns than he would have on the plan of a 
fixed payment.
(Marshall, 1961: 644, emphasis added)
Marshall illustrates this with the help of a diagram13. 
Thus according to Marshall under sharecropping total per 
hectare product and total per hectare land rent accruing to 
the landlord will be less than optimal. Though Marshall is 
often quoted as the chief architect of the inefficiency 
argument of sharecropping, he himself very well knew that 
if the landowner possessed the opportunity to determine the 
inputs which the tenant applies, then an efficient solution 
would result. This is quite clear when he writes (in his 
side notes): "if the control of the landlord is slight the 
cultivation is poor; but if it is effective the results may 
not be very different from those on the English plan (1961, 
644-45)." Marshall also eulogises sharecropping by 
suggesting that "this plan has many of the advantages of 
the three modern systems of co-operation, profit sharing, 
and payment by piece-work (p.644),"
But what worried Marshall was that under fixity of 
tenure as it existed in many parts of Europe, an efficient 
outcome depended on constant supervision and interference 
by the landlord. Marshall specifies the situations where 
share tenancy may be more efficient "the advantages of the
13 That will be displayed in Chapter VII.
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metayer system are considerable when the holdings are very 
small, the tenants poor, and the landlords not averse to 
taking much trouble about small things: but that it is not 
suitable for holdings large enough to give scope to the 
enterprise of an able and responsible tenant (p.645)." Thus 
Marshall was aware of the fact that most of the defects of 
share tenancy were a function of how it was practised in a 
given context, and that there were conditions14 under which 
it could operate efficiently.
Thus Marshall is erroneously associated with the 
inefficiency argument on share tenancy. The diagram based 
on excise tax analogy which was discussed in a 
footnote(p.614) cannot be considered as his central 
argument as the intention was only to show why the landlord 
must supervise to keep the tenant to his work (Jaynes, 
1984 : 53) .
Johnson (1950: 271} identified three techniques by
which the landlord may enforce the desired intensity of 
cultivation by the tenant:
(i) By specifying in great detail what the tenant 
is required to do: cropping pattern,
cultivation technique, labour input, fertiliser 
application and other input use
(ii) By sharing input costs in the same ratio as the 
crop share i.e. cost sharing
14 Conditions for efficiency as implied from Marshall's 
writings are if (i) there is no fixity of tenure and the contract 
is flexible (ii) if the landlord can supervise and monitor the 
tenant's use of inputs and (iii) share in input costs.
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(iii) By granting short-term leases which makes
possible periodic review of the performance of 
the tenant
To this there is an additional point that by leasing out 
land in small parcels to many poor tenants the landlord can 
impose an increased intensity of effort . OJti the tenants 
who crucially depend on the meagre plot of leased land to 
earn their livelihood. Among these alternatives Johnson 
stresses the third technique i.e. limiting the duration of 
leases to bring about efficient utilisation of land. Cheung 
accepted the first technique of enforcing the desired 
intensity of cultivation on the tenant and formalized it in 
his model. Newbery (1975b) incorporated the second 
mechanism in his model and Adams and Rask (19 68) favoured 
the second technique in modelling the efficiency of tenancy 
contracts.
However, Cheung (1969) was first formally to outline 
not only how sharecropping might be as productive as other 
forms of contract, but also the contexts in which it might 
be the preferred contract. Cheung (1969: 4) argues that
"The implied resource allocation under private property 
rights is the same whether the landowner cultivates the 
land himself, hires farm hands to do the tilling, leases 
his holdings on a fixed rent basis, or shares the actual 
yield with his tenant." Cheung's model is often referred to 
as the "private property rights approach".
Cheung develops a model to demonstrate that with well- 
defined private property rights and free markets, resource
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allocation must be efficient, regardless of the choice of 
tenancy15. In his model the landowner's objective function 
is to maximise his wealth given his total land holdings 
subject to the constraint that the tenant gets his 
alternative earnings i.e. his wage income. The control 
variables in the landlord's hand are the number of tenants 
among whom the given land holding will be parcelled out, 
the rental percentage and the tenant inputs. Thus in 
Cheung's model the rental ratio is endogenously determined 
whereas the wage is given that will be achieved in a 
competitive wage labor market. Thus by assuming free and 
competitive market Cheung completely ignored the 
overwhelming evidence that the choice of share tenancy is 
founded on the existence of fundamental market 
imperfections. Cheung treats rental share as the outcome of 
the landlord's profit maximisation exercise. In Cheung's 
model transaction cost is zero, therefore the landowner can 
monitor the tenant input level whereas in Marshall's model 
transaction cost is infinite as it is left to the tenant to 
decide its own input intensity.
The pertinent question arises that if all forms of 
tenure lead to optimal allocation of resources 
characterised by Pareto-efficient competitive equilibrium 
results as propounded by Cheung; what determines the choice 
of contract? Cheung suggests that the choice of contractual 
arrangement is made so as to maximise the gains from risk
15 Cheung's model will be discussed in detail with the help 
of geometry and algebra in Chapter VII.
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dispersion subject to the constraint of transaction costs. 
Cheung's model has been subjected to scathing criticism for 
his unrealistic assumptions.16 The assumption of perfect 
competition and full employment is questioned. As share 
tenancy is pervasive in over populated and land scarce 
economies where unemployment is the stark reality. Jaynes 
(1984) argues that the existence of risk and transaction 
costs implies that markets are incomplete or imperfect. 
Therefore a Pareto-efficient outcome in the first best 
sense cannot be achieved. Jaynes (1984) concludes that "the 
use of share contracts must be understood as an imperfect 
response to incomplete and imperfect markets caused by 
fundamental imperfections of information and the resulting 
transaction costs."
2.4.2 The Marxist View: Share Tenancy as a Theory of
Stagnation
Marxists consider the efficiency implication of share 
tenancy in a dynamic context. They argue that share tenancy 
is a remnant of feudalism and its persistence inhibits 
productive investment by diverting reinvestible surplus 
into unproductive channels like rack renting, usury, 
trading etc.. Thus share tenancy being a feature of 
agricultural backwardness also perpetuates underdevelopment 
and thus causes stagnation in agriculture. Views of eminent 
Marxists on this issue are discussed below.
16 See Bardhan and Srinivasan (1971), Koo (1973), Mazumdar 
(1975), Bell (1976), Chandra (1974), Jaynes (1984), Basu (1984a) 
and others.
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2,4,2,1 Bhaduri's Model of Agricultural Backwardness
A distinguishing feature of the Smith-Marshall model 
of sharecropping is that the decision as to whether or not 
to invest or innovate is taken by the tenant, not by the 
landowner. In that model the landlord is passive, a 
sleeping partner, a pure rentier, while the tenant 
exercises the role of a decision maker. Recently an 
alternative model has been presented by Bhaduri (1973) in 
which the roles played by the sharecropper and landlord are 
reversed: the landlord is the active agent, in the sense 
that it is he who decides whether or not to innovate, while 
the tenant remains passive, becoming little more than an 
agricultural labourer paid in kind (Griffin, 1974:85).
In Bhaduri's model the semi-feudal landowner derives 
his income both from property right to land and usury. That 
is the landowner has two sources of income: (i) the rental
income that he gets from the leased out land and (ii) the 
interest that he charges for the loan advanced to tenants. 
If the landowner adopts technological innovation, the 
productivity will increase and consequently the crop income 
of the tenant will increase in absolute amount even if the 
share remains the same. Therefore the tenant will borrow 
less to meet his consumption needs and the landowner will 
suffer losses in interest income. Therefore, the landlord 
will be discouraged from introducing any technological 
improvement so long as his gain in rental income from 
increased productivity brought by technological change 
falls short of his loss in income from usury due to a
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reduction in the level of consumption loan required by the 
farmer.
Bhaduri even argues that the semi-feudal land—owner 
will resist big investments as it makes the tenant free 
from perpetual debt and destroys the political and economic 
control of the land-owner on the tenant, even though on an 
exclusively economic grounds it may be profitable to him. 
Thus technological backwardness may be used as a control 
variable to reinforce existing asymmetry of economic power 
relations. A land — owner may be inclined to adopt
innovation, if he is benefited by it. But in order to
promote his class efficiency and to maintain his economic 
power over time, he will prefer not to invest. Thus, here 
maintenance of class efficiency in a dynamic context will 
distract him from adopting technical innovation (Bhaduri, 
1990). In this schema production relations act as a fetter 
on development of forces of production.
But it has been argued by Ghose and Saith (1976), 
Griffin (1974) and Newbery (1975a) that if the landlord has 
sufficient power to withhold innovation, then he can
extract the extra gain from the innovation by manipulating 
the rental share, the interest rate and other terms and
conditions of the contract. Bhaduri's assumption of 
exogenously given rental shares and interest rates is
questioned in the context of power relations that exist in 
backward agriculture as Bhaduri portrays them to be. Ghose 
and Saith (1976) have developed a model of accumulating 
debt and their conclusion is diametrically opposite to that
82
of Bhaduri . They stress that the stronger the domination of 
landlord the more readily he accepts the technological 
improvement, Bhaduri does not adequately explain the 
mechanism of the debt trap on which his theory rests 
squarely (Basu, 1984a: 116). That is, how does the
indebtedness of the tenant persist and how is it an ongoing 
process in the village? Newbery (1975a) clearly points out 
that the trap exists without the exercise of any power by 
the landlord. The peasant could free himself through his 
endeavour. A good year with a slightly better than usual 
harvest could set the peasant on his way to freedom. 
Therefore, the foundation of Bhaduri's thesis as a theory 
of stagnation is quite flimsy.
Basu (1988) argues that several economists in their 
insistence that interlinkage results in inefficiency have 
partly exonerated the exploitative character of rural 
moneylenders. The reason is that if in a group, one agent 
is perfectly exploitative, then it is in the agent's 
interest to enlarge the cake as much as feasible, i.e. to 
extract all consumers' surplus from whoever deals with him 
by giving him only the subsistence requirements. If the 
monopoly moneylender happens to be the landlord then it is 
very easy for him to extract all consumers' surplus from 
the borrowers and the outcome is efficient. Basu cautions 
that his view should not be interpreted that rural markets 
are efficient but what he emphasizes is that inefficiency 
cannot be explained by interlinkage as some of the early 
writers in this area had believed.
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Newbery (1975a) argues that economic circumstances 
which lead to sharecropping may make some innovations which 
increase moral hazard unattractive. But to treat this as a 
hypothesis of non-innovation one must first adduce good 
reasons or evidence as to why innovation would increase 
moral hazard problem (Basu, 1984a: 120). But many studies 
reveal that the single most powerful obstacle to the 
adoption of improved technology is the lack of finance and 
scarcity of credit (Byres, 1981; Griffin, 1974; Newbery, 
1975b). Therefore, unlike in Bhaduri's model, the absence 
of innovation may be due not to the landowners' reluctance 
but to an inability to innovate.
Moreover, the axioms of Bhaduri's model are suspect as 
certain empirical evidence prove the contrary (Bardhan and 
Rudra, 1978, 1980; Bharadwaj and Das, 1975; Khasnabis and
Chakravarty, 1982 and others) . Usury as the main mode of 
exploitation was found to be very rare and no strong 
interlinkage between tenancy and credit contracts was 
observed. The landlord was found to take a lot of interest 
in productive investment by sharing in input costs and 
participating in decision making, Bharadwaj and Das's study 
of some villages in Orissa revealed that new technologies 
were absorbed while the exploitative hold was retained 
through appropriate changes in tenurial systems.
2.4.2.2 Patnaik's Argument: Existence of Pre-capitalist 
rent as barrier to investment
Patnaik (1983), a leading exponent of Marxist ideas,
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argues that investing a given sum of money in direct 
capitalist cultivation in agriculture is conditional upon 
that sum of money yielding a surplus profit at least equal 
to the existing level of pre-capitalist rent over and above 
the average profit. Thus in a situation where capitalist 
production is confronted by existence of high level of pre­
capitalist ground rent as a historically given conditions 
(as in India) , this must also constitute a barrier to 
investment.
Patnaik's argument can be explained as follows. 
Suppose that a landlord has one acre of land which he has 
leased out and that his rental income from that acre of 
land is Rs.R and if he decides to self-cultivate the land 
he has to invest Rs.M in fixed and working capital. Here 
his opportunity cost of investing that sum of money in 
agriculture is the average profit say, Rs.P that he could 
have earned in alternative uses like trade, industry or 
depositing in bank and on top of that the rental income of 
Rs.R which he foregoes now. Thus he will be willing to 
invest Rs.M in cultivation if he expects a profit of Rs. 
P+R. In short, direct cultivation requires that a given 
capital earns surplus profit equal to pre-capitalist rent, 
over and above average profit. Thus a discrete rise in 
profits from agriculture is a precondition for the onset of 
capitalist farming.
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2.4,2,3 Bharadwaj'8 View: Diversion of Reinveetible
Surplus
Bharadwaj (1985) has a broader framework than Patnaik 
as she takes into consideration the widespread existence of 
interlinked transactions where the landlord's income is not 
restricted to only rent. He also advances loans at 
exorbitant interest rates to his tenants, and gets labour 
at less than the prevailing wage rate and buys crop produce 
at a pre-determined lower price at the time of harvest. 
Therefore, the landlord's income is from a variety of 
sources and the aim is to extract maximum surplus from the 
deficit households.
Bharadwaj argues that the greater the predominance of 
chronically deficit households in the rural communities, 
the greater the diversion of re-investible resources into 
unproductive channels like usury, trading, labour 
attachment and tie-in-sales etc. . Rural underdevelopment 
is thus attributed mainly to the existence of precapitalist 
mode of exchange which acts as a fetter on the development 
of productive forces and thereby reinforces the existing 
production relations. If the forces of productive 
accumulation, nurtured by a set of favourable initial 
conditions, generate a minimum pace, then they can succeed 
in breaking through the fetters of precapitalist remnants. 
In certain pockets like Punjab and Haryana where this has 
been achieved, there has come about capitalist accumulation 
and investment.
On the other hand, several economists argue that
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interlinkage cannot explain the rural backwardness as 
exists in today's South Asia, the reason to be sought 
somewhere else. Khasnabis and Chakravarty's (1982) survey 
of tenurial arrangements in Nadia district of West Bengal 
reveals that no strong interlinkage could be found between 
tenancy contract and credit contract. A model of agrarian 
backwardness should therefore to be based on some 
explanatory factors other than the interlinkage between 
credit conditions and tenurial arrangements. A non­
legalised sharecropping arrangement that assures a high 
share of produce for the landowners wielding semi-feudal 
authority over the tenants in a near stagnant agrarian 
economy, is the typical reality with respect to the 
observed households. No neat model on the lines of 
differential risk aversion, or varying bargaining power of 
individual lessors or lessees (Bharadwaj and Das, 1975b) 
seems to be applicable to such an economy. An alternative 
analysis, mainly socio-political in nature, which discusses 
the process of interaction between the semi-feudal 
authority and the rural masses, might give a better insight 
into the problem.
But Lehman (1985) in his study of Ecuador argues that 
there does not seem to be any inherent incompatibility 
between sharecropping and capitalist development. Taslim's 
(1988) study of Bangladesh agriculture also reveals that 
land, labour and credit markets were not interlinked to any 
significant extent.
The increasing evidence of big farmers leasing in land
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and small farmers leasing out land in agriculturally 
advanced regions of India17 suggest that sharecropping does 
not in itself denote an exploitative relationship in which 
the lessor inevitably has the upper hand: he may be the 
impoverished victim of the contract and the tenant the 
prosperous capitalist. A detailed discussion of
interlinked transaction follows in the next section,
2.5 SHARE TENANCY AND INTERLINKAGE
In underdeveloped agrarian economies it is very often 
observed that transactions in several markets are 
intertwined in a significant way in the sense that a 
transaction in one market becomes contingent upon a 
transaction in another market. A landlord and his tenant 
enter into several transactions at the same time; in 
leasing out land, in hiring labour, in providing credit, in 
sharing of input costs, in marketing of output etc. all as 
part of a comprehensive interlinked contract encompassing 
several markets. Thus interlinkage of factor markets is 
said to take place when contracts regarding several 
interdependent market transactions are simultaneously 
agreed upon between the same parties.
The fundamental difference between the neoclassical 
and Marxist analysis of share tenancy is that the 
neoclassicals view it as a transaction or as an exchange 
mechanism caused by market imperfections; while Marxists,
17 See Nadkarni (1976: A141), Vyas (1970: A75), Singh (1989: 
A88), Jodha (1981) and Srivastava (1989a).
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consider it as a production relation as it is not simply an 
interlinked deal between land and labour, but rather makes 
production feasible and share tenancy is a system of 
production organisation.
2.5.1 Why interlinkage Takes Place?
The interlinking of markets is interpreted differently 
by neoclassicals and Marxists. The neoclassicals emphasize 
that interlinkage is the means by which a profit maximising 
land-owner overcomes the inefficiencies of incomplete and 
imperfect markets and which facilitates increased 
efficiency and higher social welfare. But the Marxists 
believe that the purported increase in social welfare is 
experienced entirely, and cumulatively over time by the 
landowning class while the welfare of the tenant class is 
continuously forced back to the bare survival level.
This point is clear from the way the neoclassicals and 
the Marxists define interlinkage. According to Braverman 
and Srinivasan (1984: 65) : "Interlinked contracts may be
defined as transactions in more than one commodity or 
service made between the same pair of individuals and
linked in an essential way.....An essential feature of
this definition, therefore, is that delinking the contracts 
would be infeasible or costly for at least one party,"18 By 
contrast Bharadwaj (1974: 4) argues: "Such interlocking of 
markets increases the exploitative power of the stronger
18 Braverman and Srinivasan (1984) also recognise that in 
the case of forced linking, interlinkage may not be a Pareto- 
improving move.
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sections because/ while there could be limits to 
exploitation in any one market - due to traditions or 
conventions - or due to economic factors, the 
interpenetration of markets allows them to disperse 
exploitation over the different markets and to phase out 
exploitation over time as well."
2,5.1.1 Neoclassical Explanation of Interlinkage
It is argued by neoclassicals that rural markets are 
characterised by potential risk and that this generates an 
inherent tendency for them to get interlocked with each 
other to reduce the associated risk. Therefore, the most 
plausible explanation of interlinked deals is that it 
ensures insurance against risk and moral hazard in a world 
of uncertainty and information asymmetry.
Bardhan (1984b) argues that "In a world of costly 
information, an interlinked system of personalised 
transactions may serve the function of reducing some of the 
market costs of work monitoring, contract enforcement and 
of search by making the possible discovery of dishonesty or 
shirking by an agent in one transaction, too costly for him 
in terms of its spill over effects threatening other 
transactions."
Stiglitz (1986) shows why it will be profitable for 
the landowner to interlink tenancy with the credit market. 
Clearly, the terms of contract with the landlord will 
affect the lender and vice versa: if the landlord can, for 
instance reduce the probability of default by supplying
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more fertiliser, the lender is better off. The actions of 
the borrower (both with respect to effort and choice of 
technique) may be affected by the individual's 
indebtedness, so that the landlord's (expected) income may 
be affected by the amount(and terms) of indebtedness. There 
appears to be clear and possibly significant externalities 
between the actions of the landlord and the actions of the 
lender, a natural market solution is to internalise the 
externality, and that is precisely what interlinkage of 
markets does. Jaynes (1982) also notes that "Since the 
landlord must monitor the terms of the contract with the 
tenants anyway, it will often be advantageous for him to 
also be the tenant's direct creditor or an intermediary 
between the tenant and a credit specialist."
To sum up, interlinked rental and credit contracts may 
be a device to internalise externalities generated by moral 
hazard considerations when production uncertainty and
information asymmetries between agents prevail  as in
the case when it is difficult to monitor for the landlord 
if the tenant's low input is the result of inadequate 
effort or bad luck. The land—owner provides a consumption 
loan to the tenant to induce him to work harder, advances 
production loans to enable the tenant to adopt improved 
package of practice and shares in cost to increase in the 
input intensity use, all aiming at getting increased yield 
(Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982). Thus interlinking of land, 
labour and credit markets can be regarded as an attempt to 
improve allocative efficiency by reducing transaction costs
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in the face of risk and moral hazard in the absence of any 
insurance market. This is precisely what the neoclassicals 
argue for the existence of interlinked deals.
2.5.1.2 Marxist Explanation of Inter linkage
Marxists, however, believe that interlinked 
transactions are devices of the dominant party to subjugate 
the poor and to increase their economic and political power 
in the village community. The land-owner is not concerned 
about increase in productivity. Rather his aim is to 
extract surplus to swell his coffers even at the cost of 
social welfare. Bhaduri's model of interlinkage between 
tenancy and credit as already explained is nothing but a 
mechanism to keep the tenant perpetually indebted so that 
he can act as a permanent host for the landlord parasite. 
The various instruments that are interpreted in the 
neoclassical analysis as increasing the efficiency of 
sharecropping are deemed in the Marxist formulation as 
improving the effectiveness of surplus extraction.
2.6 SHARE TENANCY AND ITS DYNAMICS
Sharecropping is an institutional arrangement and a 
form of production organisation on terms and conditions 
which are often structured by norms of behaviour that 
evolve from repeated human interaction in a closely-knit 
adhesive village social unit.
Neoclassicals and the Marxists differ on their views 
on the mechanism of institutional change. Neoclassicals
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stress that institutions are transaction cost minimising 
arrangements which may change and evolve with changes in 
the nature and sources of transaction costs and the means 
of minimising them. In most of the neoclassical models the 
assumption is that competition, actual or potential, among 
alternative institutions would assure the emergence of 
efficient institutions at any point of time. Marxists are 
primarily concerned with the dynamics of share tenancy 
contracts in the context of changing social formation and 
its transition from feudalism to capitalism. They emphasize 
that institutional change is brought about to reinforce the 
mechanism of surplus extraction by the dominant class from 
the depressed. Thus enhanced surplus extraction and not 
promotion of allocative efficiency is the test of 
institutional change.
Among the neoclassicals Ruttan and Hayami (19 84) have 
explicitly dealt with the changes in share tenancy 
contracts and among Marxists Lenin has sufficiently 
discussed on issue of tenancy. Therefore, we have taken up 
these two opposite views on institutional change for our 
narration of the dynamics of tenancy contracts.
2.6.1 Ruttan and Hayamifs Induced Innovation Model
Ruttan and Hayami's (1984) induced innovation model 
has the typical neoclassical characteristic that it 
analyzes institutional innovation or change in a demand and 
supply framework. On the demand side, the institutional 
innovation may result from changes in relative factor
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endowments and relative factor prices. More specifically, 
as factor input scarcities change it becomes profitable for 
entrepreneurs to undertake the costs of institutional 
innovation. In addition, technical innovation resulting in 
new income streams can result in demand by certain groups 
to change the method by which such gains are distributed.
The supply side is, according to Ruttan and Hayami, 
less well understood. In order to supply institutional 
innovations, substantial political resources will have to 
be mobilized by political entrepreneurs and innovators. 
Thus the costs of mobilizing such resources will play an 
important role, as well as the expected return (demand), in 
determining the extent to which innovations will be 
supplied. These costs would seem to be critically dependent 
on the power structure or balance among vested interest 
groups in a society. If those interest groups which will be 
harmed by institutional innovation are extremely powerful, 
the costs of carrying out such innovation is likely to be 
high. Thus the institutional innovation may not be 
forthcoming even if it is expected to produce a large net 
gain to society as a whole. Socially undesirable 
institutional innovations may occur if the returns to the 
entrepreneur or interest groups are high. Again, cultural 
endowments, including religion and ideology which are 
assumed to be exogenously given, also exert a strong 
influence on the supply of institutional innovations.
Ruttan and Hayami test their model of induced 
institutional innovation with data on land tenancy
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relations in a rice-growing village of the Philippines, 
East Laguna for the period 1956-7 6. In the study area rice 
production per hectare increased by a factor of almost 2.7 
due to (1) the availability of irrigation water and (2) the 
availability of new high yielding varieties of rice, 
accompanied by the increased use of fertiliser and 
pesticides, and by the adoption of new cultural practices 
such as straight-row planting and better weeding. Over the 
twenty-year period population growth in the area was
pronounced while the cultivated area remained rather 
constant, the number of landless labourer households more 
than doubled, and the average farm size fell from 2.3
hectares to 2.0 hectares. The vast majority of the land had 
been farmed by tenants, with the predominant institutional
form being one of share tenancy. In 1963 a new land reform
code was passed with the purpose of breaking the power of 
the landlords and providing better incentives to peasant 
producers of food crops. It permitted tenants to initiate 
a shift from share tenure to leasehold, with rent under 
leasehold set at 25% of the average yield for the previous 
three years. This led to a shift from share tenure to 
leasehold. But there was a sharp increase in the number of 
plots farmed under subtenancy arrangements though 
subtenancy was illegal under the land reform code. The 
subtenancy arrangements are usually made without the formal 
consent of the landowner. And, all cases of subtenancy were 
on land farmed under a leasehold arrangement.
Ruttan and Hayami hypothesize from their model of
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institutional innovation that there was an incentive for 
the development of subtenancy institution since the rent 
paid to the landlords under the leasehold arrangement was 
below the equilibrium rent, the level which would reflect 
both the higher yields of rice obtained with the new 
technology and the lower wage rates implied by the increase 
in population pressure against the land.
The major contention of the induced innovation model 
is that new institutions will evolve when the benefits of 
a new structure exceed the costs of change; if institutions 
do not change then the costs of change exceed the benefits. 
It is a thoroughly circular, or tautological set of 
propositions.
In this model, resource endowments are defined by 
institutional arrangements. To say that institutions change 
in response to new resource or factor endowments is to say 
that new institutions appear in response to new 
institutions: not a very interesting prospect (Bromley,
1989: 26). It is incomplete to regard technical change as 
the primary source of institutional change and regard 
institutions as constraints on new technology. The 
technical change itself is a function of the institutional 
structure.
In this regard Epstein's (1967) observation is quite 
revealing. Epstein contrasts two alternative systems for 
organising economic activities in a rural economy: the
customary system of rewards and obligations (CSRO) and the 
contractual system. In the contractual system the parties
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to exchange are free to weigh the benefits and costs of the 
exchange and transaction takes place only if they agree to 
it. The contracts cover relatively short periods and are 
therefore responsive to changing supplies and demands. In 
the CSRO the agreements are given by custom. She shows that 
the CSRO system is fundamentally inimical to innovation. 
Typically, for a new technology to be implemented effort is 
required not only from the landlord, but also from his 
tenants. To take Epstein's example, the adoption of the 
Japanese method of paddy cultivation in South India meant 
the workers would have to undertake a more laborious way of 
spacing plants properly. But the tenants or workers have 
neither any customary obligation to provide the additional 
effort nor any incentive to do so, since under the CSRO the 
landlord cannot pay them more. Similarly in this system, 
landlords do not have the incentive to adopt labour-saving 
innovations since they have to make their customary 
payments anyway. Epstein compares the villages Wangala and 
Dalena with customary relations weak in the latter. Dalena 
was comparatively more receptive to innovations as its 
inhabitants had the flexibility to work out new 
arrangements which would reward the increased effort of the 
agents of change.
Others argue that institutions may not always evolve 
efficiently. The degree of tautology is great, i.e., "what 
exists is efficient, therefore it exists" (Basu, Jones and 
Schlicht; 1987). Often dysfunctional institutions persist 
for a long period. Basu, Jones and Schlicht cite the
97
example of continuance of caste system and the extreme 
abstinence the widows in India have to observe. In such a 
system, potential members of a splinter coalition fear that 
it is doomed to failure and failure to challenge the system 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Akerlof (1984) has 
built models to show how economically unprofitable or 
socially unpleasant customs may persist as a result of a 
mutually sustaining network of social sanctions when each 
individual conforms out of fear of bad reputation from 
disobedience.
Recently Stiglitz (1974) and Jaynes (1982) have 
explicitly mentioned the conditions under which 
sharecropping will disappear. They hypothesize that with 
the development of a credit market and increasing capital 
intensity of agriculture or technological change share 
tenancy will tend to disappear. With the development of 
credit and capital markets, cost-sharing and risk-sharing 
motives for share-contracts will lose significane. With 
increasing capital intensity of agriculture either the 
landlord has to provide strong incentives (the rental 
system) or has to provide close supervision leading to the 
wage system (Stiglitz, 1974: 251).
2,6,2 Lenin's Theory of Transition from Corvee to
Capitalism
Marxists study the evolution of society in its 
transition from feudalism to capitalism. According to Marx 
in response to technological change, institutional change
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takes place and the change is rather abrupt and sudden.
Class conflict and not inducement is the motor force to
bring about institutional change. In the words of Marx, in
a famous formulation:
The mode of production in material life determines the 
general character of the social, political and 
spiritual processes of life....At a certain stage of 
their development, the material forces of production 
in society come into conflict with the existing 
relations of production, or-what is but a legal 
expression for the same thing-with the property 
relations within which they had been at work before. 
From forms of development of the forces of production 
these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes 
the period of social revolution. With the change of 
the economic foundation the entire immense 
superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.
(Quoted from Hayami and Kikuchi, 1981:24-25)
Thus according to Marx when the forces of production come 
in conflict with the existing production relations and the 
production relations act as a barrier to its further 
development, there comes about a rearrangement and a change 
in the mode of production and the entire superstructure is 
trans formed.
Lenin has devoted one chapter entitled 'The 
landowners' transition from corvee to capitalist economy' 
in his book Development of Capitalism in Russia to 
delineating the process of development of capitalism in 
Russian agriculture with Zemstov statistics.
To start with, Lenin describes the characteristics of 
the corvee economy "the essence of the system was that the 
entire land of the given unit of agrarian economy, i.e., of 
the given manor, was divided into the lord's land and the 
peasant's land; the latter was distributed in allotments 
among the peasants, who (receiving other means of
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production in addition) cultivated it with their own labour 
and their own implements, and obtained their livelihood 
from it (1956: 190)." The product of this labour
constituted the necessary labour and the surplus labour 
consisted of their cultivation, with the same implements, 
of the landlord's land. Lenin interprets the peasants' 
allotment as wages in kind, or as a means of providing the 
landlords with hands.
Corvee economy is usually prevalent in conditions of 
1) predominance of natural economy, 2) the direct producer 
being tied to land, 3} personal dependence of the peasant 
on the land or existence of extra-economic coercion and, 4) 
primitive and stagnant nature of technology.
The corvee economy was undermined by the abolition of 
serfdom in Russia but Lenin observes that the capitalist 
economy could not arise at once and corvee economy could 
not disappear immediately and the post-reform system of 
farming in Russia actually combined both the features of 
corvee and the capitalist system. He prefers to replace the 
word corvee by the term otrabotki. Otrabotki in the narrow 
sense refers to the system where the peasant tills the 
landlord's land in return for land leased to him. In the 
broader sense it includes job-hire where the payment is in 
money and also half-cropping where payment is in kind. Thus 
otrabotki is a direct survival of corvee economy.
Though Lenin includes sharecropping under the 
otrabotki system, it would be wrong to conclude that Lenin 
views share tenancy as a feature of feudalistic economy. In
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the words of Lenin:
Sometimes the otrabotki system passes into the 
capitalist system and merges with it to such an extent 
that it becomes almost impossible to separate and
distinguish one from the other Life creates forms
such as combine systems of economy whose main features 
are opposite to each other, and it does so with 
remarkable gradualness. It becomes impossible to say 
where "otrabotki" end and where "capitalism" begins. 
(Lenin, 1956: 198)
For example, for the peasant's farm renting of land 
may be of contradictory significance: for some it is a
profitable expansion of their farms; for others it is a 
deal made out of dire need. From the point of view of the 
landlord, sometimes he leases out the land to receive rent; 
in others it is a method of conducting one's own farm, a 
method of providing one's estate with manpower. Thus it is 
very difficult to associate tenancy in general and share 
tenancy in particular with any mode of production.
Lenin, in contrast to Marx, observes that money rent, 
rent in kind and otrabotki (in the narrow sense) could 
coexist in post-reform Russia. Patnaik (1983) also argues 
that it is not the form of rent that is important for
distinguishing the mode of production, but it is important 
to know who pays the rent: the petty producer or the
capitalist tenant. Lenin found that under half-cropping the 
rent was significantly higher than money rent. The poorest
peasants lease in land out of dire need and rent is paid in
kind whereas the rich peasants take advantage of every 
opportunity and pay rent in money. Lenin condemns rent in 
kind, which utterly ruins the peasant and turns him into a 
farm worker as it is only want that compels the tenant to
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rent land on half-crop.19
In the capitalist system the landowner cultivates the 
land with hired workers who till the land with the owner's 
implements. Lenin argues that in the transitional period 
the combination of the dissimilar system of capitalist and 
the otrabotki systems leads in practice to a whole number 
of most profound and complicated conflicts and 
contradictions, and the pressure of these contradictions 
results in a number of ■ farmers going bankrupt.
With every advance in the development of commodity 
economy and commercial agriculture the conditions of 
practicability of otrabotki was undermined as it was based 
on natural economy, on unchanging technique, on inseparable 
ties between the landlord and the peasant. The most 
important reason for the decline of the otrabotki system 
was the disintegration of the peasantry. Lenin stressed 
that in post reform Russia the contradictions inherent in 
any commodity economy were already manifest: competition, 
the struggle for economic independence, the grabbing of 
land (purchasable and rentable), the concentration of 
production in the hands of a minority, the forcing of the 
majority into the ranks of the proletariat, their 
exploitation by a minority through the medium of merchant's 
capital and the hiring of farm labourers. The sum-total of 
all the contradictions constituted the 'differentiation' or 
the 'depeasantisation' of the peasantry. Lenin refuted the 
Nardonik doctrine of the special economic form of peasant
19 See footnote in Lenin (1956: 202).
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production and argued that due to the tradition of
patriarchal life the transformation of capitalism would be
slow and gradual but inevitable. In the words of Lenin:
The old peasantry is not only 'differentiating' , it 
is being completely dissolved, it is ceasing to exist, 
it is being ousted by absolutely new types of rural 
inhabitants .... rural bourgeoisie and the rural 
proletariat- a class of commodity producers in 
agriculture and a class of agricultural wage-workers.
(Lenin, 1956: 174)
Lenin was aware that capitalism penetrates into agriculture
particularly slowly and in varied forms. A class of
allotment-holding wage-workers still continued to exist as
it served the interest of the capitalist employer and it is
too stereotypic to presume that capitalism requires the
free, landless worker.
In the process of differentiation the middle peasants
are the most vulnerable. Some lucky ones succeed in
entering the top bourgeoisie class but most of them are
pushed to the bottom group and are ultimately
depeasantised. Thus Lenin observed that differentiation was
proceeding apace in Russia: the peasants were leasing out
their land, the number of horseless peasants was growing,
peasants were fleeing to the towns and on the other the
progressive capitalist farmers were buying land, improving
the method of cultivation, combining dairy farming. Lenin
emphasized the role of migration in hastening the process
of differentiation:
It is mainly the peasants in medium circumstances who 
are leaving the areas of emigration and mainly the 
extreme groups who are remaining at home. Thus, 
migration is accelerating the differentiation of the 
peasantry in the areas of emigration and is carrying
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the elements of differentiation to the new places.
(Lenin, 1956: 184)
Unfortunately, the role of migration in the development of 
capitalist relationShas not been given due attention by the 
Marxist writers.20
The differentiation of the peasantry creates a home 
market for capitalism. Firstly, by bringing about 
specialisation in production, it creates a market for 
exchange of agricultural commodities between different 
agricultural areas and undertakings. Secondly, with the 
increase in commodity circulation, the demand for 
manufactured personal consumption items increases. Thirdly, 
demand for improved agricultural implements increases and 
fourthly demand is created for labour-power.
Lenin in the course of his discussion also points out 
that the development of merchant's and usurer's capital21 
in the countryside retards the differentiation of the 
peasantry. With the development of commerce and credit 
institutions and the integration of countryside with town, 
the well-to-do peasants will be forced out of petty trade 
and usury and capital will flow into production. The more
20 However, Guy Standing's (1981) article on migration is a 
commendable work exploring the deeper underlying causes of 
migration and interpreting it as a symptom of feudal crisis.
21 Marx also in his Capital pointed out: "'merchant's and
usurer's capital always historically precedes the formation of 
industrial capital and logically the necessary premise of its 
formation, but in themselves neither merchant's capital nor 
usurer's capital represents a sufficient premise for the rise of 
industrial capital; they do not always break up the old mode of 
production and replace it by the capitalist mode of production; 
the formation of the latter'depends entirely upon the stage of 
historical development and the attendant circumstances'." (Quoted 
from Lenin, 1956; 185)
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completely bondage, usury and otrabotki are forced out, the 
more profoundly will there proceed the disintegration of 
the peasantry and the development of capitalism,
2.7 SHARE TENANCY AND MODE OF PRODUCTION
Economists hold quite opposite views with regard to 
whether share tenancy can be considered as a feudalistic 
feature or can be compatible with capitalist agriculture. 
In the Smith-Marshall model of share tenancy the metayer 
was considered to be an impoverished poor peasant who 
lacked possession of any instruments of production and was 
dependent on the landlord for credit. Share tenancy was 
viewed as a feudalistic feature though an improvement over 
the serf economy. But Marx's notion of sharecropper was of 
a relatively well-to-do peasant who had some means of 
production and categorically Marx states that "A
sharecropper .... is to lay claim to a portion of the
product not in his capacity as labourer, but as possessor 
of part of the instruments of labour, as his own 
capitalist." In comparison to Smith and Marshall, Marx had 
a relatively optimistic view on share tenancy which can be 
considered as preparing ground for the development of 
capitalist relations. Thus the economic position or the 
characteristics of the share tenant should be studied 
carefully if one is inferring about the mode of production 
from the tenancy relationship.
Marx considered share tenancy as an intermediate and 
transitory form of rent from the original form of rent to
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capitalist rent. Marxist writers (Bhaduri, 197 3; Prasad, 
1989) those who consider share tenancy as a prominent 
feature of semi-feudalistic economy perhaps mistake Marx's 
view on pre-capitalist ground rent (kind) in its pure form 
as his opinion on share tenancy. According to Marx, kind 
rent is an institution characterising all pre-capitalist 
modes which have gone beyond the institution of labour rent 
while remaining overwhelmingly a natural economy. But 
sharecropping seems to succeed precapitalist ground rent 
which includes labour, kind and even money rent and thus 
resembles a transitional stage between feudalism and 
capitalism.
Lenin's view on share tenancy is realistic. He 
condemned share tenancy as a peasant enters into tenancy 
relationship only out of need as the rent was about double 
the amount that of fixed rent. But he described 
circumstances in which share tenancy can be compatible with 
capitalist relations (profitable expansion of the farm by 
leasing in) and a whole range of possible combination of 
otrabotki and capitalist relations is possible in the
(H88-)
transitional stage. Interestingly, KautskyA argues that 
among the various capitalist modes of production the 
tenancy system yields the highest net product. This is 
because, it enables the entrepreneur to devote his capital 
exclusively to cultivation. So that capital intensity per 
unit of land increases. And also, tenancy helps in 
centralisation of land and large scale farming becomes 
possible.
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Marxists consider share tenancy as an intermediate 
method of surplus appropriation and formal subsumption of 
labour under capital which will tend to disappear with 
capitalist accumulation and under real subsumption of 
labour under capital. But share tenancy is observed to 
persist even being compatible with capitalist relations, 
reappearing in advanced agriculture, disappearing (due to 
prohibitory state legislation) and reappearing in backward 
agriculture. Thus share tenancy cannot be considered as a 
figment of history or a transitory phase in the evolution 
of productive relationship. Since it existed in feudalist 
society, in the ancient and medieval period, and it
coexists with capitalist agriculture in the modern world. 
Therefore, share tenancy per se cannot be equated with 
feudalism or pre-capitalist relations. It is the most
versatile and flexible system of production in the bio-
ecological production environment of agriculture. In order 
to interpret the relevant production relations, one has to 
study the circumstances or the macro features of the 
economy which necessitate the share tenancy contract; the 
economic position or the class hierarchy of the tenant and 
landlord in the rural community and the terms and
conditions of contracts and its enforceability should also 
be studied carefully.
The neoclassical models of Cheung and of Bardhan and 
Srinivasan seek to probe the functioning of share tenancy 
with text book assumptions of a perfectly competitive 
capitalist system with full employment whereas unemployment
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is the stark reality in the countries where sharecropping
is pervasive. In this regard Chandra's (1974) observation
on share tenancy relationship in West Bengal in the late
1960s is quite penetrating by revealing the crux of the
problem of share tenancy. Chandra considers share tenancy
as semi-feudalistic and the cause for this persistence of
semi-feudalism is the existence of massive unemployment due
to slow pace of industrialisation. In his own words:
Labour surplus on a scale that is probably 
unparalleled in human history, is perpetuating the
semi-feudal set-up  Without vigorous measures to
reduce considerably that surplus, we fail to see how 
one can get out of the vicious circle, or how 
capitalism can strike deep roots.
(Chandra, 1974*. 1328)
By highlighting the problem of massive underemployment as
the cause of share tenancy, Chandra(1974) and also Bagchi
(1976) have provided a solution to the existence of debt-
trap in Bhaduri's interlinked model of sharecropping and
usury. If jobs are available, the tenant can flee from the
landlord and the clutch of the landlord over the tenant
does not lie in usury and perpetual indebtedness but more
fundamentally in the precarious situation of the tenant due
to lack of alternative job opportunities.
2.8 NEOCLASSICAL AND MARXIST APPROACH: A COMPARISON
The neoclassical and Marxist approach to share tenancy 
differ as their points of entry and methodology are 
entirely different. The differences may be identified 
as follows: CSec. Wotff and Resmck, 1957) %
(1) The point of entry for neoclassicals is the individual 
whereas for Marxists it is class. Neoclassical theory
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starts with (i) the concept of self-interested, utility- 
maximizing individuals who are (ii) endowed with initial 
productive resources and (iii) an inherent ability to use 
the available technology to transform nature by means of 
initial resources. But Marxian theory begins not with 
presumptions about human nature but rather with 
presumptions about social relationships which shape and 
change human behaviour. Individuals are understood to be 
born into social arrangements they did not create nor 
choose to live with.
(2) Neoclassical theory is reductionist or essentialist in 
the sense that they look for the ultimate causes of events 
which are essential for explaining its occurrence and the 
event can be reduced to its essential causes. But the 
Marxian theory does not believe in the cause-and- effect 
relationship of the neoclassical explanation and they 
presume that no event or aspect of a society is 
independent; nothing determines other things without itself 
being determined by them. Marxist do not look for the 
ultimate causes of events, because they believe that such 
final explanations do not exist. Thus Marxian theory is 
antiessentialist and antireductionist and its methodology 
is to analyse events in terms of mutual cause-and-effect 
relationship between class and non-class aspects of society 
and thus Marxian notion of causation is overdetermination.
(3) The Marxian methodology is dialectical, i.e. it focuses 
on tension and contradiction between opposites as an 
explanation of the forces which brings about social change.
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In contrast, neoclassical economics emphasise social 
harmony. Individual economic units only interact with each 
other through the exchanges in the market, since each 
individual is assumed free to choose whether and when to 
enter into the market and no conflict in interest arises.
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CHAPTER III 
AGRICULTURE AND SHARE TENANCY IN ORISSA 
(IN POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD)
3.1 INTRODUCTION
India became independent from British rule in 1947. At 
the time of independence, Orissa was a young province 
having been created in 193 6 and consisting of six 
districts: Balasore, Cuttack, Puri, Ganjam, Koraput and
Sambalpur. The Garhjats1 or the 2 6 feudatory states 
voluntarily merged into Orissa on January 1, 1948.
3.2 AGRICULTURE IN ORISSA: SOME SELECTED ECONOMIC
INDICATORS
Orissa is one of the most agriculturally backward 
states in India. Some selected economic indicators of the 
performance in agriculture and input use are given in Table
3.1 in respect of Orissa, Punjab2 and All-India for the 
early 1980s. The value of output per hectare of net sown 
area was Rs.1437 in the case of Orissa, whereas it was 
Rs.3845 in Punjab and Rs.1468 for all-India. The low yield 
rate in Orissa can mainly be attributed to a low intensity
1 Garhjats refer to the lands belonging to Western Orissa 
consisting of mountain fortresses which were under the rule of 
semi-independent Rajas. British Lauxs were not applicable to some 
of these areas.
2 Punjab is the most agriculturally advanced state in India. 
That is why we have compared agricultural indicators of Orissa 
with that of Punjab to highlight the discrepancy between what is 
achievable (under favourable conditions) and what is actually 
achieved in Orissa,
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of input use. Despite being endowed with large water 
resources only about 19 per cent of net sown area was 
irrigated in Orissa3, whereas it was 78.1 per cent in the 
case of Punjab. Use of fertiliser per hectare of gross sown 
area was low i.e. 9.9 Kg. in Orissa whereas it was quite 
high i.e. 123.7 Kg/ha in Punjab. All the villages in Punjab 
were electrified, but in Orissa only 43.4 per cent of the 
villages were supplied with electricity.
Agriculture has, so to say, remained stagnant for the 
last three decades in Orissa. Productivity (kg/ha) and 
annual compound growth rate in productivity of major crops 
are shown for 1961-1981 in Table 3.2. In the case of staple 
cereal crop rice, the growth rate in productivity was only 
0.6 per cent per annum during the period 1961-81 and was 
only 0.1 per cent for total food-grains.
Changes in cropping pattern for the period 1950-1985 
are given in Table 3.3. Though the percentage of gross 
cropped area under rice shows a decline from 64 per cent in 
1950-51 to 49 per cent in 1984-85, it still accounts for 
the largest proportion i.e. about half of the gross cropped 
area. However, percentage of are under pulses has 
significantly increased from less than one per cent in 
1950-51 to 19 per cent in 1984-85. As a result area under 
food grains has increased from 68 per cent in 1950-51 to 76 
per cent in 1984-85. Thus food-grains account for a major
3 The identified irrigation potential of Orissa is 59 lakh 
ha. Against this, the actual gross irrigated area in 1980-81 was 
only 16.8 lakh ha constituting about 28 per cent of potential. 
Thus 72 per cent of irrigation potential remains unutilised 
(R.B.I., 1984, Vol.II).
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proportion of the gross cropped area. This is because 
agriculture in Orissa is not yet commercialised. Mainly the 
farmers produce for domestic consumption purposes and 
subsistence farming is pervasive. The percentage of gross 
cropped area under cash crops which includes oilseeds, 
fibre crops, plantation crops and vegetables etc. is only 
24 per cent. However, the area under oilseeds has increased 
remarkably (specifically groundnut) from only 3 per cent of 
gross cropped area in 1950-51 to about 10 per cent in 1984- 
85.
Orissa suffers from natural calamities like flood, 
drought and cyclone almost every year with varying
intensity. This has caused a great deal of instability in 
agricultural production of Orissa as shown in Appendix 3.1. 
Therefore, the peasants in Orissa are hesitant to cultivate 
cash crops where production risk is more.
3.3 AGRARIAN STRUCTURE IN ORISSA
Agricultural productivity is mainly determined by the 
intensity of input use. And the level of intensity of input 
use is critically dependent on the resource position of a 
farmer. The resource position of a farmer is mainly
reflected in his landownership structure. The cumulative 
distribution of land ownership as per area and number of 
households in Orissa is given in Table 3.4.
In the year 1971-72, 87 per cent of the holdings
belonged to the class of below 5 acres which included the
class of landless, marginal and small farmers. But they
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accounted for only 47 per cent of owned area. The
percentage of large farmers having land more than 10 acres
was about 4 per cent, and they possessed 27 per cent of
owned land. Thus there was significant concentration in
landownership. Poor peasants constituting 87 per cent of
the households account for 47 per cent of land, whereas the
medium and large farmers constituting 13 per cent of the
households possessed 53 per cent of land. But the
percentage of large farmer (above 10 acres) holdings which
was 8 per cent of total holdings accounting for 47 per cent
area in 1954-55 decreased to 4 per cent accounting for 27 
in
per cent of area/>y1971-72 . This (about 50 per cent) decrease 
in percentage of large holdings and area owned by them 
might be due to land reform measures (ceiling on land) , 
sub-division of holdings and law of inheritance.
An analysis of the size-wise distribution of 
operational holdings shows that (Table 3.5) in year 1980- 
81, a significant proportion (74 per cent) of operational 
holdings were held by farmers operating less than 2 
hectares and they accounted for only 38 per cent of 
operational area. The percentage of large farmers operating 
land area of more than 4 hectares was small (8 per cent), 
but they cultivated a significant proportion i.e. 32 per 
cent of operated area. Thus there was concentration of 
operational land area among medium and large farmers. But 
the percentage of large farmer holdings and the percentage 
of operated area cultivated by large farmers fell between 
1970-71 and 1980-81.
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Thus percentages of both owned and operated large 
holdings are decreasing in number and also area operated by 
those holdings show a declining tendency over time.
3.4 TENANCY IN ORISSA
In India data on extent of tenancy are available from 
two sources: NSS (National Sample Survey) estimates and 
Agricultural census data. Between the two estimates, the 
NSS estimates are more dependable as they are based on 
independent household surveys, while the census figures are 
based on land records.4
However, there is general agreement that available 
official data on incidence of tenancy are underestimates. 
There are several reasons for this. Tenancy is legally 
forbidden in most of the states excepting under some 
unusual circumstances. Tenants usually hesitate to reveal 
their tenurial relationships. As lease contracts are mainly 
oral, there is virtual absence of any record of lease
details. Moreover, when leases are short, data very soon
become outdated. Thus official data on tenancy are not 
really reliable. With this reservation in mind, we furnish 
the NSS estimates on extent of tenancy in Orissa 
in the following sections.
3.4.1 Inter-state Comparison of Tenancy
Orissa belongs to the category of 'high tenancy'
4 For a comparison of NSS data with Agricultural census 
figures on inter-state variations in extent of tenancy, see 
Laxminarayan and Tyagi (1982: 61-67).
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states in India. According to official reported figures, 
the percentage of area leased-in to area owned in the case 
of Orissa was 8.0 per cent in 1980-81 whereas it was 7.5 
per cent at All-India level (see Table 3.6) . The high 
tenancy states are a curious conglomeration of two groups: 
high irrigation-intensive, high productive and 
technologically developed north-western states; and, 
densely populated, high rainfall, rice growing and 
technologically less developed north-eastern states 
(Parthasarathy, 1991: A-32).
Bardhan (1984) has estimated a regression equation to 
identify certain economic factors which accounts for inter­
state variations in extent of tenancy. His finding is that 
percentage of cultivated area under tenancy will be higher
(i) where land improvement factor is larger i.e. in 
fertile, irrigated and high rainfall areas
(ii) where production uncertainty is lower
(iii) where labour demand is higher due to larger labour 
intensity of crop harvested
(iv) where extent of unemployment in wage labour market 
facing the landless households is larger
A careful analysis of NSS estimates reveals that the 
reported percentage of area leased-in to area owned is 
significantly higher than the percentage of area leased-out 
to area owned. The discrepancy between total leased-in area 
by rural households from rural households and total leased- 
out area by rural households to rural households is 
considered as non-reported tenancy (external tenancy).
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Concealed tenancy is measured as the percentage of non­
reported tenancy to total tenancy (leased-in area).5 It is 
estimated that there is a high proportion (35.8 per cent) 
of concealed tenancy in Orissa which may be attributed to 
area leased out by external agencies like non-resident 
landlords and institutes. Thus data on leased-in area is 
more reliable than data on leased-out area. Because, the 
lessors usually under-report the leased-out area in fear of 
protective tenancy legislation. Therefore, we have used 
mainly data on leased-in area in the following sections,
3.4.2 Basic Features of Tenancy in Orissa
The basic features of tenancy in Orissa for the year 
1981-82 are given in Table 3.7. There were 6,78,400 tenant 
households constituting 16.7 per cent of operational 
households leasing in 3,28,500 hectares of land which was
8.04 per cent of owned area and 9.92 per cent of operated 
area. About 45 per cent of leased-in area was under share 
tenancy. Thus share tenancy is more prevalent in Orissa. In 
India, sharecropping is prominent in rice and wheat growing 
areas like East and North West India. In the South where 
plantation crops are important, fixed-produce rents 
predominate (Singh, 1988b).
The distribution of leased-in area according to size 
classes of operational holdings (Table 3.8) reveals that 
the percentage of leased-in area to operated area decreases
5 See Table 1 and Table 3 in Sawant (1991) for the procedure 
to estimate concealed tenancy.
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with increase in size of operational holding being 22 per 
cent in the size class of less than 1 ha and about 9 per 
cent in the class of 10.13 ha and above. Moreover, 56 per 
cent of leased in area was in the size classes of less than 
2.02 hectares and only 4 per cent of leased-in area was in 
size classes above 10.13 hectares. Thus leasing-in is more 
practised by marginal and small holdings than by large 
farmers. Subsistence tenancy is more prevalent than 
capitalist tenancy.
An analysis of distribution of leased-out area 
according to size classes of ownership holding (Table 3.9) 
shows that in 1971-72, the greatest percentage (65%) of 
lessor households belonged to category of 'upto 1 ha' and 
they also accounted for a major proportion (36%) of leased 
out area. Thus the lessor households were mainly marginal 
farmers. On the other hand, a very small percentage (5.5%) 
of lessors belonged to large farmer category owning more 
than 4.04 ha of land which accounted for only 14.7 per cent 
of leased-out area. Thus, in Orissa mainly marginal and 
small farmers lease out land.
With regard to the incidence of different types of 
tenancy, Table 3.10 shows that share tenancy was more 
pervasive than fixed produce and fixed money tenancy. In 
1971-72 about 42 per cent of leased-in area was under 
sharecropping but only 14 per cent and 8 per cent of 
leased-in area was under fixed produce and fixed money 
respectively. But the percentage of leased-in area under 
share of produce was more than 39 per cent in the case of
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size classes below 4.04 hectares whereas it was only 19 per 
cent and 7.5 per cent for classes 4.05 to 10.12 ha. and 
above 10.13 ha. respectively. Thus the terms of lease were 
clearly more favourable to large farmers, inasmuch as, rent 
is usually higher in the case of share tenancy than with 
fixed crop or fixed cash tenancy.
3.4.3 Changes in Tenancy Contracts
If we consider the incidence of tenancy in a dynamic 
context we find the following. The proportion of operated 
area leased-in has declined from 12.6 per cent in 1953-54 
to 9.^ per cent in 1981-82 (see Table 3.11). The share of 
size class of below 5 acres in total tenanted area has 
increased from 39.8 per cent in 1953-54 to 56.7 per cent in 
1971-72. The percentage of tenanted area accounted for by 
the size class above 20 acres has decreased from 13.3 per 
cent in 1953-54 to 6.8 per cent in 1971-72. This suggests 
that leasing-in by marginal farmers and small farmers is 
increasing over time. Whereas leasing-in by large farmers 
shows a declining tendency.
The percentage of leased-in area from external agency 
(the percentage of leased-in area less leased-out area to 
area operated) has decreased from 7.1 per cent in 1971-72 
to 2.5 per cent in 1981-82. The percentage of leased-in 
area under sharecropping has remained nearly the same i.e. 
42 per cent in 1971-72 and 1981-82 6. The percentage of
6 In 1981-82, about 37 per cent of leased-in area comes 
under not recorded (see Table 6, p.A35 in Parthasarathy, 1991).
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leased out area under sharecropping has decreased from 64.8 
per cent in 1971-72 to 41 per cent in 1981-82. Thus 
sharecropping continues to be the main form of tenancy in 
Orissa.
To sum up our findings with regard to tenancy in 
Orissa, both lessors and lessees are predominantly from the 
marginal and small farmer class. Share tenancy is more 
prevalent than fixed crop and fixed cash tenancy. Mainly 
small farmers lease in on sharecropping basis. Leasing-in 
by marginal and small farmers is on the increase.
3.5 TENANCY REFORMS IN ORISSA
The term tenancy reforms broadly cover those measures 
which are intended to protect the interests of tenants and 
sharecroppers in respect of getting their due share or 
benefits of produce from the cultivation of the leased-in 
land and gradually to establish peasant-proprietorship by 
conferring ownership right in land on those who actually 
cultivate it (Mitra, 1981). At the time of independence in 
Orissa, most of the leases and sub-leases were oral and 
terminable at will (Mitra, 1981:33) . And the rent was on an 
average 50 per cent of the gross produce. To improve the 
conditions of the raiyats1 and under-raiyats8, radical
7 A ‘Raiyat'is a tenant and is primarily a person who has 
acquired a right to hold land for the purpose of cultivating it 
by himself, or by members of his family, or by hired servants, 
or with the aid of partners, and includes also the successors-in- 
interest of persons who have acquired such a right. A person 
shall not be deemed to be a raiyat, unless he holds land either 
immediately under a proprietor or immediately under a tenure- 
holder (Orissa Tenancy Act, 1913, P.4).
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tenancy reforms were introduced in Orissa in the post 
independence period. The Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952
aimed at abolishing all intermediary interests and vested
those rights in the state free from all encumbrances. 
However, the agricultural and horticultural lands in khas9 
possession of ex-intermediaries remained with them without 
any payment. But the important acts aiming at tenancy 
reforms (Mitra, 1981) were:10
(1) Orissa Tenants' Protection Act, 1948,
(2) Orissa Tenants' Relief Act, 1955, and
(3) Orissa Land Reforms Acts, 1960, and its subsequent 
amendments.
The objects of the Orissa Tenants' Protection Act of 
1948 were stated thus:
8 'Under-raiyats' were tenants holding whether immediately, 
or mediately under raiyats (Orissa Tenancy Act, 1913, p.5). The 
raiyats who were unable to cultivate their holdings due to caste 
rules or some other reasons were leasing out their land in whole 
or in part, to their poorer neighbours either on produce or cash 
rent and these people were known as 'under-raiyats' . A Bhag 
tenant (sharecropper) was considered as an 'under-raiyat'.
9 Khas possession refers to land directly and personally 
managed by the intermediaries.
10 For this sub-section we have mainly relied on Rath, 
1977, Chapter II and Mitra, 1981.
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It is well known that the status of the Bhag-chasis11 
is very insecure. They have not been recognised by the 
land laws in force in some parts of the Province. They 
can be evicted at the sweet will of the landholders, 
who often realise more than half the gross produce as 
rent besides exacting forced labour. Government, 
therefore, considers it necessary to give protection 
to these Bhag-chasis against eviction and in respect 
of the produce rent payable by them.
(Quoted from Rath, 1977: 71)
Thus the protection and relief which the above mentioned 
Acts provided to the tenants and sub-tenants may be broadly 
classified into the following categories:
(1) Regulation of Rent,
(2) Security of Tenure,
(3) Conferment of Ownership Right of the Land on Tenants. 
These points are elaborated below.
3.5.1 Regulation of Rent
The Orissa Tenants' Protection Act, 1948 prescribed 
that (a) tenants12 enjoying occupancy rights were not bound 
to pay more than one-third of the gross produce as rent to 
the superior raiyat, for holding land under produce-rent 
system; (b) tenants without security of tenure were not 
bound to pay more than two fifths of the gross produce as 
rent to the landowners. The collector or any authorised 
officer in a district was empowered by this Act to decide
11 In Orissa the local name for a sharecropper is Bhag- 
chasi.
12 The Tenants' Protection Act of 1948 defined a tenant as 
a person who under the system, variously called 'Bhag', 'Sanja', 
'Kata', cultivates the land of another person on condition of 
delivering to that person a share of the produce, or the 
estimated value, of a portion of the produce of land cultivated 
by him.
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disputes between a 'bhag-chasi' (sharecropper) and the
landlord. This legislation caused a lot of friction between
landlords and tenants in the state. In districts like
Cuttack and Puri a great deal of agrarian commotion was
caused by the agitating kisans organised by Socialist and
Communist parties.
The Tenants' Protection Act of 1948, due to expire in
1950, was extended from time to time until it was replaced
in .1955 by a more comprehensive legislation i.e. The Orissa
Tenants' Relief Act, 1955.13. Under this Act a temporary
tenant was not bound to pay more than one-fourth in kind or
cash of the gross produce of the land. In the Land Reforms
Act, 1960, and its subsequent amendments, the amount of
rent was retained at one-fourth of the gross produce of the
land, or the value thereof or the value of one-fourth of
the estimated produce of land.
But the regulation was not at all effective (Mitra,
1981: 35) and the traditional system of paying 50 per cent
of the gross produce just after the harvest as rent still
prevailed. The Orissa Administration Enquiry Committee
reported in 1958:
It is said that the beneficial effect of the Orissa 
Tenants' Protection Act was to bring about some 
consciousness amongst the cultivators in regard to 
their rights. It is only where there was strained 
relationship between the landlord and the tenants that 
they came up to the court for redress, otherwise there 
was quite a large number of cases which were 
compromised, and a vast majority of the cultivating 
tenants remained as they were before, in their
13 The benefits of the Tenants' Protection Act of 1948 were 
extended to the territories of the merged feudatory States by the 
Orissa Merged States (Laws) Act of 1950 (Rath, 1977: 72).
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relationship with the superior ryots.
(Quoted from Rath, 1977: 74)
3.5»2 Security of Tenure
In the pre-independence period under British rule 
certain tenancy reforms had been undertaken. But these 
measures: The Rent Act of Bengal, 1859; Bengal Tenancy
Act,1885; and Orissa Tenancy Act, 1913 protected only 
raiyats with occupancy rights from eviction. The problem of 
under-raiyats and sub-tenants was very acute. Under the 
Orissa Tenants' protection Act, 1948, land-holders owning 
33, or more, acres of land were debarred from evicting the 
cultivator-tenants. The Orissa Tenants' Relief Act, 1955, 
intended to strengthen the position of the tenant further. 
It provided that no tenant holding land for cultivation on 
1st July, 1954, or at any time thereafter, could be 
lawfully evicted from his holding by the landlord. However, 
the law recognised with defined limitation the right of the 
landlord to evict tenant from any land selected by him for 
personal cultivation. But a landlord could not resume for 
personal cultivation more land than seven acres in 
aggregate, inclusive of such land that was under his 
personal cultivation before or on July 1, 1954.
The Orissa Land Reforms Act 1960 was probably the 
first piece of legislation which assumed that a raiyat had 
obligations to the state other than regular payment of rent 
for holding land for agricultural purposes. The Act made 
the raiyat liable to eviction for using land in a manner 
which rendered it unfit for agriculture. It provided that 
the tenants could not ordinarily be evicted from the land
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except on grounds of improper or inefficient farming and 
non-payment of rent. It was also declared that a raiyat 
enjoyed permanent, heritable and transferable right in land 
held by him. But he had no right to lease out land held by 
him as a raiyat, unless he was a person under
'disability'14 , or was a 'privileged raiyat'15.
The Orissa Land Reforms (Amendment) Act,19 65 and its 
subsequent amendments in 1973 and 1974 conferred cent per 
cent right to the raiyat s on the land under their
possession. The Revenue Officer was empowered to declare 
the whole land to be non-resumable on receipt of an
application made by the tenant within two years from the
commencement of the Orissa Land Reforms (Amendment) 
Act, 1973, that is, from 2nd October, 1973.
In spite of these legal provisions, in most parts of 
the state, tenants were exposed to eviction as the problem 
of establishing tenancy rights over land was difficult for 
tenants.16
14 A person under 'disability' meant: (i) a widow or 
unmarried woman, or a woman divorced or separated from her 
husband by a decree or order of a court; (ii) a minor or a person 
of unsound mind; and (iii) a person incapable, because of some 
other physical or mental disability, of cultivating personally 
the land he held as a raiyat.
15 In the category of 'privileged raiyat' the following were 
included: (i) trusts holding land for public purpose; (ii)
charitable and educational institutions engaged in work of public 
benefit; and (iii) religious or other institutions by which the 
public were benefited.
16 A Report on An Enquiry into the Working of Orissa 
Tenants' Protection Act, 1948, and Orissa Tenants' Relief Act, 
1955 in Five Districts of Orissa, 1970 by B.Misra revealed that 
in the coastal districts more than 90 per cent of the agreements 
were oral and more than 80 per cent of the tenants did not 
receive any receipt for payment of rent. This made it impossible
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3.5.3 Conferment of Ownership Right on Land, to the
Tenants
The Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960, as amended in 1965, 
provided that in the matter of disposal of ceiling-surplus 
land priority was to be given to the evicted tenant and the 
contiguous raiyat having land not exceeding one basic 
holding. The objective of this legislation was to confer 
the ownership right of the cultivable land on the tenant or 
the actual cultivator of the land.
An amendment to the Act in 1973 provided that seventy 
per cent of ceiling-surplus land was to be distributed 
among the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in 
proportion to their respective population in the village. 
As more than 65 per cent of the tenants belonged to the 
scheduled castes and tribes, the Act was also intended to 
benefit sub-tenants and tenants at-will. B u t  t h e
provisions of ceiling on land-holding will not affect the 
bulk of the land owners. The ceiling limit even at its 
present lower level of 10 standard acres, would not affect 
a large number of landowners. In this situation a 
sufficient amount of ceiling surplus land will not be 
available for distribution among tenants and landless 
agricultural labourers.
The highly defective land records, the prevalence of 
oral leases, an absence of rent receipts and the ignorance 
of the legal provisions of tenancy legislation and the
on the part of the tenants to establish their tenancy rights 
(Mitra, 1981: 38) .
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inability of the tenants to go to the law courts for 
justice due to poor resource base and acute poverty caused 
by the interaction of lease, labour and credit markets and 
the indebtedness of the peasants made enforcement of 
tenancy legislation practically impossible. More 
importantly, lack of political will, absence of 
bureaucratic commitment and deficiency in organisational 
ability of intended beneficiaries led to non-implementation 
of tenancy reforms in Orissa.
Moreover, there are certain socio-cultural reasons 
because of which tenants do not come forward to establish 
their rights on the tenanted land.
. To quote a conversation between a Harijan17 and a 
group of politicians from P.Mohanti's book 'Changing 
Village, Changing Life' {1990) 18.
The politicians said to the tenant, "You have lived on this 
land for so many years, the land is yours. Register a case 
against the landlord."
The Harijan replied, "How can I start a case against him? 
I know this land is his. How can it suddenly become mine? 
When I have problems I go to him for help. We live in the 
same village and we see each other every day. You are here 
now, but after one hour you will be gone and it will be
17 The word 'Harijan' refers to the 'son of God', the name 
given to untouchables in India by Gandhi. In the constitution of 
India Harijans are named as scheduled castes.
18 For a lively depiction of village life in Orissa, see 
Mohanti (1973) and Mohanti (1990).
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difficult for me to see you. How can we get their land in 
our name? It is not good."
Thus as long as the state machinery is not capable of 
providing a dependable and perfect substitute of the 
informally contracted recipient systems which are 
endogenously created out of necessity, it cannot 
successfully supplant it.
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TABLE 3 .1
Selected Economic Indicator* 
Orissa, Punjab, All-India
Indicators ORISSA PUNJAB ALL-INDIA
Population Density per sq km 1981 169 331 221
No. of Agricultural Workers per 
100 ha of Net Sown Area 1981
106 66 105
Per capita food-grains output in 
Kg. 19BQ-81
196 711 181
Cropping Intensity 1980-81
Value of Output in Rs.
(Average of Five Years Ending at 
1879-80 at 1978-79 Prices)
138 159 123
Per ha of Net Sown Area 1,437 3.845 1.466
Per ha of Gross Sown Area 1,059 2.422 1,198
Per Agricultural Worker
Levels of Intensification of Input Use
1,361 5,610 2,432
Percentage of Net Sown Area Irrigated 18.8 78.1 26.6
Intensity of Land Use with 
Irrigation, 1978-79 (Per cent)
138.2 168.8 18.0
NPK in Kg/ha of Gross Sown Area, 81-82 9.9 123.7 34.6
% of Villages Electrified 43.4 100.0 55.6
No. of Private Energized wells per 
1000 ha of Net Sown Area, 1981-82
31 .9 73.6 32.6
Source: Collected from Report of the Committee on Agricultural 
Productivity in Eastern India, Vol.I, RBI, Bombay (1984)
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TABLE 3 .2
Productivity and Annual Percentage Coaipound Growth Rata 1n Productivity
of Major Crops 1n Orissa
Crop Productivity (Kg/ha) Annual Compound Growth Rata
Triennium ending
1961 1971 1981 1961-71 1971-81 1961 -81
Rice 805 917 917 1.3 - 0.6
Wheat 571 1,243 1,750 8.1 3.5 5.8
Other cereals 404 867 640 5.1 -0.4 2.3
Pu Ises 488 522 454 0.7 -1.4 •0.4
Total Food-grains 758 839 779 1.0 -0.7 0.1
Groundnut 757 1,198 1,111 4.7 -0.8 1.9
Rapeseed & mustard 405 426 392 0.5 -0.8 ■0.2
Total OiI Seeds 332 593^ 561 6.0 -0.6 2.7
Sugarcane (Gur) 3,054 5.452 6,155 6.0 1.2 3.6
Jute 1,030 1,281 1,368 2.2 0.8 1.5
Mesta 905 1,033 925 1.3 -1.1 0.1
Potato 3,000 11,183 6,815 14.1 -4.8 4.2
Source: Compiled from Annexure 9.2 and Annexure 9.3 in Report on Agricultural 
Productivity in Eastern India. Vol. II, RBI, Bombay (1984: 160-61)
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TABLE 3 .3
Chang** 1n Cropping Pattern in Orlaaa
<Parc*ntag* of Araa under aach Crop to Qroas Cropped Araa)
Crop 1950-51 1960-61 1970-71 1980-81 1M4-65
Rice 64.37 61.87 66.13 47.92 49.05
Wheat 0.02 0.11 0.19 0.77 0.62
Mai ze 0.38 0.38 1.06 2.07 1.88
Ragi 2.02 1.09 2.31 3.84 3.27
Jowar 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.25 0.42
Baj ra 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.10
Coarse Cereals 2.66 2.42 6.08 10.56 7.27
TOTAL CEREALS 67.05 64.40 72.40 59.25 56.93
Gram 0.42 0.32 0.31 0.57 0.46
Arhar 0.18 0.23 0.75 0.94 1.53
Other Pulses - 7.50 11.44 18.22 16.90
TOTAL PULSES 0.60 6.05 12.50 19.73 18.88
TOTAL FOODGRAINS 67.65 72.45 84.90 78.98 75.81
Groundnut 0.42 0.39 1 .04 1.97 3.40
Sesamum 1 .70 1.50 1.35 1.78 3.00
Rapeseed & Mustard 0.43 0.75 0.81 1.85 1.29
Other Oi Iseeds 0.42 0.93 1.68 2.82 2.78
TOTAL OILSEEDS 2.97 3.57 4.88 8.42 10.47
Cotton 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.02
Jute 0.75 0.65 0.65 0.50 0.48
Mesta - 0.13 0.41 0.48 0.46
Other Fibres 0.13 - 0.05 0.11 0.13
TOTAL FIBRES 0.92 0.91 1.15 1.14 1.09
Sugarcane 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.56 0.52
Potato 0.05 0.16 0.31 0.09 0.13
Tobacco 0.02 0.07 0.21 0.24 0.20
Other Crops 27.97 22.43 8.11 10.57 11.78
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Compiled from Agricultural Statistics of Orissa (19B7, P.84).
131
TABLE 3 .4
Percentage of Household* Owning Land Below Specified 
Size of Ownership Holding and Cumulative Percentage 
of Area Owned by Them
Size of Household 
Ownership Holding 
(acres)
1954-55 
Househo Ids Area Owned
1961-62
Household* Area Owned
1971-72
Households Area Owned
0.0 12.3 - 7.8 * 10.6 -
0.5 - - 37.6 0.7 36.1 1.2
1.0 43.7 2.4 44.5 2.2 44.8 3.8
2.5 60.5 9.8 62.7 11 .4 6B.9 20.5
5.0 78.5 28.0 79.9 30.6 87.0 47.4
7.5 87.2 42.7 88.8 46.7 93.3 63.3
10.0 91.6 53.3 92.8 57.4 96.1 73.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Compiled from Table 5.A.1 in Sanyal (1988, P.148) 
based on 8th round, 17th round and 26th round N.S.S. data.
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TABLE 3 .5
Size-wise Distribution of Operational Holdings 1n Orissa 
1970-71 and 1980-81
Class 1970-71 1970-71 1980-81 1080-81
No, of 
Holdings 
(per cent)
Operational
Area
(per cent)
No. of 
Holdings 
(per cent)
Operations I 
Area
(per cent)
Below 1 ha 44.6 12.0 46.8 14.9
Between 1 & 2 ha 30.9 26.6 26.8 23.0
Between 2 & 4 ha 13.7 21.1 18.4 29.8
Between 4 & 10 ha 9.4 27.8 7.2 24.9
10 ha and above 1.4 12.5 0.8 7.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Report of the Committee on Agricultural Productivity
in Eastern India (1984, p.134), RBI, based on Agricultural Census data 1980-81.
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TABLE 3 .6
Statewise Tenancy Statist let (Rural, 1B81-B2)
States by X of X of Araa % of Area X of Area %  of Area X of Irrigated
Descending Order Households Leased-in to Leased-in to Leased out under Area
of Percentage Leasing-in Area Owned Operated Area to Area Ooneealed to Total
Leased-in Area Owned Tenancy Operated Area
High Tenancy States
1 Haryana 22.3 19.7 18.2 10.6 35.3 66.2
2 Punjab 23.0 19.0 16.1 11.1 40.9 78.0
3 Tami I Nadu 29.2 13.4 10.9 5.9 34.7 47.0
4 Weast Bengal 27.1 12.3 12.3 2.5 75.8 22.3
5 Uttar Pradesh 21.3 11.1 10.2 4.8 57.4 59.6
6 Bihar 17.2 10.4 10.3 5.0 52.5 24.8
7 Orissa 16.7 8.0 9.9 5,5 35.8 11.4
Medium Tenancy States
8 Assam 14.1 6.9 6.2 1.8 77.0 0.5
9 Karnataka 17.0 6.6 6.0 5.0 6.9 9.6
10 Andhra Pradesh 19.7 6.5 6.2 6.3 -10.8 15.6
11 Maharashtra 16.7 5.6 5.2 2.7 44.7 10.1
Low Tenancy States
12 Rajasthan 9.7 4.3 4.3 3.1 24.5 11.6
13 Madhya Pradesh 12.1 3.8 3.6 3.3 13.1 10.8
14 Himachal Pradesh 17.0 2.9 3.2 6.9 -17B.3 9.9
15 Jammu and Kashmir 5.4 2.8 2.4 1 .0 53.2 24.1
16 Kerala 12.7 2.3 2.0 0.4 74.8 12.0
17 Gujarat 9.0 2.0 2.0 1 .7 17.9 26.5
All India (including 18.5 7.5 7.2 4.3 37.2 24,8
States not specified)
Sources: Compiled from TabLe 5 (p.A33) in Parthasarthy 1991) and
Table 2 (p.19). Table 3 (p.20) in Sawant(1991) based on NSS 37th round data.
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TABLE 3.7
Basic Features of Tenancy in Orissa (1981-82) 
Absolute Number of Tenants 6
Percentage Households Leasing-in
Absolute Tenanted Area (hectares) 3
Percentage Area Leased-in to Area Owned 
Percentage Area Leased-in to Operated Area 
Percentage of Leased-in area under Share Tenancy 
Percentage of Leased-out Area under share Tenancy
,78,400 
16 . 7 
,28,500 
8.0 
9.9 
44 . 5 
40.6
Source: Compiled from Table 5 (p.A33), Table 7 (p.A35),
Table 8 (p.A35) in Parthasarathy (1991) and
Table 2 (p.19) in Sawant (1991) based on NSS 37th round data.
TABLE 3 .8
Distribution of Leassd-1n Araa according to Siza Claaaaa of Oparatlonal Holdings 
Orissa, 1971-72
(Araa in '00 Hactsrss)
Size Class of
Operational
Holding
Operated
Area
X of Total 
Operated 
Area
Leased-in 
Area
X of Total 
Leased-in 
Area
X of
Leased-in Area 
to Operated Area
0.002 - 1.00 ha 7,947 18.6 1,745 30.4 21.96
1.01 - 2.02 ha 11.557 27.1 1,495 26.0 12.94
2.03 - 4.04 ha 11,561 27.1 1,526 26.6 13.2
4.05 - 10.12 ha 9,319 21.8 775 13.5 8.32
10.13 ha and Above 2,288 5.4 201 3.5 8.78
All Size Classes 42.672 100.0 5,742 100.0 13.46
Source: Compiled from Table 17, Table 17A, Table 17B in Laxminarayan and 
Tyagi (1982, P.74-79) based on N.S.S 26th Round data.
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TABLE 3 .9
Distribution of Leased-out Arts 
According to Sizs Classes of Ownership Holding 
Orissa. 1971-72
(Araa in '00 Hectares) 
(Rural only) (No. of Households in '00)
Size Class 
of Ownership 
Holding
No. of 
HousehoIds 
Leasing 
out Land
X of 
Total 
House­
holds
Area
Leased
out
X of 
Tota I 
Leased-out 
Area
Area
Leased out 
per 
Househo Id
Upto 1 ha 3099 64.8 977 35.5 0.32
1.01 • 2.02 ha 754 15.8 495 18.0 0.66
2.03 - 4.04 ha 660 13.8 877 31.9 1.33
4.05 - 10.12 ha 215 4.5 302 11.0 1.40
10.14 ha & abov 54 1.1 101 3.7 1.87
All Size Classe 4782 100.0 2752 100.0 0.58
Source: Compiled from Table 27 in Laxminarayan and Tyagi 
(1982, p.116-21) based on NSS 26th round data.
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TABLE 3 .1 0
Percentage Share of Different Typos of Tsnsnelss in Total Leased-in Arss 
According to Diffsrsnt Siz* Clsssss of Opsrationsl Holdings
Orissa (1971-72)
Size Class of
Operational
Holding
Share of 
Produce
Fixed
Produce
Fixed
Money
Others Total
0.002-1.00 ha 38.7 14.9 8.5 37.9 100.0
1.01-2.02 ha 43.8 7.1 9.1 40.1 100.0
2.03-4.04 ha 59.4 10.5 5.1 25.1 100.0
4.05-10.12 ha 19.0 30.1 10.7 40.3 100.0
10.13 ha and Above 7.5 - 2.5 90.1 100.0
Alt Size Classes 41.8 13.8 7.8 37.2 100.0
Source: Compiled from Table 21 in Laxminarayan and Tyagi (1982, p.88-93) 
based on NSS 26th Round data.
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TABLE 3 .1 1
Changes 1n Incidence of Tenancy in Orissa
Measures of Extent of Tenancy 1B53-54 1960-61 1971-72 1981-82
X of Operated Area Leased-in 12.6 10.8 13.5
X of Tenanted Area Accounted 
for by Size Groups:
Below 5 acres 
Above 20 acres
39.8
13.3
45.7
6.0
56.7
6.8
-
X of Leased-in Area less 
Leased-out Area to Area Operated
- * 7.1 2.5
X of Leased-in Area under Sharecropping 41 .8 42.0
X of Leased-out Area under Sharecropping - - 64.8 40.6
Source: Compiled from Table 2 (P.10). Table A2 (p.S3) in I.Singh (1988b) and
Table 1 (p.558), Table 4 (p.564) in Svamy (1988); Table 7 (p.A-35) in Parthasarathy (1991).
139
CHAPTER IV 
VILLAGE PROFILE AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN STUDY VILLAGES 
IN RELATION TO OWNERSHIP, TENANCY AND 1 DEGREE OF TENANCY'
4.1 INTRODUCTION
It is an acknowledged fact that the features of 
tenancy contracts differ from village to village as the 
village is the smallest social unit within which resident 
households interact and enter into several transactions in 
different markets like land, labour, credit and output in 
a personalised atmosphere. Thus, the terms and conditions 
of these contracts are to a large extent affected by the 
village specific socio-economic characteristics. Therefore, 
at the outset an attempt is made to give an overall profile 
of the study villages in terms of their geographical 
location, ecological conditions, available infrastructural 
facilities and selected socio-economic indicators, to give 
an idea of the extent of economic development and a 
portrait of the villages. Then, characteristics of the 
households in each study villages are carefully studied and 
presented villagewise in relation to ownership, tenancy and 
'degree of tenancy'1 with differences highlighted.
1 'Degree of Tenancy' refers to the extent of tenantness. 
When one moves from a part tenant (who operates both his owned 
and leased-in land) to a pure tenant whose entire operational 
holding is tenanted land, 'degree of tenancy' increases.
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4.2 VILLAGE PROFILE
4.2.1 Geographical Location
This study is based on primary data collected from 
three villages in Orissa in Eastern India (see Map 4.1) . 
The villages were selected on the basis of rough indicators 
of their agricultural advancement and the differing 
historical development of land labour relations in the 
regions in response to different land revenue 
administration introduced during the British rule under 
different circumstances.
Charapara is the agriculturally advanced village 
receiving perennial canal irrigation from the Wo.11 
Pattamundai Canal. It is located in Cuttack district (see 
Map 4.2) in the Eastern Coastal plain of Orissa. It comes 
under Kendrapara Tahasil or Police Station (P.S.). Cuttack 
is the most populous and advanced district in Orissa. The 
moderately advanced village Harinababi is also canal 
irrigated and it is adjacent to the village Charapara. In 
both the villages, irrigation water is supplied from July 
to September and in January and April. Charapara and 
Harinababi taken together cover about 157 hectares of land. 
Historically these two villages were under zamindari2 
settlement located in the mainland of Orissa, It is to be 
noted that both the villages are recorded as a single 
village Charapara in all official documents i.e. in census,
2 In the zamindari settlement, the British conferred the 
proprietary right in land on the zamindars. The zamindars or the 
landlords were the intermediary between the Government and the 
tenants having responsibility for the collection of land revenue.
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land revenue records and others. But in our presentation, 
the two villages have been treated separately mainly for 
the purpose of emphasizing the inter-village differences in 
the mode of rent payment, wages and other behaviourial 
relations despite the fact that they are adjacent to each 
other and there is no significant difference between the 
two with respect to agricultural progressiveness.
The backward village is Sandhagaon. There is complete 
absence of irrigation facility in this village. It is 
situated in the district of Dhenkanal in the mid-central 
table land of Orissa (see Map 4.2). Sandhagaon comes under 
Talcher Sadar Tahasil covering about 2 5 square kilometres 
of area. Dhenkanal is more backward in comparison to 
Cuttack district.
Important demographic statistics with respect to the 
two districts and Orissa state as a whole are given in 
Table 4.1. As per the 1981 census data the literacy rate is 
significantly higher in Cuttack district (45.4%) than that 
of Dhenkanal district (36.9%). The proportion of urban 
population to total population is also higher in Cuttack 
district (10.3%) than that of Dhenkanal (7.8%) . The density 
of population per sq km is 415 in the case of Cuttack 
district, whereas it is only 146 in Dhenkanal.
Historically, the village Sandhagaon was under the 
rule of semi-independent Rajas located in the Tributary 
Mahals3 or feudatory states of Orissa and constituted some
3 The Tributary Mahals were under the rule of semi- 
independent kings and were permanently settled. Some of them 
(Talcher) were excluded from the working of the British civil and
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hilly tracts and inaccessible areas and, was sparsely 
populated. Exploitation of tenants in the Tributary Mahals 
or Garhjats was more excessive than in Zamindari areas. 
Mainly shifting cultivation was practised in Garhjats. The 
district of Dhenkanal came into being on 1st January 1948 
when new districts were created after the merger of the 
princely states with the province of Orissa. The 
inhabitants of the ex-feudatory states in general and 
residents of Dhenkanal district in particular think that 
they have been exploited by the coastal people, commonly 
called 'Katakis' (residents of Cuttack district) (Pathy, 
1988:41) . The coastal region is agriculturally advanced due 
to large scale irrigation works and fertile lands.
4,2,2 Soil, Climate and Rainfall
In the irrigated villages of Charapara and Harinababi 
the soil is fertile loam, clay loam and coastal alluvium. 
But in the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon the soil is 
lateritic and red loam.4
The climate in Orissa is tropical climate with high 
humidity. Winter is short and mild. The average temperature 
ranges between minimum of 12 degree Centigrade and maximum 
of 3 9 degree Centigrade. The climate in the coastal plain
criminal law. The tributary chiefs were expected to pay annual 
tributes in specified instalments. The tributes were fixed in 
perpetuity.
4 All data in this sub-section have been collected from 
Agricultural Statistics of Orissa, 1987, Directorate of 
Agriculture and Food Production, Government of Orissa and 
Agricultural Productivity in Eastern India, Vol. II, R.B.I., 
1984.
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where Charapara and Harinababi are situated is hot and 
humid whereas in the central table land of Sandhagaon it is 
hot, dry and sub-humid. The mean maximum summer temperature 
is about 3 9 degree centigrade in both the regions. But the 
mean minimum winter temperature is 11.5 degree centigrade 
in the irrigated coastal villages whereas it is 14 degree 
centigrade in the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon.
Average annual rainfall in Orissa during the last 50 
years is around 1480 mm. However, variation in rainfall is 
considerable as it is dependent on monsoon which is often 
erratic. Over 75 per cent of rainfall is received during 
June to September. The mean annual rainfall in the coastal 
plain is 1577 mm, but it is only 1421 mm. in the central 
table land.
4.2.3 Infrastructural Facilities
To begin with, the education and health facilities 
available in the villages are considered which promote 
manpower development in an area. Development of manpower 
holds the key to all material progress. In the irrigated 
villages of Charapara and Harinababi educational facilities 
are available upto Minor School and for High School and 
college education students go to nearby villages Nikirai 
and Indupur which are at a distance of only 1.5 km from 
these villages. There are no health facilities in the 
villages and these are available in Nikirai and Indupur 
(see Appendix 4.1).
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon there is only
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one Lower Primary and one Upper Primary School in the 
village. For school education higher than primary level 
students go to the village Baghuapola which is 3 km far 
from this village. The nearest college is at Talcher town 
at a distance of 6 km from the village. There is no health 
facility in the village itself. For all medical treatment 
villagers go to Talcher.
Having discussed the infrastructural facilities 
required for human development, facilities required for 
material development of the area are considered. This 
categorisation is not exhaustive but overlapping. There are 
no marketing and storage facilities, retail input centres 
and food processing facilities in the irrigated villages 
Charapara and Harinababi. Also credit facilities, 
communication facilities and agricultural extension 
facilities are conspicuous by their absence in the 
villages. But most of the above mentioned facilities are 
available in Indupur and at the block headquarters 
Kendrapara which is 18 km far from these two villages.
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon all of these 
infrastructural facilities are absent. But most of these 
facilities are available in the nearest town Talcher which 
is the block headquarters. Rice mills and rice hullers are 
available in nearby villages. All the information regarding 
infrastructural facilities has been summarised in Appendix 
4.1.
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4.2.4 Selected Socio-Economic Indicators
Some selected socio-economic indicators of the three 
study villages are given in Table 4.2. In this section, we 
will discuss the demographic characteristics only and other 
socio-economic indicators will be elaborated under relevant 
sections in the main text.
There are 43 households in Charapara, 22 in Harinababi 
and 33 in Sandhagaon. The proportion of households which 
are scheduled castes is 37 per cent in Charapara and 61 per 
cent in Sandhagaon. There is not a single scheduled caste 
household in Harinababi. Total population is 151 in 
Charapara, 17 9 in Harinababi and 234 in Sandhagaon. In all 
the three villages more than 50 per cent of population are 
adults. Average family size is the highest i.e. 8.1 in 
Harinababi, followed by 7.09 in Sandhagaon and it is quite 
low (3.51) in the advanced village Charapara. This is 
partly due to higher emigration from Charapara. The number 
of emigrants is the highest (i.e. 28) in the case of 
Charapara, whereas it is 21 in Harinababi and 13 in 
Sandhagaon. The percentage of adult population who are 
illiterates is the highest in the backward village 
Sandhagaon.
4.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS
In neoclassical theorizing on tenancy, the peasantry 
is considered as a homogeneous mass of peasants and can be 
divided into two categories like lessor and lessee only in 
a taxonomic sense. The lessor is the landlord and is
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portrayed as the dominant party in the transaction and the 
tenant is the weaker party. But we stress that the class 
configuration of the peasantry is crucial, and that 
leasing behaviour is to be superimposed on a differentiated 
class structure. A careful observation of the three study 
villages reveals that the position of a household in the 
class hierarchy is determined at two levels. At the first 
level it is the category of farm household like owner 
cultivator, part tenant, pure tenant, pure lessor and 
agricultural labourer that counts in establishing the class 
position in the village. Secondly, within each category 
peasants are further classified according to size class of 
owned or operational holding.
All the households in each village have been divided 
mainly into five categories viz. owner cultivator, part 
tenant, pure tenant, pure lessor, landless labourer 
depending on their behaviour with respect to hiring of 
labour, renting land and the surplus of production and 
income over consumption.5
The part tenants have been further subdivided into two 
categories owner tenant and tenant owner. The category of 
landless labourer includes casual labourer, attached 
labourer and farm servant. And a residual category has been 
added to capture those households who do not fit into any 
of these categories. The categorisation of households is 
based on the viewpoints of the residents i.e. how they
5 Bharadwaj (1985, p.335) explicitly considers the level of 
surplus production over consumption requirements as a criterion 
to classify households.
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perceive their class position and rank themselves in a 
class hierarchy. The different categories are explained in 
the next section.
4.3.1 Categorisation of Farmers
Owner Cultivator(OC): The owner cultivator cultivates his 
owned land only and does not have any leased in Jard 
under annual tenancy. The owner cultivator may have 
some land (an insignificant area) under seasonal 
tenancy for the cultivation of specific crops. The 
owner cultivator may lease out some land. In the study 
villages the owner cultivators are considered to be at 
the top of the class hierarchy. Most of them hire in 
labour for agricultural operations. And they have 
adequate surplus after consumption.
Part Tenant(PRT): The part tenant cultivates his owned Jad 
as well as leased-in land. An owner tenant (OT) is a 
part tenant who has half or more than half of his 
operational holding as owned land. Thus an owner 
tenant is more of an owner than a tenant. The reverse 
is the tenant owner(TO) who is more of a tenant than 
an owner and has more than half of his operational 
holding as leased-in land. In the study villages a 
cultivator who leases in land is considered as below 
the status of an owner cultivator. And most of the 
tenants use their own labour for agricultural 
operations. They are just able to meet their 
consumption needs, with hardly any surplus left after
148
consumption.
Pure Lessor (PL) : The pure lessor leases out all of his
owned land and his operational holding is nil. He iray 
lease in a small segment of land seasonally. He does 
not have much surplus after consumption.
Pure Tenant (PT) : The pure tenant is the landless tenant vlo 
does not have cultivable land of his own. He has 
leased in land as he has some means of production life 
bullocks and a plough. He and some of his family 
members may be casual labourers and hire out
labour on a regular basis. The pure tenant is
usually a deficit household and his income from 
cultivation and wage labour hardly meets his annual 
consumption needs.
Landless Casual Labourer(LCL): The landless casual
labourer does not have any owned land and he 
hires out labour to earn his livelihood. He is not 
attached to any particular employer.
Attached Labourer(AL): The attached labourer is attached b 
a particular employer and works for him. Usually h e 
is provided with homestead land or land for 
cultivation by the employer. But he has the freedom to
work for other employers when his employer does not
have enough work for him. He is semi-attached to thst
extent. And he is paid wages for the days he
works for the employer.
Farm Servant (FS) : The farm servant is a fully attached
labourer who is paid annually or monthly. And he does
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not have the freedom to work for other employers 
during the period of the contract. He is given food 
and clothing by the employer.
Others: In this category are included the government job
holder, pensioner and single widow family.
Land is the mainstay of livelihood in rural areas and 
landownership not only indicates possession of property and 
wealth but also is a source of power and prestige. 
Therefore, the farmer categories i.e. the owner cultivator, 
part tenant, the pure tenant and the pure lessors have been 
further classified into four farmer classes on the basis of 
the size of operational holding or owned holding depending 
on the type of farm household characteristics under study. 
For the purpose of analyzing inter-class differences in 
cropping pattern, cropping intensity, crop yield, cost of 
cultivation, farm income, crop sale and sources of 
household income and consumption and investment expenditure 
the households have been classified on the basis of 
operational holding. While studying asset structure, 
indebtedness, asset sale and migration aspects the owned 
holding criterion has been adopted to classify the 
households.
4.3.2 Classification of Farmers
The farmers interviewed have been classified into four
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classes: Marginal, Small, Medium and Large Farmer.6 Each 
farmer class has been defined as follows:
Marginal Farmer (MF): Farmer with a holding size of less
than one hectare of unirrigated land or 0.5 hectare 
of irrigated land;
Small Farmer (SF) : Farmer with a holding size of 1 to 2
hectares of unirrigated land or 0.5 to 1 hectare of 
irrigated land;
Medium Farmer (MDF) : Farmer with a holding size of 2 to 4 
hectares of unirrigated land or 1 to 2 hectares of 
irrigated land;
Large Farmer (LF) : Farmer with a holding size equal to or 
exceeding 4 hectares of unirrigated land or 2 
hectares of irrigated land.
It is to be noted that there is simultaneity between 
holding size and tenancy status. A farmer at the same time 
belongs to a size class of land holding and also to a 
particular tenancy status. Therefore, the issue of 
productivity differential between owned and sharecropped 
land, and the relationship between size and productivity 
should be studied together (Sen, 1981). Our observation of 
farming practices in the study villages made us to believe 
that the right approach to study the productivity 
differential is to classify the households according to 
farm categories like owner cultivator, owner tenant, tenant
6 This classification is based on the class limits as used 
by the state Government of Orissa.
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owner and pure tenant. And then each farm category needs to 
be further divided unto farmer classes on the basis of size 
of holding. One should try to study the size effect under 
each farm category by controlling the tenancy status. And 
to study the impact of tenancy, the size of holding should 
be controlled. However, due to data limitation i.e. a few 
number of observations under each sub-category, we could 
not follow this method in a satisfactory way in the present 
study. But we have attempted to study both issues 
simultaneously when it seems necessary.
4.3.3 Distribution of Households: Category and Caste
The distribution of households in three villages as 
per farmer category and caste is presented in Table 4.3. In 
the advanced village Charapara all categories of households 
are found like owner cultivator, owner tenant, tenant 
owner, pure tenant, pure lessor, landless casual labourer, 
attached labourer, farm servant and others. Thus an 
elaborate pattern of social cleavage is observed in the 
agriculturally progressive village. In the moderately 
advanced village Harinababi, there are no landless labourer 
households as there is no scheduled caste household 
residing in that village.7
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon all categories 
of farm households are found except attached labourer and
7 As there are no scheduled castes residing in the village 
Harinababi, the wage rate is found to be higher i.e. Rs 15/day 
than the wage rate (Rs 12/day) in Charapara. Thus, the labour 
market is segmented.
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farm servant. As the farmers in Sandhagaon mostly follow 
monocropping, there is no need to keep attached labourers 
because of underutilisation of labour during slack period. 
All the farm servants employed in this village are 
immigrants from nearby jungle areas and they stay in their 
employers' residence.
It is an acknowledged fact that in rural areas in a 
hierarchical society, class and caste relationship are 
intertwined to a significant extent and considerably 
overlapping. An analysis of the caste configuration in the 
three villages reveals that in Charapara out of total 43 
households 27 are 'Khandayats' and the rest 16 belong to 
scheduled castes. The khandayats are upper castes in the 
caste hierarchy and are traditionally held to belong to the 
warrior caste: supposedly fighting for the king during war 
and at other times cultivating their land. The scheduled 
castes are the lower castes and are traditionally do 
sweeping and scavenging jobs and hiring out their labour. 
The scheduled castes live in a cluster at the outskirts of 
the village. It is noted from Table 4.3 that all the 
labourer households and the pure tenants in Charapara 
belong to scheduled castes.
In village Harinababi out of a total of 22 households, 
20 belong to the caste 'gudia' and the rest 2 are 
'khandayats'. Gudias are a middle caste in the caste 
hierarchy and are traditionally known to prepare and sell 
sweets and snacks. Now they are considered under other 
backward classes (O.B.C) just above the scheduled castes.
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The cultivators in Harinababi have less access to 
government facilities in comparison to cultivators of 
Charapara who have familial or social ties with government 
officials/ the majority of whom come from higher castes.
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon out of the 
total households of 33, 13 are 'karan' by caste and the
remaining 20 are scheduled castes. The 'karans' are an 
upper caste and are traditionally held to have accounting 
jobs near the king. The karans lead an ostentatious life. 
In Sandhagaon all pure tenants and casual labourers belong 
to scheduled castes. But there are one owner cultivator, 
one tenant owner and one pure lessor household who belong 
to scheduled castes. Whereas in Charapara there is not a 
single scheduled caste household owning land, in Sandhagaon 
there are landowning scheduled castes. Thus caste rigidity 
is observed in the advanced village Charapara, which we may 
attempt to explain in terms of the power relations 
prevailing in that village.
Thus, in the three study villages, all pure tenants 
are scheduled castes. In the advanced village Charapara, 
all the scheduled castes are landless, whereas in the non­
irrigated village Sandhagaon landowning scheduled castes 
like owner cultivator, tenant owner and pure lessor 
households are found.
4.3.4 Land Ownership Structure
In order to examine the Marxist approach to the theory 
of share tenancy, the preliminary step is to study the
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production relations8 prevailing in a village which may 
have an important bearing on the observed mode of 
transaction. To perceive the production relations one must 
be sufficiently aware of the inequality in the ownership of 
means of production existing in the villages. And 
inequality can directly be gauged by studying the 
landholding pattern, the asset structure, the household 
income, consumption expenditure (from which it can be 
indirectly inferred), indebtedness status and the depletion 
or acquisition of assets of the households in the villages.
As the leased-in area of a household changes from year 
to year, leading to fluctuation in the size of operational 
holding, the owned land area has been taken into 
consideration to determine the class status of a household. > 
The owned landholding pattern of households according to 
farmer category and class is contained in Table 4.4. An 
acre of irrigated land has been calculated to be equivalent 
to two acres of non-irrigated land, as the cropping 
intensity in the case of irrigated land is almost twice the 
cropping intensity of non-irrigated land and the price of 
one acre of irrigated land is about twice the price of one 
acre of non-irrigated land.
Table 4.4 shows that the average landholding size is
8 Production relation refers to the access of different 
classes of people to productive resources, and hence*to control 
over what they produce. According to Marx: "In the social
production of their life, men enter into definite relations that 
are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of 
production which correspond to a definite stage of development 
of their material productive forces."
Quoted from Bottomore et al.eds.(1983, p.395)
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the highest i.e. 5.54 acres in Charapara and then 3.61 
acres in Harinababi and the lowest 2.91 acres in 
Sandhagaon. In the advanced village Charapara there are 5 
LFs under the owner cultivator category and there is none 
in Harinababi and Sandhagaon. Most of the owner tenants are 
MFs. All the tenant owners are MFs in all the villages. 
Most of the pure lessors are marginal and small farmers. 
There are some medium farmer pure lessors in Sandhagaon. 
This point will be further elaborated while studying 
tenancy in Chapter VI.
Thus, in all the three study villages there is no 
significant difference in ownership holding between the 
lessors as a class and the tenants as a class. Lessors as 
well as tenants are mostly found to be marginal and small 
farmers.
Now we analyze distribution of owned land among 
different classes (see Table 4.5). Our purpose is to see 
whether there is significant inequality in ownership 
holding, such that a conventional Marxist framework in 
terms of a differentiated peasantry can be applicable to 
our data. Table 4.5 shows that the peasants are more 
differentiated in the advanced village Charapara in 
comparison to other two villages. In Charapara MFs 
constituting 31 per cent of households own only 8 per cent 
of owned land, whereas the LFs constituting about 19 per 
cent of households account for 48 per cent of the owned 
area. In village Harinababi the MFs are 3 6 per cent of the 
total households and they own only 15 per cent of the
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landholding. On the other hand, the MDFs are 32 per cent of 
the households and occupy about 54 per cent of owned land. 
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon about 47 per cent 
of households are MFs and they own 21 per cent of owned 
area, whereas the MDFs constituting 27 per cent of the 
households possess 47 per cent of the owned land. It is 
clearly discernible from Table 4.5 that the peasantry is 
more differentiated in village Charapara. The Lorenz curves 
drawn on the basis of the cumulative distribution of owned 
holding for the three villages are shown in Figure 4.1 and 
supplement this finding.
Thus, our data suggest that differentiation of 
peasantry i.e. skewed distribution of landholding is 
observed in all the study villages. Therefore, one should 
attempt to study leasing behaviour of a household according 
to its class position in the society and relate to it.
4.3.5 Structure of Operational Land-holdincr
It is often observed that the concentration ratio in 
the case of operational holding9 is less than that of 
ownership holding (Laxminarayan and Tyagi, 1982: 58). It is 
argued that leasing-in by small farmers and leasing-out by 
large farmers cause reduction in concentration in 
operational holding.
The distribution of operational land area according to
9 Operational holding is usually calculated as owned holding 
plus leased-in area minus leased-out area. Also usufructuary 
mortgage is taken into account. It is added if one is operating 
somebody's land mortgaged to him, it is deducted, if one has 
mortgaged his land to somebody else.
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farmer classes is given in Table 4.6. It is observed that 
there are no LFs in Harinababi and Sandhagaon, whereas 
there are 5 LFs in the village Charapara. There is 
concentration of land in the hands of MDFs and LFs in all 
the villages. Inequality in operational land area is more 
pronounced in the advanced village Charapara. The Lorenz 
curves plotted on the basis of operational land area 
(Figure 4.2) support this finding. The percentage of 
operated land which is irrigated decreases with increase in 
farm size.
In all the villages the concentration in the case of 
operational holding is less than that of owned holding. As 
the lorenz curves plotted on the basis of operational 
holding have moved towards the diagonal. But it is to be 
noted that the curves have shifted closer to one another. 
This implies that the role of tenancy in decreasing 
concentration in land-holding is of different degree in 
each village. In the case of Sandhagaon, the Lorenz curve 
has substantially shifted towards the diagonal. This 
implies that the impact of tenancy in levelling down land- 
holding is more in Sandhagaon. This finding will be further 
substantiated in Chapter VI when we will discuss incidence 
of tenancy.
4.3.6 Asset Structure of Households
Land is no doubt the primary asset in rural areas but 
the possession of other assets like real estate 
(house,building), livestock, agricultural implements,
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consumer durables/ gold and silver, savings and receivables 
should be taken into consideration to give a clear picture 
of the extent of inequality observed in the study villages. 
For this purpose the asset structure of all the households 
has been studied and the findings have been given in Table
4.7 and Table 4.8 according to farmer category and farmer 
class respectively.
Table 4.7 shows that in Charapara asset value per 
household ranges from Rs.2,962 in the case of landless 
labourer to Rs.2,37,119 for an owner cultivator. Per 
household asset in the case of lessor class i.e. PLs is 
Rs.91,511. And in the case of part tenants it is Rs.78,013. 
Thus, with regard to asset ownership, there is no 
significant difference between the lessors as a class and 
landowning tenants (the PRTs) as a class. But, in the case 
of pure tenants, who do not have any owned land, the asset 
value per household is significantly smaller i.e. Rs.8,300. 
It is to be noted that the asset value of a PT household is 
significantly higher than that of a landless labourer 
(Rs.2, 962). This is because, the ownership of draft 
animals like bullocks is a prerequisite for a landless 
labourer to qualify for leasing -in land and to move to the 
next rung in the agricultural ladder i.e. to become a pure 
tenant.
In Harinababi the OCs, PLs and the PRTs on an average 
possess assets worth of Rs.1,40,507, Rs.56,083 and
Rs.1,00,150 respectively. In Harinababi some MDFs had 
leased in land as they were good farmers. As a result, the
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asset value in the case of PRTs is more than that of PLs 
who were MFs.
In Sandhagaon the asset value per household is the 
highest in the case of OCs i.e. Rs 1,33,258/- and then in 
descending order are the PLs (Rs.1,11,217), PRTs 
(Rs.85,620), PTs (Rs.18,883) and the LLs (Rs.6,778) 
successively. Thus, in this village there is no significant 
disparity in asset ownership between lessors as a class and 
part tenants as a class. But there is a large gap in asset 
value between a lessor household and a pure tenant
household.
From the above analysis, it becomes clear that with 
regard to asset ownership, there is no real difference 
between the pure lessors as a class and landowning tenants 
as a class. But there is significant difference between the 
part tenants as a class and pure tenants as a class.
Therefore, the tenants should not be considered as a 
homogeneous class and it is wrong to join together the part 
tenants and pure tenants under one class of tenants. There 
is considerable difference in asset value per household 
between pure lessors and pure tenants.
At the village level, the asset value per household is 
Rs.99,902 in Charapara, Rs.1,19,823 in Harinababi and 
Rs.57,493 in Sandhagaon.
Then we study percentage distribution of assets among 
different farmer classes. Table 4.8 shows 'that asset 
distribution is markedly skewed in all the villages. In
Charapara the MFs and SFs taken together constitute 33 per
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cent of households and they account for 2 6 per cent of 
assets. But the MDFs and LFs combinedly own 72 per cent of 
assets though they constitute only 28 per cent of total 
households. The share of the PTs (1.0%) and the LLs (0.8%) 
in the total asset value is very small though they 
constitute 12 per cent and 2 6 per cent of households 
respectively.
In village Harinababi the MFs and SFs taken together 
constitute 68 per cent of households and they account for 
only 48 per cent of assets whereas the MDFs constituting 
the remaining 32 per cent of households command 52 per cent 
of assets.
In village Sandhagaon the share of MFs and SFs taken 
together in total assets is 54 per cent and they constitute 
far less per cent (33%) of the village households. The MDFs 
being 12 per cent of total households command 34 per cent 
total assets. It is to be noted that the share of landless 
class (which includes the landless labourers and pure 
tenants and others) in total assets is higher than that of 
Charapara. Thus, in Sandhagaon the distribution of assets 
according to land ownership is less skewed than that of 
irrigated villages. Because, a significant proportion of 
income comes from salary besides cultivation. We will 
discuss this later under the section on sources of income.
It is quite clear from Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 that 
the landless class possess a very insignificant proportion 
of consumer durables (radio, cycle, cot, almirah, table, 
chair, television etc.) and also gold and silver. In the
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irrigated villages the landholding class have considerable 
savings whereas the landless class do not have any savings. 
But surprisingly in the non-irrigated village none of the 
households including the landholding class reported having 
any savings.
Then the composition of assets into different types 
according to farmer categories is given in Table 4.9. In 
Charapara and Harinababi, in the case of the landed classes 
like owner cultivator, part-tenant and pure-lessor, 
agricultural land and real estate taken together constitute 
more than 80 per cent of total assets. In Charapara in the 
case of pure tenants, livestock constitutes 72.3 per cent 
of their total asset. A pure tenant's major asset is the 
bullocks which he requires to cultivate land. In the case 
of landless labourers their major asset is real estate 
i.e.the living house (58.3%).
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon in the case of 
the landholding class agricultural land and real estate 
taken together constitute 7 5 per cent to 85 per cent of 
total assets. In the case of pure tenants and landless 
labourers real estate constitute 63,6 per cent and 87.4 per 
cent of their total assets respectively. In this village, 
the pure tenant households have considerable salary income 
for which they have been able to construct good tile 
houses. Therefore, the major assets of pure tenants is real 
estate rather than bullocks as found in Charapara.
It is to be noted that in the irrigated villages the 
proportion of agricultural implements to total assets
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ranges from only 0.1 per cent to 0.2 per cent in the case 
of the landholding class and in absolute rupee terms it 
ranges from only Rs.100 to Rs.300 per household, which 
shows the absence of mechanisation. What most of the 
farmers possess are a plough with wooden beam, Mould Board 
plough, hand hoe, rake weeder, hand sprayer and simple hand 
tools.
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon the per cent 
of agricultural implements to total assets varies from 
about 1 per cent to 2 per cent and also in money terms it 
varies from Rs 250 to Rs 1700 per household. It is 
significantly higher than that of the irrigated villages. 
This is because most of the farmers in Sandhagaon possess 
bullock carts which they use to carry farmyard manure (FYM) 
to their land. Even pure tenants and pure lessors possess 
bullock carts. Those who possess bullock carts earn by 
hiring out the carts at the rate of Rs 3 0 per day. In the 
irrigated villages the farmers carry the F.Y.M with the 
help of a balance type structure by keeping the F.Y.M in 
baskets made of thin bamboo strips on two sides of the 
balance and carrying it over their shoulders. As the 
village road is on a higher level than the fields and the 
fields are not levelled, there is in effect no road on 
which the bullock-carts can move and reach the fields. Thus 
ecology sometimes affects the production process 
significantly. This aspect has not been given due attention 
and emphasis that it deserves specifically in studying the 
diverse complex production relations and labour process
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observed in backward agriculture10. The protagonists of 
large scale surveys simply in their attempt to generalise 
and to draw overall conclusions evade these issues which of 
course undoubtedly have great relevance. Thus intensive 
village studies provide answers to some of the puzzling 
issues, which the large scale surveys fail to perceive 
because of their excessive emphasis on generalisation.
To summarise our findings with regard to asset 
ownership structure according to tenancy status, the 
lessors are not the wealthy, rich and big farmers 
representing the so-called landlord class. Rather there is 
no significant difference in asset ownership between the 
lessor class and the landowning tenant class. But there is 
ample difference in asset ownership between the part tenant 
and the pure tenant class,
4.3.7 Household Income and Sources
Having gained some idea of the landholding pattern and 
asset structure of the households, it is prudent to analyze 
household income and the different sources from which 
income is derived, to examine whether property ownership 
affects the income earning opportunities that are available 
to the peasants. Here the farmers have been classified on 
the basis of operational holding as income from cultivation 
depends on operational holding and farm income is the major 
source of income in rural areas.
10 See Geertz (1963) for an excellent narration of the 
impact of ecology on the production process. Also see Djurfeldt 
and Lindberg (1975).
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4.3,7,1 Household Income according- to Farmer Category
Data on distribution of household income among 
different sources according to farmer category are 
contained in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11. Table 4.10 shows 
that in village Charapara the average annual household 
income ranges from Rs.3,2 87 in the case of landless 
labourers to Rs.24,468 in the case of owner cultivators. 
The income per household in the case of pure lessors 
(Rs.10,87 0) is significantly higher than that of a part 
tenant household (Rs.6,573). Because the pure lessor 
households have significant income from remittances. Annual 
income per household in the case of pure tenant is Rs.4,424 
which is quite lower than that of a part tenant. In 
Harinababi average household income in the case of OCs is 
the highest (Rs 17,851). Income of a PL (Rs.9,981) is 
significantly lower than that of a PRT (Rs.15,653). Part 
tenants in Harinababi are efficient farmers, as observed 
from their income from cultivation, as compared to PRTs in 
Charapara.
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon, average 
household income is the highest for OCs i.e. Rs.22,293 and 
then it gradually decreases to Rs.17,799 for PRTs, 
Rs.16,085 for PLs, Rs.6,328 for LLs and Rs.5,421 for PTs. 
Thus, in this village there is small difference in income 
between the lessors as a class and part tenants as a class. 
But income of the pure tenants is significantly lower than 
that of a part tenant. It is clear from the table 4.10 that 
income from cultivation is negative which will be explained
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in Chapter V on farm economy.
At the village level average annual household income 
is the highest (Rs 16,729) in Harinababi and then it is Rs 
11,72 8 in Charapara and Rs 11,750 in Sandhagaon.
4.3, 7.2 Percentage Distribution of Household Income among 
Different Sources
A break up of total household income into different 
sources (Table 4.11) shows that in village Charapara in the 
case of OCs and PRTs the major source of income is 
cultivation i.e. 32,3 per cent for OCs and 3 6.8 per cent 
for PRTs. But it is to be noted that while the share of 
imputed value of own labour in total income is only 1. 7* per 
cent for OCs, it is 11.8 per cent for PRTs. From this it 
can be construed that as part tenants hesitate to hire out 
their labour because of their higher caste status, they 
lease in land. Therefore, some economists tend to interpret 
tenancy as a labour adjustment mechanism (Sharma and Dreze, 
1990; Bliss and Stern, 1982).
In Charapara, in the case of PTs, a major proportion 
(45%) of their income is from wages. The share of imputed 
value of labour in income is 15 per cent. Thus, share of 
income from labour in total income is 60 per cent. But 
income from cultivation accounts for only 18 per cent of 
total income. The pure tenant is in effect more of a 
labourer than a cultivator. All the pure tenants are found 
to hire out labour (Table 4.11) . Thus, PTs lease in land to 
supplement their wage income. In the case of PLs the
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largest component (47%) of their income is from 
remittances. This is because the households whose heads 
have migrated and are employed in urban areas are pure 
lessors as there is not sufficient manpower in the 
household to self cultivate the land. The emigrant heads of 
households remit money regularly to their family members 
who reside in the village. In the case of landless 
labourers, share of wages in total income is the largest 
i.e. 7 9 per cent. The landless labourers and pure tenants 
also earn by catching and selling fish, carrying a 
palanquin, pulling a rickshaw, doing small jobs in marriage 
ceremonies when there is no agricultural work available 
which constitute 2 per cent and 5.7 per cent of their 
income respectively.
In contrast to Charapara where cultivation is the
major source of income for OCs and PRTs, in Harinababi in 
the case of OCs highest proportion of income is from
remittances (41%) and in the case of PRTs it is from
business (52%) . The PRTs are business men by caste and they 
earn their income from small business like a betel shop, or 
small restaurant. Table 4.12 shows that an owner cultivator 
hires out labour. But none does so in Charapara, Caste 
structure seems to be too rigid in Charapara. In the case 
of pure lessors remittances account for the largest
component (69%) of income. As heads of lessor households 
have migrated to urban areas for employment.
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon for OCs, PRTs, 
PTs and PLs the largest source of income is from salary. As
167
the village is situated near the Talcher Thermal Power 
Station and Talcher unit of South Eastern Coal Fields 
Limited and Samal barrage construction work, many residents 
work there as helpers, operators, drivers, fitters and 
peons. An owner cultivator also hires out labour for non- 
agricultural work under contractors as shown in Table 4.12. 
Income from cultivation is significantly negative for all 
cultivator classes. But in the case of PRTs and PTs 16 per 
cent and 2 3 per cent of their income come from imputed 
value of own labour respectively. In the case of PTs 23 per 
cent of their income is from imputed value of labour and 18 
per cent is from wages. All PTs are found to hire out 
labour. In non-irrigated agriculture work is not available. 
That is why the share of imputed value of labour is more 
than that of wages. Therefore, tenancy seems to be merely 
a labour adjustment mechanism rather than for any 
commercial purpose. Under other income pension and income 
earned by hiring out bullock-cart are included. In the case 
of casual labourers 98 per cent of their income is from 
hiring out labour.
To have a clear picture of the occupation of the 
households according to farmer category, the percentages of 
households engaged in different sources of income are 
presented in Table 4.12.
At the village level, it is found that in both 
Charapara and Harinababi the largest component of household 
income is from remittances followed by cultivation. In the 
case of Sandhagaon, salary constitutes the largest source
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of income followed by remittances. Thus, in none of the 
villages, cultivation turns out to be the largest source of 
income. The village can no longer be considered as a closed 
self-contained social unit. Rather, the village boundary is 
breaking down as remittances and salary income are found to 
play a greater role in the village economy than that of 
income from cultivation.11
In this context, one may question, can land be taken 
as an index to establish the position of a household in the 
class hierarchy. Therefore, we have measured the 
correlation coefficient between owned land, total asset 
value and total income. Table 4.13 reveals a high and 
significant correlation between the variables{see Table 
4.13) . Thus, in our study villages, land ownership reflects 
class position of a household in a village community. It is 
to be noted that in the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon 
the correlation coefficient between owned land and income 
is comparatively low and less significant, as other sources 
of income like salary are more important.
Here we try to sum up our major findings with respect 
to distribution of income and sources of income according 
to tenancy status. There is significant difference in 
annual income per household between pure lessors as a class 
and part tenants as a class in Charapara and Harinababi. 
Income per pure lessor household is higher than that of a 
part tenant in Charapara. And the reverse is true in
11 See Bailey (1971a) and Beteille (1971) for a vivid 
description of how village economy is gradually being integrated 
to the outer world.
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Harinababi. In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon, there 
is small difference in income per household between pure 
lessors as a class and part tenants as a class. The largest 
component of income in the case of part tenants is from 
cultivation in Charapara, small business in Harinababi and 
from salary in Sandhagaon. Income per household in the case 
of a pure tenant is significantly lower than that of a pure 
lessor in Charapara and Sandhagaon. In the case of pure 
tenants, the largest source of income is wages in Charapara 
and salary in Sandhagaon. In the case of pure lessors, the 
largest source of income is remittances both in Charapara 
and in Harinababi. But it is salary in Sandhagaon. Thus, in 
Charapara and Harinababi, the lessors are semi-absentee 
being in employment in urban areas, In Sandhagaon the 
lessors are residents in the village but salaried.
4.3.8 Consumption Expenditure
After considering information on the annual income of 
households, their consumption expenditure pattern should be 
studied so that deficit households can be identified and 
their adjustment mechanism to cover the deficit can be 
analyzed.
In a village the class position of a resident can 
easily be perceived from his style of living which includes 
the way he dresses, the food he takes, ceremonial expenses 
he incurs which can be captured in a single figure of his 
total consumption expenditure.
Data on household consumption expenditure according to
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farmer category reveal (Table 4.14) that in Charapara the 
annual consumption expenditure per household is the highest 
for OCs i.e. Rs.12,406 and then it gradually decreases 
being Rs.9,689 for PLs, Rs.8,380 for PTs, Rs.7,763 for PRTs 
and Rs.3,593 for landless labourers. In Harinababi the 
average consumption expenditure per annum is highest i.e. 
Rs.14,540 for PRTs and then Rs.13,514 for OCs and Rs.10,200 
for PLs. The annual consumption expenditure per capita is 
also calculated and it shows the same gradation as annual 
household consumption in both the villages.
In Sandhagaon (see Table 4.14) the annual consumption 
expenditure is highest in the case of OCs(Rs.25,7 00) and 
then gradually decreases being Rs.17,475 for PRTs, 
Rs. 12,917 for PLs, Rs.10,617 for PTs and Rs.9,287 for 
casual labourers. The consumption expenditure per capita is 
also shown in the table but it reveals the same gradation 
as per household consumption expenditure.
It is to be noted that average consuming members is 
the highest for OCs in all the study villages. Number of 
consuming members per household in the case of PLs is found 
to be lower than that of a PRT and a PT in all the study 
villages. This is due to the emigration of family members 
of PL households to urban areas.
The coefficient of correlation between annual income 
and annual consumption expenditure is found to be high and 
significant in three villages.12 A comparison of annual
12 The Pearsonian coefficient of correlation between annual 
income and annual consumption expenditure is calculated to be 
0.7 8 in Charapara, 0.63 in Harinababi and 0.74 in Sandhagaon at
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household income with annual household consumption 
expenditure reveals that in village Charapara the OCs and 
the PLs are surplus households (income being greater than 
consumption) and the remaining categories are deficit or 
just at the margin of subsistence. In village Harinababi 
the OCs and the PRTs are surplus households whereas the PLs 
are deficit households. In the non-irrigated village 
surprisingly the OCs are deficit households as the better 
off 'karans' lead an ostentatious life by spending a lot on 
festivals and sending bebhars (customary gifts) on 
ceremonies. In Sandhagaon the PRTs, the PLs are surplus 
households and the PTs and casual labourers are
significantly deficit households as they do not get
sufficient work due to the non-irrigated farming where most 
of the farmers follow monocropping.
We must consider to what extent this type of analysis 
in terms of annual income and annual expenditure to
determine the deficit households is appropriate. This is 
necessary since in rural areas income does not accrue 
regularly and it is actually very difficult to measure 
income accurately when the households are themselves 
producers and consumers. The measurement is not cent per 
cent scientific as some sort of arbitrariness enters into 
the calculation just to provide something rather than
nothing. For example, it is very difficult to measure the 
amount that a household spends on both labour and material 
to rear livestock and how much net income he earns out of
0.1% level of significance.
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it as he neither purchases the fodder and grass nor sells 
the products like milk, eggs and FYM, And it is also
fallacious to measure something monetarily in terms of 
profit and loss when that production activity was not 
undertaken with any profit motive. It is obvious that to 
understand the family farms who produce for their own 
subsistence consumption and not for the market an
alternative framework is necessary and Chayanov's attempt 
in this regard is commendable.13 But Chayanov's analysis is 
not applicable to India as hiring in/out of labour is ruled 
out in his model. Economists must attempt to develop a 
coherent and consistent theory to capture the essence of 
the market mechanism and production process in backward 
agriculture. Unfortunately, though existing neoclassical 
economics is criticised because of its inadequacy in 
explaining human behaviour in traditional agriculture, no 
effort has been undertaken to formulate an alternative 
appropriate theory in the context of India. Those who deny 
the neoclassicist explanation lean over to the readily
available Marxist theory and try to enlist certain tenets 
from Marx's writings by scanning it and with the help of 
that try to explain market transactions in backward
agriculture. But it is debatable to what extent a theory 
developed on the observations of a quite different society, 
with differing norms and developing under different socio­
economic conditions can explain the Indian situation. It is
13 In spite of various sharp criticisms levelled against 
Chayanov, his work is the first serious attempt to study 
subsistence peasant household behaviour in a scientific way.
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not to under — estimate the Marxist framework as a 
theoretical device, but what is required is to mould it 
creatively and scientifically to fit to the Indian 
setting.14
4.3.9 Inequality in Study Villages
A summary of observed inequality in three villages 
with respect to land ownership, asset possession, income 
and consumption expenditure is given in Table 4.15. It is 
shown that the coefficient of skewness is higher in 
Charapara in the case of all the variables excluding 
consumption expenditure than in the other two villages. 
Thus, one can suggest that inequality increases with 
increase in agricultural advancement.
4.3.10 Investment Expenditure
Having studied the sources of income and consumption 
expenditure of households, the logical next step is to 
probe the investment pattern of surplus households. How do 
surplus households invest their surplus income? Do they 
simply save it for contingencies? Or do they invest it in 
different channels? What are the different avenues for 
investment in rural areas? It is observed that in the 
irrigated villages most of the surplus OCs have constructed 
pacca houses with their surplus income and that they also 
undertake some land improvement measures which will be
14 Patnaik's (1983) explanation of retarded development of 
capitalist farming in India in terms of historical existence of 
high ground rent is one such example.
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discussed in greater detail in Chapter VII. In the non­
irrigated village the well-to-do farmers construct tile 
houses and also buy bullock-carts.
In all the villages, it is found that most of the 
surplus income of the landed class is of course depleted in 
expenses on daughter's marriage which range from Rs.20,000 
to Rs.60,000 depending on the status of the family and the 
buying price of the groom in terms of demanded dowry. The 
number of employed males of marriageable age is quite small 
in comparison to the heavy demand by the families with 
marriageable daughters. As a result, the parents of the 
would-be groom demand certain items like scooter, coloured 
television, refrigerator and cash to be given as dowry with 
the bride. Who agrees to pay that price, he wins the race 
and the marriage proposal is finalised with his daughter.
It is observed that cultivators borrow from their 
relatives and friends and even sell land to incur expenses 
for daughters' marriages. We will discuss this in the 
section on causes of indebtedness and sale of land.
4.3.11 Indebtedness of Households
After analyzing the investment pattern of surplus 
households, the next plausible step is to examine the 
adjustment and escape mechanism of deficit households in 
terms of their indebtedness and depletion of assets to meet 
emergencies. As the lease market and the credit market very 
often get interlocked, the problem of indebtedness has been 
studied in detail and with care. In this section the extent
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of indebtedness, sources of finance and purpose of
borrowing of different households are discussed and 
intercategory and interclass differences are highlighted.
4,3,11,1 Percentage of Households Indebted according to
Category and Class
Table 4.16 shows that in Charapara 56 per cent of PL 
households are indebted. In the case of PRTs, the
percentage of indebted households is 50 per cent. Thus, 
there is no significant difference in the percentage of 
indebted households between the PLs and PRTs. But in the
case of PTs, the indebted ratio is quite high i.e. 80 per
cent. In Harinababi none of the PLs is indebted, whereas 
all PRTs are in debt.
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon the percentage 
of indebted households is 33 per cent in the case of PLs, 
50 per cent for PRTs and cent per cent for PTs. Thus the 
indebted ratio is lower in the case of PLs than that of 
PRTs as well as the PTs.
At the village level the percentage of indebted 
households is the highest i.e. 64 per cent in the non­
irrigated village and it is 51 per cent in Charapara and 41 
per cent in Harinababi (Table 4.16).
As tenancy status is more fluid varying from year to 
year, the indebtedness of landed households has been 
studied according to different classes differentiated on 
the basis of ownership holding and the landless classes 
have been sub-divided into two classes like PTs and
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landless labourers (LLs).
A comparison of the indebtedness ratio of different 
landed classes reveals that in all the villages there is no 
clear tendency for ratio of indebtedness to decline with 
increase in holding size (see Table 4.17). But, somehow the 
inverse relationship between the indebtedness ratio and 
size of holding is more transparent in Charapara than in 
Harinababi. In Charapara while 62.5 per cent of the MFs are 
indebted it is only 2 0 per cent in the case of LFs. 
Interestingly, in Sandhagaon, the relationship is reverse, 
implying that the indebted ratio increases with increase in 
farm size. This is, in part due to more weightage of other 
sources of income like salary than that of income from land 
in total household income.
A comparison of the indebted ratio of pure tenants 
with that of landless labourers reveals that it is higher 
in the case of PTs than that of landless labourers in 
Charapara and Sandhagaon. In Charapara the indebted ratio 
for PTs is quite high i.e. 80 per cent and it is 64 per 
cent for LLs. In Sandhagaon all PTs are indebted, whereas 
67 per cent of LLs are indebted.
4.3.11.2 Sources of Credit
The eligibility of a household in getting a loan 
depends on its credit-worthiness, which is gauged by the 
type of collateral that the household is able to offer and 
also its access to and influence over the institutional or 
private sources of finance. Therefore, it is necessary to
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analyze the sources of finance according to farmer classes 
to assess the differential access of different classes to 
different sources.
4.3.11.2.1 Distribution of Number of Loans Among Different 
Sources
Table 4.17 shows that in village Charapara in the case 
of SFs, MDFs and LFs more than 75 per cent of the number 
of loans are from institutional sources like commercial 
banks, co-operatives and the government employment 
programme meant for the self-employment of educated youth. 
But in the case of MFs and PTs and LLs more than 50 per 
cent of the number of loans are from private sources and 
the rest are subsidised loans under government poverty 
alleviating programmes like Integrated Rural Development 
Programme(IRDP)15 and Economic Rehabilitation of Rural Poor 
(ERRP)16. It is clear from the table they do not have any 
access to institutional loans from commercial banks and 
cooperatives, where a borrower has to pledge some land or 
gold to get a loan and also one must have sufficient 
influence over or connection with the officer who will 
sanction the loan. It was found that the panchayat
15 IRDP refers to Integrated Rural Development Programme 
under which subsidised loans are disbursed to the poorest of the 
poor for acquiring income generating assets with the goal to lift 
them above the poverty line.
16 ERRP is the Economic Rehabilitation of Rural Poor 
Programme initiated by the state Government in 1980-81 and aims 
at improving the economic status of the poorest of the poor 
families particularly landless labourers. It provides subsidised 
loans to 10 poorest families in each village.
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secretary of the village was able to borrow for the second 
time from the co-operative even if he had an outstanding 
cooperative loan which was of course against the rules. 
Table 4.17 further shows that in Charapara in the case of 
MFs 14.3 per cent of number of loans are from other sources 
which are the housing loans from the company (the employer) 
being adjusted against salary. In Harinababi the SFs and 
MDFs have better access to loans from commercial banks and 
cooperatives than the MFs.
In Sandhagaon the SFs and MDFs have borrowed only from 
institutional sources. The PTs and LLs have mainly borrowed 
from private sources. In the case of PTs 10 per cent of 
loans are from other sources which is interestingly loans 
from the Yubak Sangha (youth club) in that village. Some 
young men of higher castes have formed a youth club to 
which each member contributes a paltry sum of rupees every 
month and with that fund they organise some village 
functions or sports events. And to increase their fund they 
lend it at exorbitant interest rates i.e. 120 per cent per 
annum, to co-villagers who are in financial need.
In all the villages about 40 to 45 per cent of number 
of loans are from private sources and about 3 0 to 40 per 
cent come under different government programmes. Thus only 
15 to 30 per cent of loans can genuinely be called an 
institutional loan. More importantly private sources still 
predominate as source of finance for the rural poor 
specifically for the MFs and the PTs and LLs.
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4.3.11.2.2 Distribution of Amount of Loans among
Different Sources
Distribution of amount of loan among different sources 
according to farmer class is presented in Table 4.18. The 
table shows that 46.1 per cent of loan amount in Charapara 
is from private sources and it is 25.8 per cent in 
Harinababi and 23.1 per cent in Sandhagaon. It is found 
that in the case of PTs and LLs major proportion of loans 
is from institutional sources under different government 
programmes, but from this one should not hastily conclude 
that the landless poor have access to formal loans. As 
subsidised loans under government programmes are meant for 
the poorest of the poor and are aimed at upliftment of the 
poor, it is natural that they get these loans. But none of 
the landless class is able to get a loan from a commercial 
bank or from cooperatives. Consequently, at the hour of 
their need, the rural poor knock at the door of private 
moneylenders who in most cases are their employers, lessors 
or shopkeepers. It is clear in the case of Harinababi and 
Sandhagaon that the percentage of loan from private sources 
for the landholding class is significantly low and it 
decreases with increase in size of holding. In Charapara 
this percentage is quite high because some of the 
households have borrowed from their relatives and friends 
for their daughter s' marriages (see Table 4.19 and Table 
4.20) .
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4.3.11.2.3 Distribution of Private Loans Among Different 
Sources
The distribution of amount of private loans among
different sources (Table 4.19) shows that in all the
villages, in the case of the landholding class a major
proportion of private loans is from friends and relatives.
But for the landless poor there is no well-to-do relative
to whom they can turn for financial assistance. As a
result, they value their patron-client relationship with
the resourceful rich villagers as an insurance against
qvW cul+cva lors
risk. Most of their loans are from cultivatorsAwith salary 
income in Charapara and Harinababi. As there is no 
professional moneylender class, salaried people like school 
teachers, lecturers, doctors and professional musicians are 
lending money to the needy. In Sandhagaon, a major amount 
of loans in the case of landless casual labourers and pure 
tenants is from shopkeepers. More detailed discussion will 
follow when discussing linked credit transactions in 
Chapter VIII.
Thus among private sources of finance, friends and 
relatives are major sources of finance in Charapara and 
Harinababi, and shopkeepers are important sources in 
Sandhagaon. Professional moneylenders as a class are 
totally absent in all the villages. Traders are also found 
to be unimportant as a source of finance.
4.3.11.3 Purpose of Borrowing
Data on distribution of amount of loans among
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different purposes and percentage borrowed for different 
purposes according to farmer class are contained in Table 
4.20 and Table 4.21 respectively. Table 4.21 reveals that 
in all the villages percentage of loans for consumption 
purposes is insignificant. The PTs and landless labourers 
borrow for consumption marginally. It is a fact that it is 
very difficult to know exactly the amount of consumption 
loans as usually the attached labourers and the deficit 
households take consumption loans in kind from the large or 
medium farmers in the month of September and October when 
their stock of paddy is finished and they repay it just 
after harvest in December and January or in terms of 
labour. As we conducted the survey in the month of June, 
the informants had more or less forgotten the amount of 
loan borrowed in kind as most of those loans had been 
repaid. But on questioning, the MFs and the PTs and the 
labourer class reported that it is an understanding between 
them and their employers and lessors for which the 
employers/lessors usually advance kind loans at the time of 
their need, on which no interest rate is charged.
In Charapara in the case of MFs, SFs and MDFs more 
than 50 per cent of loans is for the purpose of ceremonial 
expenses mostly for daughter's marriage. For PTs and LLs 
most of the loans are for small business which are the 
loans under government poverty alleviating programmes for 
self-employment like buying rickshaw, sheep, jersey cow, 
bullock and for frying 'mudhi' {puffed rice). In village 
Harinababi the highest proportion of loan for MFs, SFs and
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MDFs are for the purpose of ceremonial expenses, house 
building and for cultivation respectively. In the non­
irrigated village Sandhagaon in the case of SFs and MDFs 
all the loans are for cultivation. The major proportion of 
loan in the case of MFs, PTs and LLs are meant for small 
business, ceremonial expenses and small business 
respectively.
In all the villages production loans or loans for 
cultivation are found to be important than loans for 
consumption. This finding casts doubt on the applicability 
of Bhaduri's model to our study villages. In his (1983a) 
model of agricultural backwardness, Bhaduri assumes that 
consumption loans by deficit households become an integral 
part of the exchange mechanism.
4.3,11.4 Extent of Indebtedness
Here an attempt has been made to determine the 
indebtedness status of the households by subtracting the 
amount of government subsidy and the amount repaid from the 
amount borrowed. The result is given in Table 4.22. In 
Charapara the landed class on an average are more indebted 
than the landless class. This is because of their better 
access to credit facilities. But this difference is not so 
conspicuous in Sandhagaon. And it was observed that whereas 
the landless class are somehow repaying their loans, the 
landed class do not care to repay the loans under 
government employment schemes and pumpset loans as by their 
influence they can deter punitive actions.
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Then we attempt to examine whether there is any 
association between borrowing and indebtedness of a 
household with its economic status. For this purpose we 
calculated the correlation coefficients of total amount
borrowed (TOTALBOR) and extent of indebtedness (INDEBT)
*
with total owned land (OLANDT), total asset value (TASSETV) 
and annual total income (TOTALIN) of households. Results 
are given in Table 4.23. It is shown that the extent of 
indebtedness is positively correlated with asset and income 
variables in the advanced village Charapara, whereas it is 
negatively correlated in Harinababi and Sandhagaon. The 
correlation coefficients are also found to be higher and 
more significant in village Charapara than that of other 
two villages.
4.3.11*5 Mode of Repayment of Loan
The findings regarding repayment of loans in different 
modes are summarised in Table 4.24. This table shows that 
the landholding class mainly repay their loans by income 
from cultivation and salary. The landless rural poor repay 
their loans mostly from business (petty) income like income 
earned by pulling rickshaw, selling milk, hiring out 
bullock cart (in Sandhagaon) and the like. Also they repay 
loans from wage income, sometimes in terms of labour on the 
lender's field, in terms of crop as contracted and also in 
the worst case by selling asset like a young bullock or 
homestead land. Different contractual arrangements 
regarding repayment of loan, and linked loans as percentage
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of total private loan, and distribution of private loans 
according to interest rate charged (implicit and explicit 
and zero) will be discussed under linked credit contracts 
in Chapter VIII.
4.3.11.6 Results of Regression Analysis with Respect to 
Borrowing, Debt Burden and Default Rate
In the estimated regression equations amount of total 
borrowing, the debt burden and the default ratio are the 
dependent variables and income is the explanatory variable. 
Table 4.25 contains the regression results. In Charapara 
the total borrowing (TOTALBOR) is positively and 
significantly related with total income (TOTALIN), But debt 
burden (DEBTBURD) which is measured as the ratio of total 
borrowing to total income is negatively related with the 
logarithm of total income (LTINCOME) . There is . positive 
association between the default ratio (DEFAULTR i.e. the 
ratio of indebtedness to total borrowing) and the total 
income. DEFAULTR and LDEBTBUR (logarithm of DEBTBURD) are 
negatively related. Thus all regression coefficients are of 
expected signs and significant.
In Harinababi most of the regression coefficients are 
found to be not significant. Only DEBTBURD and LTINCOME are 
negatively and strongly related. This implies that debt 
burden decreases with increase in income.
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon, the 
relationship between DEBTBURD and LTINCOME is negative and 
significant. The regression coefficient in the case of
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LDEBTBUR as the explanatory variable and DEFAULTR as the 
dependent variable is estimated to be negative and 
significant.
Thus the amount of borrowing increases with increase 
in income. Debt burden decreases with increase in income. 
Default rate is positively related with income in Charapara 
and negatively in Harinababi and Sandhagaon. Default ratio 
and debt burden are negatively related in Charapara and 
Sandhagaon but positively related in Harinababi.
Now we attempt to enlist our main observations on
indebtedness of households in the sample villages. In
Charapara and Sandhagaon percentage of indebted households 
in the case of PTs is significantly higher than that of 
PLs. But no such difference is observed between PLs as a 
class and PRTs as a class. Percentage of indebted 
households decreases with increase in size of holding in 
Charapara. But in Sandhagaon, the relationship is reverse. 
With regard to sources of finance, non-institutional or
private sources are found to be important sources of
finance in all the villages. Specifically, the rural poor 
like PTs, LLs and MFs do not have access to loans from 
commercial banks and cooperatives. They primarily rely on 
private sources like cultivators, salaried people and 
shopkeepers for their credit needs. In all the villages 
professional moneylenders are conspicuous in their absence. 
Trader moneylenders are also unimportant, The MDFs and LFs 
mainly borrow from institutional sources and from friends 
and relatives. With respect to purpose of borrowing,
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consumption loans are less important than production loans. 
But PTs and LLs are found to borrow marginally from their 
lessors and employers in kind which they repay in terms of 
crop or labour.
4.3.12 Sale of Land
After analyzing one adjustment mechanism of the 
deficit households at time of financial stringency i.e. the 
indebtedness status of households, it is prudent to analyze 
the next harsh alternative i.e. that of selling assets 
which the households do most reluctantly.
Sale of asset is mainly sale of land in rural areas 
as land is the primary asset. There are some households 
which sell land at times of emergency like a daughter's 
marriage but they also purchase land when they have 
sufficient savings. Therefore, we have considered both sale 
and purchase of land by households in the last 3 0 years to 
obtain a complete picture of the economic status of the 
households.
Table 4.2 6 shows that even the owner cultivator MDFs 
and LFs sell land to meet the expenses for daughters' 
marriage. But they are also found to buy land to increase 
their operational holding. So for the medium and large 
farmers, sale of land is an interim sale with the hope of 
buying it back at a later date, not necessarily the same 
plot. But the landless labourers and the pure tenants sell 
their homestead land to incur ceremonial expenses like 
spending on funeral occasion.
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Interestingly two MFs in the irrigated villages 
reported selling land to repay bank loans. This shows that 
the impersonalised relationship with the government 
machinery sometimes compels the rural poor to undertake 
painful adjustment mechanisms. Of course, they could have 
avoided such adverse consequences if they could have 
borrowed from a patron. Landed households avoid lending to 
the poor as the recovery of loan is very difficult because 
of the social disapproval of any harsh stance taken by them 
to recover the loan. Of course the large farmers do not 
hesitate to lend if it is for their own benefit which is 
hidden behind their strategy of linked transactions.
None of the labourer households in our survey revealed 
losing owned land due to non-repayment of loan. All of them 
reported that their ancestors did not have any land. Only 
one resident in Charapara belonging to higher caste and 
landless single widow family reported losing land due to 
non-repayment of loan long ago i.e. about fifty years back, 
which throws some light on Bhaduri's (1977) explanation of 
usurious interest rates. This we will discuss in Chapter 
VIII.
Besides distress sale of land in emergency, sale of 
land for commercial purposes was also observed in the 
villages under study. In Charapara a part tenant MF is 
found to sell land to buy a bullock. Thus, poor peasants 
are found to borrow, sell land, sell crops to buy bullocks. 
Sometimes, they also sell bullocks to repay loans. Thus, 
sale and purchase of bullocks are observed in the sample
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villages. Therefore, tenancy as a bullock adjustment 
mechanism seems to have less relevance. In Harinababi, an 
owner cultivator MDF sold non-irrigated land to buy 
irrigated land. An owner cultivator SF in Sandhagaon 
reported selling land to a company as the land was upland 
and unsuitable for cultivation. As the land fetched a good 
price from the company, he decided to sell it. From this it 
is discernible that rural people are rational and are 
responsive to the market stimuli. They are ready to take 
advantage of any gainful economic opportunity.
It is noticed from the sale price of land for 
different years that there is remarkable appreciation in 
value of land (see Table 4.26) . In Charapara in the year 
1970 the price of one acre of irrigated land was Rs.5,000 
and it has increased to Rs.31,250 in 1988. In Harinababi it 
is Rs 42,500 in the year 1990. Price of land varies 
considerably with respect to quality, soil fertility, 
irrigation facility and nearness to village road and the 
like. In Sandhagaon the value of non-irrigated land has 
increased from Rs 5,000 per acre in 1975 to Rs.15,000 per 
acre in 1988. As price of land is increasing considerably, 
everybody wants to hold it unless compelled by extreme 
adverse circumstances to sell. Thus land transfer through 
sale is rare in the villages under study. A market for land 
exists in tenancy.
4.3.13 Purchase of Land
Findings regarding purchase of land are given in Table
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4.27 which shows that in the irrigated villages mainly the 
owner cultivator MDFs and LFs have purchased land. Most of 
them have some extra income from salary and professional 
income which enables them to buy land. In the non-irrigated 
village a part tenant MF and a PT have also purchased land 
with their salary income. As the village is located near 
Talcher Thermal Power Station and Talcher Colliery, and 
Samal irrigation project construction works, some of the 
labourer class are working there as unskilled workers and 
they purchase land. Consequently the scheduled castes are 
found to possess land. Thus other economic forces like 
alternative employment opportunities do play a role in 
structuring production relations in a village.
It is to be noted that the sale price of land (Table 
4.26) in any particular year is less than the buying price 
of land in same year (Table 4.27) . It may be due to the 
distress sale of land in emergencies which lowers its price 
in the market as the buyer is in a position to bargain. 
Usually in a village the number of potential buyers of a 
piece of agricultural land offered on sale is countable. 
Only the cultivators who will be able to cultivate that 
land will be interested in buying it. In most cases a 
farmer having land near the saleable land shows interest to 
buy it and also he must have the resources to purchase. 
Even in a village there are few cultivators capable of 
paying the price of land in one instalment. Thus the buyer 
of the land is in a monopsonist position to dictate the 
price and the plight of the seller is increased if he is in
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need of urgent money.
Thus in our study villages buying and selling of land 
are infrequent. Sale of land by medium farmers and large 
farmers to incur expenses on daughters' marriages reveal 
that they don't have much surplus income or savings. Most 
of the cultivators who have purchased land reported buying 
with income from salary and remittances. Thus, income from 
cultivation alone is not the determinant of class position 
in the sample villages.
4.3.14 Migration Details
Deficit households no doubt undertake temporary 
adjustment mechanisms like borrowing and selling assets at 
the time of paucity of finance, but when financial 
stringency recurs, the household as a whole has to think of 
a strategy which will provide a solution to the problem on 
a permanent basis. That is why some family members prefer 
to migrate to urban areas in quest of jobs. If they succeed 
in getting a job, they take up the job even if it involves 
unskilled labour which they would not have taken up in 
their native place because of their caste aversion towards 
manual labour. Thus the impersonalised atmosphere in the 
urban area widens their feasible choice set and getting 
employment becomes easier. Not all migration can be 
explained in this manner as some family members being 
educated obviously migrate to urban areas to hold white 
collar jobs. Due to the extended family system they 
continue to maintain link with their family members in the
191
village and regularly send money to their parents. The 
remittances that a household receives help in consolidating 
one's position in the village.
Detailed information on migration has been collected 
and is presented in tables from Table 4.28 to Table 4.34. 
As the emigration from the village has far reaching impact 
on the production relations observed in the village, it has 
been studied with utmost care and in detail.
Table 4.28 shows that in Charapara 47 per cent of the 
households have members who have emigrated from the 
village. In Harinababi the emigration ratio is 59 per cent. 
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon this ratio is much 
lower i.e. 24 per cent. Thus in the non-irrigated village 
the mobility is less due to inadequate knowledge about work 
opportunities in the outside world. It is found that few 
residents of this village are in high government posts 
where they can absorb the other co-villagers by their 
influence. Moreover, it is located amidst the industrial 
complexes which makes possible for the villagers to get 
jobs nearby the village.
A categorywise comparison of the migration ratio 
reveals that in village Charapara the emigration ratio is 
the highest for pure lessors(89%) followed by OCs (69%) and 
50 per cent for PRTs. And it is the lowest for the landless 
class. The same gradation is observed in Harinababi. In 
Sandhagaon the emigration ratio is the same 50 per cent for 
the PLs and PRTs and 20 per cent for OCs and the lowest 
(12.5%) for the landless labourers.
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Thus in irrigated villages the semi-absentee emigrants 
lease out their entire land-holdings. Therefore, in the 
case of PLs the emigration ratio is the highest. PRTs are 
found to be less mobile than the OCs. In Sandhagaon, there 
are resident pure lessors. Therefore, the emigration ratio 
is low in the case of PLs. In Charapara and Sandhagaon the 
PTs and LLs are found to be quite immobile.
Table 4.29 presents the regression results with 
migration as the dependent variable. In Charapara the 
number of members emigrating from a household (MIGR) is 
positively and significantly related to total owned 
cultivable land (OLANDT) of the household. Also there is 
negative and strong association between the ratio of adult 
members migrating (MIGRRA) and owned land per adult members 
including the emigrants (OLANDRA). There is positive and 
significant relation between the ratio of total members 
migrating (MIGRRAT) and owned land per family member 
including emigrants (OLANDRAT). Also the caste (CASTE) 
coefficients are found to be negative and significant. 
Caste has been entered as a dummy variable with value equal 
to one if scheduled caste but zero if otherwise. Thus the 
signs of all the regression coefficients are as expected in 
the village Charapara.
In the village Harinababi there is weak and positive 
relationship between MIGR and OLANDT and between MIGRRAT 
and OLANDRAT. MIGRRA is negatively related to OLANDRA but 
is not significant. The signs of all the co-efficients are 
as expected.
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In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon there is
be-t-wee.ru
strong and positive association^MIGR and OLANDT. And there 
is negative strong relation between MIGRRA and OLANDRA. But 
OLANDRAT and MIGRRAT are negatively associated in contrast 
to the irrigated villages but not significant.
An analysis of the types of jobs for which the family 
members have migrated {see Table 4.30) shows that in 
Charapara most of the OC household emigrants i.e. 63 per 
cent are employed in managerial and clerical jobs. 
Managerial jobs include administrative jobs and all class 
I and class II employees of state government like 
engineers, doctors, supervisors and superintendents. 
Clerical jobs refer to class III employees of the state 
government like teachers, cashiers, clerks. In the case of 
PRTs all the emigrants are employed in unskilled work. For 
PLs 7 8 per cent are engaged in unskilled manual labour. One 
landless labourer has sent his son to an urban area to work 
as a hotel boy. In Harinababi 64 per cent of the OC 
emigrants are engaged in unskilled manual labour. And in 
the case of PLs cent per cent emigrants are engaged in 
unskilled manual labour. Most of them are working in the 
non-government sector. As the residents of Harinababi 
belong to the middle caste in comparison to higher caste 
residents of Charapara, they have mainly migrated for 
unskilled manual work.
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon 75 per cent of 
the PLs have emigrated for skilled work like helper and 
operator and they are industrially trained. A casual
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labourer has migrated to his wife's native place as work is 
available there. Also it is observed that in the irrigated 
village Charapara most of landless labourers' daughters 
after their marriage prefer to come back to this village as 
work is available here and are settling permanently. Thus 
there is considerable immigration of labourers to irrigated 
villages.
An interclass comparison of migration for different 
jobs (Table 4.31) reveals that most of the MDF and LF 
emigrants are engaged in managerial and clerical work 
whereas the MF and SF emigrants are mostly unskilled 
workers. The landless labourers hesitate to migrate as they 
do not have the initial sum that is required to start job 
hunting. Thus the class cleavage is gradually being 
solidified in this manner. The education level of the
emigrants has been given in Table 4.32 and naturally the
education level of emigrants tallies with the jobs in which 
they are engaged.
Then the distance traversed by the emigrants as per 
farmer class is given in Table 4.33. It is revealed that in 
the irrigated villages most of the migrants have moved to
places which are at a distance of more than 100 kms
including Calcutta and distant states like Uttar Pradesh, 
Punjab, Delhi and Karnataka and even Nepal. But in 
Sandhagaon most of the emigrants are employed within 50 kms 
of the village. Thus the residents of Sandhagaon are less 
mobile than that of irrigated villages.
A villagewise comparison of duration of migration (see
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Table 4.34) unfolds that in the advanced village Charapara 
3 6 per cent of the migrants migrated more than fifteen 
years ago and 3 9 per cent have migrated within the last 5 
years. Those who have migrated within last five years 
belong to the second generation and are much younger and 
have migrated mostly for clerical and managerial jobs. In 
Harinababi and also in Sandhagaon the largest proportion 
i.e. 38 per cent of the migrants have moved within the last 
5 to 10 years. Thus the households in these two villages 
have been mobile quite later than that of Charapara.
But it is to be noted that in the case of irrigated 
villages those emigrants who have migrated more than 
fifteen years ago are the marginal farmers. They did not 
have sufficient income from cultivation to meet their 
consumption. That is why they had to migrate mainly to 
Calcutta. They had to take up unskilled manual jobs liJ^ e 
gardener, peon, cook in private sectors. They were low paid 
and there was no job security. Thus the emigration of 
marginalised peasantry from Charapara and Harinababi to 
Calcutta was not due to any pull factor of growth and 
income but under the push factor of indebtedness, 
pauperisation and unemployment and as a survival strategy 
of the last resort. Though the emigrants stayed in urban 
area, their family members used to stay in the villages. It 
was quite impossible on their part to maintain their family 
in urban areas with the meagre salary that they were 
getting. Thus the neoclassical explanation of migration in 
terms of benefit (expected income) and cost does not hold
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good in this context. According to Marxists crisis occurs 
when relations of production not only impede the 
development of productive forces but entail declining 
living standards and economic stagnation. Thus this 
migration can be better understood in a Marxist framework 
in terms of exploitation and as a symptom of feudal 
crisis.17 The impact of migration on the village economy 
will be dealt with where appropriate while studying tenancy 
and linked transactions.
4.4. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
In this section we attempt to summarise our main 
findings with regard to tenancy which have theoretical 
implications.
Firstly, in all the three study villages all the pure 
tenants are scheduled castes. Peasantry is more 
differentiated in the irrigated village Charapara than in 
Harinababi and Sandhagaon. Caste rigidity is more observed 
in Charapara.
Secondly, tenants as well as lessors are mostly 
marginal and small farmers. There is no significant 
difference in ownership holding between the lessors as a
17 To explain this in detail, one needs to trace the 
evolution of property rights in Orissa. During the native Hindu 
rule, the Maratha rule and the Mughal periods, there was no 
absolute property rights in land. The cultivating peasantry 
enjoyed security of tenure on the land they cultivated as long 
as they paid the required share of the produce to the-authority. 
During the British rule in the year 1804 the zamindars were 
conferred proprietary rights on land. The zamindars were only the 
rent collectors in pre-British period. Thus, the actual tillers 
of land became tenants and the revenue farmers became the de 
facto owners of land. Thus a marginalised peasantry was created 
which had adverse effects on Orissan economy in later years.
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class and the tenants as a class.
Thirdly, with regard to asset ownership structure, the 
lessors are not found to be the wealthy, rich and big 
farmers representing the so-called landlord class. Rather 
there is no significant difference in asset ownership 
between the lessor class and the landowning tenant class. 
But there is ample difference in asset ownership between 
the part tenants (higher) as a class and the pure tenants 
as a class. Therefore, tenants should not be considered as 
a homogeneous class and it is wrong to join together the 
part tenants and pure tenants under one class i.e. tenants.
Fourthly, with respect to distribution of annual 
household income, no systematic difference is observed 
between lessors as a class and part tenants as a class 
across villages. But income per household in the case of 
a pure tenant is significantly lower than that of a pure 
lessor in both Charapara and Sandhagaon.
Fifthly, with respect to sources of income, in the 
case of pure lessors, the largest source of income is 
remittances both in Charapara and in Harinababi. But it is 
salary in Sandhagaon. Thus, in Charapara and Harinababi, 
the lessors are semi-absentee being in employment in urban 
areas, In Sandhagaon the lessors are residents in the 
village but salaried. In the case of part tenants, the 
greatest component of income is from cultivation in 
Charapara, small business in Harinababi and from salary in 
Sandhagaon. In the case of pure tenants, the largest source
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of income is wages in Charapara and salary in Sandhagaon. 
Thus cultivation as a source of income is losing 
importance.
Sixthly, with regard to indebtedness/ in Charapara 
and Sandhagaon the percentage of indebted households is 
significantly higher in the case of pure tenants than that 
of part tenants. Indebted ratio is higher for part tenants 
than that of pure lessors in Harinababi and Sandhagaon.
More importantly private sources still predominate as 
source of finance for the rural poor specifically for the 
marginal farmers, pure tenants and landless labourers.
None of the landless class is able to get a loan from
a commercial bank or from cooperatives. Most of their
and Ciulicuaiors
loans are from cultivators^with salary income in Charapara 
and Harinababi and from shopkeepers in Sandhagaon. In the 
absence of developed credit market, they value their 
patron-client relationship with the resourceful rich 
villagers as an insurance against risk .
Professional moneylenders as a class are totally 
absent in all the villages. Traders are also found to be 
unimportant as a source of finance.
In all the villages production loans or loans for 
cultivation are found to be more important than loans for 
consumption.
In Charapara the landed class on an average are more 
indebted than the landless class. This is because of their 
better access to credit facilities. But this difference is 
not so conspicuous in Sandhagaon. And it was observed that
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whereas the landless class ajf« somehow repaying its loans, 
the landed class do not care to repay the institutional 
loans.
Seventhly, with regard to the land market, sale and 
purchase of land are infrequent. Nobody sells land unless 
compelled by extreme adverse circumstances. Sale of land 
even by medium farmers and large farmers to incur expenses 
on daughters' marriages reveals that they don't have much 
surplus income or savings. Excepting one case, no landless 
households reported losing their land due to non-repayment 
of loan. Land transfer through sale is rare in the villages 
under study. A market for land exists in tenancy.
Eighthly, with respect to migration, in irrigated 
villages in the case of PLs the emigration ratio is the 
highest. The semi-absentee emigrants lease out their entire 
land-holdings. PRTs are found to be less mobile than tl\e 
OCs. In Sandhagaon, there are resident pure lessors. 
Therefore, the emigration ratio is low in the case of PLs. 
In Charapara and Sandhagaon the PTs and LLs are found to be 
quite immobile.
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TABLE 4 .1
Deeographic Statistic*
Cuttack, Dhenkanal and Orissa, 1981
Features CUTTACK
DISTRICT
DHENKANAL
DISTRICT
ORISSA
STATE
Total Population 4,62B,600 1,582,787 26,370,271
Decennial Population 
Growth Rate <1971-61)
20.9 22.3 20.2
Density of Population 
(per Sq. Km.)
415 146 169
Literacy Rate 45.4 36.9 34.2
% of Urban Population to 
Total Population
10.3 7.8 11.8
X of Total Population
Main Workers 27.7 31.5 32.8
Marginal Workers 1.6 5.1 5.3
Non-workers 70.8 63.4 62.0
X of Main Workers
Cu Itivators 44.7 46.0 46.9
Agricultural Labourers 23.7 27.1 27.8
Household Industry 3.1 3.4 3.3
Other Workers 28.4 23.6 22.0
X of Scheduled Castes 
to Total Population
17.7 15.8 14.7
X of Scheduled Tribes 
to Total Population
3.1 12.3 22.4
Source: Census of India, 1981, Series-16, Part-XIII, District Census 
Handbook, Part B- Village and Townwise Primary Census Abstract, 
Cuttack and Dhenkanal.
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TABLE 4 . 2
Selected Socio-Economic Indicators of Three Study Villages
Sl.N Characteristics CHARAPARA HARINABABI SANDHAGAON
1 Tots I Households 43 22 33
2 Scheduled Caste Households 16 (37) - 20 (61)
3 Total Population 151 179 234
AduIts 95 (63) 103 (58) 126 (54)
Chi Idren 56 (37) 76 (42) 108 (46)
4 Avg. Fami ly Size 3.51 8.14 7.09
5 No. of Emigrants 28 21 13
6 Edueation(Adults)
11 literate 7 (7) 13 (13) 28 (22)
Literate 7 (7) 1 (1) 21 (17)
Primary 22 (23) 17 (16) 18 (15)
M.E. 15 (16) 30 (29) 28 (22)
H.S. 27 (29) 32 (31) 23 (18)
Above H.S. 17 (18) 10 (10) 8 (6)
7 Total Owned Area(acres) 93.12 48.78 43.6
Irrigated 61.04 (55) 30.7 (63) -
Non-i rrigated 42.08 (45) 18.08 (37) 43.6
8 Avg. Owned HoLding(acres) 5.54 3.61 2.91
9 Area under Tenancy(acres) 18.62 6.12 17.9
10 Total Operational Area(acres) 98.46 52.38 43.62
11 % of Ope. Area under Tenancy 18.9 11 .7 41 .0
12 Avai labi lity of Irrigation Ju ly-Sept, Ju ly-Sept, -
Perennial Canal Irrigation Jan, ApriI Jan, ApriI -
13 Annual Rainfall 1677 mm. 1577 mm. 1421 mm.
14 Soi I Type Loam, Alluvium Loam, Alluvium Lateritic red
15 Cropping Pattern
Kharif Paddy Paddy Paddy
Rabi Grams,G.Nut Grams,G.Nut Potato
Potato,Jowar Vegetables, Jute
Summer Green Gram Green Gram
Autumn Paddy Paddy
16 X of area under HYV Paddy 34.6 24.1 19.4
17 Avg. Yield of Paddy (qt Is/acre) 10.3 11.0 6.6
1B Avg. Gross Cropped Area (acres) 6.61 4.39 2.82
19 Avg. Cropping Intensity 1.57 1.56 1 .05
20 Avg. Asset Ownership (Rs) 99,902 1,19,823 57,493
21 Avg. Annual Income (Rs) 11,728 16,279 11 ,750
22 Avg. Annual Consumption (Rs) 8,418 13,295 I 14,430
23 X of Indebted Households 51.2 40.9 63.6
24 Avg. Indebtedness (Rs) 4,369 3,078 2,514
25 X of loan from Private Source 46.1 25.8 23.1
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percentages of total. 
M.E.- Minor Education, H.S.- Higher Secondary
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TABLE 4 . 3
D i s t r i b u t i o n  O f  H o u s e h o ld s :  F a r a e r  C a t e g o r y  and C a s te
Village\ 
Category khandayat
Caste
Karan Gudla SC Total Percentage
CHARAPARA(I)
OC 13 - - 13 30.2
OT 3 - - 3 7.0
TO 1 - ■ 1 2.3
PT - - 5 5 11.6
PL 9 • - 9 20.9
LCL - - 8 8 18.6
AL - - 1 1 2.3
FS - - 2 2 4.7
Others 1 - - 1 2.3
Tota I 27 * 16 43 100.0
HAFUNABABI (I)
OC 2 - 12 14 63.6
OT - - 3 3 13.6
TO • - 2 2 9.1
PL - - 3 3 13.6
Total 2 
SANDHAGAON(NI)
20 22 100.0
OC - 4 - 1 5 15.2
OT - 3 - - 3 9.1
TO - - - 1 1 3.0
PT - - - 6 6 18.2
PL - 5 - 1 6 18.2
LCL - - * 9 9 27.3
Others - 1 ■ 2 3 9.1
Total • 13 - 20 33 100.0
Grand Total 29 13 20 36 98
Notes: Owner CuItivator(OC), Owner Tenant(OT), Tenant Owner(TO), Pure 
Tenant(PT), Pure Lessor(PL), Landless Casual Labourer(LCL),
Attached Labourer(AL), Farm Servant(FS)
Khandayat and Karan: Upper caste, Gudia: Middle caste, SC: scheduled caste.
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TABLE 4 . 4
Distribution of Owned Landholding 
According to Tanancy Status and Farmer Class
Category
Number
of
Housaho Ids
CHARAPARA
Owned
Area
Acres
Avg.
Holding
Acres
No. of 
House- 
ho Ids
HARINABABI
Owned
Area
Acres
Avg.
Holding
Acres
No. of 
House­
holds
SANDHAGAON
Owned
Area
Acres
Avg. 
HoIding 
Acres
Owner Cultivator
MF - - - 2 3.80 1 .90 1 0.24 0.24
SF 2 5.66 2.83 6 20.38 3.40 3 11.00 3.67
MDF 6 42.84 7.14 6 35.98 6.00 1 5.50 5.50
LF 5 68.50 13.70 - - - - - -
Tota I 13 117.00 9.00 14 60.16 4.30 5 16.74 3.35
Owner Tenant
MF 2 4.24 2.12 1 2.00 2.00 2 3.50 1.75
SF 1 2.72 2.72 1 4.20 4.20 - - -
MDF ■ - - 1 7.00 7.00 1 5.00 5.00
LF • - - - - * - - -
Total 3 6.96 2.32 3 13.20 4.40 3 8.50 2.83
Tenant Owner
MF 1 1.96 1.96 2 1.92 0.96 1 0.48 0.48
SF - * - - - - -
MDF - - - - - - -
LF - - - - * - -
Total 1 1 .96 1 .96 2 1.92 0.96 1 0.48 0.48
Pure Lessor
MF 5 5.48 1.10 3 4.20 1 .40 3 4.88 1 .63
SF 3 12.76 4.25 - - - 1 3.00 3.00
MDF 1 - 8.00 - - - 2 10.00 5.00
LF - - • - - - - - -
Tota I 9 1B.24 2.03 3 4.20 1 .40 6 17.88 2.98
Grand Total 26 144.16 5.54 22 79.48 3.61 15 43.60 2.91
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TABLE 4 . 5
D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Owned A re a  A c c o r d i n g  t o  E a r n e r  C la s s
CHARAPARA HARINABABI SANDHAGAON
C lass No. of Owned Avg. No. of Owned Avg. No. of Owned Avg.
House­ Area Holding House­ Area Holding House­ Area HoIdi ng
holds Acres Acres holds Acres Acres holds Acres Acres
MF 8 11.68 1.46 8 11.92 1.49 7 9.1 1,30
(30.8) (8.1) (36.4) (15.0) (46.7) 20.9
SF 6 21.14 3.52 7 24.58 3.51 4 14 3.50
(23.1) (14.7) (31.8) (30.9) (26.7) (32.1)
MDF 7 42.84 6.12 7 42.9B 6.14 4 20.5 5.13
(26.9) (29.7) (31.8) (54.1) (26.7) (47.0)
LF 5 68.5 13.70 . . . - . .
(19.2) (47.5) • - - -
Tota I 26 144.16 5.54 22 79.48 3.61 15 43.6 2.91
(100.0) (100.0) (100,0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percentages of total.
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TABLE 4 . 6
Average Land Operated per Household, 
Percentage Distribution of Operational Land 
and Percentage of Operated Land Irrigated 
According to Farmer Class
Vi I lage\ 
Class
No. of 
House- 
holds
Tota I 
Land 
Operated 
Acres
Operated 
Land per 
House- 
ho Id
X of 
House- 
holds
X of 
Land 
Ope­
rated
X of 
Operated 
Land 
Irrigated
CHARAPARA
MF 1 0.32 0.32 4.5 0.2 100.0
SF 7 24.70 3.53 31.8 16.2 53.2
MDF 9 60.08 6.68 40,9 39.4 59.6
LF 5 67.54 13.51 22.7 44.2 51.6
Total 22 152.64 6.94 100.0 100.0 55.0
HARINABABI
MF 2 3.80 1 .90 10.5 4.4 79.2
SF 9 31.00 3.44 47.4 35.9 64.2
MDF 8 51.50 6.44 42.1 59.7 54.3
Tota I 19 86.30 4.54 100.0 100.0 58.7
SANDHAGAON
MF 5 6.64 1 .33 33.3 15.2 -
SF 7 23.48 3.35 46.7 53.8 ■
MDF 3 13.50 4.50 20.0 30.9 -
Total 15 43.62 2.91 100.0 100.0 -
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TABLE 4 . 7
Asset Structure of Households
According to Farmer Category Rupees per Household
Vi I lage\ 
Category
Agri - 
cu Itural 
Land
Rea I 
Estate
Live­
stock
Agri - 
cultural 
Implements
Consumer
Durables
Go Id 
and 
Si Iver
Savings Receiv- 
ab les
Tota I
CHARAPARA
OC 168.750 31,385 7,623 246 7,500 12,308 8,000 1,308 237,119
PRT 41.813 22,250 6,725 125 2,250 1,750 3,000 100 78,013
PT - 2,200 6,000 100 - - - - 8,300
PL 54,667 21,222 2,872 28 2,222 5,778 4,000 722 91,511
LL - 1,727 1,136 - 82 - 16 - 2,962
Others - 1,500 2,000 - - - - - 3,500
Tota I 66,349 16,733 4,566 103 2,963 5,093 3,539 556 99,902
HARINABABI
OC 83,250 28,857 5,964 214 4,214 11,643 6,357 7 140,507
PRT 56,700 25,000 6,600 210 2,600 7,800 1 ,000 240 100,150
PL 24,250 21,000 2,500 - 2,333 6,000 - - 56,083
Tota I 69,170 26,909 5,636 184 3,591 10.000 4,273 59 119,823
SANDHAGAON
OC 53,568 49,210 8,140 1,240 7,500 13,600 - 133,258
PRT 35,920 30,550 7,150 1,700 3,550 6,750 - 85,620
PT - 12,017 3,817 400 416 - 2,233 18,883
PL 50,667 44,433 2,450 250 4,250 7,167 2,000 111,217
LL - 5,922 756 - 100 - - 6,778
Others * 13,933 - - 700 1,000 - 15,633
Tota I 21,682 24,305 3,445 512 2,506 4,273 770 57,493
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TABLE 4 . 8
P e r c e n t a g e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  A s s e t s  Among F a rm e r  C la s s e s
Vi I lage\ 
C lass
% of 
Tota I 
HousehoIds
Agl.
Land
Real
Estate
Live­
stock
Ag I, 
Imp la­
ments
Consumer 
Durab les
Gold 
and 
SiIver
Savings Receiv- 
ab les
Tota I
CHARAPARA
MF 18.6 7.7 24.5 12.0 6.7 11.8 14.6 16.4 16.3 11.5
SF 14.0 13.9 17.4 16.5 13.5 8.6 14.6 15.1 12.6 14.5
MDF 16.3 33.4 24.6 26.5 41.6 25.9 40.6 32.2 71 .1 31 .9
LF 11.6 45.0 29.2 22.4 27.0 53.0 30.1 36.1 - 40.2
PT 11.6 - 1.5 15.3 11.2 - - - - 1 .0
LL 25.6 - 2.6 6.4 - 0.7 - 0.1 - 0.8
Others 2.3 - 0.2 1 .0 - - - 0.0 - 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
HARINABABI
MF 36.4 14.3 25.0 29.2 25.9 24.1 22.7 7.4 92.3 18.2
SF 31 .8 30.3 31 .4 29.8 32.1 31 .6 24.1 26.6 - 29.9
MDF 31 .8 55.4 43.6 40.9 42.0 44.3 53.2 66.0 7.7 51 .9
Tota I 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SANDHAGAON
MF 21 .2 22.9 31 .3 27.1 42.0 38.7 33.3 - 47.2 28.6
SF 12.1 31 .3 19.4 28.0 20.1 44.1 25.5 - - 25.7
MDF 12.1 45.8 28.5 18.8 23.7 10.5 39.0 - - 34.0
PT 18.2 - 9.0 20.1 14.2 3.0 - - 52.8 6.0
LL 27.3 - 6.6 6.0 - 1 .1 - - - 3.2
Others 9.1 - 5.2 - - 2.5 2.1 - - 2.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0
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TABLE 4 . 9
Percentage Distribution of Assets Among Different Types 
According to Farmer Category
Vi I lage\ 
Category
Agl.
Land
Real
Estate
Live­
stock
Agl. 
Imp la­
ments
Consumer 
Durab les
Go Id 
and 
Si Iver
Savi ngs Receiv- 
ab les
Tota I
CHARAPARA
OC 71.2 13.2 3.2 0.10 3.2 5.2 3.4 0.55 100.0
PRT 53.6 28.5 8.6 0.16 2.9 2.2 3.8 0.13 100.0
PT - 26.5 72.3 1.20 - - - - 100.0
PL 59.7 23.2 3.1 0.03 2.4 6.3 4.4 0.79 100.0
LL - 58.3 38.4 - 2.8 - 0.6 - 100.0
Others - 42.9 57.1 - - - - - 100.0
Total 66.4 16.7 4.6 0.10 3.0 5.1 3.5 0.56 100.0
HARINABABI
OC 59.2 20.5 4.2 0.15 3.0 8.3 4.5 0.01 100.0
PRT 56.6 25.0 6.6 0.21 2.6 7.8 1.0 0.24 100.0
PL 43.2 37.4 4.5 - 4.2 10.7 - - 100.0
Tota I 57.7 22.5 4.7 0.15 3.0 8.3 3.6 0.05 100.0
SANDHAGAON
OC 40.2 36.9 6.1 0.9 5.6 10.2 - - 100.0
PRT 42.0 35.7 8.4 2.0 4.1 7.9 - - 100.0
PT - 63.6 20.2 2.1 2.2 - - 11.8 100.0
PL 45.6 40.0 2.2 0.2 3.8 6.4 - 1 .8 100.0
LL - 87.4 11.1 - 1.5 - - - 100.0
Others - 89.1 - - 4.5 6.4 - - 100.0
Tota I 37.7 42.3 6.0 0.9 4.4 7.4 - 1 .3 100.0
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TABLE 4 .1 0
Distribution of Annual Household Income Among Different Sources 
According to Farmer Category
Rupees per Househlod
Vi I lage\ 
Category
Culti- Imputed Dairy Poultry 
vation Value of
Own Labour
Sma 11 
Busi - 
ness
Salary Wage Rent Remitt­
ances
Others Tota I
CHARAPARA
OC 7,912 404 1,680 143 1,769 3,538 - 137 6,577 2,308 24,468
PRT 2,417 775 980 - - 1,500 - - 900 - 6,573
PT 777 652 600 172 - - 2,000 - - 222 4,424
PL 690 - 1.611 78 - 1,822 • 1 ,402 5,044 222 10,870
LL - • 205 57 - 136 2,593 - 109 187 3,287
Others - • 2,000 - - • - - - 680 2,680
Tota L 2,852 270 1,146 99 535 1,660 841 335 3,156 834 11 ,728
HARINABABI
OC 4,173 326 1,300 - 1 ,714 2,143 214 17 7,321 643 17,851
PRT 3,125 1,088 2,040 - 8,200 - - - 1,200 - 15,653
PL - - 2,333 - - - - 815 6,833 - 9,981
Total 3,366 455 1 ,609 - 2,955 1,364 136 122 5,864 409 16,279
SANDHAGAON
OC (1,122) 955 2,440 - - 18,480 540 - 1,000 - 22,293
PRT (1,500) 2,821 2,053 - - 12,000 - - 1 ,800 625 17,799
PT (1,060) 1,227 60 - - 2,600 993 - - 1,600 5,421
PL 10 25 1 ,000 - 3,000 7,900 - 1,750 1,200 1 ,200 16,085
LL - - - - - - 6,217 - - 111 6,328
Others - - - - * 1,920 450 - - 4,000 6,370
Total (543) 714 811 - 545 6,338 303 318 2,283 979 11,750
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TABLE 4 .1 1
Percentage Distribution of Income Among Different Sources 
According to Farmer Category
Vi I lage\ 
Category
Cu Itivation Imputed 
Value of 
Own Labour
Dairy Poultry Sma 11 
Business
Salary Wage Rent Remitt­
ances
Others Tota I
CHARAPARA
OC 32.3 1.7 6.9 0.6 7.2 14.5 - 0.6 26.9 9.4 100.0
PRT 36.8 11.8 14.9 - - 22.8 - - 13.7 - 100.0
PT 17.6 14.7 13.6 3.9 - - 45.2 - - 5.0 100.0
PL 6.3 - 14.8 0.7 - 16.8 - 12.9 46.4 2.0 100.0
LL - - 6.2 1.7 - - 78.9 - 3.3 5.7 100.0
Others - - 74.6 - - - - - - 25.4 100.0
Tota L 24.3 2.3 9.8 0.8 4.6 14.2 7.2 2.9 26.9 7.1 100.0
HARINABABI
OC 23.4 1.8 7.3 - 9.6 12.0 1.2 0.1 41 .0 3.6 100.0
PRT 20.0 7.0 13.0 - 52.4 - - - 7.7 - 100.0
PL - - 23.4 - - - - 8.2 68.5 - 100.0
Tota L 20.7 2.8 9.9 - 18.1 8.4 0.8 0.7 36.0 2.5 100.0
SANDHAGAON
OC -5.0 4.3 10.9 - - 82.9 2.4 - 4.5 - 100.0
PRT -8.4 15.8 11 .5 - - 67.4 - - 10.1 3.5 100.0
PT -19.5 22.6 1.1 - - 48.0 18.3 - - 29.5 100.0
PL 0.1 0.2 6.2 - 18.7 49.1 - 10.9 7.5 7.5 100.0
LL - - - - - - 98.2 - - 1.8 100.0
Others - - - - - 30.1 7.1 - - 62.8 100.0
Tota I -4.6 6.1 6.9 - 4.6 53.9 2.6 2.7 19.4 8.3 100.0
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TABLE 4 .1 2
Percentage of Households Engaged in Different Sources of Income 
According to Farmer Category
Vi I lage\ 
Category
No. of 
House- 
holds
Culti­
vation
Imputed 
Value of 
Own Labour
Dai ry Poultry Small
Business
Sa lary Wage Rent Remi tt- 
ances
Others
CHARAPARA
OC 13 100.0 30.8 100.0 46.2 15.4 23.1 - - 69.2 7.7
PRT 4 100.0 100.0 50.0 - - 25.0 - - 25.0 -
PT 5 100.0 100.0 40.0 60.0 - - 100.0 - - 40.0
PL 9 11.1 - 66.7 55.6 - 22.2 - 100.0 77.8 11.1
LL 11 . - 18.2 36.4 - 18.2 90.9 - 9.1 54.5
Others 1 - - 100.0 - - - - - - 100.0
Tota I 43 53.5 30.2 60.5 41 .9 4.7 18.6 34.9 20.9 41.9 25.6
HARINABABI
OC 14 100.0 35.7 71 .4 - 14.3 14.3 7.1 - 57.1 7.1
PRT 5 100.0 60.0 80.0 - 60.0 - - - 20.0 -
PL 3 - - 100.0 - - - - 100.0 100.0 *
Tota I 22 86.4 36.4 77.3 - 22.7 9.1 4.5 13.6 54.5 4.5
SANDHAGAON
OC 5 100.0 80.0 80.0 - - 80.0 20.0 - 20.0 -
PRT 4 100.0 75.0 75.0 - - 25.0 - - 50,0 50.0
PT 6 100.0 100.0 16.7 - - 33.3 66.7 - - 33.3
PL 6 16.7 16.7 66.7 - 16.7 50.0 - 100.0 33.3 16.7
LL 7 - - - - - - 100.0 - - 28.6
Others 3 - - - - - 66.7 33.3 - - 33.3
Total 31 51 .6 45.2 38.7 - 3.2 38.7 41.9 19.4 16.1 25.8
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TABLE 4.13
Correlation Coefficient between Owned Land Area 
Total Asset Value and Total Annual Income
VariablesX
Villages
TOTALIN OLANDT TASSETV
CHARAPARA 
(43) 
TOTALIN 
OLANDT 
TASSETV
1.00
0.81#
0.81#
1.00
0.98# 1.00
HARINABABI
(22)
TOTALIN
OLANDT
TASSETV
1.00
0.67#
0.70#
1.00
0.93# 1. 00
SANDHAGAON
(33)
TOTALIN
OLANDT
TASSETV
1.00 
0 .42* 
0.62#
1. 00 
0.92# 1 .00
Notes: # indicates 0.1% level of significance (1-tailed) 
* indicates 1% level of significance (1-tailed)
Figures in parentheses indicate number of cases
TABLE 4 . 1 4
Consumption Expenditure per Household and per Capita 
According to Farmer Category
Village\ No. of 
Category Households
Consumption 
Expenditure 
per Household 
Rs/Annum
Average 
Consumi ng 
Members 
No.
Consumption 
Expendi ture 
per Capita 
Rs/Annum
CHARAPARA
OC 13 12,406 6.4 1,943
PRT 4 7,763 6.0 1,294
PT 6 8,380 6.4 1,309
PL g 9,689 5.4 1,780
LL 11 3,593 3.6 988
Others 1 1,000 1.0 1,000
Tota I 43 8,418 5.3 1,581
HARINABABI
OC 14 13,514 8.3 1,631
PRT 5 14,540 8.2 1,773
PL 3 10,200 5.3 1,913
Total 22 13,295 7.9 1,691
SANDHAGAON
OC 5 25,700 9.6 2,677
PRT 4 17,475 8.0 2,184
PT 6 10,617 7.5 1,416
PL 6 12,917 6.5 1,987
LL 7* 9,287 8.3 1,121
Others 3 14,240 5.3 2,670
Total 31 14,430 7.7 1,880
Note: * Number of landless households is 7 instead of S due to 
missing data for two households.
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TABLE 4.15
Inequality in Owned Land Area, Total Asset Value, 
Total Income and Total Consumption Expenditure
VillageX
Variable
Skewness S.E. of 
Skewness
Number of 
Observations
CHARAPARA
OLANDT 1.42 0. 36 43
TASSETV 1. 37 0.36 43
TOTALIN 2.06 0. 36 43
TOTALCEX 1.29 0.36 43
HARINABABI
OLANDT 0.67 0.49 22
TASSETV 0.81 0.49 22
TOTALIN 1.02 0.49 22
TOTALCEX 0.32 0.49 22
SANDHAGAON
OLANDT 1.15 0.41 33
TASSETV 1. 01 0.41 33
TOTALIN 1.83 0.41 33
TOTALCEX 2.55 0.41 33
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TABLE 4 . 1 6
P e r c e n t a g e  o f  H o u s e h o ld s  I n d e b t e d  and S o u rc e s  o f  F i n a n c e
A c c o r d i n g  t o  F a rm er  C a t e g o r y
Vi Ilage\ 
Category
Total 
No. of 
Househo Ids
No. of 
Households 
in Debt
X of 
Total
No. of Hoseholds Borrowing 
From
Insti- Govt. Private 
tutional Programs Source 
Source
CHARAPARA
OC 13 4 30.8 3 1 -
PRT 4 2 50.0 1 1 1
PL 9 5 55.6 2 2 2
PT 5 4 80.0 - 2 4
LL 11 6 54.5 - 5 4
Others 1 1 100.0 - - 1
Tota I 43 22 51 .2 7
(31.8)
11
(50.0)
12
(54.5)
HARINABABI
OC 14 4 28.6 2 1 1
PRT 5 5 100.0 1 2 2
PL 3 - - - - -
Total 22 9 40.9 3
(33.3)
3
(33.3)
3
(33.3)
SANDHAGAON
OC 5 3 60.0 2 1 -
PRT 4 2 50.0 - 2 1
PL 6 2 33.3 1 1 -
PT 6 6 100.0 - 2 6
LL 9 7 77.8 - 4 6
Others 3 2 66.7 - 2 1
Tota I 33 21 63.6 3
(14.3)
12
(57.1)
14
(66.7)
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percentages of 
total indebted households.
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TABLE 4 .1 7
P e r c e n t a g e  o f  H o u s e h o ld s  i n  D eb t  and S o u rc e s  o f  F i n a n c e
A c c o r d i n g  t o  F a rm e r  C la s s
Vi llage\ Tota I No. of 
HousehoIds
X of
Ts\4- • 1
Number of Loans (percentage)
v* nu . u i 
Househo Ids in Debt
1 Qtfi I
Commercial Co-operative
Bank Govt.
Under
Program
Private
Sources
Others Tota I
CHARAPARA
MF 8 5 62.5 - - 42.9 42.9 14.3 100.0
SF 6 3 50.0 20.0 40.0 20.0 20.0 - 100.0
MDF 7 4 57.1 25.0 50.0 - 25.0 - 100.0
LF 5 1 20.0 - - 100.0 - - 100.0
PT 5 4 80.0 - - 33.3 66.7 - 100.0
LL 11 7 63.6 - - 50.0 50.0 - 100.0
Others 1 1 100.0 - - - 100.0 - 100.0
Tota I 43 25 58.1 5.9 11 .8 35.3 44.1 2.9 100.0
HARINABABI
MF 8 4 50.0 20.0 - 40.0 40.0 - 100.0
SF 7 2 28.6 - 50.0 - 50.0 - 100.0
MDF 7 3 42.9 33.3 - 33.3 33.3 - 100.0
Total 22 9 40.9 20.0 10.0 30.0 40.0 - 100.0
SANDHAGAON
MF 7 3 42.9 - - 75.0 25.0 0.0 100.0
SF 4 2 50.0 50.0 50.0 - - - 100.0
MDF 4 2 50.0 50.0 50.0 - - - 100.0
PT 6 6 100.0 - - 25.0 75.0 - 100.0
LL 9 6 66.7 - - 40.0 50.0 10.0 100.0
Others 3 2 66.7 - - 66.7 33.3 - 100.0
Total 33 21 63.6 6.9 6.9 37.9 44.8 3.4 100.0
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TABLE 4 . IB
D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Amount o f  Loan among D i f f e r e n t  S o u r c e s  o f  F i n a n c e
A c c o r d i n g  t o  Fa rm er  C la s s
Vi Ilage\ 
Class
No. of 
Indebted 
House­
ho Ids
Total
Amount
Borrowed
Rs
Commer­
cial
Bank
Rs
Co-ope 
rative
Rs
Under 
Govt. 
Programme 
Rs
Others
Rs
Insti- 
tutiona I 
Source 
Rs
X of 
Total
Private
Source
Rs
X of 
Total
CHARAPARA
MF 5 42,650 - - 10,850 10,000 20,850 48.9 21,800 51.1
SF 3 29.300 - 3,000 3,300 - 6,300 21 .5 23,000 78.5
MDF 4 26,000 2,000 7,000 - - 9,000 34.6 17,000 65.4
LF 1 25.000 - - 25,000 - 25,000 100.0 - -
PT 4 5,400 - - 4,000 - 4,000 74,1 1,400 25.9
LL 7 12,950 - - 11,000 - 11,000 84,9 1,950 15.1
Others 1 40 - - - - - - 40 100.0
Total 25 141,340 2,000 10,000 54,150 10,000 76,150 53.9 65,190 46.1
HARINABABI
MF 4 22,200 3,000 - 9,000 - 12,000 54.1 10,200 45.9
SF 2 8,400 - 8,000 - - 8,000 95.2 400 4.8
MDF 3 13,200 4,000 - 8,500 - 12,500 94.7 700 5.3
Total 9 43,800 7,000 8,000 17,500 - 32,500 74.2 11,300 25.8
SANDHAGAON
MF 3 35,900 - - 32,900 - 32,900 91 .6 3,000 8.4
SF 2 17,500 15,000 2,500 - - 17,500 100.0 - 0.0
MDF 2 5,600 3,000 2,600 - - 5,600 100.0 - 0.0
PT 6 18,300 - - 6,000 - 6,000 32.8 12,300 67.2
LL 6 20,850 - - 14,100 200 14,300 68.6 6,550 31.4
Others 2 9,500 - - 6,500 - 6,500 68.4 3,000 31.6
Total 21 107,650 18,000 5,100 59,500 200 82,800 76.9 24,850 23.1
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TABLE 4 . 1 9
D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Amount o f  P r i v a t e  Loan among D i f f e r e n t  S o u rc e s
A c c o r d i n g  t o  Fa rm er  C la s s
Vi I lage\ 
Category
CuItivator 
Rs
Cultivator Shopkeeper 
and 
Salaried
Rs Rs
Trader
Rs
Relatives\
Friends
Rs
Others
Rs
Total
Private
Loan
Rs
CHARAPARA
MF 800 6,000 - 15,000 - 21,800
SF - 3,000 - 20,000 - 23,000
MDF - - - 17,000 - 17,000
LF - - - - *
PT - 1,100 - 300 -
oo
LL 500 1,350 - 100 - 1,950
Others - - - - 40 40
Total 1,300 11,450 - 52,400 40 65,190
(2.0) (17.6) - (80.4) (0.1) (100.0)
HARINABABI
MF - - - 200 10,000 - 10,200
SF 400 - - - - - 400
MDF 700 - - - - - 700
Tota I 1,100 - - 200 10,000 - 11,300
(9.7) - - (1.8) (88.5) - (100.0)
SANDHAGAON
MF - - - - 3,000 - 3,000
SF - - - - - - -
MDF - - - - - - -
PT 800 1,500 10,000 - - - 12,300
LL 1,650 200 1,200 - - 3,500 6,550
Others - - 3,000 - - 3,000
Tota I 2.450 1,700 14,200 - 3,000 3,500 24,850
(9.9) (6.8) (57.1) • (12.1) (14.1) (100.0)
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percentages of total.
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TABLE 4 .2 0
D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Amount o f  Loan f o r  D i f f e r e n t  P u rp o s e s
A c c o r d i n g  t o  P a rm er  C la s s
Vi I lage\ No. of Cultivation Consumption Sma 11 Ceremonial House Tota I
C lass Indebted Business Bui Iding
Househo Ids Rs Rs Rs Rs Rs Rs
CHARAPARA
MF S 800 - 10,850 21,000 10,000 42,650
SF 3 3,000 3,000 3,300 20,000 - 29,300
MDF 4 9,000 - - 17,000 - 26,000
LF 1 - - 25,000 - - 25,000
PT 4 - 200 4,000 1 ,200 - 5,400
LL 7 - 1,950 11,000 - - 12,950
Others 1 - 40 - - - 40
Tota I 25 12,800 5,190 54,150 59,200 10,000 141,340
(9.1) (3.7) (38.3) (41.9) (7.1) (100.0)
HARINABABI
MF 4 200 - 9,000 13,000 - 22,200
SF 2 400 - - - 8,000 8,400
MDF 3 9,200 - - 4,000 - 13,200
Tota I 9 9,800 - 9,000 17,000 8,000 43,800
(22.4) - (20.5) (38.8) (18.3) (100.0)
SANDHAGAON
MF 3 3,000 - 32,900 - - 35,900
SF 2 17,500 - - - - 17,500
MDF 2 5,600 - - - - 5,600
PT 6 4,800 300 3.000 10,200 - 18,300
LL 6 - 350 19,100 1,400 - 20,850
Others 2 - - 6,500 3,000 - 9,500
Tota I 21 30,900 650 61,500 14,600 - 107,650
(28.7) (0.6) (57.1) (13.6) - (100.0)
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percentages of total.
222
TABLE 4 .2 1
P e r c e n t a g e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Amount o f  Loans  f o r  D i f f e r e n t  P u rp o s e s
A c c o r d i n g  t o  F a rm e r  C la s s
Vi I lage\ 
Category
Cu Itivation Consumption Sma 11 
Busi ness
Ceremonial House 
BuiIding
Total
CHARAPARA
MF 1 .9 - 25.4 49.2 23.4 100.0
SF 10.2 10.2 11.3 68.3 - 100.0
MDF 34.6 - - 65.4 - 100.0
LF - * 100.0 - - 100.0
PT - 3.7 74.1 22.2 - 100.0
LL - 15.1 84.9 - - 100.0
Others - 100.0 - - - 100.0
Tota I 9.1 3.7 38.3 41.9 7.1 100.0
HARINABABI
MF 0.9 - 40.5 58.6 - 100.0
SF 4.8 - - - 95.2 100.0
MDF 69.7 - - 30.3 - 100.0
Total 22.4 - 20.5 38.8 18.3 100.0
SANDHAGAON
MF 8.4 - 91.6 - - 100.0
SF 100.0 - - - - 100.0
MDF 100.0 - - - - 100.0
PT 26.2 1 .6 16.4 55.7 - 100.0
LL - 1 .7 91 .6 6.7 - 100.0
Others - - 68.4 31.6 - 100.0
Total 28.7 0.6 57.1 13.6 - 100.0
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TABLE 4 .2 2
Extent of Indebtedness of Households According to Farmer Class 
Amount Borrowed, Amount of Govt. Subsidy, Amount Repaid
Vi Ilage\ 
Class 1
No. of 
Households 
in Debt
Total
Amount
Borrowed
Rs
Amount of 
Govt. 
Subsidy 
Rs
Amount
Repaid
Rs
Extent of 
Indebted­
ness 
Rs
Indebted­
ness per
HousehoId 
Rs
CHARAPARA
MF 5 42,650 3,617 4,850 34,183 6,837
SF 3 29,300 1.100 500 27,700 9,233
MDF 4 26,000 - 500 25,500 6,375
LF 1 25,000 6,000 500 18,500 18,500
PT 4 5,400 3,000 1,600 800 200
LL 7 12,950 8,250 2,200 2,500 357
Others 1 40 - - 40 40
Tota I 25 141,340 21,967 10,150 109,223 4,369
HARINABABI
MF 4 22,200 3,000 1,300 17,900 4,475
SF 2 8,400 - 4,000 4,400 2,200
MDF 3 13,200 2,100 5,700 5,400 1,800
Tota I g 43,800 5,100 11,000 27,700 3,078
SANDHAGAON
MF 3 35,900 3,367 20,800 11,733 3,911
SF 2 17,500 5,000 7,500 5,000 2,500
MDF 2 5,600 - 600 5,000 2,500
PT 6 18,300 3,000 - 15,300 2,550
LL 6 20,850 5,467 5,450 9,933 1,656
Others 2 9,500 2,667 1,000 5,833 2,917
Tota I 21 107,650 19,501 35,350 52,799 2,514
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TABLE 4.2 3
Correlation Coefficient of Amount Borrowed and 
Extent of indebtedness with Owned Land Area, 
Total Asset Value and Total Annual Income
Variables\
Villages
OLANDT TASSETV TOTALIN
CHARAPARA
(43)
TOTALBOR
INDEBT
0.16
0.19
0.18 
0.20***
0.42*
0.42*
HARINABABI
(22)
TOTALBOR
INDEBT
-0.12
-0.16
— 0.11 
-0.15
-0.12
-0.17
SANDHAGAON
(33)
TOTALBOR
INDEBT
0.03
-0.05
0.15
-0.05
0 .18 
-0 .06
Notes: * indicates 1% level of significance (l-tailed) 
*** indicates 10% level of significance (1-tailed) 
Figures in parentheses indicate number of cases
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TABLE 4 , 2 4
Mode of Repayment of Loan
According to Farmer Class (in Rupees)
Vi I lage\ 
C lass
Total
Amount
Repaid
From
Farm
Income
From
Salary
Income
From
Business
Income
From
Wage
Income
In
Terms of 
Crop
In
Terms of 
Labour
By
Selling
Asset
CHARAPARA
MF 4,850 1,500 3,350 - - - -
SF 500 - 500 * ■ - -
MDF 500 - 500 - - - -
LF 500 - - 500 - - *
PT 1,600 - - 1,200 400 - -
LL 2,200 - * 600 400 500 700
Others * - - - - - -
Tota I 10,150 1 ,500 4,350 2,300 800 500 700
(100.0) (14.8) (42.9) (22.7) (7.9) (4.9) (6.9)
HARINABABI
MF 1,300 - - 1,100 - 200 - -
SF 4,000 - 4,000 ■ - - - -
MDF 5,700 1,700 4,000 * - - - *
Tota I 11,000 1,700 8.000 1,100 - 200 - -
(100.0) (15.5) (72.7) (10.0) - (1.8) - -
SANDHAGAON
MF 20,800 - - 20,800 - • - -
SF 7,500 1,000 6.500 - - - - -
MDF 600 - 600 - - - - -
PT - - - - - - - -
LL 5,450 - - 4,000 150 * - 1,300
Others 1 ,000 - - 1,000 - - - -
Total 35,350 1,000 7,100 25,800 150 - - 1 ,300
(100.0) (2.8) (20.1) (73.0) (0.4) - - (3.7)
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percentages of total.
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TABLE 4 .2 5
Results of Least-Squares Regression Analysis 
Borrowing, Debt Burden and Default Rate
Vi I lage Dependent
Variable
Explanatory 
Variab les
B S.E.(B) T-Value Sig(T) R Square F-Va lue 
(k-1,n-k d.f,
Sig(F)
)
CHARAPARA TOTALBOR TOTALIN 
Constant
0.20
971.61
0.068
1143.530
2.94
0.85
0.005
0.400
0.17 8.66
(1.41)
0.005
DEBTBURD LTINCOME 
Constant
-1.07
4.90
0.708
2.710
-1 .50 
1.80
0.150
0.084
0.09 2.26
(1,23)
0.146
DEFAULTR LTINCOME 
Constant
0.40
-0.84
0.178
0.683
2.25
-1.23
0.034
0.231
0.18 5.06
(1,23)
0.034
DEFAULTR LDEBTBUR
Constant
-0.21
0.60
0.111
0.086
-1 .85 
6.98
0.078
0.000
0.13 3.40
(1.23)
0.078
HARINABABI TOTALBOR TOTALIN
Constant
-0.04
2666.11
0.077
1432.527
-0.54 
1 .86
0.594
0.078
0.02 0.29
(1,20)
0.594
DEBTBURD LTINCOME
Constant
-1.04 
4.72
0.326
1.324
-3.20
3.57
0.015
0.009
0.59 10.22
(1.7)
0.015
DEFAULTR LTINCOME
Constant
-0.10
1.04
0.443
1.804
-0.23
0.58
0.826
0.581
0.01 0.05
(1,7)
0.830
DEFAULTR LDEBTBUR
Constant
0.27
0.50
0.314
0.206
0.85
2.42
0.425
0.050
0.09 0.72
(1,7)
0.425
SANDHAGAON TOTALBOR TOTALIN
Constant
0.08
2320.64
0.080 
1311.400
1.00 
1 .77
0.324
0.087
0.03 1 .00 
(1.31)
0.324
DEBTBURD LTINCOME
Constant
-1 .29 
5.72
0.503 
1 .891
-2.57
3.03
0.019
0.007
0.26 6.62
(1,19)
0.019
DEFAULTR LTINCOME
Constant
-0.15 
1.20
0.225
0.845
-0.6B
1.42
0.506
0.172
0.02 0.46
(1,19)
0.506
DEFAULTR LDEBTBUR
Constant
-0.31
0.54
0.156
0.090
-1.98
6.02
0.063
0.000
0.17 3.90
(1,19)
0.063
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TABLE 4 . 2 6
Sale of Land (Type and Acres) and Cause of Sale 
According to Farmer Category and Class
Vi llage\ SI 
Category
No.Farmer
Class
Area
So Id 
I
Acres
Value
Rs/Acre
Area
So Ld 
NI 
Acres
Value
Rs/Acre
Area
So Id 
Homestead 
Acres
Value
Rs/Acre
Year
So Id
Cause Area 
of Pur- 
Sale chased 
Acres
CHARAPARA
OC 1 SF 0.20 20,000 - - - - 1980 d. marriage -
OC 2 MDF - - 0.48 2,000 - - 1975 f.difficulty 0.28
2 MDF 0.16 5,000 - - - 1970 d. marriage -
OC 3 MDF 0.08 31,250 - - - 1988 d. marriage 2.50
OC 4 IF 0.40 12,500 - - - 1986 d. marriage
4 LF 0.80 15,000 - - - 1986 d. marriage
4 LF 0.28 17,500 - - - 1986 d. marriage
PRT 5 MF 0.10 19,000 - - - 1986 repay ERRP loan
PRT 6 MF 0.12 5,000 - - * - 1965 buy bullock
PRT 7 MF - - - - 0.10 50,000 1986 d. marriage
PT 8 - - - - 0.02 10,000 1980 mother's funeral
AL 9 - - - - 0.04 5,000 1965 father's funeral
Total 9 2.14 0.48 0.16 2.78
HARINABABI
OC 1 MF 0.08 28,750 - - - - 1986 d. marriage -
OC 2 MDF - * 0.12 42,500 - - 1990 buy I land 0.32
PL 3 MF 0.24 7,500 - - - • 1980 repay bank loan -
Total 3 0.32 0.12 - 0.32
SANDHAGAON
OC 1 SF - - 1 .00 5,000 - - 1975 up land 2.00
PL 2 MF - - 0.60 15,000 - - 1988 d. marriage *
PL 3 MDF - - 2.00 5,000 - - 1985 d. marriage •
Tota I 3 - 3.60 - 2.00
Notes: I stands for irrigated and NI stands for non-irrigated. D.marriage refers to 
daughter's marriage and f.difficulty refers to financial difficulty.
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TABLE 4 .2 7
Purchase of Land: Type, Area, Price and Year Bought 
According to Farmer Category and Class
Vi llage\ Si. 
Category
No. Farmer Area Bought 
Class I
Acres
Price Area Bought 
NI
Rs/Acre Acres
Price
Rs/Acre
Year
Bought
Area Sold 
Acres
CHARAPARA
OC 1 MDF 0.28 12,500 - - 1979 0.64
OC 2 MDF 0.12 20,000 - - 1987 -
OC 3 MDF 2.50 16,000 - - 1984 0.08
OC 4 LF 0.52 20,000 - - 1972 -
4 LF 0.40 25,000 - - 1975 -
4 LF 0.32 27,500 - - 1978 -
4 LF 0.44 30,000 - - 1984 -
4 LF 0.28 42,500 - - 1985 -
OC 5 LF - - 0.48 8,750 1976 -
5 LF 0.80 20,000 * * 1978 -
5 LF 1 .00 25,000 - - 1979 -
TOTAL 5 6.66 0.48 0.72
HARINABABI
OC 1 MDF 0.20 27,500 - - 1982 -
OC 2 MDF 0.32 13,750 - - 1989 0.12
PRT 3 MF 0.48 12,500 - - 1980 -
Tota I 1 .00 - 0.12
SANDHAGAON
OC 1 SF - - 0.20 30,000 1987 -
OC 2 SF - - 2.00 13,500 1978 1 .00
OC 3 MDF - - 1 .50 24,667 1975-90 -
PRT 4 MF - - 0.04 2,750 1970 -
PT 5 - - 0.40 3,500 1963 •
PL 6 MF - - 0.48 37,500 1987 -
Total 6 - 4.62 1 .00
Notes: I and NI stand for irrigated and non-irrigated respectively.
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TABLE 4 .2 8
Number of Emigrants per Household 
According to Firmer Category
Vi I lageX 
Category
Tota I 
No. of 
House - 
ho Ids
No. of House- 
holds with 
Members 
Emigrati ng
% of 
Total
Total 
No. of 
Emigrants
No. of 
Emigrants 
per
Household 1
No. of Households 
with Emigrants
2 Plus 2
Head is 
Emigrant 
No, of 
Househo Ids
CHARAPARA
OC 13 9 69.2 16 CD 5 2 2 1
PRT 4 2 50.0 2 1.00 2 * * -
PT 5 - - - - * - - -
PL 9 8 88.9 9 1.13 7 1 - 7
LL 11 1 9.1 1 1.00 1 - -
Others 1 - - - - - - - -
Total 43 20 46.5 28 1.40 15 3 2 8
HARINABABI
OC 14 9 64.3 17 1.89 4 3 2 1
PRT 5 1 20.0 1 1.00 1 - - 1
PL 3 3 100.0 3 1.00 3 - - 3
Total 22 13 59.1 21 1,62 8 3 2 5
SANDHAGAON
OC 5 1 20.0 1 1 .00 1 - - -
PRT 4 2 50.0 6 3.00 - 1 1
PT 7 - - - * - - - -
PL 6 3 50.0 4 1 .33 2 1 - 3
LL 8 1 12.5 1 1.00 1 • - -
Others 3 1 33.3 1 1 .00 1 - - 1
Total 33 8 24.2 13 1 .63 5 2 1 4
230
TABLE 4 .2 9
Results of Least-Squares Regression Analysis 
Migration and Land Ownership 
All Households
Vi I lage Dependent
Variable
Exp lanatory 
Variables
B S.E.(B) T-Value Sig(T) R Square F-Va lue 
(k-1,n-k d.f.)
Sig(F)
CHARAPARA
MIGR OLANDT
Constant
0.14
0.19
0.026
0.148
5.62 
1.26
0.000
0.214
0.43 31.56 
(1,41)
0.000
MIGRRA OLANDRA
CASTE
Constant
-0.04
-0.46
0.46
0.019
0.084
0.061
-1.94 
-5.43 
7.45
0.060
0.000
0.000
0.44 15.17
(2,38)
0.000
MIGRRAT OLANDRAT
CASTE
Constant
0.03
-0.14
0.14
0.022
0.039
0.029
1.29 
-3.54 
4.79
0.205
0.001
0.000
0.40 13.06
(2.40)
0.000
HARINABABI
MIGR OLANDT
Constant
0.13
0.49
0.102
0.441
1.25 
1 .10
0.228
0.285
0.07 1 .55 
(1.20)
0.228
MIGRRA OLANDRA
Constant
-0.03
0.33
0.099
0.141
-0.34
2.37
0.739
0.028
0.006 0.11
(1,20)
0.739
MIGRRAT OLANDRAT
Constant
0.07
0.08
0.115
0.051
0.63
1.47
0.539
0.156
0.02 0.39
(1,20)
0.539
SANDHAGAON
MIGR OLANDT
Constant
0.14
0.21
0.079
0.179
1.79 
1.16
0.083
0.255
0.09 3.20
(1,31)
0.083
MIGRRA OLANDRA
CASTE
Constant
-0.07
-0.25
0.28
0.035
0.074
0.066
-2.03
-3.33
4.26
0.052
0.002
0.000
0.27 5.54
(2,30)
0.009
MIGRRAT OLANDRAT
CASTE
Constant
-0.11
-0.13
0,14
0.139
0.065
0.063
-0.79 
-1 .95 
2.25
0.435
0.060
0.031
0.14 2.50
(2,30)
0.099
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TABLE 4 .3 0
P e rc e n ta g e  o f  E m ig ra n ts  and Type  o f  Jo b
A c c o rd in g  t o  F a rm e r C a te g o ry
Vi Ilage\ No. of 
Category Emigr­
ants Mana­
gerial
Govt, or
Cleri - 
ca I
Semi-Govt. Job
Ski I led Unski I led 
Worker Worker
Mana­
ger ia I
Purely Private Sector Job
Cleri- Skilled Unskilled 
cal Worker Worker
Self
Empl­
oyed
CHARAPARA
OC 16 18.8 25.0 6.3 - 12.5 6.3 - 31 .3 -
PRT 2 - - - 50.0 - - - 50.0 -
PL 9 - 22.2 - 11.1 - - - 66.7 -
LL 1 - - - - - - - 100.0 -
Total 28 10.7 21.4 3.6 7.1 7.1 3.6 0.0 46.4 0.0
HARINABABI
OC 17 - 11.8 5.9 23.5 5.9 5.9 - 41.2 5.9
PRT 1 - - - - - - - 100.0 -
PL 3 - - - - - - - 100.0 -
Total 21 0.0 9.5 4.8 19.0 4.8 4.8 0.0 52.4 4.8
SANDHAGAON
OC 1 - 100.0 - - - - - - -
PRT 6 16.7 - - 16.7 - 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7
PL 4 - - 75.0 25.0 - - - - -
LL 1 - - - - - - - - 100.0
Others 1 - 100.0 - - - - - - -
Tota I 13 7.7 15.4 23.1 15.4 0.0 7.7 7.7 7.7 15.4
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TABLE 4 .3 1
P e rc e n ta g e  o f  E m ig ra n ts  and  Type  o f  Jo b
A c c o rd in g  t o  F a rm e r C la s s
Vi I lage\ No. of 
Class Emigr­
ants Mana-
geriaI
Govt, or
Cleri - 
cal
Semi-Govt. Job
Ski I led Unski I Led 
Worker Worker
Mana­
ger ia I
Purely Private Sector Job
Cleri- Ski I led UnskiI led 
cal Worker Worker
Self
Emp­
loyed
MF 7 . . - 28.6 - - - 71 .4 -
SF 4 - 50.0 - - - - - 50.0 -
MDF 7 - - - - 14.3 14.3 71.4 - -
LF 9 33.3 44.4 11.1 - 11.1 - - - -
LCL *1 - • - - - - - 100.0 -
Tota I 28 10.7 21 .4 3.6 7.1 7.1 3.6 17.9 28.6 0.0
HARINABABI
MF 4 - - - - - - - 100.0 -
SF 7 - 28.6 14.3 14.3 - - - 28.6 14.3
MDF 10 - - - 30.0 10.0 10.0 - 50.0 -
Total 21 0.0 9.5 4.8 19.0 4.8 4.8 0.0 52.4 4.8
SANDHAGAON
MF 6 16.7 - 16.7 33.3 - 16.7 - - 16.7
SF 2 - 50.0 50.0 - - - - - -
MDF 3 - - 33.3 - - - 33.3 33.3 -
LCL **1 - - - - - - - - 100.0
Others 1 - 100.0 - - - - - - -
Tota I 13 7.7 15.4 23.1 15.4 0.0 7.7 7.7 7.7 15.4
Notes: *He has become a hotel boy in urban area.
**He has migrated to his wife's native place and is a casual labourer there.
233
TABLE 4 .3 2
P e rc e n ta g e  o f  E m ig ra n ts  and  L e v e l o f  E d u c a t io n
A c c o rd in g  t o  F a rm er C a te g o ry
VillageX No. of 
Category Migrants
11 lite­
rate
Level of Education
Minor Secon­
dary
i(No. of Migrants)
Graduate ITI 
Training
AMIE\
Engineering
CHARAPARA
OC 16 - - 37.5 37.5 12.5 12.5
PRT 2 - 50.0 50.0 - - -
PL 9 * 33.3 55.6 11.1 - -
LL 1 100.0 - - - - -
Total 28 3.6 14.3 42.9 25.0 7.1 7.1
HARINABABI
OC 17 - 23.5 47.1 29.4 - -
PRT 1 - 100.0 - - - -
PL 3 - 100.0 - * - -
Total 21 0.0 38.1 38.1 23.8 0.0 0.0
SANDHAGAON
OC 1 - - 100.0 - - -
PRT 6 - 16.7 50.0 - 16.7 16.7
PL 4 - - 25.0 - 75.0 -
LL 1 100.0 - - - - -
Others 1 - - - 100.0 - -
Total 13 7.7 7.7 38.5 7.7 30.8 7.7
Notes: ITI refers to Industrial Training Institute and 
AMIE refers to Associate Member of Institute of Engineers.
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TABLE 4 .3 3
P e rc e n ta g e  o f  E m ig ra n ts  and D is ta n c e  T ra v e rs e d
A c c o rd in g  t o  F a rm e r C la s s
Category No. of 
Emigrants
0 -50 
Kms
50-100
Kms
Above 100 
Kms
Neighbour
State
Distant
State
CHARAPARA
MF 7 - 14.3 28.6 42.9 14.3
SF 4 - - 75.0 25.0 -
MDF 7 14.3 - 28.6 28.6 28.6
LF 9 33.3 11.1 44.4 - 11.1
LL 1 - - 100.0 - 0.0
Tota I 26 14.3 7.1 42.9 21.4 14.3
HARINABABI
MF 4 - - - 100.0 -
SF 7 - 14.3 42.9 - 42.9
MDF 10 10.0 20.0 30.0 20.0 20.0
Tota I 21 4.8 14.3 28.6 28.6 23.8
SANDHAGAON
MF 6 66.7 - 33.3 - -
SF 2 - 50.0 - - 50.0
MDF 3 33.3 - 66.7 - -
LL 1 100.0 - - - -
Others 1 - - 100.0 - -
Tota I 13 46.2 7.7 38.5 0.0 7.7
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TABLE 4 .3 4
P e rc e n ta g e  o f  E m ig ra n ts  and D u r a t io n  o f  E m ig r a t io n
A c c o rd in g  t o  F a rm e r C la s s
Village\ No. of 
Class Emigrants
0-5
Years
5-10
Years
10-15
Years
Above 15 
Years
CHARAPARA
MF 7 26.6 - 14.3 57.1
SF 4 25.0 50.0 - 25.0
MDF 7 71.4 14.3 - 14.3
LF 9 22.2 22.2 11.1 44.4
LL 1 100.0 - - -
Total 28 39.3 17.9 7.1 35.7
HARINABABI
MF 4 - - 50.0 50.0
SF 7 - 57.1 28.6 14.3
MDF 10 30.0 40.0 20.0 10.0
Tota I 21 14.3 38.1 28.6 19.0
SANDHAGAON
MF 6 33.3 16.7 16.7 33.3
SF 2 - - 50.0 50.0
MDF 3 - 66.7 - 33.3
LL 1 - 100.0 - -
Others 1 - 100.0 - -
Tota I 13 15.4 38.5 15.4 30.8
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CHAPTER V 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FARM ECONOMY 
IN THREE STUDY VILLAGES:
IN RELATION TO OWNERSHIP, TENANCY AND 'DEGREE OF TENANCY'
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Having established the village profile and identified
the socio-economic characteristics of the households in
relation to ownership, tenancy and 'degree of tenancy', now 
one is in a position to consider the farming practices
followed in the villages which are to a large extent 
correlated to these features. The characteristics of farm 
economy under study include the cropping pattern, cropping 
intensity, seed variety, crop yield, cost of cultivation, 
net income and finally sale of crop. These characteristics 
are compared with respect to ownership, tenancy and 'degree 
of tenancy' and differences are highlighted.
5.2 CROPPING PATTERN
In the irrigated villages Charapara and Harinababi, 
due to availability of canal water, most of the farmers 
follow double cropping and adopt a diversified cropping 
pattern. In the kharif season the cultivators grow paddy 
which is called in Oriya sarad dhan (winter rice). Winter 
rice is sown in June-July and harvested between October and 
January. In the rabi season pulses like biri (black gram), 
kulthi (horse gram), chana (arhar); and vegetables like 
potato, brinjal, chilly, pumpkin; and oilseeds like
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groundnut, mustard, sesamum, and; coriander seed and jowar 
are cultivated. The rabi crops are sown in October-November 
and harvested in February. Most of the farmers grow mung 
(green gram) in summer which is sown in February and reaped 
in April, Some cultivators sow biali (autumn rice) in June 
which is harvested (in August and September) earlier than 
kharif rice.
It is observed that farmers follow different cropping 
pattern on different types of land. In the case of 
irrigated land, paddy is cultivated in kharif and green 
gram in summer. But. in the case of non-irrigated land which 
lies near the river-bed, paddy is cultivated in autumn and 
in rabi black gram, groundnut and other crops are 
cultivated. For the cultivation of vegetables like potato 
and brinjal land with irrigation facility from tanks is 
required as adequate canal irrigation is not provided in 
the rabi season. Many farmers do not grow autumn paddy on 
non-irrigated land as the yield is low (about half of the 
yield of kharif paddy) and labour cost is high.
An examination of the overall cropping pattern adopted 
in the two irrigated villages shows that in Harinababi, 
cash crops like jute, oilseeds, and vegetables account for 
a greater percentage of gross cropped area than that of 
Charapara (see Table 5.1), despite the fact that there are 
more resourceful large and medium farmers in Charapara and 
they are able to bear the risk of cultivating cash crops. 
It seems that farmers in Harinababi are more enterprising.
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Most of them use their own labour and are hard working. 
Interestingly, when asked about the cause of not 
cultivating jute, the households in Charapara reported that 
the rabi crops are raised in October and November on the 
land near the riverbed of Brahmani where during the months 
of August and September silt is deposited by flood water. 
And the land near the river-bed in Charapara is not 
suitable for the cultivation of jute. This is because 
Charapara is situated at a lower level than Harinababi and 
flood water submerges the jute fields in Charapara if there 
is late or erratic monsoon. If the jute plants remain 
submerged under flood water for a few days the quality of 
jute that the plants ultimately give is substandard and it 
fetches a very low price in the market. Therefore, the 
farmers in Charapara are hesitant to take the risk as 
cultivation of jute also involves lots of labour cost and 
care. Thus the farming practices followed in a village to 
a large extent depend on the village's ecological 
conditions in terms of soil quality, rainfall and 
situational factors.
Now coming to the backward village Sandhagaon, as 
there is no irrigation facility at all either from canal or 
from lift irrigation, the cultivators follow monocropping 
and grow paddy in kharif season. A very few cultivators 
cultivate arhar, sesamum and potato in the rabi season on 
the land where there is minor irrigation facility, which is 
in fact illegal. When asked about their adjustment
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behaviour in the wake of crop failure due to erratic 
monsoon, the farmers reported that they somehow manage to 
grow paddy by illegally using water from the pipes which 
carry water from the river Brahamani to the Talcher Thermal 
Power station through their village.
Data on percentage of gross cropped area under major
crops according to tenancy status and villagewise are given
in Table 5.1. The table shows that in Charapara, the OCs
follow a more diversified cropping pattern than the PRTs
and the PTs. Also among the two types of tenants, the PRTs 
£
cultivate a greater number of crops than that of PTs. Thus 
diversification in cropping pattern is found to decline as 
one shifts from ownership status to tenancy, and as 'degree 
of tenancy' rises. One may argue that this might be due to 
the possession of good quality of land by the OCs. But 
Table 5.1 shows that the percentage of gross cropped area 
irrigated is nearly 60 per cent in the case of OCs as well 
as PRTs. It sharply increases to 80 per cent in the case of 
PTs. Thus the adoption of a diversified cropping pattern by 
the OCs is not due to the fact that they possess better 
quality ' land, but it might be due to their capacity to 
purchase inputs like fertiliser and seeds which required 
for cultivation of crops other than paddy and pulses. Also, 
the OCs due to their large resource base can bear 
production risk that is involved in cultivating 
remunerative crops like oilseeds, jute and vegetables.
In contrast to Charapara, in Harinababi the PRTs
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follow a more diversified cropping pattern than that of the 
OCs. Although the percentage of gross cropped area 
irrigated in the case of PRTs is lower than that of OCs. 
This is due to the fact that the tenants in Harinababi are 
good cultivators and enterprising as they are found to rent 
land in order to increase or to consolidate their 
operational holdings. This will be explained further in 
Chapter VI under the section on 'Who leases in and why?'.
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon, the 
diversification in cropping pattern decreases when one 
shifts from the status of owner cultivator to tenancy. But 
with increase in 'degree of tenancy' diversification also 
increases. This contradicts the observation in Charapara. 
It is supported by the fact that in non-irrigated 
agriculture the PTs who also hire out labour do not get 
work for a sufficient number of days.1 Therefore, they try 
to cultivate the leased-in land intensively to meet their 
subsistence needs.
However, it is to be noted that in Sandhagaon none of 
the pure tenants cultivates potato in the rabi season. On 
enquiry they disclosed that they do not get fertiliser and 
pesticides in time whereas the higher caste 'karans' in the 
village get all inputs. The Village Agricultural Worker 
(V.A.W) who is responsible for the propagation of improved
1 In Sandhagaon, the owner cultivators and the part tenants 
those who grow crops in the rabi season use entirely their own 
labour. Therefore, it becomes difficult on the part of a pure 
tenant to get work and he grows crops on tenanted land.
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package of practice in the village never comes to them and 
always sits and discusses with the higher caste families. 
Thus a bitter feeling of the lower castes towards the 
higher castes is observed in the non-irrigated village 
whereas no respondent expressed such bitterness in 
irrigated villages. This shows that the landless tenants do 
not get access to extension services provided by the state 
machinery. The higher diversification of cropping pattern 
by pure tenants than that of PRTs does not imply their 
greater entrepreneurship and involvement in market but 
shows their compulsive participation under the drive to 
meet consumption needs.
5.3 CROPPING INTENSITY
Usually it is believed that cropping intensity or the 
extent of multiple cropping is high in the case of poor 
peasants and small operators as they have to eke out their 
existence from a small piece of land by cultivating it 
intensively.2 We have calculated the average cropping 
intensity according to tenancy status in the case of our 
three sample villages. Cropping intensity has been measured 
as the ratio of gross cropped area to net sown area. The 
figures are presented in Table 5.2. The table shows that in
2 See Berry and Cline (1979) and Bharadwaj (1974) for the 
reasons for the observed inverse relationship between size and 
productivity. But the inverse relationship breaks down in 
advanced agriculture in the wake of irrigation and H.Y.V. 
technology and specifically in post-green revolution areas (Roy, 
1981).
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Charapara and Harinababi, the cropping intensity decreases 
as one moves from the status of owner cultivator to part 
tenant and then to pure tenant. In Charapara the cropping 
intensity is highest for OCs i.e. 1,61. In the case of PRTs 
it is 1.57 and it is 1.32 for PTs. In village Harinababi 
the cropping intensity for OCs is higher (1.64) than that 
of PRTs(1.38). In the non-irrigated village the cropping 
intensity is the highest i.e. 1.09 for OCs. In contrast to 
the irrigated villages, in Sandhagaon the cropping 
intensity in the case of PRTs (1.02) is lower than that of 
PTs (1.06) . The reason for this we have already discussed 
in the previous section. But the difference is too small. 
To sum up, in all the study villages, the cropping 
intensity is found to decrease when one moves from the 
status of ownership to tenancy. In the irrigated villages 
cropping intensity declines as 'degree of tenancy' rises. 
But the reverse is observed in the non-irrigated village.
The average cropping intensity is found to be the 
highest i.e.1.57 in Charapara, followed by 1.56 in 
Harinababi and 1.05 in the non-irrigated village 
Sandhagaon.
An attempt to investigate the cause of higher 
cropping intensity in the case of owner cultivators than 
that of tenants reveals that owner operators own different 
types of land suitable for cultivation of different crops 
which enables them to adopt a diversified cropping pattern. 
The cropping pattern adopted by a farmer to a large extent
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depends on the type of land that he possesses. For example, 
sandy soil is suitable for cultivation of groundnut, land 
near tanks is suitable for cultivation of potato because of 
availability of water. Moreover, the small tenants are not 
able to cultivate cash crops like jute, groundnut and 
potato because in the cultivation of these crops purchased 
inputs like seed and fertiliser are required which they do 
not have the resources to buy. Again agricultural 
operations in the cash crops are very delicate requiring 
timely completion and the inputs must be applied in time 
and in right dose otherwise the yield is reduced 
substantially. Thus the large variation in yield of cash 
crops discourages the poor tenants from cultivating these 
crops. They are not able to take the risk due to their 
precarious existence at the margin of subsistence.
5.4 SEED VARIETY
While analyzing the characteristics of farm economy it 
is very important to establish the variety of seed i.e. HYV 
or local, that the cultivators grow to comment on their 
package of practices. The seed variety has been analyzed 
for the staple cereal crop paddy (kharif) according to 
tenancy status. The findings are presented in Table 5.3.
The table shows that the percentage of area under HYV 
paddy is the highest (34.6%) in Charapara and then 24.1 per 
cent in Harinababi and lowest 19.4 per cent in Sandhagaon.
A comparison among different categories of farmers in
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each village reveals that in Charapara the percentage of 
paddy area under HYV is the highest 57.6 per cent for PRTs 
and then 3 6.7 per cent for OCs and the lowest 2,8 per cent
for PTs. In Sandhagaon also this ratio is the highest 35.2
per cent for PRTs and 14.6 per cent for OCs and only 6 per 
cent for PTs. But in Harinababi, percentage of area under 
HYV paddy is higher in the case of OCs than that of PRTs.
As the HYV yield per acre is much higher than the
local average yield as shown in Table 5.3, the PRTs are 
cultivating it in higher percentage of area to get a share 
of the increased yield so that they can meet their 
subsistence needs and are not required to buy paddy from 
the market. But the PTs are not able to cultivate it 
because they do not have the resources to buy the seeds and 
the fertiliser required for its cultivation. All the 
farmers cultivating HYV paddy like 1009 and 1014 apply 
chemical fertiliser at a standard rate in a particular 
village. In Charapara the farmers were applying 50 kgs. of 
Calcium per acre in addition to the farm-yard manure at the 
rate that they apply for traditional variety. The owner 
cultivators hesitate to cultivate HYV paddy because the 
taste of HYV paddy is not as good as traditional variety. 
Also, they dislike to use chemical fertiliser, which they 
believe will degrade their land in the long run.
5.5 CROP YIELD: KHARIF PADDY
An attempt is here made to compare the yield of
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kharif paddy according to tenancy status in the three study 
villages. We have chosen paddy, as all the farmers produce 
it and it is the staple cereal crop in the area. Table 5.3 
shows that in Charapara the physical yield of kharif paddy 
is the highest (11 gtls/acre) in the case of PTs and then 
it is 10.3 qtls/acre for the OCs and the lowest 9.3 
qtls/acre for PRTs. Yield is the highest for PTs, as they 
use their own labour and they try their best to get an 
augmented yield so that after paying the high rent (half of 
the gross produce) they will be able to meet their 
consumption requirements with the left over. The lower 
yield in the case of PRTs than that of OCs reveal some 
inefficiency in tenant cultivation. This finding is of 
course not strong enough to claim that tenancy leads to 
inefficient allocation of resources. We see no reason why 
the tenant would not cultivate his owned land with care and 
optimally. One needs to compare yield level on tenanted 
land with that of owned land.3 Moreover, if the OCs and 
PRTs belong to different size classes of operational 
holding, then the difference in yield may in part due to 
the size effect rather than due to tenancy effect alone. 
One has to control the size of holding to study the impact 
of tenancy.4
3 We have attempted several methods of comparing yield 
performance on owned land with that of tenanted land in Chapter 
VII.
4 We have tried to analyze the impact of tenancy on crop 
yield by controlling for size class in Chapter VII.
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In village Harinababi the yield is higher in the case 
of OCs than that of PRTs as observed in Charapara. Thus in 
irrigated farming, the physical productivity is found to 
decline when one moves from ownership to tenancy. In the 
non-irrigated village Sandhagaon, the yield is the highest 
for PRTs (7.9 qtls/acre). This is because, the PRTs 
cultivate more of HYV where yield is significantly higher 
than that of local paddy. Moreover, in Sandhagaon only good 
farmers have leased in land for bullock adjustment purpose 
and they use more of their own labour in comparison to the 
owner cultivator class. The yield of paddy in the case of 
PT is 5.9 qtls/acre which is greater than that of OCs (5.7 
qtls/acre) . Thus in Sandhagaon, tenancy is found to be 
comparatively more efficient than what is found in the 
irrigated villages. However, in contrast to Charapara, in 
Sandhagaon yield rate of paddy decreases when 'degree of 
tenancy' rises.
Yield rate of paddy is the highest i.e. 11 qtls/acre 
in Harinababi and then it is 10.3 qtls/acre in Charapara 
and the lowest in Sandhagaon (6.6 qtls/acre)
5.6 COST OF CULTIVATION AND NET INCOME OF KHARIF PADDY
In this section, we attempt to study the resource use 
efficiency in cultivation of kharif paddy according to 
tenancy status. Table 5.4 contains data on gross income, 
operational cost and net income in rupees per acre of 
kharif paddy and the net returns per rupee invested
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according to tenancy status. Gross income includes the 
money value of paddy produced and also of the by-products 
i.e. straw. Under operational costs, items like the cost of 
seed, labour cost (owned and hired), bullock labour cost 
(owned and hired), cost of chemical fertiliser and farm 
yard manure, cost of pesticides and taxes like irrigation 
tax and land revenue have been included. Net income is the 
difference between gross income and operational cost. Net 
returns per rupee invested is the ratio of net income to 
operational cost*
It is found that in Charapara the net returns per 
rupee invested is the highest i.e. 1.64 for PTs and then 
1.46 for OCs and the lowest for PRTs(0.90). In Harinababi 
also the net returns per rupee invested is higher in the 
case of OCs (1.54) than that of PRTs ( 1.35) . Thus the
findings with regard to resource use efficiency according 
to tenancy status tallies with our findings on physical 
yield.
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon the net income 
per acre of paddy is negative for OCs and PRTs, because the 
yield is low and the labour cost is about two times of the 
labour cost in irrigated paddy. In irrigated paddy the 
average labour cost is about 3 0 man days per acre whereas 
it is 7 0 man days per acre in non-irrigated paddy. 
Moreover, in the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon the wage 
is higher i.e. Rs. 15/day than that of Charapara 
(Rs. 12/day) . As agriculture is not at all profitable in
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Sandhagaon, the farmers prefer to lease out in-stead of 
self-cultivating it and as a result tenancy is more 
prevalent in Sandhagaon. The net loss per rupee invested is 
more for OCs (-0.31) than for PRTs (-0.11) and the PTs earn 
a marginal profit of 0.07 per rupee invested. Thus in the 
non-irrigated village resource use efficiency in 
cultivation of paddy increases when one moves from the 
status of ownership to tenancy and when 'degree of tenancy' 
increases.
It is to be noted that both in Charapara and 
Sandhagaon, the PTs are at the top in resource use 
efficiency. Their gross income per acre is found to be the 
highest and the operational cost to be the lowest. But when 
one moves from ownership status to tenancy status (PRT), 
the resource use efficiency declines in Charapara and 
Harinababi but the reverse is the case in Sandhagaon.
5.7 COST OF CULTIVATION AND NET INCOME PER ACRE OF NET SOWN
AREA
In this section an attempt has been made to analyse 
the cost of cultivation and net income per acre of net sown 
area according to tenancy status. The measure of net income 
per acre of net sown area captures in a single figure the 
cropping intensity effect, the cropping pattern effect and 
the yield effect and thus is a good indicator of 
agricultural performance. Then the net returns per rupee 
invested is calculated to compare the efficiency of
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different categories of farmers. The findings are 
summarised in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 shows that in Charapara the net income per 
acre of net sown area is the highest for OCs (Rs 1501) 
followed by PTs (Rs.1356) and the lowest Rs.1209 for PRTs. 
And the net returns per rupee invested is the highest i.e. 
1.59 for PTs, 1.3 for OCs and 1.18 for PRTs. The PTs are 
found to use relatively less inputs but get more outputs in 
comparison to PRTs and OCs. In Harinababi the net income 
per acre of net sown area in the case of PRTs is Rs.1617 
and higher than that of OCs (Rs.1582). And net returns per 
rupee invested is 1.2 for OCs and 1.18 for PRTs. Thus in 
the irrigated villages the production performance in terms 
of net returns per rupee invested is found to decline when 
the farmer category shifts from owner cultivator to part 
owner and part tenant category (PRT) . Thus PRTs are less 
efficient than owner cultivators.
By contrast, in the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon 
the net income per acre of net sown area is positive for 
PRTs and PTs but it is negative for OCs, The net returns 
per rupee invested is positive i.e. 0.08 both for PRTs and 
PTs, but for OCs it is -0.19. Thus in Sandhagaon the 
resource use efficiency increases when one moves from 
ownership status to tenancy status. Tenancy is relatively 
more efficient than owner cultivation.
It is to be noted that in Charapara and Sandhagaon 
when 'degree of tenancy' increases i.e. when one moves from
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the PRTs to PTs, the resource use efficiency increases.
Information on cost of cultivation and net income per 
acre of gross cropped area is presented in Table 5.6.
5.8 PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND INPUT USE
It is usually argued that when the production function 
exhibits increasing returns to scale, the tendency to lease 
out will be small. In order to assess the scale effect on 
productivity, production functions for the three villages 
have been estimated. To avoid ity,- only one
input land has been considered. Interestingly, in the 
advanced village Charapara increasing returns to scale are 
observed whereas in Harinababi and Sandhagaon decreasing 
returns to scale prevail. This is in conformity with a 
large number of studies which reveal that increasing 
returns to scale are operative in advanced agriculture.
Production functions by taking into account only the 
labour input have also been estimated. The results show 
that in the advanced village Charapara nearly constant 
returns to scale are observed whereas in Harinababi and 
Sandhagaon decreasing returns to scale operate.
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Production Functions and Input Use
CHARAPARA N = 22
Y = Value of total output in rupees 
Xx = Net sown area in acres 
N = Number of observations 
X2 = Man days of labour 
C = Total operational cost in rupees 
log Y - 3.25 + 1.21 log Xx R Square=0.94
log Y = 1.98 + 0.95 log X2 R Square= 0.84
log C =2.97 + 1.06 log X* R Square=0.90
log X2 =1.45 + 1.08 log X1 R Square=0.80
Level of significance in all coefficients is 0 
HARINABABI N = 19
log Y = 3.46 + 0.99 log Xx R Square=0.81
log Y = 2.42 + 0.72 log X2 R Squares- 0.83
log C = 3.14 + 0.96 log Xx R Square=0.84
log X2 =1.54 + 1,13 log X1 R Square=0.67 
Level of significance in all coefficients is C 
SANDHAGAON N = 15
log Y = 3.32 +0.80 log Xx R Square=0.76
log Y = 2.38 + 0.56 log X2 R Square=0.56
Level of significance in all coefficients is C
log C = 3.29 + 0.95 Xx R Square=0.80
log X2= 1.82 + 1.06 X: R Square=0.73
Level of significance in all coefficients is C
.0000
. 0 0 0 0
.001
. 0 0 0 0
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In order to explain the scale effect on productivity the 
cost functions (total operational cost and labour use) have 
been estimated with respect to net sown area in acres. It 
is observed that in the advanced village Charapara, the 
operational cost and labour use increases more than 
proportionately with increase in net sown area. But in 
Harinababi and Sandhagaon the operational cost increases 
less than proportionately with increase in net sown area. 
In the case of labour use, in Charapara it increases more 
than proportionately with increase in net sown area. In 
Charapara, the large farmers use more of yield stimulating 
inputs like HYV seed, fertiliser, farmyard manure as a 
result, the cost coefficient is more than unity. This 
relationship is somewhat weaker in Harinababi as there is 
less of differentiation in size of operational holding in 
this village.
5.9 USE OF HUMAN LABOUR AND BULLOCK LABOUR: OWNED AND
H I R E D
Many economists tend to interpret tenancy as a 
resource adjustment mechanism. Some emphasize it more as a 
human labour adjustment mechanism than that of bullock 
adjustment mechanism. Also, Marxists5 use hiring-in and 
hiring-out of labour as a criterion to classify the farm 
households. Those who use others' labour i.e. hire in
5 Lenin emphasized the labour use criterion as a way of 
establishing the nature of differentiation of the peasantry. This 
has been further extended to the labour exploitation criterion 
by Patnaik (1987).
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labour are considered to be relatively well-off and at a 
higher position in class hierarchy. Therefore, an attempt 
has been made to analyze the use of human labour and 
bullock labour of the households according to tenancy 
status.
Table 5.7 shows that in Charapara 69 per cent of the 
OCs use only hired labour and 8 per cent use only owned 
labour and the remaining 23 per cent use both owned and 
hired labour. In the case of PRTs 75 per cent use both 
owned and hired labour. In the case of PTs 60 per cent of 
them use only owned labour and the rest 40 per cent use 
both owned and hired labour. Thus the use of hired labour 
decreases when one moves from the ownership status to 
tenancy status and when 'degree of tenancy' increases. It 
is to be noted that the landless pure tenants also hire in 
labour whereas 100 per cent of them also hire out labour. 
Some of the agricultural operations like transplanting and 
harvesting have to be completed within a specific number of 
days. And that is why the farmers have to hire in labour to 
complete the operation within that specified time period 
irrespective of the class position. It is found that none 
of the OCs and PRTs hires out labour in Charapara.
In Harinababi 64 per cent of the OCs use only hired 
labour whereas 60 per cent of the PRTs use only owned 
labour. Thus tenants are found to use more of. their own 
labour. In the backward village Sandhagaon, there is not 
much difference in use of owned and hired labour in 
relation to ownership, tenancy and 'degree of tenancy'. In
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the case of pure tenants, 33 per cent are found to use only 
hired labour as they are salary holders. Due to reservation 
in services for the scheduled castes, most of the scheduled 
caste households in Sandhagaon have members who are in 
government jobs (class IV employee) . It is found that in 
Sandhagaon a PRT and in Harinababi an OC hires out labour.
Then the use of bullock labour is examined to 
establish the nature of the market for hiring of bullocks. 
Economists like Bliss and Stern (1982), Jodha (1981) and 
Bell (1977) have explained tenancy as an adjustment of 
bullocks because of their unmarketability in rural areas. 
But in our study villages it is observed that hiring-in of 
bullock is quite prevalent. Buying a pair of bullocks is 
the largest investment in traditional agriculture and most 
of the farmers do not have the resources to pay in one go. 
So what is observed is that the less resourceful farmers 
prefer to buy only one bullock and hire in another from his 
covillagers. It is clear in Table 5.7 that hiring-in of 
bullocks is observed in all the study villages. It will be 
explained further while analyzing in Chapter VI.
5.10 SALE OF CROP
Sale of crop constitutes the end process of village 
agricultural activity and it is the most important. In 
order to identify the surplus producers of a village, the 
extent of market involvement of households needs to be 
analyzed.
It is found that in village Charapara about 73 per
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cent of the cultivators sell crops (excluding the PL 
category) and in Harinababi and Sandhagaon the ratio is 53 
and 7 per cent respectively (Table 5.8).
Mostly the OCs and PRTs sell crops. In Charapara on an 
average an OC sells crop worth Rs.353 0 and a PRT sells for 
Rs.1125 and a PT sells for Rs.792.
In Charapara only one PT sells paddy for f^ s.7 92. On 
inquiring about the cause of sale, the PT reported that he 
sold paddy to a resident to buy a bullock. Interestingly, 
a pure lessor was found to sell brinjal for Rs. 15^ 000. This 
pure lessor who has leased out all his owned land has 
leased in 0.56 acres of irrigated land to cultivate brinjal 
in the rabi season and the leasing-in is only for one 
season. The cultivation of brinjal needs a lot of labour 
and timely watering and application of chemical fertiliser 
and pesticides. If the yield is normal, it is very
remunerative. This PL had harvested 100 quintals of brinjal 
and he sold it to a trader just after harvest on the field 
itself at the price of Rs 150 per quintal. The rent
contracted is fixed cash in this case. In village Charapara 
this type of leasing-in for a single season is often
observed. Thus farmers are quite profit motivated and try 
to maximise their profit by seizing any prospective 
opportunity.
In Harinababi OCs sell crop to the value of Rs.3318 
per household and PRTs to the value of Rs.3607. In
Sandhagaon only a single OC medium farmer was found to sell 
paddy of the value of Rs.1040 after three months of
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harvest. In Sandhagaon as the yield is low they retain it 
for self-consumption.
It is to be noted that in Charapara and Harinababi, a 
larger proportion of PRTs sell crops than do the OCs. From 
this one should not construe that the PRTs are more market 
oriented than the OCs. As the OCs have other sources of 
income like salary income and remittances, they can store 
their crop to fetch a remunerative price. It is found that 
for a large sum of agricultural expenses like annual wage 
payment to the farm servant which comes to about Rs.1500 or 
more, the OCs depend on remittances from their sons who are 
employed in urban areas. But the PRTs have to sell crop to 
obtain cash to meet most of their expenses . And they do not 
have considerable subsidiary income. The PRTs also buy 
crops when their own stock is finished or sometimes they 
borrow from surplus large farmers mainly paddy.
We gathered data also on the quantity of different 
crops sold by different farmer categories. Table 5.9 shows 
that in Charapara, OCs sell different types of crops like 
paddy, black gram, green gram, groundnut, coriander, jowar, 
horse gram. But no PRT was found to sell paddy. They sell
crops like black gram, green gram and groundnut. Only one
PT sells paddy and one PL sells brinjal. In Harinababi the 
OCs sell black gram, green gram, groundnut, jute, potato, 
brinjal and pumpkin. The PRTs sell black gram, no green 
gram (the main pulse crop used for home consumption) ,
groundnut, jute, horse gram and brinjal. Thus in Harinababi
no cultivators sell paddy. They retain paddy for domestic
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consumption as their family size is large in comparison to 
the households in Charapara. They sell remunerative crops 
like jute and vegetables which the farmers in Charapara do 
not cultivate on a large scale for the market.
Economists view the participation of marginal and 
small farmers in the market as compulsive involvement as 
very often they make distress sale of crops to repay loan 
or to meet their immediate consumption needs. Therefore, 
the timing of sale of crops after harvest is very important 
from the viewpoint of economic analysis. The more months a 
cultivator can store his crops, the higher profit he will 
get by selling it at a higher price than at harvest. We 
have considered the timing of sale of black gram as most of 
the cultivators are found to sell it. Table 5.10 shows that 
in Charapara, a large proportion (45.5%) of OCs sell after 
six months whereas all the PRTs sell within three months 
after harvest. In comparison to Charapara the cultivators 
in Harinababi sell earlier. In Harinababi, a larger 
proportion of OCs (66.7%) than PRTs (50%) sell within three 
to six months after harvest. Thus, the OCs are in a better 
position than the tenants to retain their crops for the 
purpose of selling at a future date at increased price.
Most of the households reported selling crops to 
traders who come to the doorstep of the cultivators to 
purchase crops. The sale price of different crops after 
different months of harvest is given in Table 5.11. This 
price is the sale price of crops at which the farmers sell 
to the traders. The sale price has been recorded as
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reported by the farmers. It is clear from the table that 
price increases sharply in successive months after 
harvest.
5.11 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
In this section we attempt to highlight some of our 
important findings which are crucial for an understanding 
of the tenancy and sharecropping relationship.
Firstly, in the advanced village Charapara the 
diversification in cropping pattern is found to decline as 
one shifts from ownership status to tenancy, and as 'degree 
of tenancy' rises. But in Harinababi the PRTs follow a more 
diversified cropping pattern than that of the OCs. In the 
non-irrigated village Sandhagaon, the diversification in 
cropping pattern decreases when one shifts from the status 
of owner cultivator to tenancy. But with increase in 
'degree of tenancy' diversification also increases. This 
contradicts the observation in Charapara. The higher 
diversification of cropping pattern by pure tenants than 
that of PRTs does not imply their greater entrepreneurship 
and involvement in market but shows their compulsive 
participation under the drive to meet consumption needs. It 
is heartening to note that in Sandhagaon the landless 
tenants do not get access to extension services provided by 
the state machinery.
Secondly, in all the villages, the cropping intensity 
is found to decrease when one moves from the status of 
ownership to tenancy (part tenant). In the irrigated
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villages cropping intensity declines as 'degree of tenancy' 
rises. But the reverse is observed in the non-irrigated 
village.
Thirdly, the part tenants are cultivating HYV paddy in 
higher percentage of area than owner cultivators (in
Charapara and Sandhagaon) to get a share of the increased 
yield so that they can meet their subsistence needs and are 
not required to buy paddy from the market. But the pure 
tenants are not able to cultivate it because they do not 
have the resources to buy the seeds and the fertiliser 
required for its cultivation.
Fourthly, in irrigated villages, the physical yield of 
paddy is found to decline when one moves from ownership to 
tenancy i.e. from owner cultivators to part tenants. But 
yield in the case of pure tenants is the highest. In
Sandhagaon, part tenants are more efficient than owner 
cultivators. However, in contrast to Charapara, in 
Sandhagaon yield rate of paddy decreases when 'degree of 
tenancy' rises.
Fifthly, with regard to overall resource use 
efficiency measured in terms of net returns per rupee 
invested per acre of net sown area, in Charapara and
Sandhagaon, the PTs are the most efficient. Their
operational cost is found to be the lowest. But when one 
moves from ownership status to tenancy status (PRT), the 
resource use efficiency declines in Charapara and 
Harinababi but the reverse is the case in Sandhagaon.
Thus in the non-irrigated village resource use
260
efficiency increases when one moves from the status of 
ownership to tenancy and when 'degree of tenancy' 
increases. By, contrast, in irrigated villages part tenants 
are found to be less efficient than owner cultivators. It 
is to be noted that in Charapara and Sandhagaon when 
'degree of tenancy' increases i.e. when one moves from the 
PRTs to PTs, the resource use efficiency increases.
Sixthly, in the irrigated villages the use of hired 
labour decreases when one moves from the ownership status 
to tenancy status and when 'degree of tenancy' increases. 
In the backward village Sandhagaon, there is not much 
difference in use of owned and hired labour in relation to
ownership, tenancy and 'degree of tenancy'.
Seventhly, in our study villages it is observed that 
hiring-in of bullock is quite prevalent.
Eighthly, in Charapara and Harinababi, a larger 
proportion of PRTs are found to sell crops than do the OCs. 
From this one should not construe that the PRTs are more 
market oriented than the OCs. As the OCs have other sources 
of income like salary income and remittances, they can 
store their crop to fetch a remunerative price. It was 
observed that in Charapara and Harinababi the OCs sell 
their crops at a later date at increased price than the 
part tenants. Thus the bargaining strength in the
market transactions crucially depends on the class
position.
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TABLE 5 .1
Percentage of Gross Cropped Area under Major Crops and Irrigated 
According to Tenancy Status
Village\ Percentage of Gross Cropped Area (GCA) X of
Category Under GCA
Irrigated
Paddy Pu Ises OiIseeds Jute Vegetables Others
CHARAPARA
OC 45.9 48.2 2.5 0.4 1.2 1.7 60.4
PRT 39.5 56.5 3.4 - 0.6 - 60.2
PT 53.1 46.9 - - - - 79.7
Total 45.6 49.3 2.4 0.3 1.0 1 .3 62.2
HARINABABI
OC 44.3 46.0 4.3 3.1 2.2 0.1 71.4
PRT 39.4 29.8 19.2 5.8 5.8 - 51 .2
Tota I 42.9 41 .6 8.4 3.8 3.2 0.1 65.9
SANDHAGAON
OC 91.7 3.5 2.7 - 2.1 - -
PRT 98.9 • - • 1.1 - -
PT 94.6 4.1 1 .3 - - • *
Total 95.1 2.5 1.3 - 1.1 - -
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TABLE 5.2
Average Cropping Intensity 
According to Tenancy Status
Village\ 
Category Gross
Average
Cropped
Area
Acres
Average 
Net Sown 
Area 
Acres
Average
Cropping
Intensity
CHARAPARA
OC 8.50 5.29 1.61
PRT 5.22 3.33 1.57
PT 2.84 2.14 1. 32
Total 6.61 4.22 1 .57
HARINABABI
OC 4. 32 2.64 1 . 64
PRT 4.57 3. 31 1. 38
Total 4. 39 2.82 1. 56
SANDHAGAON
OC 3.00 2.75 1.09
PRT 3.67 3 .61 1.02
PT 2.11 2.00 1. 06
Total 2.82 2 . 68 1.05
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TABLE 5 . 3
Area Cultivated and Crop Yield 
(Kharif Paddy: HYV and Local) 
According to Tenancy Status
Village\ 
Category
Average
Area
Cultivated
Acres
Average 
Area under 
HYV 
Acres
% of 
Area
under
HYV
Average
Yield
HYV
Qt Ls/Acre
Average 
Yield 
Loca I 
Qt Is/Acre
Average 
Paddy 
Yield 
Qt Is/Acre
CHARAPARA
OC 2.89 1.06 36.7 11.4 9.7 10.3
PRT 1.57 0.91 57.6 9.6 8.7 9.3
PT 1.42 0.04 2.8 13.2 11.0 11.0
Total 2.31 0.80 34.6 11.0 9.9 10.3
HARINABABI
OC 1.66 0.43 25.9 14.1 10.3 11.3
PRT 1 .64 0.31 19.0 12.9 9.2 9.9
Total 1 .65 0.40 24.1 13.9 1D.0 11.0
SANDHAGAON
OC 2.75 0.40 14.6 6.5 5.6 5.7
PRT 3.61 1.27 35.2 9.1 7.3 7.9
PT 2.00 0.12 6.0 10.0 5.6 5.9
Tota I 2.68 0.52 19.4 8.5 6.1 6.6
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TABLE 5 . 4
Cost of Cultivation and Net Income of Kharif Paddy 
According to Tenancy Status
Vi I lage\ 
Category
Average
Area
Cultivated
Acres
Gross
Income
Rs/Acre
Opera­
tional
Cost
Rs/Acre
Net
Incme
Rs/Acre
Net 
Returns 
per Rupee 
Invested
CHARAPARA
OC 2.89 2,252 916 1,335 1.46
PRT 1.57 2,074 1,089 984 0.90
PT 1.42 2,375 899 1,477 1.64
Total 2.31 2,247 935 1.312 1.40
HARINABABI
OC 1.66 2,423 953 1,470 1.54
PRT 1.64 2,190 933 1,257 1.35
Tota I 1.65 2,362 948 1,414 1.49
SANDHAGAON
OC 2.75 1,347 1,943 -595 -0.31
PRT 3.61 1,722 1,936 -214 -0.11
PT 2.00 1,758 1,640 117 0.07
Total 2.68 1,604 1,850 -245 -0.13
265
TABLE 5.5
Operational Cost and Net Income 
Per Acre of Net Sown Area 
According to Tenancy Status
VillageX
Category
Opera­
tional
Cost
Rs\Acre
Gross
Income
RsXAcre
Net
Income
RsXAcre
Net 
Returns 
per Rupee 
Invested
CHARAPARA
OC 1,153 2,654 1,501 1. 30
PRT 1,023 2,232 1,209 1.18
PT 853 2,209 1,356 1.59
Total 1,100 2, 542 1,442 1. 31
HARINABABI
OC 1, 313 2,894 1,582 1.20
PRT 1, 370 2,988 1,617 1.18
Total 1, 330 2,923 1,593 1.20
SANDHAGAON
OC 2,116 1,708 -408 -0.19
PRT 1,723 1,869 146 0.08
PT 1,676 1,814 137 0.08
Total 1,843 1,797 -46 -0.02
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TABLE 5.6
Operational Cost and Net income 
Per Acre of Gross Cropped Area 
According to Tenancy Status
VillageX
Category
Opera­
tional
Cost
RsXAcre
Gross
Income
RsXAcre
Net
Income
RsXAcre
Net 
Returns 
Per Rupee 
Invested
CHARAPARA
OC 718 1,651 934 1.30
PRT 652 1,424 772 1.18
PT 645 1,670 1,025 1.59
Total 701 1,621 919 1. 31
HARINABABI
OC 801 1,766 965 1.20
PRT 992 2,164 1,172 1.18
Total 853 1,875 1,022 1.20
SANDHAGAON
OC 1,941 1,566 -375 -0.19
PRT 1,695 1,838 144 0.08
PT 1,586 1,716 130 0.08
Total 1,749 1,706 -44 -0.02
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TABLE 5 . 7
Us« of Owned and Hi rod Labour and. Hiring of Bullock 
According to Tenancy Status 
(Number of Households)
Vi I Lage\ 
Category
On ly 
Hi red 
Labour
Owned 
Plus Hired 
Labour
On ly 
Owned 
Labour
Total
House*
holds
Hiring
Out
Labour
Hiring- 
in One 
Bu I lock
CHARAPARA
OC 9 3 1 13 - -
(69.2) (23.1) (7.7) (100.0) (0.0) (0.0)
PRT 1 3 - 4 . 1
(25.0) (75.0) (0.0) (100.0) (0.0) (25.0)
PT - 2 3 5 5 2
(0.0) (40.0) (60.0) (100.0) (100.0) (40.0)
Tota I 10 8 4 22 5 3
(45.5) (36.4) (18.2) (100.0) (22.7) (13.6)
HARINABABI
OC 9 - 5 14 - 3
(64.3) (0.0) (35.7) (100.0) (0.0) (21.4)
PRT 2 - 3 5 . 1
(40.0) (0.0) (60.0) (100.0) (0.0) (20.0)
Total 11 . 8 19 - 4
(57.9) (0.0) (42.1) (100.0) (0.0) (21.1)
SANDHAGAON
OC 2 2 1 5 - -
(40.0) (40.0) (20.0) (100.0) (0.0) (0.0)
PRT 2.0 1 1 4 1 -
(50.0) (25.0) (25.0) (100.0) (25.0) (0.0)
PT 2 4 - 6 5 1
(33.3) (66.7) (0.0) (100.0) (83.3) (16.7)
Total 6 7 2 15 6 1
(40.0) (46.7) (13.30 (100.0) (40.0) (6.7)
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percentages of total.
268
TABLE 5.8
Percentage of Households Selling Crops and 
Rupees Sold per Household 
According to Tenancy Status
VillageX
Category
Total 
No. of 
House­
holds
No. of 
Households 
Selling 
Crop
% of 
Total
Total
Crops
Sold
Rs
Rupees 
Sold per 
House­
hold
CHARAPARA
OC 13 11 84.6 38,8 34 3,530
PRT 4 4 100.0 4,498 1,125
PT 5 1 20.0 792 792
PL 9 1 11.1 15,000 15,000
Total 31 17 54 . 8 59,124 3 ,478
HARINABABI
OC 14 6 42.9 19,910 3,318
PRT 5 4 80.0 16,155 4,039
Total 19 10 52.6 36 , 065 3,607
SANDHAGAON
OC 5 1 20.0 1,040 1,040
Total 15 1 6.7 1,040 1,040
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TABLE 5 . 9
Quantity of Different Crops sold and Total Sale Value 
According to Tenancy Status
VillageX No. of Paddy Black Green Ground Jute Cori- Jowar Horse Potato Brinjal Pump- Total
Category House- Gram Gram Nut ander Gram kin Sale
Holds Value
Se I ling
Crop Qt Is Qt Is Qt Is Qt Is Qtls Qt Is Qt Is Qt Is Qt Is Qt Is Qt Is Rs.
CHARAPARA 
OC 
PRT 
PT 
PL 
Tota I
11
4
1
1
17
39.3 31.0
4.8
5.3
44.6 35.8
6.5 11.7
1.4 1.5
1 . 2 0 . 2  1 . 1
7.9 13.2 0.0 1.2 0.2 1.1
- 100.0
0 . 0  100 .0
- 38,834
4,498
792
- 15,000
0.0 59,124
HARINABABI 
OC 
PRT 
Tota I
6
4
10
3.0 
1 .5 
4.5
0.3 9.0
7,3
9.4
4.8
0.3 16,3 14.2
0.5
0.5
6.0 62.0 
65.0 
6.0 127.0
1.0 19,910
- 16,155
1.0 36,065
SANDHAGAON
OC
Total
6.0
6.0
1 ,040 
1 .040
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TABLE 5.10
Percentage of Households Selling Black Gram: 
Months after Harvest 
According to Tenancy Status
VillageX
Category
No. Of 
Households 
Selling 
Crop
1 - 3
% of Households 
Selling 
Months after Harvest
3 - 6  After 6
CHARAPARA
OC 11 27 . 3 27.3 45.5
PRT 4 100.0 -
Total 15 46 .7 20.0 33.3
HARINABABI
OC 3 33.3 66.7
PRT 2 50.0 50.0
Total 5 40.0 60.0
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TABLE 5.11
Sale Price of Crops at Months after Harvest 
Charapara and Harinababi
Months
After
Harvest
Paddy
Rs/Qtl
Green
Gram
Rs/Qtl
Black
Gram
Rs/Qtl
Ground
Nut
Rs/Qtl
Jute
Rs/Qtl
1 150 600 500 550 380
2 170 650 500 700 400
3 182 675 600 800 450
4 182 675 600 850 600
5 190 675 600 850 -
6 200 700 650 850 -
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CHAPTER VI 
BASIC FEATURES OF SHARE TENANCY:
SURVEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Having considered the characteristics of households 
and the farm economy of the three study villages in 
relation to ownership, tenancy and 'degree of tenancy', we 
are in a position to analyse the features of share tenancy 
contracts which are to a large extent correlated to these 
characteristics in a meaningful way. The features under 
study include incidence of tenancy, who leases in and why, 
who leases out and why, sharing arrangement of crop and by­
products, sharing of input cost, decisions regarding 
cropping pattern and input use, causes of eviction, 
preference for tenants etc.. The efficiency implications of 
share tenancy and dynamics of tenancy contracts are 
examined in Chapter VII. In Chapter VIII interlinked 
tenancy contracts are described.
6.2 TWO DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS ON SHARECROPPING
Let us start by reminding ourselves of the broad 
characteristics of two differing viewpoints on share 
tenancy: the 'new' neoclassical view and the Marxist view. 
We may then review our survey findings and consider what 
support they give to one or other of these views.
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Firstly, the neoclassicals presume that tenancy is a 
voluntary contractual arrangement, whereas Marxists 
believe tenancy to be a compulsive involvement in 
market transactions and essentially a production 
relation.
Secondly, the 'new' neoclassicals consider tenancy to be
a rational response to market imperfections aiming at 
improving allocative efficiency. They explain the 
existence of share tenancy in terms of its
allocative efficiency enhancing role in a static
world, Marxists, by contrast, deem share tenancy to 
be a method of surplus appropriation concomitant with 
the stage of development of productive forces. 
Marxists are more concerned with evolution of 
tenancy contracts in a dynamic world. But the 
evolution of the tenancy relationship is not to 
increase allocative efficiency but to increase 
surplus extraction and in the process inequality is 
widened because of wealth being cumulatively 
appropriated by the dominant class.
Thirdly, the neoclassicals consider the peasantry as a
homogeneous mass that can be divided into two 
taxonomic categories. landowner and tenant. By
contrast, Marxists take into consideration the
differentiation of the peasantry i.e. classification 
of peasantry into different classes and examine the 
leasing behaviour according to their position in the 
class hierarchy.
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6.3 INCIDENCE OF SHARE TENANCY
The question of incidence of tenancy embraces within 
itself three sets of issues which have theoretical
relevance. The first is whether fixed tenancy or share
tenancy is prevalent in the villages under study. The
second is whether the incidence of share tenancy is
increasing or decreasing with the advancement of 
agriculture. This can be examined with time series data 
collected over a period of time in a particular village or 
cross-sectional data across regions having varied degree of 
agricultural advancement at a particular point of time. The 
third is whether pure tenancy or part tenancy is more 
prevalent and how its incidence varies across regions and 
over time.
In the villages under study, the major manifestation 
of tenancy upon which we have drawn several conclusions 
from our data in the previous two chapters is 
sharecropping. Fixed kind and fixed cash rent are 
relatively rare, except for one or two cases of fixed cash 
tenancy observed in the advanced village Charapara. The 
prevalence of share tenancy in Orissa is corroborated by a 
number of empirical studies (Bardhan, 1984b; Bharadwaj and 
Das, 1975a). A villagewise comparison of the incidence of 
share tenancy reveals that it is more prevalent in the non­
irrigated village Sandhagaon than in the irrigated 
villages. In Sandhagaon about 41 per cent of the 
operational area is under share tenancy whereas it is about 
19 per cent in Charapara and about 12 per cent in
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Harinababi (Table 6.1).
In Sandhagaon agriculture is a losing concern as 
rainfed farming is practised in this village in the absence 
of any irrigational facility. Moreover, as we have noted 
earlier the wage rate is found to be higher in this village 
as casual labourers demand high wage in parity with the 
available industrial wage. It is surrounded by industrial 
complexes where wage paid to workers is usually higher than 
agricultural wage. The high wage and high cost of 
cultivation persuades the landholders who have other 
sources of income like salary and business to lease out 
their land instead of self-cultivating. On the demand side, 
the landless casual labourers do not get work round the 
year as there is no agricultural work available in the rabi 
season. Almost all the cultivators in village Sandhagaon 
those who grow potato in the rabi season use their own 
labour. Therefore, the agricultural labourers are keen to 
lease in land to have some security in terms of crop. Thus, 
leasing-in represents insurance against hunger.
In the case of irrigated villages where wet 
cultivation of paddy is mainly followed, the medium and 
large farmers are usually drudgery averse unless compelled 
by subsistence needs. Cultivation of rice requires such 
detailed supervision of field operations like ploughing, 
weeding and transplanting, that it is almost as onerous to 
supervise these tasks as to do them oneself. Also hired 
labour-based rice cultivation is very expensive and not at
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all remunerative.1 The large farmers are no more under the 
compulsion of consumption needs to cultivate intensively, 
as their income status has improved due to remittances sent 
by the migrant family members. Thus, ecology and the 
production technology somehow affect the productive forces 
emerging in a village. This finding is strengthened by the 
fact that during the time of our investigation some 
cultivators when asked about the reasons for low yields 
reported that they lacked the zeal to produce more as they 
had sufficient salary income. And supervision of labour and 
labour management is now-a-days too difficult as demand for 
labour is heavy in relation to availability particularly at 
peak periods like transplanting and harvesting time. Farm 
servants are not easily available. If they are not treated 
properly, they simply move away to another employer as the 
large landholders are always in search of farm servants. 
The farm servants switch employers very often for increased 
wages or for any personal grievances against their 
employers. It is very easy for a farm servant to get an 
alternative employer whereas it is extremely difficult for 
an employer to get another farm servant. No capitalist or 
commercial tenants are observed in the irrigated villages, 
since it is not seen to be worthwhile to rent land that
1 Bray (1991) argues that in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, 
where wet rice cultivation is practised, the production units 
have converged towards small family labour farms. A ■small rice- 
field requires a lot of labour, it can also support a lot of 
labour. Therefore, in rice growing regions, dense population, 
small farms, peasant family farming as opposed to capitalist 
farming and land augmenting technology rather than labour 
augmenting technical innovations are observed in sharp contrast 
to the European experience.
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would have to be cultivated with wage labour.
This finding that there is larger incidence of 
sharecropping in a non-irrigated village than that of 
irrigated villages suggests that sharecropping is a 
distinguishing feature of backward agriculture. There is a 
large volume of empirical studies which reveals that 
tenancy is more prevalent in advanced agriculture. As 
farming turns out to be lucrative with technological 
development, the large farmers in advanced areas are now 
leasing in land to cultivate on commercial basis. This sort 
of leasing-in by large farmers is termed as reverse tenancy 
(singh, 1989) or capitalist tenancy (Parthasarathy, 1991). 
In agriculturally progressive areas, the marginal and small 
farmers are not able to compete with the rich peasants to 
get the leaseholds. The large farmers are found to rent 
land on fixed crop or fixed cash basis rather than on crop 
share (Vyas, 1970: A-78, Bhalla, 1983: 837).
If we next analyse the incidence of share tenancy 
overtime in particular villages, in the irrigated villages 
most of the tenants reported that share tenancy is tending 
to increase whereas in the non-irrigated village no such 
trend is perceptible. The increase of share tenancy in 
irrigated villages is mainly due to the migration of 
household members to urban areas for employment. In the 
next section, we analyze the incidence of pure and part 
tenancy.
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6.4 SHARECROPPING AND THE INCIDENCE OF PURE AND PART
TENANCY
It is sometimes suggested that land attracts land: 
that landlords prefer to lease out land to land owning 
peasants as they are considered to be efficient cultivators 
with managerial experience in farming (Nadkarni, 197 6: 
A142; Sharma and Dreze„1990: 58); Chadha and Bhaumik, 1992: 
1010; Gill, 1989: A82). On the other hand, some empirical 
findings suggest that the big lessors prefer to lease out 
to landless tenants with large family size (dependency 
burden) and preferably in small parcels (Bharadwaj and Das, 
1975a: 200-1) . It is argued that under the burden of
survival the landless poor will exert more effort to get an 
increased yield. This is interpreted as a strategy to 
extract labour rent in a hidden and subtle manner.
Our findings with regard to the incidence of pure and 
part tenancy are presented in Table 6.2. In the advanced 
village Charapara the major proportion (60%) of tenanted 
area is under pure tenancy whereas it is about 31 per cent 
in the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon. In the case of 
Harinababi this question does not arise as there are no 
pure tenants in Harinababi. In village Sandhagaon the 
resident lessors show their preference to lease out to 
their own caste relatives who are good cultivators rather 
than leasing out to landless scheduled castes. In this 
village there is some sort of animosity observed between 
the higher and the lower castes whereas in the irrigated 
village Charapara there is good understanding between the
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two classes. It is not the caste consideration but 
managerial ability and honesty in paying rent are the 
criteria on the basis of which the lessors select their 
tenants in Charapara. Managerial ability is gauged by a 
number of factors: the possession of land, experience in 
cultivation, number of able-bodied adult male members in 
the family and past yield performance of the tenants. 
Leasing out to landless or pure tenants is comparatively 
a recent phenomenon in Charapara (elaborated in sectionKp.10)< 
This is due to the increase in supply of tenanted land 
because of migration of family members of the landed class 
to urban areas for employment. There are no landowning 
households who are really interested to lease in land. Due 
to greater increase in wages relative to rise in 
agricultural prices, sharecropping on hired labour basis is 
not at all profitable. Therefore, the landless tenants are 
getting chance to lease in land.
6.5 WHO LEASES IN AND WHY?
The decision to enter into a tenancy contract can 
mainly be triggered by two types of motives. Firstly, the 
aim may be to earn subsistence as no alternative job 
opportunity is available. In this case, it is a compulsive 
and involuntary participation in the transaction because 
the returns from tenanted land are hardly commensurate with 
the effort that the tenant puts in due to payment of high 
rent. The poor peasant most unwillingly enters into the 
production relations of share tenancy as there is no other
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option left for him other than sitting idly and semi­
starved at home. Secondly, leasing-in may be undertaken to 
increase the scale of operation due to indivisibility of 
factors of production and to reap economies of scale and 
earn commercial profit. Here the contract is voluntary and 
promotes allocative efficiency. This type of tenancy is 
called capitalist or commercial tenancy. In the first case 
tenancy is a survival strategy whereas in the second case 
it is a welfare promoting device.
In backward agriculture "subsistence leasing' by poor 
peasants on sharecropping basis is mainly observed as a 
survival strategy. By contrast, in agriculturally 
progressive areas 'commercial leasing' by rich peasants on 
fixed rent basis is prominent. There are several empirical 
studies claiming that in developed areas, large farmers are 
found to lease in whereas small farmers tend to lease out 
(Bharadwaj and Das, 197 5a, Nadkarni, 197 6: A41; Singh,
1989: A88; Vyas, 1970: A7; Srivastava, 1989a: 358). The
entrepreneurial large farmers rent in land primarily to 
cultivate large tracts of land in a compact block on 
commercial lines by using tractor and installing pumpsets 
for irrigation and to reap economies of scale in the wake 
of technological change. The small farmers lease out 
because there is security of wage earnings in advanced 
agriculture due to high demand for labour. They prefer wage 
income which is certain in advanced areas to uncertain crop 
income from leased-in land.
Our study villages are located in the agriculturally
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backward region of Eastern India where mechanisation is as 
yet in its infancy. There are mainly small lessees and 
also small lessors found in our study villages. This 
finding supports Ray's (1978) evidence from West Bengal. 
The details of leasing-in are presented in Table 6.3. The 
table shows that mostly the landless, marginal farmers and 
small farmers are leasing in land. The average owned 
holding of an owner tenant is 2.32 acres in Charapara, 4.4 
acres in Harinababi and 2.83 acres in Sandhagaon (see Table 
4.4). The average owned holding of a tenant owner is much 
smaller, only 1.96 acres in Charapara, 0.96 acres in 
Harinababi and 0.48 acres in Sandhagaon (see Table 4.4) . It 
is clear from Table 6.3 that the tenants are mainly MFs and 
SFs. It is to be noted that all these tenancy agreements 
are annual contracts.
Interestingly, we found that in the advanced village 
Charapara two owner cultivator medium farmers and an owner 
tenant marginal farmer and a pure lessor medium farmer have 
leased in land seasonally to cultivate vegetables. The OCs 
and the OT have leased in about 0.12 to 0.16 acres of land 
to cultivate potato as they do not have land suitable for 
cultivation of potato. In this case of leasing in for 
cultivation of potato the terms and conditions of the lease 
are quite different from the annual tenancy. Here the owner 
of the land gets 25 per cent or 20 per cent or one third of 
the yield for ownership and then the rest crop is equally 
divided between the owner and the lessee as the owner is 
partner in the cultivation process by sharing 50 per cent
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of total input cost which includes seed, fertiliser,
pesticides, bullock labour and human labour cost and 
others. In this case the owner is actively engaged in the 
day-to-day agricultural operations. But none of these 
households was found to sell potato and they retained
everything for their own consumption. When asked the reason 
for not cultivating potato on a large scale, they reported 
their inability to take the risk as potato cultivation
needs a lot of watering and fertiliser application and 
entails high labour cost. On the other hand, the
probability of crop failure is quite high. This is partly 
because of an erratic mons'oon what might mean rain when the 
sprout has not yet come out. Moreover, potato plants are 
prone to pest attack and plant diseases.
In the case of the PL leasing in land seasonally, the 
mode of rent payment was fixed cash for cultivation of 
brinjal. Thus, the medium farmers are leasing in on 
favourable terms with low share rent, rent paid in cash and 
input sharing basis, whereas the marginal and small farmers 
are leasing on sharecropping basis with high rent.
Thus we found that mainly the landless, marginal and 
small farmers are leasing in land. It is they who are 
sharecroppers. Then the pertinent question arises of why 
are they leasing in land. On inquiring about the causes of 
leasing in, in Charapara all the tenants reported that lack 
of alternative job opportunity compels them to lease in 
land (see Table 6.4) . In Harinababi 60 per cent of the 
tenants and in Sandhagaon 80 per cent reported 'no
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alternative job opportunity' as the reason. In Harinababi 
2 0 percent each reported the reason for leasing in as 'to 
consolidate holding' and 'to increase operational holding' 
and in Sandhagaon 20 per cent of the households reported 
'bullock adjustment' as the reason for leasing-in.
Thus, it emerges clearly that tenants are renting land 
because there is no alternative employment opportunity for 
them. It is a compulsive involvement in the transaction and 
supports the Marxist view. We need to explore whether the 
compulsion is economic i.e. due to certain macro features 
of the economy or non-economic characterised by extra- 
economic coercion. Our study reveals that the share tenants 
are under no bondage or compulsion to lease in land from a 
particular lessor. They are quite free to take their own 
decisions how much land area to lease in and from whom. The 
lessees are completely free to rent land from more than one 
lessor. No tenant reported doing unpaid labour services for 
the lessor and when they work for the lessor they are 
usually properly paid. But it is observed that tenants do 
sometimes borrow from the lessors and that they repay in 
terms of labour; and that they are paid less than the 
prevailing wage rate - which is, of course, equivalent to 
charging an implicit interest rate. Thus, the evidence 
negates the presence of any sort of extra-economic 
coercion, but suggests some interlinking of markets.
But absence of coercion of course does not mean 
absence of exploitation. The mode of exploitation changes 
with changes in productive forces and there may be subtle
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and hidden strategies to extract surplus. The compulsions 
are more due to the macro features of the economy at large 
rather than due to exercise of power of landlord class over 
the poor peasants within a village boundary. Due to the 
slow pace of industrialisation, the land poor peasants find 
it difficult to get alternative jobs. Therefore, they are 
leasing in land even if it is hardly remunerative. By 
leasing in land, they become subordinate to the landowning 
class and subject to all sorts of surplus extraction 
through high rents, low wages and interlinking transactions 
with labour, credit and output markets. In the villages 
under study sharecropping can clearly be seen as a method 
of surplus appropriation as the aim of the landowner is not 
to improve allocative efficiency but to appropriate surplus 
after paying the labour just enough for his reproduction.
Some economists view tenancy as a bullock labour 
adjustment (Bliss and Stern, 1982; Jodha, 1981; Bell, 
1977) . In our survey only 25 per cent of the tenants in 
Sandhagaon reported bullock adjustment as the reason for 
leasing-in. In Sandhagaon almost all the cultivating 
households are found to own a pair of bullocks .They require 
bullocks not only for ploughing but also for the bullock 
cart to carry farm yard manure to the fields. They even 
earn by hiring out their bullock carts. A landless labourer 
was found to possess a pair of bullocks and he was hiring 
them out to earn some money.
In the three study villages it was found that the 
bullock market is to a large extent developed as hiring-in
285
of bullock labour. That we have shown clearly in Table 5.8. 
In Sandhagaon, a pure tenant reported borrowing from a 
private moneylender to buy one bullock and when asked how 
he would repay the loan he categorically replied that he 
would sell the bullock after the agricultural operations 
were over to repay the loan. Moreover, in Charapara pure 
tenants are leasing in land jointly as each owns only one 
bullock and they are cultivating on partnership. The charge 
for hiring in a pair of bullock in all the villages is 
Rs.3 0 per day and the bullock owner provides a ploughman 
with the pair of bullocks. Thus the bullock market is quite 
developed and tenancy can therefore be construed as a human 
labour adjustment mechanism, rather than a bullock-labour 
adjustment mechanism.
The land market is not active as only under adverse 
circumstances the households sell land: as at the time of 
daughter's marriage and funeral ceremony as portrayed in 
Table 4.27. Every one tries to retain ancestral land and 
also there is considerable appreciation in the price of 
land. There is an interest in investing in land but an 
absence of land coming to the market. Therefore, some 
cultivators in Harinababi are found to lease in land to 
increase or consolidate their operational holding.
In the labour market landless casual labourers do not 
get work throughout the year and it is found that 
households with a large number of family members are 
interested in leasing in land as they have already some 
wage income earned by some family members. And if they
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produce some crop by leasing in land, they have an 
insurance against hunger for the rest of the year. 
Moreover, the part tenants belong to the higher castes and 
due to the caste status they cannot hire out labour and 
work in another man's field. As a result, they lease in 
land as they do not have any alternative employment 
opportunity.
The next important question is why we find 
sharecropping instead of renting land on a fixed cash or 
crop rent. The most plausible explanation for this is that 
due to their precarious existence at the margin of 
subsistence, potential tenants are not in a position to 
take the risk of a fixed payment contract.
A second important aspect of sharecropping is whether 
it pays the tenant to lease in land. To address this we 
have calculated total farm income per acre of gross cropped 
area in the case of tenanted land of part tenants by 
subtracting the rent payment and adding the imputed value 
of own labour to the net income. The findings are presented 
in Table 6.5. It is clear from the table that in the case 
of part tenants, tenancy is nothing but a labour adjustment 
process as imputed value of own labour constitutes a 
significant proportion of farm income and in some cases the 
net receipt after payment of rent is negative and gives 
positive profit only when we add imputed value of own 
labour to the net receipt.
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In the non-irrigated village the landless pure tenants 
reported that leasing-in is not at all paying whereas the 
pure tenants in Charapara reported that because of the 
landowning class they are able to survive by renting land. 
This is because some patronage element of the landowning 
class is observed in the village Charapara. Thus, all in 
all , clearly tenants are leasing in land most unwillingly 
as no other job opportunities are available. From this 
fact, it can be discerned that if alternative job 
opportunities were available to the land-poor section of 
the peasantry in the non-farm sector through 
industrialisation, sharecropping would tend to disappear. 
The crux of the problem here is not so much that the class 
relation as emphasised by Marxists that compels the rural 
poor to interlink transactions, as it is the operation of 
certain macro features like population pressure on limited 
land, tardy industrialisation, lack of employment 
opportunity, that serves the persistence of sharecropping. 
We suggest that the autonomous role of production 
relations, or agrarian structure, should not be 
overstressed.
6.6 WHO LEASES OUT AND WHY?
In our study villages most of the lessors are small 
lessors i.e. MFs and SFs as showtr in Table 6.6. In the 
irrigated villages all the lessors are MFs and SFs whereas 
in Sandhagaon there are two MDF lessors. The average 
holding of pure lessors in Charapara is 2.03 acres, and 1.4
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acres in Harinababi and 2.98 acres in Sandhagaon. Table 6.6 
shows that in Charapara there are three owner cultivators 
belonging to the MDF and LF categories who have also leased 
out a part of their land because of distant land or 
problematic land. In Sandhagaon a scheduled caste 
landholder has also leased out all of his land because he 
has salary income.
In the irrigated villages most of the lessors are 
semi-absentee landlords in the sense that the heads of the 
lessor households have migrated to urban areas and are 
employed there, whereas their family members stay in the 
village. They come to the village every two or three months 
to see their family members. But in Sandhagaon there are 
also resident lessors. As they have other sources of 
income, they prefer leasing out to self-cultivation. Thus 
lessors are leasing out not with the primary motive of 
earning rent income and to consolidate their power in the 
village, but due to some contingencies which are discussed 
below under causes of leasing out.
Reasons for leasing out are given in Table 6.7. In 
Charapara out of 9 pure lessor households 4 PLs reported 
that as there is no able adult male member in the family to 
supervise cultivation due to the migration of the head of 
the household to urban area for employment, they are 
leasing out land. The OCs who have leased out part of their 
land reported that as the land is situated at a distant 
place they prefer to lease out. One LF in Charapara 
reported that as the land is problematic due to too much
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weeding, he leased it out. The hidden intention is to take 
it up for self-cultivation after few years when weeding 
will be lessened as the tenant will weed it to grow crops 
on it. Moreover, it is found that the owner cultivators 
prefer to lease out non-irrigated land as shown in Table 
6.6. In Harinababi out of 3 pure lessors 2 reported lack of 
sufficient man-power as the cause of leasing out.
It is also reported that in Sandhagaon, 3 out of 6 PLs 
responded that they did not have bullock power to cultivate 
land and that is why they leased it out. In backward 
agriculture investment in bullocks is the biggest 
investment for which a large sum is required at a time and 
most of the cultivators do not have that much money to 
invest at one time. It is to be noted that in Charapara an 
OC SF reported selling land to buy a bullock and a PT sold 
paddy just after harvest to a village resident to buy a 
bullock. And in all the villages some indebted households 
are found to borrow to buy bullocks. Non-possession of 
bullocks also compels the lessors to lease out.
When we asked the tenants the reasons for their 
lessors' leasing out land, most of them also reported that 
their lessors did not have able-bodied adults residing in 
the village to supervise cultivation due to emigration of 
family members.
It is to be noted that though there are pure lessors 
the pure rentier class is quite absent. We find that in 
Charapara only 13 per cent of the income of PLs is rent 
income and it is 8 per cent in Harinababi and 11 per cent
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in Sandhagaon as shown in Table 4.12. Again in Charapara a 
major proportion of PLs' income is from remittances (46%). 
In Harinababi also remittances constitute a significant 
proportion of PLs' income (68%). But in Sandhagaon the 
major source of income in the case of pure lessors is 
salary (49%). Thus salary holders even if residing in the 
village prefer to lease out in Sandhagaon. Returns from the 
cultivation of non-irrigated land are not large enough to 
attract the salary holders to self-cultivate the land and 
to take the responsibility of labour supervision.
Thus tenancy is observed in the villages not due to 
the intention of the lessors to subjugate the tenants but 
due to certain contingencies which give the lessors little 
option but to lease out. Bhalla's ( 1983) pipeline theory2 
has thrown some light on this aspect but in contrast to her 
theory here the semi-absentee lessors have not entered into 
the pipeline which ultimately leads to sale of land. We 
observe that while the heads of households have migrated to 
urban areas for employment, their family members stay in 
the village as they cannot afford to maintain their family 
in the metropolis with their meagre income. All of the 
semi-absentee pure lessors are employed in unskilled manual 
jobs and also in the private sector. After retirement they 
will return to the village and try to self-cultivate their 
land. One PL reported that on his retirement he returned to
2 In Bhalla's 'pipeline theory' in the first instance non­
cultivating village residents, or absentee landlords, whose main 
income is derived from a non-farm occupation lease out land. But 
as time passes these lessors lose interest in land and lose 
contact with the village and ultimately sell their land.
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the village and self-cultivated his land for two years. But 
he found it difficult due to his lack of experience in 
cultivation. Also, old age prevented him from injecting 
much effort, ultimately he leased out the land. Twenty to 
thirty years back these pure lessor households were leasing 
in land and even hiring out labour to large farmers. As 
they needed money for agricultural expenses the disguised 
unemployed members preferred to emigrate to urban areas so 
that the family could have some non-farm income. And when 
the father of the emigrant who was cultivating the land 
becomes too old or dies, there is no able male adult in the 
family to undertake cultivation and the semi-absentee head 
of household has no option but to lease out land.
Whereas the potential tenants from the irrigated 
villages have migrated to urban areas and are not 
adequately paid there, there is an influx of immigrants 
from tribal drought prone and hilly areas to irrigated 
villages. Many of them are employed as farm servants and 
after staying for 10 to 15 years some of them have settled 
in these areas having their own house and family. Now they 
have started leasing in land and the lessors also prefer to 
lease out to them as they are laborious and good 
cultivators and honest. They work hard to get a good yield 
because fear of eviction looms large in their minds. They 
apprehend that their chance of being evicted is more than 
that of the native tenants. Table 6.6 shows that one OC and 
two PLs have leased out to two scheduled tribe families who 
have settled in the adjacent village. Thus the immigrants
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from tribal areas help in the persistence of precapitalist 
relations in the irrigated areas, and the emigrants from 
the irrigated villages become susceptible to exploitation 
in the metropolis and worsen the conditions there by 
dampening wages. Even most of the farm servants in the 
irrigated villages are immigrants from tribal areas and the 
ex-resident farm servants have become casual labourers or 
pure tenants.
Tenancy contracts are observed to persist in the 
irrigated villages not due to the deliberate strategy of 
the land-owning class to subjugate the poorer class over 
time but because the exploited class has itself been 
displaced by another set of immigrants from tribal drought 
prone areas. Therefore, interlinked transactions have not 
remained an intravillage phenomenon. Rather they have 
crossed village boundary and needs to be explained within 
a macro framework where population growth, unemployment, 
the slow pace of industrialisation and so on play a role in 
the persistence of interlinkage. The prediction of both 
neoclassicals and Marxists that tenancy would tend to 
disappear did not fructify because they perhaps could not 
foresee the effect of these macro features; and the 
migration aspect which has profound influence on the 
tenancy relationshas not been given due attention. Thus the 
land-holding class takes advantage of certain contingencies 
created due to some macro features over which they do not 
have any control, though they benefit from them.
Pearce (1983) provides a Marxist explanation of
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sharecropping and his view is that with the disappearance 
of the contingencies that give rise to tenancy contracts, 
share tenancy would tend to disappear. But the pertinent 
question is precisely what these contingencies are. Pearce 
emphasises the role of risk and transaction cost in 
structuring the mode of production in the interest of the 
dominant class. And he argues that with mechanisation 
supervision will become unnecessary and sharecropping will 
disappear. But in the real world there are many other 
factors which play a greater role: like large farmers
migrating to urban areas and either not returning, or when 
they do return being unable to cultivate adequately. As a 
result, they will definitely lease out their land and there 
is an unemployed or underemployed class ever ready to lease 
in due to the slow pace of industrialisation. Definitely 
this sort of tenancy arrangements cannot be explained in 
terms of the traditional Marxist approach as a labour 
mobilisation process. There is no deliberate strategy 
involved but it is due to some situational contingencies.
6.7 PREFERENCE FOR TENANTS
In all the study villages the lessors reported that 
they prefer to lease out to efficient hard working 
cultivators who have bullocks of their own. Some economists 
argue that large farmers prefer to lease out land to 
landless farmers with large family size so that under the 
compulsion of subsistence requirements they will cultivate 
intensively to produce more and this they term as a hidden
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rent strategy (Bharadwaj and Das, 1975a) . But it is found 
that the OC large farmers have leased out to tenants who 
have their own land as they are considered to be good 
cultivators even though the tenants are residents of an 
adjacent village. Thus in our findings, efficiency in 
cultivation is what counts for the selection of a tenant, 
rather than any hidden rent strategy.
6.8 NUMBER OF LESSORS PER TENANT AND NUMBER OF TENANTS PER
LESSOR
In the irrigated villages most of the tenants are 
found to lease in from 3 to 5 lessors, whereas in the non- 
irrigated village the majority of tenants lease in from 1 
to 2 lessors as shown in Table 6.3. Likewise it is found 
that in the irrigated villages the lessors in some cases 
lease out land to 3 to 5 tenants. But in Sandhagaon the 
number of tenants per lessor does not exceed 2 in any case 
(see Table 6.6) . In the irrigated villages lessors are more 
concerned about the rent income and prefer to lease out in 
small parcels to many tenants to enforce efficiency in 
production and also to spread risk. A tenant with a small 
piece of land will put in immense effort to produce his 
consumption requirements. ' ' -
6.9 TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF TENANCY
The tenancy contract is agreed upon for one year at a 
time though it can be renewed at the completion of one
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year. In all the villages the contracts are oral and no 
official documentation is there. The terms and conditions 
of the contract cannot be changed in the middle of the 
contract period and the tenant cannot be evicted before the 
completion of the period of contract.
Besides these yearly tenancy contracts, in 
Charapara some cultivators are found to lease in land 
seasonally mainly for the cultivation of vegetables like 
potato and brinjal. This we have already discussed. In the 
non-irrigated village Sandhagaon, a pure lessor reported 
cultivating potato on his land as he had leased out the 
land only for the kharif season.
6.9.1 Sharing of Crops
The crop share between the tenant and the lessor is a 
standard 50:50 in the case of paddy in all the villages. 
But in the irrigated villages the sharing ratio varies with 
the type of crops grown. In charapara and Harinababi the 
crop share is 50:50 in the case of crops like green gram, 
black gram, horse gram, arhar, jute. But for crops like 
potato, ground nut, brinjal in the cultivation of which 
some entrepreneurial function or decision making is 
required, the sharing ratio differs and it is in favour of 
the tenant. In the case of potato the share of the lessor 
is 33.3 per cent, 38 per cent or 25 per cent of the produce 
as agreed upon in the tenancy contract. In case of brinjal 
the lessor's share is 38 per cent of the yield. In two 
cases of brinjal cultivation one in Charapara and one in
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Harinababi the rent is fixed cash i.e. Rs.12 0 per 0.04 acre 
(per gunth) and the tenant pays the amount in advance and 
the entire risk is borne by the tenant. This type of 
differing rent payment arrangement for different crops 
depending on the entrepreneurial function involved 
contradicts Rao's (1971) findings in Andhra Pradesh where 
there is a shift from sharecropping to fixed rent tenancy 
with increase in the role of decision making. Sharecropping 
is a flexible system to accommodate such conditional 
factors by appropriately changing the sharing ratio.3 
Interestingly the rent payment for the same crop in the 
same village differs significantly from tenant to tenant. 
It depends on the lessor to determine the sharing ratio and 
the sharecropper usually agrees to it as the demand for 
leased-in land is more than supply.
In the irrigated villages seasonal tenancy for 
cultivation of vegetables like potato and brinjal is 
observed. This is a recent trend and is on the increase. In 
the case of potato cultivation, the tenancy was more of a 
cultivation on partnership basis rather than a stereotype 
landlord and tenant relationship. This type of seasonal 
tenancy is usually observed among higher caste households 
and their kin.
The sharing of the crop in almost all the cases takes 
place in the lessor's farm yard if the lessor or his family 
members stay in the village. The lessor himself or one of
3 See Newbery (1975: 117-18) for a critique of Rao's
arguments.
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his family members or relatives supervises the harvest. If 
there is crop failure then both the tenant and the lessor 
bear it and there is no guaranteed minimum yield imposed on 
the tenant by the lessor. And the lessor gets his share as 
per the contract.
6.9.2 Sharing of Byproduct
Sharing of by-product differs in the three villages. 
In Charapara the tenant pays half of the water tax and that 
is why he takes half of the byproducts of paddy, green gram 
and black gram. In Harinababi the lessor pays the water tax 
and takes the whole of the by-products. In Sandhagaon the 
non-resident lessors do not take the byproduct; and few
resident lessors take half of the by-products.
/
6.9.3 Decision Regarding Cropping Pattern
In the irrigated villages all the tenants reported 
that they take decision regarding the cropping pattern that 
they would follow on the tenanted land. The lessors usually 
do not interfere in this regard. But we would like to cite 
an example which we came across in village Charapara. When 
we asked the tenant informant who takes the decision 
regarding the cropping pattern whether the tenant himself 
or the lessor or jointly, the tenant reported that he takes 
the decision. In t. *• course of the interview he reported 
cultivating autumn paddy in non-irrigated tenanted land. We 
became curious to know the reason for cultivating autumn 
paddy which does not yield any net income as the yield is
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half of the kharif paddy. On questioning, he categorically 
replied that it was only to please the lessor that he 
cultivated autumn paddy though it does not pay. From this 
it can be construed that the threat of eviction is the 
instrumentality by which the lessor practically enforces 
what he wants, in this particular instance and also perhaps 
more generally.
Moreover, in a village the cropping pattern that a 
cultivator adopts depends to a large extent on what other 
farmers with land contiguous to his field are cultivating. 
Suppose, a cultivator is interested in cultivating jute in 
early kharif i.e. after summer green gram and before kharif 
paddy, but cannot do it because he has to watch the field 
when the plants grow to prevent the grazing of cattle as 
the adjacent field owners who at that time start sowing 
paddy will not be bothered about the cattle. And 
specificity of soil for specific crops also restricts 
choice. Therefore, what the tenants cultivate is very often 
the cropping pattern that happens to be feasible.
Surprisingly, the large farmer part lessors in 
Charapara reported that they(lessors) decide the cropping 
pattern. Thus where the lessors are non-resident and they 
do not have any interest in cultivation the tenant takes 
all decisions regarding a cropping pattern. Otherwise the 
resident cultivator households suggest cropping pattern 
which the tenants cultivate and usually there is no major 
difference of opinion and thus is not perceived as a 
problem and an imposition by the tenant.
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In the non-irrigated village the tenants cultivate 
only kharif paddy and the question of cropping pattern is 
not of much importance. Only one pure tenant is found to 
cultivate arhar, horse gram and til in the rabi season. 
None of the tenants cultivates potato in the rabi season 
whereas some of the part tenants grow potato on their owned 
land. Part tenants, when asked about the reason for not 
cultivating potato on the tenanted land, reported the 
unsuitability of the land for the purpose. Anyway all the 
tenants reported that they decide the cropping pattern.
6.9.4 Decision Regarding Input Use and Investment on Land
All the tenants in the three study villages reported 
that they take all decisions regarding input use like the 
selection of seed variety, use of manure and fertiliser and 
pesticides and labour input.
Regarding investment in land all the tenants reported 
that the lessor takes the decision regarding this. In this 
context we came across an interesting case in village 
Charapara. An owner tenant disclosed that he had laboured 
hard to improve the irrigation facility on the tenanted 
land but that the lessor did not agree to bear the expenses 
on the pretext that he (the tenant) had not sought his 
consent before proceeding. The tenant in retaliation did 
not give the crop share to the lessor and he was evicted. 
Thus tenants usually do not take land improving measures 
and if they take such measures they have to seek the prior 
consent of the lessor and the crop share or rent is usually
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adjusted against the expenses incurred. Land improvement is 
considered as the sole responsibility of the lessor as in 
our study in Charapara 33 per cent of the PLs are even 
found to undertake fixed investment in land as shown in 
Table 7.7.
6 * 9.5 Sharing of Input Cost
All the tenants reported that the lessors do not share 
in input cost, except in the seasonal tenancy for the
cultivation of vegetables where the landowner bears half of 
the cost and the crop is divided in the same ratio after 
the payment of rent to the landowner for his ownership. But 
in the irrigated villages as the wage for harvesting in the 
case of paddy, black gram and green gram is paid in terms 
of harvested crop on a share rate basis it can be
interpreted as cost sharing by the land owner. Harvesting 
includes cutting the plant or uprooting and then carrying 
it to the farmyard and keeping it in heaps. In case of
paddy if a labourer cuts 80 bundles he takes 10 bundles and
in green gram and black gram the labourer gets about one 
sixth of the uprooted plants. In threshing also payment is 
made in kind. In Charapara the lessor pays 50 per cent of 
the water tax and that is why takes half of the byproduct. 
Besides these cases, the lessors do not share in input cost 
in any way. But sometimes the tenant borrows from the 
lessor to incur cultivation expenses. This we will discuss 
under linked tenancy contracts in Chapter VIII.
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6.10 DURATION OF TENANT'S ASSOCIATION WITH THE LESSOR
Table 6.8 contains information on the duration of 
association of the tenant with his present major lessor, 
the years he has been a tenant and his experience in 
cultivation. The table shows that the years with the 
present major lessor is less in Charapara and Harinababi 
than the number of years they have been tenants. In the 
irrigated villages shortening of leases is observed to 
extract surplus. Most of the tenants reported that there is 
a tendency in the village to shorten the leases and when 
asked about the motive behind it the tenants reported that 
'to enforce efficiency'. Few households reported the reason 
as 'in fear of tenancy legislation'.
Moreover, in Sandhagaon and Charapara it is observed 
that the phenomenon of the landless pure tenants leasing in 
land is a comparatively recent phenomenon as the large 
farmers prefer to lease out to tenants who have their own 
land and have sufficient experience in cultivation. As the 
supply of leased-in land is increasing because of 
emigration, landless labourers get a chance to lease in and 
they have proved themselves to be good cultivators. 
Moreover, their standard of living has improved because of 
different government poverty alleviating measures like 
loans for buying productive assets and the construction of 
an one roomed asbestos pacca house for each family under 
Indira Awas Yojana, and an increase in wages. They are thus 
able to buy bullocks and are interested in leasing in land.
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6.11 REASONS FOR EVICTION
The reasons for eviction have been collected from the 
tenants. In the irrigated villages the majority of tenants 
reported 7dissatisfied with the tenant's yield' as the most 
important reason for eviction (see Table 6.9) . In Charapara 
one tenant reported that the landowner sometimes asks for 
unpaid labour services and if the tenant does not agree to 
this, he is evicted. Even a casual labourer cited this 
reason for his eviction a few years back.
In the non-irrigated village Sandhagaon 2 tenants 
reported 'in fear of tenancy legislation' as the cause of 
eviction and some reported 'to lease out to another 
favourable tenant'. One tenant reported that he had leased 
in 3 acres of land and had been cultivating it for the last 
20 years but that the lessor asked for a loan of Rs.10,000 
by keeping the land as mortgage. As he (the tenant) could 
not advance that, he was evicted. In this type of 
mortgaging the arrangement is that when the landowner 
repays the loan he will get back his land and the lender 
will get the yield of land as his interest. In the 
irrigated villages the frequency of eviction of tenants is 
on the increase whereas it has remained the same in the 
non-irrigated village as reported by the tenants. But 
eviction of tenant for the purpose of resumption of land 
for self-cultivation is rare.
6.12 TESTING OF MODELS ON TENANCY
Following the neoclassical tradition certain models
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have been constructed by economists to explain the 
existence of tenancy. Bliss and Stern (1982) have developed 
a model following the capital stock adjustment principle 
and emphasize that tenancy is nothing but a resource 
adjustment mechanism. Likewise Pant (1983) tries to 
determine to what extent a household's resource endowments 
influence the extent of land leased in by it. He considers 
multiple regression models and seeks to explain variation 
in land leased in by the sample households in terms of 
their differences in their resource endowments.
We attempt to test these models with data collected 
from our three study villages. And we suggest an 
alternative model incorporating some additional explanatory 
variables which increases the predictive power of the 
model.
The correlation coefficients of human and bullock 
resource endowment with operational holding and leased-in 
area according to farmer category and villagewise are given 
in Table 6.10. No categorywise difference is clearly 
discernible from data. We attempt to test the Bliss and 
Stern model by taking into consideration all the households 
in each village.
The regression equation to test Bliss and Stern's 
model is:
NALI = A + B1 OLANDT + B2 ADULTM + B3 BULLV 
Where NALI = Net area leased in (in acres), or
area leased in minus area leased out
OLANDT = Land area owned by the household
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(in acres)
ADULTM = Adult. active male members in a 
household
BULLV = Value of Bullocks possessed by a 
household (in Rs.)
The results of regression analysis are presented in Table
6.11. The regression coefficients in the case of OLANDT and 
BULLV are found to be in conformity with hypothesized signs 
in all the villages and are significant. The coefficient of 
OLANDT is negative implying that net area leased in 
decreases with increase in owned land area. The coefficient 
of BULLV is positive indicating that net leased in area 
increases with increase in value of bullock owned. The sign 
of regression coefficient in the case of ADULTM is expected 
to be positive. But it is estimated to be negative in the 
irrigated villages and positive in the non-irrigated 
village Sandhagaon. But the relationship is not significant 
in any of the villages.
Now we try to estimate the regression equation based 
on Pant's model of share tenancy which is:
NALIW = A + Bx OLANDTW + B2 DEPEND + B3 BULLVW 
Where NALIW = Net area leased in per worker (in acres)
OLANDTW = Owned land per worker in a household (in 
acres)
DEPEND = Ratio of non-workers to workers in a 
household
BULLVW = Value of bullock owned per worker (in Rs. )
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The results of least-squares regression are given in Table
6.12. It is clear from the table that in all the study 
villages households with a large number of workers relative 
to land ownership will lease in more land. Moreover, leased 
in area is positively correlated with bullock ownership. 
Thus, it is concluded that in imperfectly functioning rural 
markets, tenancy serves as a resource adjustment mechanism 
by adjusting the cultivated area of a household to its 
resource endowments of bullock and human labour. The 
dependency ratio (DEPEND) is found to be negatively 
correlated to the area leased in by the household in all 
the villages. This finding is quite interesting because it 
refutes the hypothesis that the family with relatively more 
dependents lease in more land. The reason for such a 
relationship is not far to seek. Income from agriculture is 
not the only source of income in rural areas. Moreover, a 
nuclear family structure is observed in the case of land 
poor households and the dependency ratio is considerably 
less for them.
We have constructed a model of our own to explain the 
leasing behaviour as observed in our study villages. The 
regression equation is:
NALI = A + Bx OLANDT + B2 ADULTM + B3 NONWORK +
B4 BULL + B5 CEXPHEAD + B6 LABOR
Where NONWORK = Number of non-workers in a household
BULL = Number of bullocks possessed by a household 
CEXPHEAD = Experience in cultivation (in no. of
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years)
LABOR = 1 if any member of the household does manual 
work 
= 0 otherwise.
Other variables are defined as previously mentioned.
Table 6.13 contains the regression results. It is to be 
noted that the explanatory power (the value of R square) of 
the independent variables in explaining variation in net 
area leased in has increased. The coefficient of the 
additional explanatory variable LABOR is positive as 
expected in all the villages. It implies that those who 
usually do manual work in the field tend to lease in more 
land. The net area leased in is found to increase with 
increase in experience in cultivation in Charapara and 
Sandhagaon.
The most important shortcoming. of this sort of 
analysis of leasing behaviour is that by taking net area 
leased in as the area leased in minus area leased out as 
the dependent variable, the presumption is that the 
leasing-in and leasing-out behaviour are dependent on the 
same set of explanatory variables. This is fallacious. The 
fact is that the lessors and lessees clearly belong to two 
different sets of farm households and their decision to 
lease in or lease out are based on different socio-economic 
considerations. Those who are leasing in are found to be 
marginal and small farmers having no supplementary income 
except farm income, which includes income from cultivation 
and wages. Thus they are leasing in land to earn income for
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their subsistence. The lessors are found to be semi­
absentee and they have other sources of income like 
remittances and salary. As there are no able adults in the 
family to supervise cultivation, they lease out. Srivastava 
(1989a) and Nabi (1985) have also tested the Bliss and 
Stern model with empirical data. The usual criticisms 
levelled against neoclassical approach to share tenancy 
also applies to these models.
In more explicit manner, Matussi and Nugent (1989) try 
to estimate a regression equation by taking incidence of 
share contract as the dependent variable and proxies for 
transaction cost as explanatory variables with the aim of 
examining the importance of transaction costs in determining 
tenancy.4 They conclude that transaction cost 
considerations are potentially useful and applicable in the 
determination of tenancy contracts. But interestingly, 
while discussing the four environmental changes that 
affected the contractual choice in the area they note that 
"Because of the emigration of secondary workers from farm 
families, reliable supervisory labour was becoming 
particularly scarce (p.149)." Transaction cost may be the
4 In their model (Matoussi and Nugent,1989; 153) the
incidence of share contract is measured by the dummy variable 
ISHARE which is equal to unity if share contracts are practised 
on at least a part of the farm, and is zero, otherwise. ISHARE 
is the dependent variable and the explanatory variables are total 
endowments of land (ST), the endowment of irrigated land (SI), 
the farm's ownership of hydraulic equipment (EH) and-AA, CS, EM 
representing three different principal occupations of the 
landowner, namely, agriculturist, civil servant and emigrant of 
any occupation; MPROP and MW which represent relatively large 
endowments of labour by the landowning household and the working 
household, respectively, and CRW, a dummy variable for the 
substantial provision of credit to working household.
308
obvious and transparent reason for an increase in tenancy. 
But the explanation is too simplistic and the crux of the 
matter lies beneath the transaction cost i.e. in migration 
and how to explain it. The ahistorical neoclassical 
explanation is ill-equipped to deal with this type of 
problem.
6.13 CONCLUSION
We here attempt to summarise our findings to examine 
them against the viewpoints set out at the beginning. Our 
findings give some support to certain of the Marxist 
propositions on share tenancy. Firstly, share tenancy is 
found to be a compulsive involvement in market transaction 
from the point of view of both the lessee and the lessors. 
Secondly, share tenancy is seen to be a method of surplus 
appropriation rather than a mechanism to increase 
allocative efficiency. Thus, shortening of leases, eviction 
of tenants due to dissatisfaction with tenant's yield and 
high rent are distinguishing features of unrecorded and 
illegal tenancy as observed in the study villages. If 
minimisation of transaction or supervision cost is the 
primary motive to lease out, then the resident cultivators 
are expected to lease out instead of self-cultivating their 
land. But no such leasing out by resident large farmers is 
observed in the study villages.
In order to explain the existence of share tenancy the 
historical development of the areas is to be considered. It 
is important to know how the landless class was created and
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why there is no industrialisation or transfer of surplus 
labour to the non-farm sector. Why agriculture remains to 
be overcrowded and land man ratio is adverse and getting 
worse. Thus a particular production relation does not 
manifest on a clean slate, the historical antecedents and 
the role of the state play a dominant role in structuring 
a production relation. This we have not been able to do in 
this thesis.
We have already shown in Chapter IV and our findings 
in this chapter support the fact that tenants are not a 
homogeneous class but there is considerable differentiation 
among them.
But, we stress that we do not find in our village a 
pure rentier class, or a class of large landlords renting 
out land to a subject peasantry. This particular Marxist 
view is clearly not supported. Nor can the Marxist 
approach, as exemplified by, say Pearce (1983) be 
supported. The role of certain situational contingencies, 
of certain macro features and the role of migration need 
analytical attention of a kind that Marxist treatment has 
tended not to give. We find little evidence of any hidden 
rent strategy: a notion which some Marxist writers have put 
forward.
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TABLE 6.1
Percentage Area under Share Tenancy 
Villagewise
Village Total
Operational
Area
Acres
Area
Linder
Tenancy
Acres
% of 
Total
Charapara 98.46 18.62 18.91
Harinababi 52. 38 6 .12 11.68
Sandhagaon 43.62 17.90 41. 04
311
TABLE 6 .2
Percentage Area under Part and Pure Tenancy 
Vi Ilagewise
Vi I lage Area
Under
Tenancy
Acres
Area under 
Part 
Tenancy 
Acres
X of 
Total
Area under 
Pure 
Tenancy 
Acres
X of 
Total
Charapara 18.62 7.36 39.53 11.26 60.47
Harinababi 6.12 6.12 100.00 - *
Sandhagaon 17.90 12.40 69.27 5.50 30.73
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TABLE 6 ,3
Tenancy Particulars: Land Owned, Land Leased in and Lessor Type
Category Si. No Land
I
(Acres)
Owned
NI
(Acres)
Land
I
(Acres)
Leased-in Mortgage
NI NI 
(Acres) (Acres)
Operational
Holding
(Acres)
No. of 
Lessors
Lessor's Lessor's 
Type Income 
Source
CHARAPARA
Owner Tenant 1 0.84 0.20 - 1.16 - 3.04 4 R C
2 0.20 1.96 1.00 0.00 0.64 3.72 1 NR S
3 1.08 0.56 0.68 0.32 • 4,40 4 NR s
Average 0.71 0.91 0.56 0.49 0.21 3.72 3.00
Tenant Owner 0.48 1 .00 3.00 1.00 0.00 8.96 4 NR s
Pure Tenant 5 - - 2.20 2.00 - 6.40 5 NR-4,R-1 S,PL
6 - - 1.50 0.48 - 3.48 3 NR-2,R-1 S,PL
7 - - 2.00 - - 4.00 1 *PWD -
8 - - 0.16 - - 0.32 1 *PWD -
g - - 2.64 - - 5.28 3 NR-1,AV-2 C&S,C
Average 0.00 0.00 1 .70 0.50 0.00 3.90 2.60
Total Avg. 0.29 0.41 1 .46 0.55 0.07 4.40 2.89
HARINABABI
Owner Tenant 1 1.00 - - 0.52 - 2.52 3 NR s
2 2.50 2.00 0.40 0.00 - 7.80 1 vi 11.land -
3 1 .50 1.20 - 0.20 - 4.40 1 R c
Average 1 .67 1 .07 0.13 0.24 0.00 4.91 1 .67
Tenant Owner 4 0.72 0.28 1 .50 1 .00 - 5.72 2 NR S
5 - 0.20 1 .00 1.50 - 3.70 6 NR S
Average 0.36 0.24 1 .25 1 .25 0.00 4.71
Total Avg. 1.14 0.74 0.58 0.64 0.00 4.83 2.60
SANDHAGAON
Owner Tenant 1 - 5.00 0.00 1 .00 - 6.00 1 R s
2 - 2.00 0.00 1 .00 - 3.00 2 R,NR s
3 - 1 .50 0.00 1.00 - 2.50 1 AV c&s
Average 0.00 2.83 0.00 1.00 0.00 3.83 1 .33
Tenant Owner 4 0.00 0.48 0.00 2.50 0.00 2.98 1 R
Pure Tenant 5 - - - 1 .00 - 1 .00 4 AV c
6 - - - 2.00 - 2.00 1 R Pension
7 - - - 2.00 - 2.00 1 AV S
B - - - 2.00 - 2.00 2 NR ,AV C&S
9 - - - 1 .40 - 1 .40 3 AV c
10 - - - 4.00 - 4.00 1 R Shop
11 - - - 0.00 2.00 2.00 1 NR s
Average 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.77 0.29 2.06 1.86
Total Avg. 0.00 0.82 0.00 1.63 0.18 2.63 1 .64
Notes: R-resident, NR-non resident, AV-adjacent village, C-cultivation, S-salary 
*PWD: Land leased out by the Public Works Department
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TABLE 6 .4
R easons f o r  L e a s in g  i n :  F re q u e n c y  o f  R e sp o n se s
Reasons for Leasing in CHARAPARA HARINABABI SANDHAGAON
OT TO PT OT TO OT TO PT TOTAL
No alternative job opportunity 3 1 5 1 2 1 1 7 21
Bullock adjustment - - - - 2 - * 2
To consolidate holding - - - 1 - - - - 1
To increase operational holding - - - 1 - - - - 1
Tota I 3 1 5 3 2 3 1 7 25
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TABLE 6 .5
Net Income, Rent Paid, Net Receipt, Imputed Value of Own Labour and 
Total Farm Income of Part Tenants from Tenanted Land 
(Rupees per Acre)
Category SI,, No. Farmer
Class
Net
Income
Rent
Payment
Net
Receipt
4-5
Imputed 
Value of 
Own Labour
Total
Farm
Income
6+7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
CHARAPARA
Owner Tenant 1 SF 537 694 (157) 358 201
2 SF 398 591 (193) 48 (145)
3 SF 1,216 827 389 138 527
Tenant Owner 1 MDF 536 519 17 144 161
HARINABABI
Owner Tenant 1 SF 2,811 1,565 1,246 1,382 2,628
2 SF 873 669 204 431 635
3 MDF 4,495 2,430 2,065 - 2,065
Tenant Owner 1 SF 1,484 1,203 281 - 281
2 MDF 1,210 779 431 462 893
SANDHAGAON
Owner Tenant 1 SF 1,154 1,204 (50) 204 154
2 SF 328 816 (488) 1,190 702
3 MDF (141) 868 (1,009) 1,190 '182
Tenant Owner 1 SF (832) 326 (1.158) - (1,158)
fslc-Ve c6 Re,,u rj?s in c are CMZ C|6\yVc v/' V clJ
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TABLE 6 .6
Leasing out Particulars
Vi llage\ SI. 
Category
No. Owned
I
(Acres)
Land
NI
(Acres)
Leased
I
(Acres)
Out
NI
(Acres)
Opera­
tions I 
Holding 
(Acres)
No. of 
Lessees
Lessee's
Owned
Land
Lessee's
Resi - 
dence
Lessee's 
Caste
Lessor's 
Income 
Source
CHARAPARA
OC 1 5.00 5.00 0.00 0.48 14.52 1 Y AV G C
2 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.48 11.52 1 Y R G C
3 3.00 3.00 0.60 2.20 5.60 5 N R,AV SC,ST C
PL 1 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 *0.28 4 N R SC C&RM
2 0.24 0.04 0.24 0.04 2 N R SC RM
3 1.40 1.40 1 .40 1.40 2 N AV ST Pension
4 2.00 0.72 2.00 0.72 3 N AV ST S&RM
5 0.48 - 0.48 - 1 N R SC RM
6 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 2 Y R G S
7 0.40 0.04 0.40 0.04 1 Y R G RM
8 0.32 0.72 0.32 0.72 1 Y R G RM
9 1.20 1 .44 1 .20 1 .44 1 Y R G RM
Total 12 21.64 18.96 10.24 10.12 31.64 24
Average 1 .80 1.58 0.85 0.84 2,64 2.00
HARINABABI
PL 1 0.48 0.28 0.48 0.28 - 2 Y R G RM
2 0.56 0.32 0.56 0.32 - 2 Y R G RM
3 0.48 0.24 0.48 0.24 - 2 Y R G RM
Total 3 1 .52 0.84 1 .52 0.84 0.0 6
Average 0.51 0.28 0.51 0.28 0.0 2.00
SANDHAGAON
PL 1 - 1.50 - 1 .50 2 N R SC RM
2 - 3.00 - 3.00 2 Y R G RM
3 - 5.00 - 5.00 2 N R SC S
4 - 1.88 - **3.00 1 N R SC s
5 - 5.00 - 5.00 2 N, Y R SC,G s
6 - 1 .50 - 1 .50 1 N R SC shop
Tota I 6 0.00 17.88 0.00 16.00 0.00 10
Average 0.00 2.98 0.00 2.67 0.00 1.67
Notes: *Has leased in 0.26 acres of land to cultivate vegetables.
**Has acquired 1.12 acres of land as mortgage by advancing Rs.20,000.
G - general, SC - scheduled caste, ST - scheduled tribe:immigrant from tribal areas 
C - cultivation, S - service, RM - remittance 
Y-yes, N-no
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TABLE 6 .7
R easons f o r  L e a s in g  o u t ;  F re q u e n c y  o f  R esp o n ses
Reasons for Leasing out CHARAPARA HARINABABI SANDHAGAON All Vi Ilages
OC PL X of 
Total
PL X of 
Tota I
PL X of 
Tota I
Lessors X of 
Tota I
*No able adult to supervise - 4 44.4 2 66.7 1 16.7 7 33.3
No bullock Power - 3 33.3 - - 3 50.0 6 28.6
Difficult to get Farm Servant - - - - - 1 16.7 1 4.8
Difficult to Supervise - 1 11.1 - - 1 16.7 2 9.5
Small Landholding - 1 11.1 1 33.3 - - 2 9.5
To Reduce Weeding 1 - - - - - - 1 4.8
Distant Land 2 - - - - - - 2 9.5
Total 3 g 100.0 3 100.0 6 100.0 21 100.0
Note: *Head of household is non-resident being in employment in distant urban area.
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TABLE 6.8
Tenant's Association with the Lessor
Category Si. NO. Years with 
Present 
Lessor
Years
Tenant
Experience
in
Cultivation
CHARAPARA
OT 1 6 10 10
2 1 12 20
3 2 8 10
TO 4 3 25 25
PT 5 2 2 2
6 2 4 4
7 4 4 4
HARINABABI
OT 1 1 5 12
2 2 10 16
3 5 5 34
TO 4 2 5 30
5 5 8 20
SANDHAGAON
OT 1 3 3 50
2 10 10 10
3 10 30 30
TO 4 15 15 25
PT 5 2 6 6
6 2 7 7
7 10 10 10
8 1 5 5
9 2 2 2
10 4 4 4
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TABLE 6 . 9
Reasons for Eviction as Reported by Tenants:Frequency of Respons
REASONS FOR EVICTION CHARAPARA HARINABABI SANDHAGAON
OT TO PT OT TO OT TO PT Total
Resumption of land for self-cultivation - 1 - - 1 1 - - 3
Dissatisfied with the tenant's yield 3 1 3 2 1 1 1 2 14
In fear of tenancy legislation ■ - - - - - 2 2
To lease out to another favourable tenant - - 1 - - - 3 4
Ask for cash advance for mortgaging land - - - - 1 - 1
Distribution of joint family land - - - - - - 1 1
Conflict over sharing capital investment on land 1 - - - - - 1
Conflict with the tenant family - - - • - - - 1 1
Ask the tenant for unpaid labour service 1 - - - - - - 1
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TABLE 6 . ID
Correlation of Human and Bullock Resource Endowment with 
Operational Holding and Net Area Leased in 
Cultivating Households
Variab les 
Vi I lages\ 
Categories
OPHOLDT
TOTALME
OPHOLDT
ADULTM
OPHOLDT
BULLV
NALI
TOTALME
NALI
ADULTM
NALI
BULLV
CHARAPARA
OC 0.09 0.24 0.39 0.33 0.02 -0.06
PRT -0.81*** -0.71 -0.98** -0.77 -0.63 -0.99#
PT 0.68*** 0.51 0.70*** 0.68*** 0.51 0.70***
TOTAL 0.04 0.24 0.46** 0.19 -0.01 -0.32***
HARINABABI
OC 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.77#
PRT 0.74*** 0.16 0.64 -0.07 -0.62 0.4
TOTAL 0.41** 0.34*** 0.73# -0.09 -0.05 0.09
SANDHAGAON
OC 0.37 0.28 0.19
PRT 0.93** 0.89*** 0.99* -0.08 -0.13 -0.33
PT 0.66*** 0.72*** 0.51 0.66*** 0.72*** 0.51
TOTAL 0.60* 0.66* 0.59* 0.023 -0.02 -0.21
Notes: Pearsonian Correlation Coefficients are given
* indicates 1% level of significance(1-tailed)
** indicates 5% level of significance(1-tailed)
*** indicates 10% level of significance^-tailed)
# indicates to 0.1% level of significance^-tailed)
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TABLE 6 .1 1
R e s u l t s  o f  L e a s t - S q u a r e s  R e g r e s s io n  A n a l y s i s
N e t  A re a  Lea se d  i n
A l l  H o u s e h o ld s
Vi I lage Dependent
Variable
Explanatory
Variables
B S.E.(B) T-Value Sig{T) R Square F-Value Sig(F) 
(k-1,n-k d.f.)
CHARAPARA NALI OLANDT -0.41 0.095 -4.27 0.000 0.38 7.98 0.000
ADULTM -0.37 0.304 -1.20 0.236 (3,39)
BULLV 0.000919 0.000212 4.33 0.000
Constant 0.17 0.550 0.31 0.756
HARINABABI NALI OLANDT -0.43 0.113 -3.79 0.001 0.57 7.9 0.001
ADULTM -0,14 0.171 -0.83 0.417 (3,18)
BULLV 0.000825 0.000177 4.66 0.000
Constant -0.50 0.457 -1 .09 0.292
SANDHAGAON NALI OLANDT -0.76 0.096 -7.93 0.000 0.77 32.45 0.000
ADULTM 0.27 0.170 1.61 0.118 (3,29)
BULLV 0.000631 0.000108 5.83 0.000
Constant -0.61 0.311 -1 .95 0.060
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TABLE B .1 2
R e s u l t s  o f  L e a s t - S q u a r e s  R e g r e s s io n  A n a l y s i s
N e t  A re a  Leased  i n  p e r  W o rk e r
A l l  H o u s e h o ld s
Vi I lages Dependent 
Vari able
Exp lanatory 
Variables
B S.E.(B) T-Va Lue Sig(T) R Square F-Value
(k-1,n-k d.f,
sig(F)
)
CHARAPARA NALIW OLANDTW -0.4 0.103 -3.91 0.000 0.37 6.99 0.000
DEPEND -0.00125 0.156 -0.01 0.994 (3,35)
BULLVW 0.000945 0.000217 4.358 0.000
Constant -0.14 -0.14 -0.26 0.798
HARINABABI NALIW OLANDTW -0.48 0.112 -4.31 0.000 0.66 10.18 0.000
DEPEND -0.19 0.096 -1 .99 0.065 (3,16)
BULLVW 0.00106 0.000213 4.99 0.000
Constant -0.08 0.241 -0.34 0.738
SANDHAGAON NALIW OLANDTW -0.78 0.082 -9.5 0.000 0.84 52.45 0.000
DEPEND -0.22 0.056 -3.94 0.000 (3,29)
BULLVW 0.000598 0.00008733 6.84 0.000
Constant 0.58 0.199 2.93 0.007
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TABLE 6 . 1 3
R e s u l t s  o f  L e a s t - S q u a r e s  R e g r e s s io n  A n a l y s i s
Net  A re a  Leased  i n
A l l  H o u s e h o ld s
Vi Ilages Dependent 
Variab le
Explanatory 
Variab les
B S.E.<B) T-Value R Square F-Value Sig(F) 
(k-1,n-k d.f.)
CHARAPARA NALI OLANDT -0.29 0.125 -2.35 0.024 0.51 6.13 0.000
ADULTM -0.51 0.293 -1.75 0.090 (6,36)
NONWORK 0.07 0.174 0.39 0.696
BULL 0.92 0.525 1.75 0.089
CEXPHEAD 0.05 0.041 1.32 0.195
LABOR 1.93 0.958 2.01 0.052
Consant -0.30 0.731 -0.41 0.687
HARINABABI NALI OLANDT -0.41 0.125 -3.28 0.005 0.61 3.9 0.015
ADULTM -0.15 0.199 -0.76 0.462 (6,15)
NONWORK -0.12 0.143 -0.85 0.411
BULL 1.93 0.462 4.19 0.000
CEXPHEAD -0.00986 0.019 -0.51 0.617
LABOR 0.26 0.522 0.51 0.620
Consant -0.18 0.834 -0.21 0.836
SANDHAGAON NALI OLANDT -0.82 0.091 -9.00 0.000 0.83 21.69 0.000
ADULTM 0.10 0.225 0.42 0.674 (6.26)
NONWORK -0.07 0.089 -0.736 0.468
BULL 0.42 0.263 1.60 0.120
CEXPHEAD 0.06 0.025 2.17 0.039
LABOR 0.74 0.431 1 .72 0.097
Consant -0.04 0.446 -0.09 0.931
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CHAPTER - VII 
SHARE TENANCY AND EFFICIENCY 
AND ITS DYNAMICS 
(SURVEY FINDINGS)
7.1 INTRODUCTION
A scrutiny of the theoretical literature on the 
efficiency aspect of tenancy reveals that there are two 
broad approaches to this question. One is the neoclassical 
approach which emphasizes the allocative efficiency 
implication of tenancy in a static setup. Among the 
neoclassicals there clearly emerges two different views. 
The economists (Bardhan and Srinivasan, 1971; Bell and 
Zusman, 197 6) following the Marshallian tradition argue 
that share tenancy is inefficient. On the other hand, those 
economists (Newbery, 1974, 1975a, 1975b; Stiglitz, 1974)
who adhere to the Cheungian viewpoint - exponents of the 
so-called 'new' neoclassical view stress that tenancy can 
be an efficient arrangement under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty. In contrast to the neoclassical approach, 
Marxists are concerned with the efficiency implication of 
tenancy in a dynamic context and argue that tenancy being 
interlinked with usury, labour and trading markets 
facilitates surplus extraction and thus by diverting 
accumulated surplus into these unproductive channels causes 
stagnation in agriculture.
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8.2 EXPOSITION OF NEOCLASSICAL ARGUMENT
LabourFigure 7.1
The difference between the Marshallian and the 
Cheungian viewpoint on the efficiency implications of 
tenancy can be well understood with the help of simple 
algebra and geometry.
To begin with the Marshallian argument, assume a 
perfectly certain and competitive world. There is a lessor 
who gives a plot of land to a tenant with the agreement 
that the tenant will pay a fraction r of the total output 
as rent in each year. Assume that labour is the only factor 
of production. In figure 7.1 MP depicts the marginal 
product curve of the tenant's labour. Let EP be so drawn 
that at each point its height equals to (l-r)th times the 
height of MP curve. This curve is nothing but the marginal 
earning curve of the tenant showing his additional earning 
from each additional unit of labour after payment of rent.
Now coming to cost consideration of the tenant, the 
marginal cost is assumed to be the wage which is the
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opportunity cost of labour which remains constant in a 
competitive market. Measured in farm output the wage W is 
OW. Here the assumption is that the tenant can hire or sell 
labour in the market at the competitive wage rate W. Thus 
the tenant will maximise his earnings when his marginal 
product will equal his marginal cost i.e. at the point of 
intersection of MP and WC curves . In the diagram the tenant 
will use labour upto OLi units. He will have a gross income 
equal to area MOLjB out of which he will pay rent equal to 
area MBAE and wage WOL-lA. Thus his net earnings from 
tenanted land will be AEW. If the tenant had sold his 
labour in the market his earnings would have been OLxAW. 
Thus the extra earning AEW that he is getting by leasing in 
land is nothing but present from the landlord (Cheung, 
1969: 47) .
Now suppose the landlord decides to cultivate the land 
himself with hired labour instead of leasing out to the 
tenant. For the owner operator the earning curve is the MP 
curve and the marginal cost curve is WC. Thus the landlord 
will hire 0L2 units of labour which is more than the labour 
used under tenant cultivation. Now the gross income will be 
OMCL2. His net income after payment of wages is MWC. Thus 
under share tenancy the producer loss or welfare loss to 
the society was BAC. Thus according to Marshall under share 
tenancy the use of variable inputs will be sub-optimal 
leading to inefficient production and loss of social 
product.
In the above analysis it is assumed that the land
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leased in by the tenant is fixed. If this assumption is 
relaxed, it is clearly in the interest of the tenant to 
lease in from several lessors as long as the marginal 
productivity of land is positive, as he is earning some 
residual income over and above his opportunity cost. Thus 
in equilibrium the marginal product of land would be driven 
down to zero (Johnson, 1950J.1
Cheung argues that at equilibrium the share tenant's 
income cannot be more than his alternative earnings i.e. 
his income in the wage market. If it is more, then it can 
not be an equilibrium situation. Hence, there will be an 
excess supply of labourers willing to be tenants. Thus 
Cheung concluded that the lessor can extract the residual 
earnings from the tenant without apprehending that the 
tenant will leave him. In particular Cheung argued that the 
lessor can regulate the rental ratio, enforce desirable 
input use and can decide the number of tenants to whom to 
lease out. With these three instrument variables, the 
lessor will drive down the earnings of the tenant to his
1 Bell (1977: 319) explains this with simple algebra. Assume 
that the tenant produces output Q with land H and labour L. 
Assume that the rental ratio r is specified and the wage rate is 
w. Now the tenant's objective is to maximise income from leased 
in land:
Max Y = (1-r)Q - wL (1)
with respect to H and L where Q = f(H,L)
Then the first order conditions for equilibrium are
(1-r >?n-= 0 (2)
and
(l-r)iLL = w (3)
"&L
Thus equation (2) implies that in equilibrium the marginal 
productivity of land will be zero.
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opportunity cost i.e. his wage earnings and then only 
equilibrium will be reached.
It is argued that Cheung is wrong in believing that 
excess supply cannot be consistent with equilibrium (Basu, 
1984: 130) . If the lessor has no instrument at his disposal 
to extract surplus, then excess supply will persist and 
nevertheless the condition will be considered as 
equilibrium. Likewise, in credit rationing models, the 
credit is rationed even though there is excess demand for 
credit to avoid adverse selection because of asymmetry in 
information and credit rationing is perfectly compatible 
with equilibrium. Thus the conventional belief in the 
equality of supply with demand as the condition for market 
equilibrium is no more valid.2
Now we attempt to formalise Cheung's model with the 
help of algebra following Basu's procedure (Basu, 1984: 
128) . In contrast to Marshall's model, in Cheung's analysis 
the lessor not the tenant is the active agent who tries to 
maximise his income with the assumption that the input 
contracts can be enforced without cost. Thus in Marshall's 
model the transaction cost is infinity as it is the tenant 
who decides the intensity of input use and in Cheung's 
model transaction cost is zero.
2 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for credit rationing models. 
They stress that:" The law of supply and demand is not in fact 
a law, nor should it be viewed as an assumption heeded for 
competitive analysis. It is rather a result generated by the 
underlying assumption that prices have neither sorting nor 
incentive effects. The usual result of economic theorizing that 
prices clear markets, is model specific and is not a general 
property of market-unemployment and credit rationing are not 
phantasms."
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Now assume that a lessor leases out his land to a 
tenant who does not have any other land. The output, X, 
from his land depends on the amount of labour used, L.
Thus X = X (L) X'(L)>0, X" (L) <0 (1)
Let r be the lessor's share of the output or the rental 
share. According to Cheung the lessor decides r and also 
specifies the amount of labour input, L. The constraint on 
the lessor is to see that the tenant at least gets his 
opportunity cost that is his earnings in the alternative 
labour market i.e. (1-r) X(L) must be at least equal to WL. 
Otherwise, the tenant will quit the lessor. Thus the 
landlord's objective function is 
Max r X (L), 
with respect to (r,L) 
subject to the constraint
(1-r) X (L) = wL. (2)
Forming the Lagrangian 
Z = r X (L) - /\[wL- (1-r) X(L)],
The first order conditions for equilibrium are arrived at 
by differentiating Z with respect to r, L and A  , and 
setting these equal to zero.
IS- = X (L) -'Ax(L) = 0 
O T
= r X' (L) -'Aw +*A(l-r) X' (L) = 0 
= _ f^ L - (1-r) X (L)_j = 0 
These imply
= 1 (3)
X' (L) = w (4)
r = X ( L ) - W L  (5)
x Cl)
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Since XML) - w i.e. wage rate is equal to the marginal 
product of labour, labour is optimally used in this case.
Even, if we solve the constraint (2) for r and 
substitute it in the objective function, we get 
Max X(L) - wL 
with respect to L
which is nothing but the objective function of the 
capitalist farmer. Thus a lessor who leases out land on 
sharecropping basis earns the same profit if he self- 
cultivates the land on capitalist line. Therefore, under 
share tenancy there is no loss in output and share tenancy 
is as efficient as owner cultivation if the lessor is 
capable of enforcing the required input intensity and the 
rental ratio.
Johnson (1950) categorically mentioned the three 
techniques which if adopted by the landlord will lead to 
efficiency under tenant cultivation. The techniques are 
namely; specification of inputs, cost sharing and 
shortening of leases.
7.3 TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
Here we attempt to select some hypotheses from these 
alternative theories on share tenancy and try to test them 
against empirical data collected from our three study 
villages. The testable hypotheses as selected from three 
different views are as follows:
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'Marshallian' Hypotheses:3
Hypothesis 1 (Ml): Inputs and output per acre on tenanted 
land will be lower than on owned land of the same 
fertility.
Hypothesis 2 (M2) : The rental share is determined by
custom and it is not affected by the variation in sail 
fertility and incidence of irrigation.
Hypothesis 3 (M3) : There is no clearcut view on the
impact of input cost sharing by the lessor on the 
rental ratio.
Hypothesis 4 (M4): Share tenants will attempt to lease in 
land from several lessors.
'Cheungian' Hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (Cl) : There is no difference between inputs 
and output per acre on tenanted and on owned land.
Hypothesis 2 (C2) : The rental share depends on land type
and soil quality. The better quality of land is 
associated with higher rental ratio.
Hypothesis 3 (C3): If the lessor shares in input cost, the 
rental share accruing to the lessor also 
increases.
Hypothesis 4 (C4) : Each tenant will lease in from a
single lessor.
3 See Bell (1977) for a detailed account of these 
hypotheses. Bell terms the 'Cheungian' hypotheses as the 'new 
school'.
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Marxian Hypotheses
Hypotheses 1 (El): Lessors lease out land in small units b 
a large number of tenants to ensure maximum labour 
use under the threat of survival (Bhaduri, 1983b). 
Hypothesis 2 (E2): Lessors advance loans to tenants at
exorbitant interest rates and thereby combine leasing 
with usury to extract surplus from the d e f i c i t  
peasant households (Bhaduri, 1983a).
Hypothesis 3 (E3): The lessor resists innovation as it will 
increase the income of the tenant and his economic 
power in the village community may therefore be 
lessened (Bhaduri, 1983a).
Hypothesis 4 (E4): Surplus households instead of investing 
their surplus in productive channels prefer to invest 
in rack renting, usury, trading, labour tying etc. and 
in most cases interlink the transactions to increase 
their grip over the poor peasants. Thus, surplus being 
diverted to unproductive channels perpetuates 
backwardness (Bharadwaj, 1979).
7.4 IMPACT OF TENANCY ON CROP YIELD
To examine the impact of tenancy on crop yield, a 
large number of empirical studies have already been 
undertaken in different regions of India. There is 
considerable variation in the methodology as well as the 
conclusions arrived at from these studies. Several studies 
in India document the fact that tenancy has no adverse 
effects on efficiency. These include studies in Gujarat by
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Vyas (1970), in Andhra Pradesh by C.H.H. Rao (1971) and 
Parthasarathy and prasad (1978), Bliss and Stern (1982) and 
Sharma and Dreze (199 0) in U.P. But studies by 
Chattopadhyay (1979) in West Bengal and Bell (1977) in
Bihar suggest the opposite.
The efficiency implication of tenancy can be tested by 
comparing the input and output on owned and tenanted land 
or among farmer categories like owners, part tenants and 
pure tenants. This comparison can be made in three
different ways:
(1) Between owners as a class and tenants as a class. 
Tenants can further be divided into part tenants and pure 
tenants.
(2) In order to cancel the effects of farm size on 
productivity if the tenancy status and farm size are
correlated, the impact of tenancy can be better studied by
studying the yield performance of tenants and owners 
belonging to the same landholding size.
(3) There are many other factors like access to credit and 
input availability that will affect the yield performance. 
In order to control for these variables, it is suggested 
that there should be a comparison of the productivity 
between owned and tenanted land of the same part tenant, so 
that all other things remain constant, and the impact of 
tenancy can be studied.
Following the first two methods, economists apply the 
't' test and those who follow the third method use a paired 
't' test to derive statistically valid results. As our data
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are collected from three small villages, we do not have 
sufficient number of observations that will enable us to 
apply these parametric tests. Therefore, we have attempted 
some non-parametric tests to reach some plausible 
conclusions. Out of these three methods of comparing 
efficiency on owned and tenanted land, we selected the 
third method as the most appropriate method.
To begin with we give some tables regarding input and 
output of the owners and tenants following the methodology 
outlined above. We are well aware of the averaging errors 
that this type of data presentation suffers from.
Findings regarding crop yield as per different 
categories like OC, PRT and PT have already been discussed 
in crop yield sub-section in Chapter V on farm economy. 
Here we present the data on input and output of farmers 
according to tenancy status controlling for farm size. As 
there are not enough observations on the marginal farmer 
and large farmer class, we have taken only the small 
farmers and medium farmers into consideration.
First we compare with respect to a particular crop 
i.e. kharif paddy and then we consider net income and cost 
of cultivation for all crops taken together.
Table 7.1 shows that in the case of SFs, OCs cultivate 
HYV paddy on a larger proportion of their cultivated area 
in comparison to PRTs and PTs. But in case of MDFs, PRTs 
are found to cultivate more HYV paddy than OCs. This is 
because the MDF PRTs have the resources to purchase inputs 
like HYV seed and fertiliser. Moreover, they are in a
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position to take risk in cultivating HYV where the 
variation in yield is more than with traditional variety. 
A comparison of total average yield of kharif paddy shows 
that SF PRTs produce more than SF OCs. But the MDF OCs 
produce more than MDF PRTs in all the villages. Thus 
tenancy is found to be 'efficient' if we compare between 
small farm categories. It seems plausible that under 
compulsion to meet their subsistence consumption they 
produce more.
Then an attempt is made to compare the cost of 
cultivation and net income per acre of cultivated area of 
kharif paddy (Table 7.2). We find that the PRTs use more 
inputs and therefore their net income is less in comparison 
to the OCs under the two farmer classes and in all 
villages. As the tenants use their own labour, they use 
more labour in comparison to the OCs and as imputed value 
of labour has been included under operational cost, their 
cost of cultivation is comparatively more.
Now we compare cropping intensity, cost of cultivation 
and net income per acre of gross cropped area for all crops 
taken together. Table 7.3 shows that the cropping intensity 
is less for PRTs than OCs in all the villages and for the 
two farmer classes excepting in Charapara where the SF PRTs 
have greater cropping intensity.
The gross income in the case of SFs and MDFs is found 
to be more for PRTs than OCs in Harinababi and Sandhagaon. 
But the reverse is the case in Charapara. Thus tenants are 
found to be 'inefficient' in the advanced village because
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they lack the resources to adopt a diversified cropping 
pattern and to take advantage of the improved technology 
that is possible in irrigated farming.
So far we have discussed the yield performance of 
tenants as a class and owners as class. Now we attempt to 
examine the efficiency implication of tenancy by comparing 
yield performance on owned and tenanted land of part 
tenants. The yield performance on owned and tenanted land 
of part tenants can again be studied at two levels i.e. for 
one particular crop and all the crops grown by the 
cultivator taken together and total farm income. Here we 
first compare the difference in package of practice and 
productivity with respect to the staple cereal crop paddy 
which all the cultivators grow.
Table 7.4 contains information on the seed variety of 
paddy that the PRTs cultivate on their owned and tenanted 
land. It emerges that in Charapara the percentage of 
leased-in area (63.6%) under HYV is larger than the 
percentage of owned land (50.0 %) under HYV. Also in
Harinababi the percentage of area under HYV is more in the 
case of leased-in land. But in the non-irrigated village 
only about 9 per cent of leased-in land is under HYV but a 
significantly higher proportion (51%) of owned land is 
under HYV variety. In the irrigated villages the threat of 
eviction in the event of low yield prompts the tenants to 
cultivate HYV paddy whose yield is more.
Then we compare the use of yield stimulating inputs 
like FYM and chemical fertiliser in the cultivation of
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kharif paddy on owned land and tenanted land. We find that 
(Table 7.5) in Charapara the use of FYM in terms of rupees 
per acre of owned land is on an average Rs.198 whereas on 
tenanted land it is only about Rs.15. Likewise in 
Harinababi and in Sandhagaon there is also significant 
difference in use of FYM on owned and tenanted land as 
shown in the table. But the use of fertiliser in Rs./acre 
is more in the case of tenanted land by comparison with the 
owned land in all the villages. Tenants use more FYM on 
their owned land and less fertiliser because of the belief 
that use of chemical fertiliser degrades the land in the 
long run. In the case of tenanted land they are least 
bothered about the soil degradation and their prime aim is 
to get an augmented yield to satisfy the lessor for the 
renewal of the lease contract and to meet their consumption 
needs.
The yield of kharif paddy is found to be higher in the 
case of owned land in Charapara whereas it is lower in 
Harinababi and Sandhagaon. In Harinababi the part tenants 
are efficient farmers as their motive behind leasing-in is 
to consolidate their holding in a compact block and to 
increase operational holding. In Sandhagaon it is more due 
to averaging error as in the case of a MDF the yield on 
tenanted land is significantly lower which depresses the 
average figure.
Having discussed about the seed variety, input use and 
yield in the case of kharif paddy on owned and tenanted 
land, now we attempt to analyse the overall cropping
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intensity, operational cost, gross income, net income and 
net returns per rupee invested on owned and leased in land 
for all crops taken together. Table 7.6 shows that in the 
case of almost all the owner tenants the cropping intensity 
is higher on owned land than on leased-in land but in the 
case of tenant owners the cropping intensity is more on 
tenanted land. In Sandhagaon no part tenants cultivate 
potato on tenanted land and they cultivate only paddy in 
the kharif season. As a result the cropping intensity is 
one in all cases.
When we compare the net returns per rupee invested it 
is found that in Charapara it is higher in the case of 
owned land than that of leased-in land but the reverse 
happens in the case of Harinababi and Sandhagaon. In 
Harinababi the part tenants have leased in non-irrigated 
land and cultivate cash crops like jute, groundnut and 
vegetables as a result the yield is more.
With regard to three techniques to enforce efficiency 
as propounded by Johnson (1950), our findings are that 
threat of eviction is the instrument variable by which the 
lessor enforces the required intensity of input use. The 
threat of survival compels the tenants to put in adequate 
efforts to get an increased yield. Regarding cost sharing 
by the lessor it is found that in the irrigated village 
Charapara there is cost sharing between the lessor and the 
tenant and a new type of seasonal leasing-in on partnership 
basis for cultivation of vegetables is coming up. But in 
Sandhagaon there is no cost sharing by the lessor. With
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regard to shortening of leases, this is much observed in 
the irrigated villages as a means of enforcing efficiency.
7.5 RESULTS OF NON-PARAMETRIC TESTS
An attempt has been made to test the difference in 
yield performance on owned and tenanted land by applying 
the Mann-Whitney test. The owned land and tenanted land 
have been studied for different groups as shown in Table 
7.8 to Table 7.12. First the difference in output 
performance has been studied for a particular crop i.e. 
local paddy of traditional variety. Then the difference has 
been assessed for all crops taken together. The variables 
that we have considered as the index of yield performance 
include
YIELDGAV = Value of yield per acre of gross cropped area 
(in Rs./acre)
YIELDNAV = Value of yield per acre of net sown area (in 
Rs./acre)
CROPIN = Cropping intensity i.e. ratio of gross cropped 
area to net sown area 
PROF ITG A = Profit per acre of gross cropped area (in 
Rs./acre)
PROFITNA = Profit per acre of net sown area (in Rs./acre) 
IORATIO = Input output ratio i.e. the ratio of profit to 
cost of cultivation 
For studying input use for paddy we have included 
LABORGA = Cost of human labour per acre of gross cropped 
area (in Rs./acre)
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COSTGA = Total operational cost per acre of gross
cropped area (in Rs./acre)
The results of the Mann-Whitney test for input and 
output on owned and tenanted land in cultivation of local 
paddy in kharif are presented in Table 7.8. The observed 
significance level (2-tailed probability) is large for all 
of the variables in Charapara and Harinababi, and the 
hypothesis that the input and output variables have the 
same distribution on owned and tenanted land is not 
rejected. In the case of non-irrigated village Sandhagaon 
the significance level is small for variables PROFITGA, 
IORAT10 and COSTGA*therefore, the hypothesis of equality is 
rejected. Thus in Sandhagaon tenancy is found to be 
.efficient.
Then an attempt is made to apply Mann-Whitney test to 
compare the yield performance on owned and tenanted land by 
considering all the crops grown by the cultivators taken 
together and classifying the owned and tenanted land into 
different groups. In Charapara it is found that the 2- 
tailed probability is large for most of the variables 
excluding value of yield per acre of net cropped area 
(YIELDNAV) and profit per net cropped area (PROFITNA) (see 
Table 7.9) . Thus there is no conclusive evidence of 
inefficiency of tenancy. In village Harinababi the observed 
significance level is small in the case of variables 
YIELDGAV, CROPIN and PROFITGA (Table 7.10) and thus the 
hypothesis of equality can be rejected. But for YIELDNAV, 
PROFITNA and IORATIO the significance level is large so
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that the hypothesis of equality is not rejected. Thus the 
evidence is mixed and not conclusive. In the non-irrigated 
village Sandhagaon the significance level for all the 
variables is large excepting the cropping intensity 
(CROPIN) and thus there is no significant difference 
between yield performance on owned and tenanted land.
Then we try to compare the yield performance on owned 
and tenanted land of the same part tenants and the 
observations are paired data and we apply Wilcoxon Matched- 
pairs Signed-rank Test. The results are presented in Table 
7.12. The table shows that the level of significance is 
found to be large for almost all of the variables in three 
villages and thus the hypothesis of equality is not 
rej ected.
From our analysis we conclude that there is no 
conclusive evidence that share tenancy is 'inefficient' if 
one considers allocative efficiency in a static set-up. 
However, tenancy can be considered 'inefficient' inasmuch 
as the part tenants are found to use less FYM on tenanted 
land than that on owned land. But they use more of 
fertiliser on tenanted land to get an increased yield at 
the cost of land degradation caused to the land in the long 
run. Therefore, the inefficiency implication of tenancy 
should be considered in a dynamic framework. The argument 
that tenants produce more under the threat of eviction and 
survival and that is why tenancy is efficient is not a 
valid argument. Because efficiency cannot be sustained 
under a compulsive mechanism if no real incentives are
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there for the tenants to foresee. Under high rental share 
for the land-owner, we do not see any real incentives for 
the tenant to cultivate land on a sharecropping basis.
Our reservations are that while analysing the 
efficiency aspect of tenancy, the type of land the tenant 
possesses and the type of land he leases in should be taken 
into consideration as the cropping pattern and crop yield 
to a large extent depend on that. As our survey is not a 
large scale survey our results cannot be conclusive, yet 
the conclusions can be considered as tentative, paving the 
way for further research work to be taken in this regard. 
Now we turn to the long-run impact of tenancy on the farm 
economy.
7.6 LONG-TERM IMPACT OF TENANCY: INVESTMENT, ACCUMULATION
AND HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
In this sub-section we try to analyse the fixed 
investment undertaken by tenants and owner cultivators. In 
Table 7.7 the fixed investment on owned land as per farmer 
category and class is presented. Fixed investment here 
includes purchase of agricultural equipment and land 
improvement measures like improving irrigation facility and 
land levelling. No tenant households reported investing on 
tenanted land except for a landless pure tenant. The table 
shows that in Charapara the OC class on an average invests 
Rs.99 0 per annum and the PRT invests Rs.2 50, the PT invests 
Rs.80 and the PL spends Rs.183. In Harinababi on an average 
an OC invests Rs.510 and the PRT invests Rs.600 and the PL
342
invests nothing. In Sandhagaon an OC invests Rs.600 whereas 
a PRT invests Rs.2 00 and the PTs and PLs invest nothing. In 
Charapara and Sandhagaon the proportion of investing 
households is highest in case of OCs but in Harinababi it 
is highest for PRTs.
Thus if the area under sharecropping were transferred 
to owner cultivation investment in agriculture would no 
doubt increase. The tenants after paying the high rent are 
left with a meagre sum of money that is even inadequate for 
meeting their consumption needs. If the tenanted land were 
self-cultivated, there would be no rent to be paid and 
cultivators would have investible surplus and consequently 
investment in land would increase. In this sense tenancy 
discourages productive investment and is undoubtedly 
inefficient.
It is also argued that when share tenancy is 
associated with rack-renting, short leases, no cost-sharing 
and self-exploitation of tenant households, it adversely 
affects the human resource development {Murty, 1987). 
Tenants are usually underfed and malnourished. This causes 
gradual depreciation in their labour power. This also 
affects the vitality and work ability of next generation 
and their progeny. During our investigation, some land-' 
owners complained that the labourers now-a-days are lacking 
the strength and vigour to work hard.
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7.7 TESTING MARXIAN HYPOTHESES
7.7.1 Examining Bhadurifs Hypothesis
Bhaduri considers share tenancy as a labour process 
and asserts that the lessor will lease out land in small 
parcels to a large number of tenants to extract surplus . In 
the advanced village Charapara this mechanism to extract 
surplus is operative. The lessors are found to lease out to 
many tenants and in small parcels.
Bhaduri also argues that the exchange mechanism can be 
used as an instrument variable to reinforce the power 
relations in a village economy by perpetuating backwardness. 
According to Bhaduri (1973) the lessor combines usury 
income with rent income to subjugate the poor perpetually 
under his control. But our survey discloses that no lessor 
household has interest income and most of the private 
moneylenders found in the study villages are salary holders 
or shopkeepers rather than large farmers. The lessors are 
found to lend to the tenants at their hour of need and also 
charge high interest rates but usury as the main mode of 
exploitation by the lessors is quite absent. Moreover, the 
lessors do not represent the conventional landlord class 
having rent as their sole income. Rather the lessors are 
marginal and small farmers and the major source of their 
income is salary and remittances.
That the landlord discourages technical innovation is 
not found in the villages under study. Rather, a new type 
of seasonal leasing-in on input cost sharing basis is 
emerging in which the land-owner becomes a partner.
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7.7.2 Examining Bharadwaj's View
According to Bharadwaj, in backward agriculture the 
agricultural surplus instead of being reinvested in 
agriculture productively is diverted to unproductive 
channels like usury and rent seeking activities as long as 
a class of deficit households continues to exist. It is to 
be noted that in Orissan villages few large farmers are 
now-a- days found. Due to the law of inheritance and 
disintegration of the joint family system the landholding 
size has considerably decreased. As a result the surplus 
households as Bharadwaj portrays them are quite non­
existent in rural areas.
In wet cultivation of rice, agriculture is not 
remunerative and large farmers in the villages even depend 
on remittances from their sons to meet expenses for 
cultivation. Moreover, in the irrigated villages no 
household is found that leases out land to earn rent income 
even if it is able to self-cultivate it. The households 
lease out only when there is no other option but to lease 
out. In Sandhagaon the salary holders even if they are 
residents in the village prefer to lease out as cultivation 
of paddy yields no net income in non-irrigated conditions. 
Again, due to the spread of banking facilities in villages, 
the surplus households save whatever surplus income they 
have in the banks where they earn interest income. The 
farmers are found to buy bonds like 'krishi vikash Patras' 
whose value will be doubled after five years. Thus the 
surplus households are not interested in investing in usury
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as it is very difficult to recover a loan once advanced. If 
a man in need approaches them for a loan and if they can 
see that there is possibility to recover the loan from him 
as he is his tenant or his labourer then they advance loans 
out of mercy. But no households see money-lending as a 
business and a source of income.
This is not to deny that moneylenders as a class never 
existed. But the fact is that the class has disappeared due 
to certain restrictive legislations preventing recovery of 
private loan and interest charged and more importantly due 
to the disintegration of the large landed class caused by 
the sub-division of family land among the heirs. Moreover, 
Orissa suffers far less severely from natural calamities 
like drought, flood, cyclone and hailstorm because of 
improvement in irrigation facilities and construction of 
dams. Due to the frequent occurrence of severe natural 
calamities in past years, the rural poor had to depend on 
the propertied class for loans perpetually and private 
moneylending was a brisk business. Thus the ecological 
change has brought about a change in the rural power 
structure.
7.8 RESULTS OF HYPOTHESES TESTING
Here we summarise the results of our hypothesis 
testing with regard to efficiency of share tenancy. The 
micro evidence on Marshallian and Cheungian hypotheses are 
as follows:
(1) Our study provides no conclusive evidence that input
346
and output per acre on tenanted land will be lower than on 
owned land.
(2) The rental share is determined by custom and it is not 
affected by the quality or fertility of land.
(3) If the lessor shares in input cost, the rental share 
accruing to the lessor increases.
(4) The lessees are found to lease in from many lessors.
The last three points are recapitulation of our 
findings already discussed in Chapter VI.
The inefficiency implication of tenancy lies in the 
dynamic context i.e. tenancy discourages investment and 
accumulation and adversely affects human resource 
development.
The testing of Marxian hypotheses with our micro 
level data provides some support to Bhaduri's assertion 
that share tenancy is a method of labour extraction under 
the threat of survival.
7.9 SHARE TENANCY AND ITS DYNAMICS
While studying share tenancy the social setting or the 
context in which it is observed should be clearly defined. 
The kind of share tenancy that we observe in our study 
villages is nothing but subsistence tenancy undertaken by 
a poor peasant as a survival strategy. To explain this the 
social setting should be studied carefully and linked to 
the phenomenon of tenancy. In a labour surplus and land 
scarce economy like Orissa, where there * no alternative 
earning opportunity for poor peasants, share tenancy turns
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out to be a source of livelihood for the land poor 
peasants. Thus the labour surplus and land scarcity and 
lack of job opportunity are to be invoked to account for 
the existence of tenancy. For this the historical 
development of the society or the evolution of share 
tenancy in an historical perspective needs to be attempted. 
This we have not been able to pursue in this thesis.
With regard to share tenancy in transition, we here 
attempt to recapitulate our findings in Chapter VI. It is 
observed that in the irrigated villages tenancy is in 
constant flux. The resourceful farmers are now-a-days 
leasing in land on a partnership basis and are sharing in 
cost on equal terms . In this case of leasing-in between the 
same farmer class, the relationship is one of equal status 
in contrast to the unequal status found in traditional 
tenancy. On the contrary in the non-irrigated village, the 
landowners are asking for an advance by mortgaging the land 
near the tenant. This type of usufructuary mortgage is on 
the increase in the non-irrigated village.
In the irrigated village a differing sharing ratio for 
different crops is observed. For the crops where some 
entrepreneurial decision making is required the sharing 
ratio is in favour of the tenant as he bears all the risk 
and cost of cultivation. Thus rental share is adjusted to 
capitalise on productivity gains.
The eviction of tenants is observed more in the 
advanced village Charapara and gradually the leases are 
being shortened by the lessors to extract surplus.
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In the irrigated villages most of the lessors are 
semi-absentee/ whereas in the non-irrigated village 
Sandhagaon there are some resident lessors.
Though sharecropping is legally prohibited in Orissa, 
it exists and persists and clearly shows a tendency to 
increase. The number of emigrants from the villages are on 
the increase. Therefore, share tenancy will definitely 
increase in future.
7.10 SHARE TENANCY AND A BACKWARD AGRICULTURE
The type of share tenancy that we observe in our study 
villages do not show any extra-economic coercion involved 
in the contract. That is why it cannot be termed as a 
feudalistic feature. Still it contains features that 
clearly show that the tenants are exploited to the point of 
leaving with them only what is necessary for their 
reproduction. The rent is too high, the lessor does not 
share in input cost. There is no security of tenure. The 
lease is oral and not recorded. Tenancy legislation is 
violated. The tenant is charged a high interest rate if he 
borrows from the lessor. Sometimes the tenant repays in 
terms of labour at a lower wage rate. The farm servants and 
attached labourers loosen the solidarity of the labourer 
class and their bargaining strength is lowered. The farm 
servants are all immigrants from tribal and jungle areas.
There is no tendency for 'commercial' tenancy to 
emerge. But the features that we have identified are that 
of a 'backward agriculture' in which capitalist tendencies 
are not wholly developed.
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TABLE 7 .1
Area Cultivated of Kharif Paddy (HYV and Local) 
According to Farmer Class and Tenancy Status
Category Area Area X of Yield Yield Total
Culti­ under Tota I HYV Loca I Avg.
vated HYV Yie Id
Acres Acres Qtls/Acre Qt Is/Acre Qt Is/Acre
CHARAPARA
Small Farmer
OC 0.64 0.56 87.5 10.0 6.2 9.5
PRT 1.21 0.54 44.5 12.2 9.2 10.5
PT 1.54 0.10 6.5 13.2 8.6 8.9
Medium Farmer
OC 2.36 0.82 34.6 12.0 8.8 9.9
PRT 2.64 2.00 75.8 7.6 7.4 7.5
PT 1 .92 0.00 0.0 0.0 13.1 13.1
HARINABABI
Small Farmer
OC 1 .43 0.52 36.4 13.2 10.7 11 .6
PRT 1 .17 0.20 17.1 15.1 9.6 10.6
Medium Farmer
OC 2.16 0.41 19.2 15.2 10.2 11.1
PRT 2.35 0.48 20.4 11.5 9.0 9.5
SANDHAGAON
Small Farmer
OC 3.00 0.67 22.2 6.5 3.4 4.1
PRT 2.81 0.36 12.8 13.3 7.3 8.1
PT 4.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.2
Medium Farmer
OC 4.50 0.00 0.0 0.0 8.5 8.5
PRT 6.00 4.00 66.7 8.0 7.2 7.7
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TABLE 7 . 2
Cost of Cultivation and Nat Incoma of Kharif Paddy 
According to Farmer Class and Tenancy Status
Vi I lage\ Gross Ope- Net Net
C lass\ Income rational Income Returns
Category Cost per Rupee
Rs./Acre Rs./Acre Rs./Acre Invested
CHARAPARA
Small Farmer
OC 2122 688 1433 2.08
PRT 2289 1087 1202 1.11
PT 2015 1044 971 0.93
Medium Farmer
OC 2182 812 1370 1.69
PRT 1777 1092 684 0.63
PT 2721 796 1924 2.42
HARINABABI
Small Farmer
OC 2471 1008 1463 1 .45
PRT 2296 945 1350 1.43
Medium Farmer
OC 2392 902 1490 1 .65
PRT 2111 923 1188 1.29
SANDHAGAON
Small Farmer
OC 1074 1985 -911 -0.46
PRT 1745 1902 -157 -0.08
PT 1735 1083 652 0.60
Medium Farmer
OC 1826 1765 61 0.03
PRT 1690 1983 -293 -0.15
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TABLE 7 .3
Cropping Intensity and Cost of Cultivation and Net Income 
Per Acre of Gross Cropped Area 
According to Farmer class and Tenancy Status
Vi I lage\ Croppi ng Opera­ Gross Net Net
Class\ Intensity tional Income Income Returns
Category Cost per Rupee
Rs.\Acre Rs.NAcre Rs,\Acre Invested
CHARAPARA
Small Farmer
OC 1.25 539 1894 1355 2.51
PRT 1 .59 728 1619 891 1.22
PT 1.56 782 1612 830 1.06
Medium Farmer
OC 1.59 675 1637 963 1 .43
PRT 1 .53 507 1047 540 1.07
PT 1 .20 550 1724 1174 2.14
MARINABABI
Small Farmer
OC 1 .63 829 1821 992 1 .20
PRT 1 .24 1226 2555 1329 1.08
Medium Farmer
OC 1 .65 790 1754 963 1 .22
PRT 1 .51 818 1872 1054 1.29
SANDHAGAON
Small Farmer
OC 1 .04 2103 1439 -664 -0.32
PRT 1 .02 1460 1887 426 0.29
PT 1 .00 1083 1735 652 0.60
Medium Farmer
OC 1 .20 1584 1737 153 0.10
PRT 1 .01 2026 1770 -255 -0.13
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TABLE 7 , 4
Owned and Leased in Land: Area under HYV and Local Kharif Paddy 
Part Tenants
Category Area Area % of Area Area X of
CuItivated under Owned Cu Itivated under Leased in
Owned HYV Area Leased in HYV Area
Acres Acres Acres Acres
CHARAPARA
SF 2.12 0.82 38.68 1.52 0.82 53.95
MDF 0.48 0.48 100.00 2.16 1 .52 70.37
Tota I 2.60 1 .30 50.00 3.68 2.34 63.59
HARINABABI
SF 2.50 - - 1.00 0.60 60.00
MDF 3.20 0.96 30.00 1.50 * -
Tota I 5.70 0.96 16.84 2.50 0.60 24.00
SANDHAGAON
SF 3.98 0.60 15.08 4.46 0.48 10.76
MDF 5.00 4.00 80.00 1.00 - -
Tota I 8.98 4.60 51 .22 5.46 0.48 8.79
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TABLE 7 .5
Yield of Kharif Paddy and Input Use on Owned and Leased-in Land 
Part Tenants
Vi L Lage\ 
Class
Yie Id 
Owned Land
Qt Is./Acre
Yield 
Leased in 
Land 
Qt Is./Acre
FYM
Owned Land 
Rs./Acre
FYM 
Leased in 
Land 
Rs./Acre
Fertiliser 
Owned Land
Rs./Acre
Fertiliser 
Leased in 
Land 
Rs./Acre
CHARAPARA
SF 13.12 6.90 198.11 9.88 12.00 -
MDF 8.25 7.35 200.00 50.69 3,40 112.50
Tota I 12.22 7.16 198.46 14.97 6.82 66.03
HARINABABI
SF 9.17 14.04 210.00 6.54 0.00 73.00
MDF 9.23 10.00 138.75 5.08 6.03 -
Tota I 9.21 11 .62 170.00 5.72 3.12 29.20
SANDHAGAON
SF 7.64 7.35 457.29 5.76 4.04 29.15
MDF 1 .28 8.00 210.00 21 .88 108.13 125.00
Tota I 4.10 7.47 319.60 8.56 24.45 46.70
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TABLE 7 . 6
Cropping Intensity, Cost of Cultivation and Net Income 
Owned and Leased-in Land of Part Tenants
Vi I lage\ Si. Farmer Crop­ Crop­ Ope. Ope. Gross Gross Net Net Net Net
Category No. Class ping ping Cost Cost Income Income Income Income Returns Returns
Inten­ Inten- Per Rupee Per Rupee
sity sity Rs/Acre Rs/Acre Rs/Acre Rs/Acre Rs/Acre Rs/Acre Invested Invested
Owned Leased Owned Leased Owned Leased Owned Leased Owned Leased
CHARAPARA
Owner Tenant 1 SF 2.00 1.66 816 1,107 2,272 1,645 1,456 537 1.78 0.49
2 SF 1.54 1.56 564 783 1,174 1,182 610 398 1.08 0.51
3 SF 1.61 1.24 649 438 1,876 1,654 1,227 1,216 1.89 2.77
Tenant Owner 1 MDF 1.32 1.63 521 501 1,071 1,038 551 536 1.06 1.07
HARINABABI
Owner Tenant 1 SF 2.00 1.00 604 2,427 1,905 5,238 1,301 2,811 2.15 1.16
2 SF 1.25 1.00 864 616 1,700 1,489 836 873 0.97 1.42
3 MDF 1.58 1.00 838 1,114 1,588 5,609 750 4,495 0.90 4.04
Tenant Owner 1 SF 1.00 1 .08 3,678 1,577 4,695 3,061 1,017 1,484 0.28 0.94
2 MDF 1.32 1.54 625 818 1,758 2,028 1,133 1,210 1.81 1.48
SANDHAGAON
Owner Tenant 1 SF 1.04 1.00 2,143 1,629 2,089 2,783 (54) 1,154 -0.02 0.71
2 SF 1.05 1.00 2,111 1,679 2,301 2,007 190 328 0.09 0.20
3 MDF 1.02 1.00 2,055 1,876 1,777 1,735 (278) (141) -0.14 -0.08
Tenant Owner 1 SF 1.00 1 .00 2,773 1,860 2,075 1,028 (698) (832) -0.25 -0.45
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TABLE 7.7 
Fixed Investment in Agriculture 
According to Tenancy Status and Farmer Class
Vi llage\ 
Category\ 
C Lass
Total 
No. of 
House­
holds
No. of 
Investing 
House- 
ho Ids
X of 
Total
Tota I 
Amount of 
Invesment 
Rs.
Average
Invest­
ment
Rs.
CHARAPARA 
Owner cultivator
SF 2 1 50 500 500
MDF 6 4 67 2.100 525
LF 5 5 100 7,300 1,460
Total 13 10 77 9,900 990
Part Tenant
SF 3 2 67 500 250
MDF 1 - - - -
Tota I 4 2 50 500 250
Pure Tenant
MF 1 - - - -
SF 2 - - - -
MDF 2 1 50 80 80
Tota I 5 1 50 80 80
Pure Lessor
MF 5 1 20 50 50
SF 3 1 33 300 300
MDF 1 1 100 200 200
Total 9 3 33 550 183
GRAND TOTAL 31 16 52 11,030 689
HARINABABI 
Owner Cultivator
MF 2 1 50 250 250
SF 6 2 33 1,000 500
MDF 6 2 33 1,300 650
Tota I 14 5 36 2,550 510
Part Tenant
SF 3 2 67 1,700 850
MDF 2 2 100 700 350
Total 5 4 80 2,400 600
Pure Lessor
MF 3 - - - -
GRAND TOTAL 22 g 41 4,950 550
SANDHAGAON 
Owner Cultivator
MF 1 - - - -
SF 3 1 33 200 200
MDF 1 1 100 1,000 1,000
Total 5 2 40 1,200 600
Part Tenant
SF 3 1 33 200 200
MDF 1 - - - -
Total 4 1 25 200 200
Pure Tenant 6 - - - -
Pure Lessor 6 - - - -
GRAND TOTAL 21 3 14 1,400 467
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TABLE 7 . 8
Results of Mann-Whitney U-WiIcoxon Rank Sum W Test 
Yield Performance on Owned and Tenanted Land 
In Cultivation of Paddy (Traditional Variety)
Vi Ilages Variables Mean Rank 
Owned
Mean Rank 
Tenanted
Z Score 2-tai led 
Probability
U w
CHARAPARA YIELDGAV 9.67 9.17 -0.19 0.850 34 55
(12,6) PROFITGA 9.67 9.17 -0.19 0.850 34 55
IORATIO 9.83 8.83 -0.37 0.708 32 53
LABORGA 10.08 8.33 -0.66 0.511 29 50
COSTGA 9.17 10.17 -0.37 0.708 32 61
HARINABABI YIELDGAV 9.59 13.50 -0.93 0.352 10 27
(17,2) PROFITGA 9.47 14.50 -1.20 0.232 8 29
IORATIO 9.35 15.50 -1.46 0.144 6 31
LABORGA 10.53 5.50
oCSI 0.230 8 11
COSTGA 10.41 6.50 -0.93 0.352 10 13
SANDHAGAON YIELDGAV 4.29 7.50 -1.47 0.142 2 15
(7,2) PROFITGA 4.00 8.50 -2.05 0.040 0 17
IORATIO 4.00 8.50 -2.05 0.040 0 17
LABORGA 5.29 4.00 -0.64 0.521 5 8
COSTGA 6.00 1.50 -2.05 0.040 0 3
Notes: Figures in parentheses indicate number of 
observations on owned and tenanted land respectively.
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TABLE 7 . 9
R e s u l t s  o f  M a n n -W h i tn e y  U - W i I c o x o n  Rank Sum W T e s t
Y i e l d  P e r fo r m a n c e  on Owned and T e n a n te d  Land
V i  I l a g e - C h a r a p a r a ( I r r i g a t e d )
Variables Group 1 Group 2 Mean Rank Mean Rank Z Score 2-tai led U
Owned Tenanted Owned Tenanted Probabi Li ty
OC PRT,PT
(13) (4,5)
YIELDGAV 13.15 9.11 -1.44 0.151 37
YIELDNAV 14.31 7.44 -2.44 0.015 22
CROP IN 13.08 9.22 -1.37 0.171 38
PROFITGA 13.00 9.33 -1.30 0.193 39
PROFITNA 13.77 8.22 -1 .97 0.049 29
IORATIO
PRT
(4)
PRT.PT
(4,5)
12.69 9.78 -1 .04 0.301 43
YIELDGAV 8.00 6.56 -0.62 0.537 14
YIELDNAV 8.00 6.56 -0.62 0.540 14
CROPIN 8.50 6.33 -0.93 0.354 12
PROFITGA 8.50 6.33 -0.93 0.355 12
PROFITNA 8.75 6.22 -1 .08 0.280 11
IORATIO
OC
(13)
PT
(5)
7.75 6.67 -0.46 0.643 15
YIELDGAV 10.23 7.60 -0.94 0.349 23
YIELDNAV 11 .00 5.60 -1 .92 0.055 13
CROPIN 10.69 6.40 -1 .53 0.126 17
PROFITGA 9.77 8.80 -0.35 0.730 29
PROFITNA 10.31 7.40 -1 .04 0.301 22
IORATIO
OC,PRT
(13,4)
PRT.PT
(4,5)
9.85 8.60 -0.44 0.657 28
YIELDGAV 15.00 10.67 -1 .37 0.169 51
YIELDNAV 15.88 9.00 -2.18 0.029 36
CROPIN 15.06 10.56 -1.43 0.153 50
PROFITGA 15.00 10.67 -1.37 0.169 51
PROFITNA 15.65 9.44 -1 .97 0.049 40
IORATIO 14.59 11.44 -1 .00 0.319 58
Notes: U is the number of times a value in group 1 precedes a value in group Z. 
W is the sum of the ranks for the group with the smaller number of observations 
Figures in parentheses indicate number of observations in each group
W
82
67
83
84
74
88
32
32
34
34
35
31
38
28
32
44
37
43
96
81
95
96
85
103
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TABLE 7 .1 0
R e s u l t *  o f  M a n n -W h i tn e y  U-Wi Ic o x o n  Rank Sum W T e s t
Y i e l d  P e r f o r m a n c e  on Owned and  T e n a n te d  Land
V i  I l a g e - H a r i n a b a b i ( I r r i g a t e d )
Variab les Group 1 
Owned
Group 2 
Tenanted
Mean Rank Mean Rank 
Owned Tenanted
Z Score 2-tailed 
Probabi lity
U W
OC PRT
(14) (5)
YIELDGAV 8.29 14.80 -2.22 0.026 11 74
YIELDNAV 8.86 13.20 -1.48 0.139 19 66
CROPIN 12.07 4.20 -2.69 0.007 6 21
PROFITGA 8.50 14.20 -1.94 0.052 14 71
PROFITNA 9.21 12.20 -1.02 0.309 24 61
IORATIO
OC.PRT PRT
9.07 12.60 -1.20 0.229 22 63
YIELDGAV (14,5) (5) 10.89 18.60 -2.17 0.030 17 93
YIELDNAV 11.42 16.60 -1.46 0.145 27 83
CROPIN 14.39 5.30 -2.56 0.010 11.5 26.5
PROFITGA 10.95 18.40 -2.10 0.036 18 92
PROFITNA 11.63 15.80 -1.17 0.240 31 79
IORATIO 11 .85 16.00 -1 .24 0.213 30 80
Notes: U is the number of times a value in group 1 precedes a value in group 2.
W is the sum of the ranks for the group with the smaller number of iobservations
Figures in parentheses indicate number of observations in groups.
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TABLE 7 .11
R e s u l t s  o f  M a n n -W h i tn e y  U - W i I c o x o n  Rank Sum W T e s t
Y i e l d  P e r fo r m a n c e  on Owned and  T e n a n te d  Land
V i  I l a g e - S a n d h a g a o n ( N o n - I r r i g a t e d )
Variables Group 1 Group 2 Mean Rank Mean Rank Z Score 2-ta1 led U W
Owned Tenanted Owned Tenanted Probabi li ty
OC PRT.PT
(5) (4,6)
YIELDGAV 8.00 8.00 0.00 1.000 25.0 40.0
YIELDNAV 8.4 7.8 -0.25 0.806 23.0 42.0
CROPIN 11.10 6.45 -2.26 0.024 9.5 55.5
PROFITGA 5,40 9.30 -1 .59 0.111 12.0 27.0
PROFITNA 5.40 9.30 -1.59 0.111 12.0 27.0
IORATIO
PRT
(4)
PRT,PT 
(4,6)
5.80 9.10 -1 .35 0.178 14.0 29.0
YIELDGAV 10.38 6.35 -1 .63 0.103 8.5 41.5
YIELDNAV 9.63 6.65 -1 .21 0.228 11.5 38.5
CROPIN 10.38 6.35 -2.04 0.042 8.5 41 .5
PROFITGA 6.50 7.90 -0.57 0.572 16.0 26.0
PROFITNA 6.50 7.90 -0.57 0.572 16.0 26.0
IORATIO
OC
(5)
PT
(6)
6.50 7.90 -0,57 0.572 16.0 26.0
YIELDGAV 6.00 6.00 0.00 1 .000 15.0 30.0
YIELDNAV 6.20 5.83 -0.18 0.855 14.0 31 .0
CROPIN 7.50 4.75 -1.49 0.135 7.5 37.5
PROFITGA 4.40 7.33 -1.46 0.144 7.0 22.0
PROFITNA 4.40 7.33 -1 .46 0.144 7.0 22.0
IORATIO
OC,PRT
(5.4)
PRT,PT 
(4,6)
4.60 7.17 -1 .28 0.201 8.0 23.0
YIELDGAV 11 .28 8.85 -0.94 0.347 33.5 101 .5
YIELDNAV 11.17 8.95 -0.86 0.391 34.5 100.5
CROPIN 13.00 7.00 -2.45 0.014 18.0 117.0
PROFITGA 8.11 11.70 -1.39 0.165 28.0 73.0
PROFITNA 8.11 11.70 -1 .39 0.165 28.0 73.0
IORATIO 8.33 11.50 -1 .22 0.221 30,0 75.0
Notes: U is the number of times a value in group 1 precedes a value in group 2. 
W is the sum of the ranks for the group with the smaller number of observations 
Figures in parentheses indicate number of observations in each group.
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TABLE 7 .1 2
Results of WiIcoxon Matched-pairs Signed-ranks Test
Yield Performance on Owned and Tenanted 
ALL Vi I lages
Land of Part Tenants
Villages Variables Cases Mean Rank Cases Mean Rank Z Score 2-Tailed
T < 0 T < 0 T > 0 T > 0 Probability
CHARAPARA YIELDGAV 4 2.50 0 0.00 -1 ,83 0.068
YIELDNAV 3 3.00 1 1 .00 -1 .46 0.144
CROPIN 3 3.00 1 1.00 -1.46 0.144
PROFITGA 3 3.00 1 1 .00 -1 .46 0.144
PROFITNA 3 3.00 1 1.00 -1 .46 0.144
IORATIO 2 3.00 2 2.00 -0.37 0.715
HARINABABI YIELDGAV 2 2.00 3 3.67 -0.94 0.345
YIELDNAV 2 3.00 3 3.67 -0.94 0.345
CROPIN 3 4.00 2 1 .50 -1 .21 0.225
PROFITGA 0 0.00 5 3.00 -2.02 0.043
PROFITNA 1 1.00 4 3.50 -1 .75 0.079
IORATIO 2 3.00 3 3.00 -0.40 0.686
SANDHAGAON YIELDGAV 3 2.33 1 3.00 -0.73 0.465
YIELDNAV 3 2.33 1 3.00 -0.73 0.465
CROPIN 3 2.00 0* 0.00 -1.60 0.273
PROFITGA 1 2.00 3 2.67 -1.10 0.273
PROFITNA 1 2.00 3 2.67 -1.10 0.273
IORATIO 1 3.00 3 2.33 -0.73 0.465
Notes: T < 0 refers to cases where the value of the variable in 
the case of tenanted land is less than that of owned land 
and T > 0 is the reverse.
* there is one case tie T=0
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CHAPTER VIII 
SHARE TENANCY AND INTERLINKAGE 
(SURVEY FINDINGS)
8.1 INTRODUCTION
In underdeveloped agrarian economies it is very often 
observed that tenancy contracts are interlinked with 
transactions in other markets like credit, labour and 
marketing of produce. Due to this interlinked nature of 
transactions, Bharadwaj (1974) argues that the neoclassical 
individualist market framework is not applicable to the 
sort of multiple exchanges observed in backward 
agriculture. And she suggests an alternative classical 
framework to explain the interlinked deals in terms of 
surplus extraction.
Bhaduri (1983a) argues that by interlinking the credit 
and land market, the land owner wields semifeudalistic 
power over the tenant and brings the tenant under his 
perpetual control subjugating him to a kind of serfdom. 
Thus Bhaduri's view resembles the classical form where the 
precapitalist relations are a direct relationship of 
domination and subordination between the ruling classes and 
direct producers unmediated through the market and they are 
thus characterised by extraeconomic coercion.
Bardhan (1984b), a noted exponent of neoclassical 
approach asserts that interlinkage reinforces the impact of 
imperfection in each market. Interlinked personalised 
transactions by their very nature act as a formidable
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barrier to entry for third parties and is thus a source of 
additional monopoly power for the dominant partner in such 
transactions. Interlinking of transactions in different 
markets is also a very effective way for the dominant party 
to avoid social or legal controls or charging high prices 
if control on prices is not uniform in all markets or 
prices adjust at different speed in different markets. He 
emphasizes that the neoclassical tools to explain and study 
the impact of market imperfections can perfectly be used to 
study interlinked transactions in backward agriculture. In 
contrast to Bhaduri, Bardhan does not have such a 
pessimistic view of interlinked contracts. In explaining 
the existence of attached labourer arrangement, for 
example, Bardhan (1984b) notes that "the employee's need 
for job security and the employer's need for a dependable 
and readily available source of labour supply and not 
feudal subordination that provides the major motivation for 
a predominantly market relationship between the attached 
labourer and his master."
Interestingly Basu (1983) in his attempt to explain 
dispersion in prices i.e. several interest rates or wage 
rates prevailing in the same village or adjacent areas 
argues that what appears imperfect may actually be perfect 
viewed as a whole package and not from the angle of 
individual markets. While workers are not getting wage 
equal to their marginal product, one cannot infer 
immediately from this that the market is imperfect as the 
worker may be getting credit at an interest below the
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organised sector rate. Actually when deals are interlinked 
it is no longer correct to think of wages as payment for 
labour and interest for payment for loans. Thus in 
explaining price dispersion, what interlinkage displays is 
that in a fundamental sense there is equality. But in 
reality, it is indeed often the cases that peasants in one 
village are better off in terms of utility derived from the 
package than workers in another village. An interlinkage 
theory in itself cannot explain this. In order to explore 
the causes of dispersion of factor prices one has to go 
deeper to find out the existence of transfer cost due to 
exogenous barriers to entry caused by hereditary 
connections, caste and community links and a multitude of 
intricate human relationship. Thus dispersion in factor 
prices is caused by both interlinkage of markets and the 
existence of transfer costs. So what Basu tries to stress 
is the limitation of the theory of interlinkage and not the 
existence of perfection in rural markets. To explain 
fundamental aberrations one has to go a step further than 
interlinkage, to the existence of transfer costs and 
exogenous barriers to factor movements.
There is a burgeoning literature on interlinkage of 
factor markets which we have already discussed in Chapter 
II. With this broad theoretical underpinning we now attempt 
to examine the kind of interlinked contracts observed in 
our study villages.
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8.2 LINKED TENANCY CONTRACTS
In our study villages, some of the tenants are found 
to borrow from their lessors. As a result, the land, labour 
and credit contracts are interlinked. In Charapara a pure 
tenant has borrowed Rs.1000 from his lessor for the funeral 
ceremony of his father at an interest rate 60 per cent per 
annum and he will repay in terms of labour. Usually when a 
loan is repaid in terms of labour the wage rate is less 
than the prevailing market rate i.e. Rs. 8 per day when 
prevailing wage rate is Rs.10 per day and thus involves 
implicit interest charges. In Harinababi a part tenant has 
borrowed Rs.400 from the lessor for the purpose of 
cultivation which he will repay in terms of paddy at the 
market price just after harvest. As the harvest price of 
paddy is low, an implicit interest is charged. In 
Sandhagaon one OT and two pure tenants have borrowed from 
their lessors.The OT had borrowed Rs.50 which he repaid in 
cash by selling straw. Two PTs have borrowed Rs.2 00 and 
Rs.300 at 60 per cent interest rate which they will repay 
in terms of labour. Thus it is found that the loans from 
the lessors are charged interest either explicit or 
implicit. And most of the lessor creditors have salary 
income or extra income in addition to cultivation.
8.3 INTERLINKAGE BETWEEN CREDIT AND ASSET: USURIOUS
INTEREST RATES
In backward agriculture the interest rates charged on 
privately made loans are often found to be exorbitant.
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Table 8.2 shows that the interest rate when charged 
explicitly is exorbitant either 60 % or 120 % whereas the 
interest rate in the formal sector is only 12 per cent.
Economists put forward different explanations for the 
usurious interest rates which can broadly be categorised 
into three schools of thought viz. the lenders' risk 
hypothesis, the default hypothesis and the theory of 
interlinkage. According to the lender's risk hypothesis 
propounded by Bottomley (1963), while advancing loans the 
lender faces the risk of default and the lender has to add 
a premium to the opportunity cost of money to cover the 
likely loss of capital due to default. Once this risk of 
default is taken into account, the effective interest rate 
may turn out to be no higher than its counterpart in the 
organised sector. Consequently there is no real room for 
arbitrage and high interest rates persist unabated. But 
this lender/s risk hypothesis has been vehemently 
criticised as the moneylender is always the dominant party 
in the loan transaction due to his large asset base and 
monopoly position. In the specific power relations that 
prevail in village communities, it is very unlikely that 
the borrower can default the loan and go scot free. Thus 
the lender's risk is more myth than reality and the lender 
is rational enough to extend loans only against collateral 
kept as security. And in case, the borrower defaults, the 
collateral is confiscated by the lender.
Knowledge of this social fact prompted Bhaduri (1977) 
to expound his 'default hypothesis' which lays that the
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lender deliberately raises the interest rate to cause 
default1 and confiscates the collateral kept as security. 
In Bhaduri's model the essence of usurious extraction lies 
in undervaluation of collateral. Here the concept of 
interlinkage creeps in through the back door, though 
Bhaduri (1977) has no where explicitly considered 
interlinkage in his model. As credit market is 
characterised by risk of default, there is a tendency for 
the credit market to be interlinked with the asset market 
to provide insurance against risk. Rao (1980) questions the 
theoretical adequacy of Bhaduri's model on the ground that 
it fails to capture the essence of credit phenomenon in 
backward agriculture by focusing on exchange categories 
rather than production relations or real power relations. 
In Bhaduri's model the limits to credit relation^ are set 
not by personal or class power but by organised credit 
market. Rao in the typical Marxist tradition argues that 
the economic power relations between borrowers and lenders 
are the chief determinants of the interest rates on credit 
transactions in rural areas. The distinction between 
lenders as a group and borrowers as a group is a class 
distinction reflecting unequal distribution of control over 
the means of production and subsistence. The credit 
relation is a historically specific mode of appropriating 
surplus and of transferring control over the means of
1 In the 'lender's risk' hypothesis, the word 'default' 
means non-repayment of loan, whereas in 'default hypothesis' it 
refers to non-repayment of loan in money terms but repaid in 
terms of collateral which is confiscated by the lender.
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production, frequently appearing during periods of 
transition between modes of production. The direct 
producers produce with their own means of production but 
are not able to meet/ their subsistence requirements and 
this social fact is the basis for perpetuating a social 
relation of subordination in the form of perpetual 
indebtedness.
Recently there has been a spurt of literature on 
interlinkage which propounds that if no .interest rate is 
charged this does not mean an absence of usury, since there 
may be implicit interest charge in the form of a lower wage 
payment or buying a crop at less than the ruling market 
price from the borrower. In order to examine this we have 
divided the private loans according to interest charged 
into three categories: private loan with explicit interest, 
implicit interest and zero interest.
Table 8.2 shows that in the case of the landowning 
class a significant proportion of loans is from friends and 
relatives, where no interest is charged. Usually the 
landowning class borrows from relatives and friends at the 
time of a daughter's marriage when a huge sum of money is 
required for marriage expenses which nobody has at that 
time. But in the case of landless labourers and pure 
tenants the loans are charged either explicit or implicit 
interest. In Sandhagaon in the case of.the landless class 
much of the loans are shown to have been charged at a zero 
interest rate. Here they have borrowed from the shopkeeper 
in the nearby village from whom they buy all their
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groceries. In a sense this loan from the shopkeeper can be 
considered as having implicit interest charges because in 
order to qualify to borrow from the shop-keeper you must be 
his regular customer even if he charges a high price. It is 
found that in the village shop, prices are about 10 to 15 
per cent higher than the prices in nearby town shops. This 
is, then, an implicit interest rate.
We next analyse the different linked credit contracts 
as observed in the villages in Table 8.3. The table shows 
that in village Charapara an MF has borrowed Rs.800 by 
linking the loan with an asset. The MF has mortgaged 0.64 
acres of non-irrigated land near a large farmer in the 
nearby village and borrowed Rs.800 about four years ago 
which he has not yet repaid. When he repays the loan, he 
will get back his land. And the lender cultivates the land 
and keeps the crop as interest charged towards the loan. In 
contrast to this in Sandhagaon a landless pure tenant is 
found to advance Rs.700 to the land-owner by keeping 2 
acres of land as mortgage for the last four years and he 
will cultivate the land and will have all crop yield to 
himself until the land—owner repays the loan. This type of 
reverse usufructuary mortgage observed in the non-irrigated 
village is interesting. In Sandhagaon a landless casual 
labourer has borrowed Rs.1500 by placing his gold necklace 
as collateral near a large farmer in the nearby village. 
The market value of the necklace will be about ks.3 000 and 
he is allowed to borrow half of the market value. He is 
also charged 60% interest rate and when he repays the loan
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he will get back his necklace. Thus at the time of need the 
village poor mortgage whatever asset they possess to get a 
loan. Whereas the landed class are found to borrow from the 
commercial banks and co-operatives against gold or land as 
mortgage, the rural poor do not have such access.
But in the villages under study no household reported 
losing land due to non-repayment of a loan excepting one 
single household in Charapara. In Charapara all of the 
landless scheduled castes reported that their ancestors did 
not have any owned cultivable land excluding homestead 
land. The single widow in Charapara reported that she lost 
her entire holding as the land-owner confiscated her land 
fifty years back due to non-repayment of loan. The land 
owner and his younger brother together had owned 45 acres 
of land and when the land was divided each owned 22.5 acres 
of land and after their death the land was further divided 
among their sons . One had five sons and the other had three 
sons. Thus ultimately the landholding size of the present 
heirs come to less than 7 acres per household. All of them 
are settled in cities and they are now selling their land. 
Thus the offspring of the large landowners are gradually 
being detached from cultivation. Land-holding size is 
becoming smaller and smaller generation after generation, 
due to the law of inheritance, population growth and 
disintegration of the joint family system, and as a result 
large farmers having enough surplus to engage in usury are 
rarely found in the villages. Thus a Bhaduri- type 
exploitative moneylender is no longer found in the villages
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under study though in the past such a class did exist. 
There are many novels in Oriya depicting the exploitative 
character of the zamindari class but that class no longer 
exists.
8.4 INTERLINKAGE BETWEEN LABOUR AND CREDIT
In backward agriculture, the boundaries of the village 
labour market are often narrowly delimited and heavily 
dependent on social and territorial affinities. Personal 
knowledge of the employers in relation to the work 
capacity, reliability and trust-worthiness of particular 
labourers plays a crucial role in labour hiring (Bardhan 
and Rudra, 1985). These affinities are often cemented by 
relationship of regular consumption credit, provision of 
rent-free land or homestead land and wage advances. In the 
absence of any developed market for credit and insurance 
these interlinked transactions act as an imperfect 
substitute and perpetuate the territorial segmentation of 
the labour market even in adjacent areas. Because, if the 
labourer wants to shift from the employer from whom he has 
taken a loan, he has to shift lock, stock and barrel which 
is not an easy job.
In this section we will analyse the loans linked with
labour, semi-attached labourer and farm servant 
etc,
arrangements /y observed in the three study villages.
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8.4.1 Loans Linked with Labour
Table 8.3 shows that in village Charapara landless 
labourers have taken loans of Rs.1850 against the promise 
of future labour in the lender's field. When a labourer 
repays loans in terms of labour he is paid a smaller wage 
than the prevailing market wage rate and thus implicit 
interest is charged. In Sandhagaon also a landless casual 
labourer has taken a loan of Rs.150 which he will repay in 
terms of labour.The landless class possess only their 
labour which they can pledge to get a loan.
8.4.2 Attached Labourer Arrangement
Attached labourers are found only in the irrigated 
villages. In the irrigated villages, as there is 
agricultural work throughout the year and availability of 
labour is an acute problem at peak periods the medium and 
large farmers prefer to make labour tying arrangements with 
the labourers by providing them land for cultivation or 
homestead land so that the labourer is compelled to work 
for the employer when< the employer needs his service. The 
labourer is paid wages for the days he works for the 
employer. Details regarding attached labourers are given in 
Table 8.4. The contract is usually agreed in the month of 
March and for one year which may be renewed after 
completion of the year. The land-owner provides some 
homestead land or land for cultivation to the labourer for 
the period of contract, for which the labourer becomes 
attached to the employer. If the contract is not renewed or
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violated then the landowner takes away the land. The 
attached labourer can cultivate his land only when his 
employer does not have enough work for him. The attached 
labourers are paid a wage rate less than the prevailing 
wage rate. As the table shows, the wage rate varies from 
case to case. The wage rate increases with years of 
employment. The attached labourer who has remained attached 
for the last thirty years is receiving a wage of Rs.10 per 
day and others get Rs. 8 or Rs. 9 per day, as against the 
prevailing wage rate of Rs.12 per day. The attached 
labourers reported an increase of Rs.1 over last year. In 
a year they work for the employer about 3 00 days. When the 
employer does not have enough work, the attached labourer 
has the freedom to work for other employers. In Charapara 
one attached labourer is paid in kind for 200 days. The 
cash equivalent of paddy that he gets as wage is Rs.8.50 
per day. Now-a-days the attached labourers prefer to be 
paid in cash as with ready cash they can buy rice from the 
market. If they take paddy they will have to prepare chaula 
(uncooked rice) from dhana (paddy) which is laborious. In 
Harinababi an MDF has kept an attached labourer and he is 
paid Rs.3 00 above his usual daily wage but is not provided 
with any land.
The attached labourers usually borrow from their 
employers at the time of their need either in cash or in 
kind and repay it in terms of labour at the usual wage rate 
in which they are paid. In the table it is shown that two 
attached labourers have borrowed Rs,2 00 and Rs.600 which
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they have repaid in terms of labour. One attached labourer 
takes an advance in kind from the employer which he repays 
in terms of labour.
All of the attached labourers were working as casual 
labourers before their present employment. All of them 
reported their other family members (like wife or father) 
working near the employer as casual labourers. The 
employment of attached labourer has decreased whereas the 
employment of farm servants or fully attached labourers is 
on the increase. That is because the resident labourers are 
no more interested in making labour tying arrangements as 
in irrigated agriculture work is available throughout the 
year. The arrangements regarding employment of farm 
servants are discussed below.
8.4.3 Farm Servant Arrangement
The landowner class sometimes interlink credit 
transactions with wage contracts to avert group 
assertiveness of the labourer class and to counterfoil 
their attempt at collective bargaining. As Bhalla's (197 6) 
study in Haryana reveals that the landowners employ some 
trust-worthy workers as permanently attached labourers who 
supervise the work of casual labourers and this arrangement 
works as a check on class solidarity. Thus workers who are 
willing to make required behaviourial adjustments are paid 
wages above their marginal products as tied rent or ability 
rent.
Findings regarding farm servant particulars are summarised
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in Table 8.5. In Charapara and Harinababi the medium and 
large farmer owner cultivators keep farm servants to get 
dependable labour supply at their beck and call. Usually 
the very large farmers keep an attached labourer, a farm 
servant and a cow boy to take the cattle to grazing and to 
bring them back to the cowshed. The table reveals that out 
of 9 farm servants 5 are from tribal areas and are 
scheduled tribes. All of these immigrants from tribal areas 
have owned land (non-irrigated) in their native place. But 
they have migrated to irrigated areas because farming in 
their native place is prone to drought and what they 
produce does not meet their consumption requirements. Wage 
employment, moreover, is not available. All of them have 
come from one district Keonjhar as the first immigrant 
gradually brings others of his friends and relatives to be 
employed in the village.
The contract is made for one year and in the case of 
immigrant tribals the period of contract is from January to 
January as in their area the year starts from a festival 
called 'Makara' which falls in the month of January. But 
the resident or adjacent village farm servants are employed 
from March to March when all agricultural operations for 
kharif start. The farm servants, except the residents, stay 
in the land-owner's house and their maintenance expenses 
are borne by the employer. They are paid salary which 
varies from Rs.1000 to Rs.1800 per annum. The farm servants 
who are associated with a single employer for many years 
are paid more in comparison to others and every year their
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salary increases by about Rs.100. They usually work for 10 
hours in a day in the field and in the house. Sometimes 
they supervise the work of the casual labourers. All the 
employers of farm servants have extra income other than 
cultivation which includes professional, salary, 
remittances and pension. The resident farm servants usually 
prior to the contract take cash advances whereas the 
tribals are paid after the completion of contract period. 
The farm servants are given clothing twice in a year on the 
main Oriya festivals Raja and Dasara.
In the case of non-irrigated village Sandhagaon even 
marginal farmers and landless tenants keep farm servants 
who are called as 'halia'(plough men). The contract is made 
from March to March and in most cases salary in Sandhagaon 
is fixed on a per month basis in contrast to the yearly 
basis found in the irrigated villages. As the landowners 
are salary holders they prefer to employ farm servants to 
till the land and to supervise the work of other casual 
labourers employed. In Sandhagaon 5 out of 6 farm servants 
are immigrants from jungle areas and four of them have 
owned land in their native places. They also cite the same 
reason as the farm servants of irrigated villages for their 
migration. But interestingly one of them reported that he 
had borrowed Rs.1000 from a private moneylender at 60 per 
cent interestyyin his own village to buy a young bullock and 
that is why he migrated to this village to earn enough to 
enable him to repay the loan. Thus exploitation in one 
village has its repercussion on another village and shapes
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production relations in the target village. This particular 
instance made us think that interlinked transactions may be 
observed in a particular place not because of poverty or an 
unequal exchange relationship exists there but because of 
poverty somewhere else. For example, in Punjab the 
employment of farm servants is on the increase and most of 
these farm servants are immigrants from backward and poor 
states like Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. There are agents 
with connections with the landed class in Punjab who 
regularly come to the drought prone villages in Orissa and 
advance loans to the family members of the labourer who is 
contracted for one year. In Punjab the labourers are given 
a fixed ration per week and no cash and they are compelled 
to work hard. We had occasion to hear woeful tales from a 
contract labourer who had fled from Punjab, although his 
family members were eager to send him again to Punjab to 
get the cash advance by which they can meet their 
subsistence requirements. Thus poverty in Orissa helps in 
the perpetuation of interlinked transactions in Punjab. 
Likewise in the irrigated villages the land owners go to 
the tribal areas in quest of farm servants and the ex­
resident farm servants have now become casual labourers. 
Also the landowners are no more interested to keep resident 
farm servants as they do not stay in the land-owner's 
house. As a result it becomes a problem to call them, if 
some urgent work is required. During our survey many large 
farmers were found to grumble that the resident farm 
servants sometimes do not come on the pretext of illness
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when they are actually doing other highly paid work in 
marriage ceremonies. We have already discussed how marginal 
farmers who were tenants and hiring out labour in Charapara 
and Harinababi have migrated to Calcutta and are employed 
there in unskilled manual work as gardeners, cleaners and 
watchmen in purely private companies. There they do not 
have any job security and even once the company did not pay 
them their full salary as the company incurred a loss. 
Therefore, the phenomenon of interlinkage is no more 
considered to be an intravillage phenomenon. With overall 
development and with the improvement in transport and 
communication facilities the mobility of the depressed 
class has of course increased but from one set of 
exploitation they enter into another set in a different 
place and thus interlinkage has crossed village boundaries. 
In a vast country like India there is large scope for 
migration and as long as unbalanced regional development 
and inequality are there interlinkage will remain.
8,4.4 Casual Labourers
In this section we will deal with the wage 
differential observed in the three villages, the previous 
occupation of the casual labourers and the position of the 
casual labourers in the village class hierarchy as to their 
bargaining power in wage negotiation and the like.
In Charapara wage per day for a male was Rs.12, 
whereas it was Rs.15 in Harinababi. The higher wage in 
Harinababi is due to the absence of a labourer class i.e.
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the scheduled castes in that village. But Harinababi is 
hardly at a distance of half kilometre from village 
Charapara. The scheduled castes of Charapara expressed 
their reluctance to work in Harinababi though the wage rate 
in Harinababi was significantly higher. The reason the 
labourers put forward was that they were not willing to 
break the long-run patron-client relationship with the 
landowner class in their own village for short-term 
uncertain gain. In Sandhagaon, the wage per day for a male 
was Rs.15 per day, because of its location amidst the 
industrial complexes as has already been discussed.
It is to be noted that in irrigated villages piece 
rate of wage payment was observed for transplanting paddy. 
Also, for harvesting paddy, black gram, green gram and 
groundnut, the wage payment was on share rate basis. In the 
case of paddy, if the labourer cuts 80 bundles, he takes 10 
bundles as his wage payment. In the case of green gram, 
black gram and groundnut, the wage payment is one iky th of 
the uprooted plants. By contrast, in the non-irrigated 
village Sandhagaon, only daily wage payment system was 
observed. But for harvesting of paddy, the labourer was 
provided with lunch as to fuel energy and to speed up the 
work.
In all the villages there was inmigration of labourers 
from nearby villages at the time of certain agricultural 
operations like transplanting, weeding and harvesting. They 
were paid daily wages. The cause for coming to these 
villages for work was unavailability of work in their
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native villages. No labourer in our study villages reported 
going to other villages for work.
Now we discuss the previous occupation of the casual 
labourers in our three study villages. In village Charapara 
out of the 8 landless casual labourers 1 was a farm 
servant, 2 were cow boys, 1 was an attached labourer, 1 was 
a pure tenant and the other three had remained casual 
labourers. All the pure tenants were previously casual 
labourers. And it is to be noted that two pure tenants and 
two casual labourer households are adopted son-in-laws as 
they are staying in their in-laws' house. In Sandhagaon all 
the landless casual labourers reported no change in their 
occupation excepting one who reported that because of a 
fractured leg he was retrenched, from his job (worker) in the 
Talcher colliery and henceforth he has become a casual 
labourer. All the pure tenants reported that they were 
previously casual labourers.
Regarding increase in wage, in Charapara the labourers 
reported an increase in wages over last year. For male 
workers the wage increased from Rs.10 per day to Rs.12 per 
day. And for females the wage increased from Rs.7 per day 
to Rs.8 per day. The casual labourers usually work in the 
field for 5 hours from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. per day. The 
labourers again reported that this increase was brought 
about by collective bargaining. In Charapara for the last 
four years the wage has risen by one or two rupees. In 
Sandhagaon the wage has remained the same Rs.15 per day for 
the last four years and before that it was Rs.12 per day.
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The wage increase had been brought about by collective 
bargaining. But all the labourers complained that though 
the government (state) has declared wage of Rs.25 per day 
for 8 hours labour, no land-owner is paying that. The 
present chief minister of Orissa in his socialistic 
enthusiasm in 1990 (year of our survey) increased the wage 
for unskilled worker from Rs.12 to Rs.25 per day. His 
slogan was that if you are not in a position to cultivate 
the land by paying the due wage to the labourers, leave it 
to the labourers to cultivate. The landowners' reaction was 
to assert that if the labourers demand the increased wage 
then they will simply leave the land uncultivated, because 
if they pay that much wage there is absolutely no profit as 
labour cost is the major component of operational cost. 
With the increase in wage as declared by government, 
sharecropping will definitely increase as self-cultivation 
will be less remunerative.
8.5 INTERLINKAGE BETWEEN CREDIT AND PRODUCE
In backward agriculture returns from cultivation are 
low and insufficient for internal financing. Lack of 
finance turns out to be the major hurdle for the cultivator 
in adopting a diversified cropping pattern and a modern 
package of practices. Institutional finance hardly meets 
the credit requirements of the farmers. As a result private 
trader lenders are emerging in the villages. Usually the 
trader cum moneylenders advance loans for the cultivation 
of cash crops like jute at the time of sowing or
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transplanting with the condition that just after harvest 
the cultivator will sell the crop to the lender at a 
predetermined price irrespective of the market price. 
Conditions vary with regard to interest payment.
In our investigation only one respondent, a small 
farmer owner tenant in village Harinababi, reported 
borrowing from the trader-moneylender. He had borrowed 
Rs.2 00 from the trader for two months. And after harvest he 
repaid the principal loan amount in terms of jute at the 
prevailing market price but towards interest he paid 2 kgs. 
jute for the principal amount of Rs.100. As the price of 
jute was Rs.380 per quintal, interest for Rs.100 was 
Rs.7.60 for two months. So the interest rate per annum was
45.6 per cent. But here the borrower is compelled to sell 
just after harvest when the price is very low. To that 
extent there is further implicit interest charged.
It is to be noted that 10 years back there were many 
trader cum moneylenders in these villages advancing loans 
for cultivation of jute. In 1982-1983 the price of jute 
increased abruptly to Rs.1000 per quintal as demand for 
jute increased due to floods in West Bengal. The farmers in 
response to this started cultivating jute the next year but 
the price decreased abruptly to Rs.500 per quintal. The 
price of jute is volatile in nature. Gradually there is 
decreasing demand for jute as the gunny bags are now being 
replaced by plastic and paper bags. Therefore in Charapara 
cultivators are not interested in cultivating jute. 
Moreover, almost all the cultivator households have some
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supplementary income like remittance income or salary 
income so that they no longer go to the trader moneylenders 
to borrow for cultivation purposes.
In Harinababi a tenant has borrowed Rs.400 from his 
lessor which he will repay in terms of paddy just after 
harvest at the prevailing market price. As the price of 
paddy is quite low at harvest time, it is again equivalent 
to charging of implicit interest rate.
8.6 CONCLUSION
It is observed that interlinked transactions are more 
prevalent in irrigated villages than the non-irrigated 
village. The tenants, attached labourers, farm servants and 
the casual labourers are subject to exploitation as the 
interest rate charged is found to be exorbitant, wages paid 
to the workers are low and the minimum wage declared by the 
government is not paid to the labourers. The labour tying 
arrangements are in total contrast to the free labour found 
in capitalist agriculture. The relationship between the 
employer and the employee is not a symbiotic relationship 
as Bardhan presumes. Rather it resembles a dominant and 
dependent relationship where the landowning class has an 
upper hand. Through different contrived ways the landowning 
class extract surplus from the poor peasants. Of course, 
the modality is different from that observed in feudalistic 
society characterised by extra-economic coercion. There is 
considerable variation in wages with regard to status of 
the farm servant (resident or immigrant) and also wages
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increase with period of association with the employer.
The mode of exploitation is always defined with 
respect to a stage of historical development of a society. 
Bhaduri's model of interlinkage between usury and tenancy 
is perfectly applicable to Orissa under British rule when 
a zamindari class with large landed estates spread over a 
number of villages dominated village society and were 
mainly a rentier class. The existing environment and 
colonial state policy were not congenial for self- 
cultivation by this group (Padhi, 1985) . Therefore, they 
tried to increase their hold over the peasants by combining 
usury with tenancy. In the changed circumstances of 
contemporary Orissa such explanations of agricultural 
stagnation are not tenable. No such class exists now. 
Implementation of Orissa Estates Abolition Act (1952), 
ceiling on land, sub-division of family holding due to law 
of inheritance, disintegration of the joint family system 
and pressure of growing population on limited land have 
combined to produce a levelling down in landholding size in 
Orissa. Accumulation of land in the hands of rich peasants 
or class polarisation is not at all visible.
To conclude, our study reveals that interlinkage 
clearly exists in the sample villages. But it is not to be 
considered as a dominant set of relationship as has been 
suggested by some Marxist writers. The role of migration in 
the persistence of interlinkage is significant and needs to 
be emphasised and incorporated in theoretical analysis of 
interlinkage.
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TABLE 8 .1
Linked Tenancy Contracts
Vi I lage\ SI. 
Category
No Borrowing 
from 
Lessor 
Rs.
Amount
Repaid
Rs.
Interest
Rate
per Year
Purpose
of
Borrowing
Mode of 
Repay­
ment
Years
with
Lessor
Lessor's
Income
Source
CHARAPARA
PT 1 1000 - 60% ceremonial labour 4 C&S
HARINABABI
OT 1 400 - - cultivation crop 5 C
SANDHAGAON
OT 1 50 50 » cu Itivation cash 10 S
PT 2 200 - 60% ceremoniaI labour 10 C&S
PT 3 300 • 60% consumption Labour 1 C&S
Notes: C - Cultivation, S - Salary
385
TABLE 8.2
Distribution of Private Loan as per Interest Charged 
According to Farmer Class
Vi ILage\ 
Category
Total
Private
Loan
Rs.
Explicit
Interest
Charged
Rs.
Interest
Rate
per
Annum
Implicit
Interest
Charged
Rs.
Zero
Interest
Charged
Rs.
CHARAPARA
MF 21,800 6,000 60% 800 15,000
SF 23,000 3,000 120% * 20,000
MDF 17,000 - - - 17,000
LF - - - - -
PT 1,400 1,000 60% - 400
LL 1,950 - - 1,850 100
Others 40 40 120%
Tota I 65,190 10,040 2,650 52,500
HARINABABI
MF 10,200 - - 200 10,000
SF 400 - - 400 -
MDF 700 700 60% - -
Total 11,300 700 600 10,000
SANDHAGAON
MF 3,000 - - - 3,000
SF - - - - -
MDF - - - - -
PT 12,300 1,300 60% - 11,000
LL 6,550 5,200 60% 150 1,200
Others 3,000 - - - 3,000
Total 24,850 6,500 - 150 18,200
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TABLE B .3
Distribution of Commercial Private Loan among Different Linked Transactions 
According to Farmer Class
Village\ Commercial Linked X of Linked Linked Linked Linked
Category Private Loan Total Wi th With With With
Loan Tenancy Labour Asset Produce
Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs.
CHARAPARA
MF 6,800 800 11.8 - - 800 -
SF 3,000 - - * - - -
MDF - - - - • - -
LF * - - * - - -
PT 1,000 1,000 100.0 1,000 - - -
LL 1,850 1,850 100.0 - 1.850 - -
Others 40 - - - - - -
Tota I 12,690 3,650 28.8 1,000 1,850 800 -
HARINABABI
MF 200 200 100.0 - - - 200
SF 400 400 100.0 400 - - -
MDF 700 - - - - - -
Total 1,300 600 46.2 400 - - 200
SANDHAGAON
MF * - - - - - -
SF - - - - * - -
MDF - - - - - - -
PT 1,300 1,300 - - - - -
LCL 5,350 1,650 - - 150 1,500 -
Others - • - - - - *
Total 6,650 2,950 - - 150 1,500 -
TABLE 8 .4
Attached Labourer Details: Irrigated Villages
SI.No. Caste Resident/ Wage Wage No. of Loan Amount Mode of No.of PreviousGiven by Employer Employer's
Adjacent Cash Kind Days From Repaid Payment Years Oocu..................  Ope.
Village Working Employer Rs. Emp- pation Land H.Land Holding
Rs./day Paddy per Year Rs. loyed acres acres acres
CHARAPARA
1 SC R 8 300 200 200 labour 1 CL 0.24 - 16.50
2 SC AV 10 *5Kgs. 300 **Advance - labour 30 CL 0.28 - 14.62
3 SC R 9 300 600 300 labour 2 CL - 0.28 11.52
HARINABABI
1 SC AV 9 300 - - 2 CL Rs.300 - 6.00
Notes: * Cash equivalent of paddy is Rs.8.50/day. he is paid in kind for about 200 days. 
**He takes advances in kind which he repays in terms of labour at the usual wage rate.
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TABLE 8 .5
Farm Servant Particulars
SI. No. Caste Owned Resident/ 
Land Adjacent 
NI
Acres Village
Immigrant from Salary/ Advance Years Previous 
Annum Taken Emp- Occu- 
loyed pat ion
(Rs.) Rs.
Employer Detai Is
0-50
Kms.
50-100
Kms.
+100
Kms.
Farmer
Category
Farmer 
C lass
Ope. 
Holding
Extra
Income
CHARAPARA
*1 SC - AV - - - 1,500 300 1 DS OC LF 17.50 PR
*2 SC - R - - - 660 - 1 - OC LF 17.50 PR
3 ST 5.00 - - - y 1,800 - 13 - OC LF 14.52 RM
4 ST 6.00 - - - y 1,000 - 1 AL OC MDF 6.84 P&RM
5 ST 3.50 - - - y 1,600 - 3 FS OC LF 16,50 SE&RM
6 SC - R - - - 1,800 350 1 FS OC LF 12.00 SE&RM
7 SC - R - - • 1,200 1,000 4 CL OC LF 12.00 S&RM
HARINABABI
1 ST 3.00 - - - y 1,400 - 2 FS OC MDF 5.00
2 ST 3.00 - - - y 1,200 - 1 FS OC MDF 5.50
SANDHAGAON
1 SC 2.00 - y - - 1,800 * sr _ 2 FS OC SF 4.00 S
2 sc 1.50 - - y - 1,920 - 3 CL OC SF 4.00 S
3 . sc 1.00 - y - - 1,600 - 1 CL PT - 2.00 P&tf
4 sc - - y - - 1,300 - 1 - TO MF 2.98 s&w
5 sc - R - - - 500 - 1 CL OC MDF 5.50 s
6 sc 2.00 * - y - 1,800 - 1 FS OT MF 3.00 -
Notes: *Both of them are working under one employer.
**They take loans at the time of their need 
which is being adjusted towards their salary.
S - service, P - pension, RM - remittance, SE - self-employment, PR - professional, W - wage 
DS - domestic servant
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this concluding chapter we attempt to summarise our 
major findings with regard to the causes of share tenancy, 
its efficiency implications and its dynamics. And a 
concluding remark is made with respect to the applicability 
of neoclassical and Marxist approaches to the tenancy 
question. Some policy measures are suggested for the 
improvement of tenants. Certain directions in which this 
study can be extended are outlined.
With regard to the causes of share tenancy our study 
based on primary data collected from three villages in 
Orissa reveals that the main cause of leasing-in as 
reported by the share tenants is 'lack of alternative 
employment opportunity' . The prime reason for leasing out 
as given by the lessors is 'no able adult male in the 
family to supervise'. Thus tenancy viewed from the
viewpoint of both lessees and lessors is a compulsive 
contractual choice arising from certain social
contingencies.
Regarding the efficiency implication of tenancy, our 
study provides no conclusive evidence that share tenancy is 
allocatively inefficient in a static setup. But in a
dynamic setup share tenancy definitely emerges as 
inefficient, since it discourages accumulation and 
investment and adversely affects human resource
development.
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In explaining backwardness tenancy does play a role as 
in our study we find that tenants do not undertake land 
improving measures. Rather they use more fertiliser which 
may degrade the land in the long run. But we do not have 
any evidence of agricultural surplus being diverted to 
usury as propounded by Bharadwaj(1985) or the landlord 
discouraging innovative measures as suggested by 
Bhaduri{1973).
Tenancy is found to be interlinked with the credit and 
the labour market. Our study reveals that interlinkage is 
more prevalent in the advanced villages in comparison to 
the non-irrigated village. In the advanced village labour 
attachment (attached labourers), input sharing in tenancy, 
seasonal tenancy, interlinkage between credit and produce, 
different crop sharing arrangement for different crops and 
patron-client relationships are observed. By contrast, in 
the non-irrigated village such features are absent. 
Moreover, in the irrigated village shortening of leases and 
eviction of tenants to extract surplus are on the increase. 
In the non-irrigated village mortgaging of land by land 
owners with the tenants for a cash advance is on the 
increase. In the irrigated villages tenancy is in a state 
of flux and changing continuously so that surplus can be 
appropriated by the landowning class.
Our analysis shows that the Marxist approach though 
more appropriate in explaining share tenancy than the 
neoclassical approach, it is not sufficient and needs to be 
supplemented by an overarching macro framework so that the
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persistence of tenancy and the emergence of interlinked 
deals can be adequately explained. In this respect we have 
emphasized the migration aspect which has not been given 
the attention that it deserves. The issue of migration 
provides a solution to some of the puzzling issues like 
persistence of interlinkage being consistent with the 
development of market forces.
We emphasise that the power relations do not remain 
constant and that with change in macro variables and other 
economic forces the power structure is itself changed. 
Thus, for example, the law of inheritance and 
disintegration of joint family system appear to have 
resulted in no large farmers having substantial surpluses, 
while due to improved transport and communication 
facilities the oppressed class has itself migrated, giving 
their place to another set of immigrants from remote tribal 
areas.
Tenancy and interlinkage can be better explained by 
the Marxist approach but enmeshed in a macro framework 
attempting to study the changing power relation with 
respect to changes in macro variables like overall 
population growth, the unemployment rate, the rate of 
industrialisation, unbalanced regional development and the 
other economic factors like migration caused by overall 
development. Historical antecedents and the role of the 
state should also be integrated to the analysis: although 
we have not been able to do so in this thesis.
Last but not the least ecology plays a major role in
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influencing the labour process and power relations. This 
has not been given adequate attention in the literature.
Our findings suggest that tenancy does play a useful 
role by providing employment to poor peasants who do not 
have any other alternative job opportunity. Therefore, 
tenancy should not be declared illegal. Rather the legal 
provisions regarding the terms and conditions of tenancy 
should be clearly spelt out. Tenants should be made aware 
of these legal provisions. Tenancy should be recorded and 
an official document should be signed by the parties to the 
contract. For effective implementation of tenancy 
legislation, the political will of the ruling class, the 
social commitment of the bureaucrats and organisation of 
tenants is required. The Government should encourage 
farmers' organisation like service cooperatives and 
irrigation water users' society. It is essential that the 
intended beneficiaries of all poverty alleviating 
programmes can have a forum to express their views. 
Moreover, all inputs like seed, fertiliser, credit and 
marketing facilities should be provided to the peasants in 
a package and through one window.
This study can be extended in three ways. Firstly, in 
the neoclassical model building exercise, the macro 
features of an economy like unemployment, population 
growth, unbalanced development, migration must be 
incorporated to provide a meaningful explanation of share 
tenancy. Secondly, in the Marxist framework, the
autonomous role of the class relations must not be
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overstressed. The impact of the above mentioned macro 
variables which effectively shape the enforcement device of 
the dominant class must be taken into consideration. 
Thirdly, we observe that the village boundary is gradually 
breaking down. Because, a number of lessors lease out to 
residents of adjacent villages. Likewise, tenants also 
lease in land from land owners of nearby villages. Also, 
sale and purchase of land are not restricted to be an intra 
village transaction. Therefore, in order to get sufficient 
number of observations which will allow to do parametric 
tests and to get some robust results, one must collect data 
from a cluster of villages having fairly similar socio­
economic characteristics and ecological conditions.
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APPENDIX - 1.1 
VILLAGE QUESTIONNAIRE
1) Name of the village
2) Tehsil
3) District
4) Canal/minor
5) Total population
6) No.of scheduled castes
7) No,of schedule tribes
8) No, of cultivators
9) No*of agricultural labourers
10) Literacy ratio
11) Distribution of population by educational standard
(a) Just literate
(b) Primary
(c) Secondary
(d) Above Secondary
12) Total land area (acre)
13) Cultivable area (acre)
14) Irrigated land area (acre)
15) Sources of Irrigation
(a) Canal
(b) Ground water
16) Period of availability of irrigation water
17) No,of pumpsets in the village
18) Farming implements and machinery
Items
422
(a) Tractors
(b) Harvesters
(c) Threshers
(d) Any other (specify)
19) Modal size of holding (acre)
20) Area under High Yielding Varieties:
Season/Crop Area
21) Area under application of chemical fertiliser:
Season/Crop Area
22) The year the village is electrified
23) Cropping pattern
Crop Acre
24)
(i)INFRASTRUCTURAL FACILITIES
SI.No. Facilities No. in the village Distance to 
nearest centre 
(if not 
available in 
the village) 
(Kms)
1 2 3 4
A. Educational Facilities
(i) Lower Primary School
(ii) Upper Primary School
(iii) M. E. School
(iv) High School
(v) Library/ .Club
(vi) College
{vii) Anganwadi
B. Health Facilities
\
(i) Primary Health Centre/dispensary
423
{ii) Veterinary Dispensary
(iii) Private Medical Practitioner
C. Marketing/storage facilities
(i) Daily Market
(ii) Weekly Market
(iii) Wholesale Market
(iv) Cold storage
(v) Warehouse/godown
(vi) Retail Input Centre
(a) Seed supply
(b) Fertiliser
(c) Pesticide
(vii) Marketing Co-operative Society
D. Processing Facilities
(i) Rice Mill
(ii) Rice huller
(iii) Cane crusher
(iv) Oil mill
E. Credit Facilities
(i) Primary Agricultural Co-operative Society
(ii) Commercial Bank
(iii) Regional Rural Bank
(iv) Land Development Bank
(v) Private moneylenders
(a) Landlord cum moneylender
(b) Professional moneylender
(c) Trader cum moneylender
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F. Coinmunication Facilities
(i) Post and Telegraph office
(ii) Branch post office
(iii) Public call office
G. Agricultural Extension Facilities
(i) Village agricultural worker
(ii) Agricultural Extension Officer
(iii) Agro-service centre
H. Reliability of power supply
24. (ii) Distance of the villages from nearest: (in Kms)
(a) Block Headquarters
(b) District Headquarters
(c) Main Road
(d) Railway Station
(e) Large road construction
(f) Main place for outside work
25. PRICE OF LAND
Land type Price/ Price/gunth price/acre 
local unit (.04 acre)
2 6. WAGE PAYMENT
(a) Operations/seasons Daily wage rate
c| £.pef\olx Atj
(b) Does wage vary^on sex?
Operations Male Female____ Child
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(c) Is Child labour observed in the village?
(d) Is there any change taking place in the wage payment
system? Which type of payment is on the increase?
(1) Piece rate
(2) Share rate
(3) Daily Wage
27. MIGRATION
(a) Are there labourers who come from outside the 
village during certain seasons?
(b) If yes, for what kind of operations and what 
seasons are they employed?
(c) Would there be any short supply of labour during 
peak seasons if there was no migration?
(d) Are the migrant labourers employed more on
1) Piece rate
2) Share basis
3) Daily wage
(e) Are the migrant labourers paid less than the 
labourers belonging to the same village?
(f) What is the ratio of female migrant labourers to 
male migrant labourers?
(g) Do they come regularly?
(h) Do they come regularly for the same operation or
different operations?
(i) How do they come? On their own initiative or 
through local agent ?
(j) Do such outside labourers- belong to certain 
particular castes or tribes?
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(k) If so specify.
(1) Do they migrate from a particular place?
(m) If yes, What are the reasons behind their 
migration?
(n) Are most of the farm servants immigrant labourers?
(o) Do labourers migrate from this village?
28. TENANCY
(a) Is there any tendency in the village for increase o|§ 
tenancy?
(b) What are the reasons for increase or decrease in 
tenancy?
(c) Is there any tendency for eviction of tenants?
(d) Is there any tendency for increase in fixed cash or
fixed kind or crop share rent? For which
crops/variety?
(e) Is there any tendency for increase of employment of
casual labourer under own supervision?
(f) Is there any tendency for employment of farm 
servants to increase?
2 9. BORROWING
(a) Is institutional finance on the increase in the 
village?
(b) Do the villagers prefer to borrow from private 
moneylenders?
(c) Majority of private moneylenders come under which 
category?
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1) Landlord cum moneylender
2) Trader cum moneylender
3) Professional moneylender
4) Relatives and friends
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HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Identification
(a) Sl-No*
(b) Name (Head of the house"hold)
(c) Village
(d) Caste (specify)
1. Scheduled caste
2. Schedule tribe
3. General
{e) Age
(f) Education
(g) No-of years in agriculture
2. FAMILY PARTICULARS
SI. No. Items Adults Children
Male Female Male Female
1.Members
2. Occupation
(a) Cultivation
(b) Wage
(c) Business/Trade
(d) Service
(e) Any other (specify)
3. Education
(a) Illiterate
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(b) Primary
(c) M.E
(d) High School
(e) Higher Education
(f) Technical education/ Vocal education
3. LAND HOLDING PATTERN
Land Owned Leased in No. of Leased
Lessors out
Irrigated -------------------------------
Non-irrigated No. of Mortgage Operational
Lessees Holding
4. A.If any usufructuary mortgage, give details as to
(a) Moneylender's main profession
(b) Purpose of taking the loan
(c) Terms and conditions
(d) Reasons for borrowing from that 
particular moneylender
B. (i) If any leased-out land, state causes of 
leasing out land (in order of importance)
(a) Scarcity of labour
(b) Difficult to supervise labour
(c) does not possess bullock or difficult to 
get bullock
(d) No sufficient man-power in the family
(e) Lack of finance to self-cultivate
(f) Lack of experience in cultivation
(g) Problematic land
(h) Distant land
(i) Cultivation is risky
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(j) Living outside the village
(k) Caste restriction
(1) If any other (specify)
(ii) If non-resident lessor, what are the reasons 
for not selling the land
(a) Appreciation in land value
(b) Desire to retain ancestral land
(c) Difficulty in selling land (specify)
(d) Other difficulties (specify)
(iii) What type of tenants does a lessor prefer
(a) Efficient cultivators
(b) Honest in rent payment
(c) Who owns bullocks
(d) Who has large family size
(e) Who has sufficient able-bodied adult male
members
(iv) What type of cultivator does a lessor prefer? 
Who has
(a) No land
(b) Less than 2.5 acres
(c) 2.5 - 5.0 acres
(d) 5.0 - 10.0 acres
C. If leased-in land, go to the tenancy questionnaire.
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5. ASSET POSITION
Items No. Value (Rs.)
(a) Owned land (acre)
(b) Homestead land (acre)
(c) Houses
(d) Cattleshed
(e) Other structures
(f) Cattle owned
(g) Farm implements
(1) Plough
(2) Bullock carts
(3) Others (specify)
(h) Financial assets
(1) Savings
(2) Outstanding dues
(3) Outstanding loans
(4) Total (1) + (2) - (3)
(i) Consumer durables 
(j) Gold/silver ornament
Total Asset Position
6. CROPPING PATTERN AND COST OF CULTIVATION
Season Crop HYV\Local Area Seed Labour Cost
Cultivated Kgs. Rs- owned Hired 
(acre) No. No.
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Bullock labour cost Chemical\F.Y.M. Pesticides
Owned Hired Servants Fertiliser Qtls Rs Kgs' Rs
Irrigation tax Others Total cost Output By-product 
Rs. Rs. Rs. Qtls’Rs. kgs Rs
Total output
7. SALE OF OUTPUT
Crop/ Quantity Value To whom Where When Contract
by-product sold Rs sold sold sold if any
To whom sold Where sold When sold
(a) Retailer (a) Market (a) How many months
(b) Wholesaler (b) Field after harvest
(c) Trader (c) Home
8. SALE OF ASSET
Items Sale price When Cause To Whom 
(Rs.) sold of sale sold
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9. CREDIT AND INDEBTEDNESS
Purpose Items Agency Amount Purpose of Interest
borrowed borrowing rate
Security offered When borrowed
Cash Loans
No of instalments Amount Mode of repayment 
Grain Loans -----------------------------------------
10. Do you face difficulties in getting loan? Yes/No
11. If Yes, give details in order of importance?
(a)  (b)   (c) -----
12. OUTSTANDING LOAN AT THE OUTSET OF 1989-90
Amount Amount Agency When Purpose Reasons for
outstanding borrowed borrowed not repaying
13. SOURCEWISE HOUSEHOLD INCOME
SI. No. Source No of members Monthly Annual
(1) Cultivation
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(2) Dairy
(3) Poultry
(4) Piggery
(5) Fishery
(6) Trading and business
(7) Cottage industry
(8) Services
(9) Wages
(10) Rent and interest
(11) Remittances
(12) Other income (specify)
TOTAL INCOME
14. EXPENDITURE PATTERN (ANNUAL)
SI. No. Items Amount (Rs.)
1) Subsistence consumption expenditure
2) Farm expenses
3) Investment in agriculture
(a) Purchase of land
(b) Reclamation of land
(c) Construction of farm houses
(d) Development of irrigation
(e) Purchase of implements and machinery
(f) Others (specify)
4, Family expenditure
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(a) Consumer durables
(b) Marriage
(c) Other ceremonies
(d) Education
(e) Medical expenses
(f) Clothings
(g) Others (specify)
TOTAL EXPENDITURE
15. SAVINGS (1989-90) (Rs.)
(a) Addition to deposits
(b) Purchase of shares in co-operative banks
(c) Purchase of savings certificates
(d) Others (specify)
TOTAL
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TENANCY QUESTIONNAIRE
1. LEASING PARTICULARS
SI. No. Land 
IR
leased in 
NIR
Description of Duration of 
lessor contract
2 3 4 5
Written or 
oral
Terms of 
contract
Sharing of Input Borrowing from 
by-product sharing land-owner
6 7 8 9 10
purpose of 
borrowing
Interest
rate
11 12
Description of lessor
(a) Absence of landlord
(b) Owner cultivator
(c) Non cultivator (specify major source of income)
(d) Small farmer having unviable size of holding
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Terms of contract (specify the amount)
(a) Crop share
(b) Fixed kind
(c) Fixed cash
2. What are the causes of leasing in the land (in order 
of importance)
(a) To make the land holding viable
(b) No alternative job opportunity
(c) To consolidate holding in a compact block.
(d) To undertake commercial farming in a large scale
(e) Resource adjustment, bullock/manpower
(f) If any other specify
3. (a) Can terms of contract be changed in the middle of lie 
season for the year? Yes/No
(b) Do such changes take place commonly? Yes/No
(c) Can tenant be evicted in the middle of the 
season/year for which he has leased in land?
Yes/No
4. (a) Who takes decision regarding crops to be grown?
Owner/tenant/jointly
(b) Who takes decision what and how much of fertiliser, 
seed etc. to be used? Owner/tenant/jointly
(c) Are certain investments on land carried out by 
tenants? If yes, who takes decision?
Owner/tenant/jointly 
Give particulars of such investments.
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(d) Are certain investments on land carried out on a 
share basis by owner and tenant? If yes, who takes tie 
decision? Owner/tenant/jointly
5. (a) Is harvesting supervised by the owner or on behalf
of the owner? Who actually does the supervision?
(b) Where does the sharing of crops take place?
Tenant's house/owner's house/public place
6. Does he do any unpaid or underpaid work for the owner? 
Give particulars?
7. (a) Is there any tendency in the village of eviction of
tenants? Yes/No
(b) What are the causes of eviction of tenants? (in order 
of importance)
(i) Resumption of land for self-eviction
(ii) Dissatisfied with the tenants yield
(iii) In fear of tenancy legislation
(iv) To lease out to another tenant at increased iat 
(iv) Asked for advanced rent payment i.e mortgaging
of land
(vi) Distribution of joint land
(vii) Family conflict
(viii) If any other, specify
(c) Is there any tendency in the village to shorten 
the leases? Yes/No
(d) If yes, what are the motives behind it (in order of 
importance)
(i) To resume land for self-cultivation
(ii) To enforce efficiency
439
(iii) To avoid land legislation
(iv) To lease out to another tenant at 
increased rent
(iv) If any other (specify)
8.(a) Is there any tendency in the village of tenancy 
being changed to self cultivation with the help of 
hired labours? Yes/No
(b) If yes, what are the reasons according to the 
tenant?
9.(a) Is there any tendency in the village of the terms 
and conditions of tenancy undergoing any change?
(b) If yes, describe what kind of changes?
(c) What are the reasons for such changes according to 
the tenant?
10. What kind of adjustments between the owner and 
tenant take place in the wake of crop failure on the 
leased in land because of bad weather or certain 
uncertain factors?
11. Does owner stipulate any minimum level of output on 
the tenanted land? Yes/No
12. What kind of tenants do landowners prefer?
(a) Tenants with large family size
(b) Tenants with large size of holding
(c) Tenants with bullock power
(d) Tenants with managerial ability
(e) If any other (specify)
13. Which land i.e fertile or problem land or land at 
distance places, the landowner prefers to lease out?
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14.(a) Since when is the respondent a tenant?
(b) How long has the tenant been with the same owner?
(c) Does any member of the tenant's family work as farm 
servant or casual labourer? If so does any of them 
work for the tenant's landlord?
(d) Does the tenant sell any crop to the landowner?
(e) If yes, whether the price is lower than the 
prevailing market rate?
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SEMI ATTACHED AND CASUAL LABOURERS
BACKGROUND
1. Name
Type of respondent a) Semi-attached
b) Casual labourer
2. Since when is the respondent in his present 
occupation?
3. Was he ever before
(a) a tenant
(b) a farm servant
(c) any other kind of labourer
(d) in any other occupation
4. If he was a tenant, was he evicted by the landlord?
If yes,
a) When was he evicted?
b) Does he now work as a labourer for the 
landlord of whom he was a tenant
5. (a) Do some other members of his family work for the sate 
employer as attached or semi-attached labourer?
(b) If yes, what kind of work do they do?
6. did he own any land before which he lost for loan 
repayment? Yes/No
7.(a) If he was a farm servant before, did he change his 
occupation to the present one voluntarily or was he
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forced to do so? Yes/no 
(Applicable only for casual labourers)
(b) If forced to change, for what reasons?
(c) If changed voluntarily, for what reasons?
ATTACHMENT CONDITIONS
1. (a) Is the respondent attached to a single employer?
Yes/No
(b) Has he got the freedom to work for other 
employers?
Yes/No
2. If he is attached to a single employer, since how 
long?
3. What is the basis of attachment?
(a) The labourer has been attached to employer's family in
master servant relation over long time
(i) because of an ancient hereditary debt
(ii) because of a loan taken some years back
(iii) without such debt
(b) The labourer habitually takes consumption loans from 
the employer time to time
(c) The labourer has received some pieces of land on
allotment basis from the landlord
(d) The labourer has long standing family relation with 
the employer
(e) personal liking for the employer
4. In case of (a), (i) or (ii) mention
(i) amount of the outstanding debt
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(ii) age of the debt
(iii) form (cash, kind or labour) in which 
repayment has to be made or is being made
(iv) the kind of interest that has to be made
5. What are the obligations of the labourer towards the 
employer?
6. (a) If the remuneration received by the labourer from
the employer is different from ' normal, i wage 
specify the difference?
(b) If the labourer receives daily wage or meals or
tiffins, does he get them every day or only on days h 
works for the employer?
7. For how many employers has the labourer worked during 
the current crop season?
8.(a) Did he get consumption loan from any of these 
employers?
(b) If so, give details
{i) amount borrowed
(ii) interest rate charged
(iii) from how many employers 
WAGE BARGAINING
1. Are the wages received by the respondent this year the 
same as those received by him last year? If no, how 
has the change come about?
(a) owner himself has increasetithe wage
(b) there was collective bargaining
(c) there was some agitation
2. Did the respondent participate in the process of
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bargaining or agitation?
3. If he did not what were the reasons? Was it on the 
account of the way he is dependent on his employer?
4. Has there been any time when for the same operation 
different employers offered different wage rates? Give 
details
(a) which month
(b) which operation
(c) which kind of employer pays more
(d) for what reasons
5. Does the respondent know about the minimum wage rate 
declared by the government?
6. In the lean season when there is not much agricultural 
work, does he go out for non-agricultural work? Give 
details.
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FARM SERVANT QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Name 
2 . Caste
3. Is he a
(a) resident of the village
(b) immigrant from the distant village
(c) immigrant from tribal areas
4. If he is an immigrant, why did he leave his native
place?
5. How could he come to know of the employment
opportunity available in this particular village?
6. Since how long the respondent is a farm servant for 
the present employee?
7. Give details regarding terms of contract:
(a) Period of contract from to
(b) Amount of wage cash kind
(c) Periodicity of wage payment
(i) wage advance
(ii) at the end of the contract period
(iii) at the time of need
(d) Other perquisites given by the employer
(e) Is the farm servant satisfied with the meal given by 
the master?
(f) For how many hours does the farm servant work in a 
day?
(i) in the field
(ii) at home
8. On what basis does the employer renew the contract?
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9. If the farm servant is associated with the employer
for long, does he gain from it?
10. Can he work for any other employer when his own 
employer doe not have enough work for him?
11. Does he supervise the work of other casual and semi­
attached labourers?
12. (a) Does he take consumption loan from the employer?
(b) Is it cheaper to take loan from him than any
other outside sources?
13. Has he worked as a casual labourer in the last two 
years?
14. If yes, state reasons for becoming a farm servant?
15. Was he ever before
(a) a tenant
(b) semi-attached labourer
(c) casual labourer
(d) in other occupation
16. If he was a tenant, was he evicted by the landlord?
17. If yes,
(a) when was he evicted
(b) on what grounds
(c) does he work as a farm servant
for the landlord of whom he was tenant
18. Do some other members of his family work for the 
same as attached or semi-attached labourer?
19. Did he own any land before, which he lost for loan 
repayment?
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20.
a)
(b)
(c) 
20 .
21 .
(a)
(b)
(c)
WAGE BARGAINING
Are the wages received by the respondent this year 
the same as those received by him last year? If No, 
how has the change come about?
(i) owner himself has increased the wages
(ii) there was collective bargaining
(iii) there was some agitation
Did the respondent participate in the process of 
bargaining or agitation?
If he did not, what were the reasons? Was it on 
account of the way he is dependent on his employer?
Is the respondent a farm servant because of any 
previous loan to be borrowed against promise of 
future labour?
PARTICULARS ABOUT THE EMPLOYER 
Principal occupation of the employer 
Subsidiary occupation of the employer
(i) renting out land
(ii) trading
(iii) moneylending
Is the employer a progressive farmer? Does he use
(i) H.Y.V. seed
(ii) chemical fertiliser
(iii) small machineries
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APPENDIX 3 .1
Foodgrains Production, 1865-66 to 1980-81
(Lakh tonnes)
Abnormal Years Normal Years
Year Factor Production Year Production
1965-66 Severe drought 36.9 1970-71 51.0
1966-67 Drought 42.3 1973-74 52.7
1967-68 F loods and Cyclone 41.4 1975-76 55.7
1968-69 Mi Id flood 47.2 1977-78 55.6
1969-70 Mi Id f lood 47.3 1978-79 57.7
1971-72 Severe cyclone and flood 43.5 1980-81 59.8
1972-73 Drought and flood 48.6
19^4-75 severe drought and flood 39.7
1976-77 Severe drought 40.8
1979-80 Severe drought 38.7
Source: Collected from Agricultural Productivity in Eastern 
India, Vol.II, R.B.I, Bombay, 1984 (p.32).
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A p p e n d ix  4 .1
Infrastructural Facilities Available in the Study Villages
CHARAPARA AND HARINABABI SANDHAGAON
Faci Lities No. in the 
Vi I lage 
{if Available)
Distance to 
Nearest Centre 
(if not avai lable 
in the Vi I lage) 
Kms
No. in the 
Vi I lage 
(if Avai lable)
Distance to 
Nearest Centre 
(if not available 
i n the Vi I lage) 
Kms
(A) EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES
Lower Primary School 1 - 1 -
Upper Primary School 1 - 1 -
M.E. School 1 - - 3
High School 1.5 - 2
Library/Club 1 - - 6
Col lege 1.5 - 6
(B) HEALTH FACILITIES
Primary Health Centre - 1.5 - 6
Veterinary Dispensary - 1.5 - 6
Pvt. Medical Practitioner - 1.5 - 6
(C) MARKETING/STORAGE
FACILITIES
Dai ly Market 1.5 6
Weekly Market 1.5 - 6
Wholesale Market 12 - 6
Cold Storage 12 - 45
Warehouse/godown 12 - 22
RetaiI Input Centre
Seed supply _ 1.5 6
Ferti liser - 1.5 - 6
Pesticide - 1.5 - 6
Marketing Co-op. Society - 1.5 -
(D) PROCESSING FACILITIES
Rice Mi 11 - 0.5 - 1
Rice Huller - 0.5 - 2
Oi I Mi 11 - 12 - 22
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A p p e n d ix  4 .1
Infrastructural Facilities Available in the Study Villages
CHARAPARA AND HARINABABI SANDHAGAON
Facilities No. in the Distance to No. in the Distance to
Vi I lage Nearest Centre Vi Ilage Nearest Centre
(if Avai lable) (if not available (if Avai lable) (i f not avai lab le
in the Vi I lage) in the Vi I lage)
Kms Kms
(E) BANKING FACILITIES
Primary Agrl. Co-op. Society - 1.5 - 5
Commercial Bank - 12 - 6
Regional Rural Bank - 1.5 - 6
Land Development Bank - 12 - 6
(F) COMMUNICATION FACILITIES
Post & Telegraph Office - 1.5 - 6
Branch Post Office - 1.5 - 6
Public Call Office - 1.5 - 6
(G) AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION 
FACILITIES
Village Agricultural Worker 1 .5 6
Agricultural Extension Officer - 1 .5 - 6
Agro Service Centre • 12 * 6
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DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
Variables Definition
ADULTM
BULL
BULLV
BULLVW
CASTE
CEXPHEAD
COSTGA
CROPIN
DEBTBURD
DEFAULTR
DEPEND
INDEBT
IORATIO
LABOR
LABORGA
LDEBTBUR
LTINCOME
MIGR
MIGRRA
MIGRRAT
NALI
NALIW
NONWORK
OLANDRA
OLANDRAT
OLANDT
OLANDTW
OPHOLDT
PROFITGA
PROFITNA
TASSETV
TOTALBOR
TOTALCEX
TOTALIN
TOTALME
YIELDGAV
YIELDNAV
Number of adult active male members in a household 
Number of bullocks possessed by a household 
Value of bullocks possessed by a household (in Rs.) 
Value of bullocks owned per worker (in Rs. )
Caste=l if Scheduled Caste 
Caste=0 otherwise
Experience in cultivation (in number of years) 
Operational cost per acre (in Rs./acre)
Cropping intensity i.e. ratio of gross 
cropped area to net sown area 
TOTALBOR/TOTALIN 
INDEBT/TOTALBOR
Ratio of non-workers to workers in a household 
TOTALBOR-REPAID i.e. extent of indebtedness 
Input output ratio i.e. the ratio of profit 
to total cost
Labor=l if any member of the household does manual work
Labor=Q if no member does manual work
Man days of labour per acre
Logarithm of debt burden with base 10
Logarithm of total income with base 10
Number of members emigrated from a household
MIGR/(MIGR+ADULTM) i.e. ratio of adult members migrated
MIGR/(MIGR+TOTALME)i.e. ratio of total members migrated
Net area leased in i.e. area leased in minus area
leased out
Net area leased in per worker 
Number of non-workers in a household 
OLANDT/(MIGR+ADULTM)
OLANDT/(MIGR+TOTALME)
Land area owned by the household (in acres)
Owned land per worker in a household (in acres) 
Operational holding (in acres)
profit per acre of gross cropped area (in Rs./acre) 
Profit per acre of net sown area (in Rs./acre)
Value of total household asset (in Rupees)
Amount borrowed (in Rs.)
Total annual household consumption expenditure (in Rs.) 
Total annual household income (in Rs. )
Total members in a household
Value of yield per acre of gross cropped area 
(in Rs./acre)
Value of yield per acre of net sown area 
(in Rs./acre)
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